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Socrate, tout en réprouvant l'abus que les Sophistes faisaient du droit de douter,
était pourtant de leur école. Comme eux, il repoussait l'empire de la tradition, et croyait
que les règles de la conduite étaient gravées dans la conscience humaine. Il ne différait
d'eux qu'en ce qu'il étudiait cette conscience religieusement et avec le ferme désir d'y
trouver l'onligation d'être juste et de faire le bien. Il mettait la vérité au-dessus de la
coutume, la justice au-dessus de la loi. Il dégageait la morale de la religion ; avant lui,
on ne concevait le devoir que comme un arrêt des anciens dieux; il montra que le
principe du devoir est dans l'âme de l'homme. En tout cela, qu'il le voulût ou non, il
faisait la guerre aux cultes de la cité. En vain prenait-il soin d'assister à toutes les fêtes et
de prendre part aux sacrifices; ses croyances et ses paroles démentaient sa conduite. Il
fondait une religion nouvelle, qui était le contraire de la religion de la cité. On l'accusa
avec vérité « de ne pas adorer les dieux que l'État adorait ». On le fit périr pour avoir
attaqué les coutumes et les croyances des ancêtres, ou, comme on disait, pour avoir
corrompu la génération présente. L'impopularité de Socrate et les violentes colères de
ses concitoyens s'expliquent, si l'on songe aux habitudes religieuses de cette société
athénienne, où il y avait tant de prêtres, et où ils étaient si puissants. Mais la révolution
que les Sophistes avaient commencée, et que Socrate avait reprise avec plus de mesure,
ne fut pas arrêtée par la mort d'un vieillard. La société grecque s'affranchit de jour en
jour davantage de l'empire des vieilles croyances et des vieilles institutions.
--Fustel de Coulanges, La Cité Antique V.1
Hoc tamen solo delectabar in illa exhortatione, quod non illam aut illam sectam, sed
ipsam quaecumque esset sapientiam ut diligerem et quaererem et assequerer et tenerem
atque amplexarem fortiter.
--Augustinus, Confessionum III 4.8

PREFACE
SHAFTESBURY, PHILOSOPHY, AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE
While contemporary scholars disagree about the extent to which Locke was a
sincere Christian,1 his former pupil Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of
Shaftesbury, seems to have considered him one. Shaftesbury's papers contain an odd
letter addressed "to a friend" describing his reaction to Locke's sentiments about dying.2
His reaction, it must be said, is scornful.
Shortly before his death in October of 1704, John Locke writes a letter to be
delivered to his friend Anthony Collins upon his decease. Locke writes,
may you live long and happy in the enjoyment of health, freedom, content, and all
those blessings which providence has bestowed on you, and your virtue entitles
you to. I know you loved me living, and will preserve my memory now I am
dead. All the use to be made of it is, that this life is a scene of vanity, that soon
passes away; and affords no solid satisfaction, but in the consciousness of doing
well, and in the hopes of another life. This is what I can say upon experience; and

1

John Dunn, for example, argues that Locke was religious theorist, while Richard Ashcraft presents him as
Nonconformist. John Marshall thinks Locke was tempted toward Unitarianism. John Dunn, The Political
Thought of John Locke : An Historical Account of the Argument of the 'Two Treatises of Government', 1st
paperback ed. (Cambridge [Eng.]: Cambridge University Press, 1982). Richard Ashcraft, Revolutionary
Politics & Locke's Two Treatises of Government (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986). John
Marshall, John Locke : Resistance, Religion, and Responsibility, Cambridge Studies in Early Modern
British History. (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Michael Zuckert, on the
other hand, denies that Locke was a believer at all. Michael P. Zuckert, Launching Liberalism : On
Lockean Political Philosophy (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2002).
2

Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury, The Life, Unpublished Letters, and Philosophical Regimen of
Anthony, Earl of Shaftesbury, ed. Benjamin Rand (London, New York: S. Sonnenschein & Company, The
Macmillan Company, 1900), 344-47.
vii

what you will find to be true, when you come to make up the account. Adieu; I
leave my best wishes with you.3
It is difficult to know what to make of a parting letter. Locke speaks of the
transience of this life and the hopes of a life to come. Perhaps he intends to console his
friend; perhaps he consoles himself. Shaftesbury himself finds no consolation in Locke's
account of beatitude. He writes,
the piece of a letter you sent me savours of the good and Christian. It puts me in
mind of one of those dying speeches which come out under the title of a Christian
warning piece. I should never have guessed it to have been of a dying
philosopher. Consciousness is, indeed, a high term, but those who can be
conscious of doing no good, but what they are frighted or bribed into, can make
but a sorry account of it, as I imagine. Now it being my turn to say something in a
dying way (for so, indeed, I am looked upon), I take upon me to send you, as my
disciple, this counter charge.4
Shaftesbury's letter contrasts the life of the Christian with the life of the
philosopher. "Consciousness," is indeed something to be sought, although he has a
different understanding of it than does Locke; it is more common to find Shaftesbury
speaking of self-knowledge. The remark about consciousness intimates Shaftesbury's own
understanding of philosophy. For Shaftesbury, Socrates is the model of excellence, and
for Socrates, knowledge is virtue.
Shaftesbury's counter-charge takes Locke point by point. Shaftesbury extends his
good wishes but denies he is offering a compliment.

Instead he offers the simple

acknowledgement of virtue owed to a noble friend: "the use I would have you make of it

3

August 23, 1704. "For Anthony Collins, Esq." John Locke, The Correspondence of John Locke, 8 vols.,
The Clarendon Edition of the Works of John Locke (Oxford [Eng.]: Clarendon Press, 1989), 418-19.
4

Shaftesbury, Philosophical Regimen, 345.
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is, that our life, thank heaven, has been a scene of friendship of long duration, with much
and solid satisfaction, founded on the consciousness of doing good for the sake of the
good, without any farther regards, nothing being truly pleasing or satisfactory but what is
thus acted disinterestedly, generously, and freely." Such a legacy is its own reward,
"leaving no terrible account to be made up, nor terrible idea of those who are to account
with." For Shaftesbury, belief in an afterlife is a serious impediment to the practice of
genuine virtue. According to Shaftesbury, genuine virtue is pursued for its own sake; it is
never the result of fear of punishment or the hope for reward. Shaftesbury is not overly
attached to life but not, apparently, because he thinks it is tragic:
life is vain ('tis true) to those that make it so. And let those cry vanity, for they
have reason. For my own part, who never could be in love with riches or the
world, nor ever made any great matter of life, so as to love it for its own sake, I
have therefore no falling out with it, now at last when I can no longer keep it; so
without calling names or giving hard words, I can part freely with and give it a
good testimony.5
He ridicules the notion that practicing virtue is miserable without an afterlife.
"Hard, hard duties, if nothing be to follow! Sad conditions at the best, but such as must be
complied with for fear of what is worse." Shaftesbury is disappointed that such a view
might be attributed to a "dying philosopher" and can only think that Philosophy herself has
been slandered:
O Philosophy! Philosophy!ŕI have heard, indeed, of other philosophy heretofore,
but the philosophers of our days are hugely given to wealth and bugbears; and
philosophy seems at present to be the study of making virtue burdensome and
death uneasy. Much good may do those improvers of misery and diminishers of

5

Ibid., 346.
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all that is good in life. I am contented that they should cry, Vanity! For our part,
let us, on the contrary, make the most of life and least of death.6
Shaftesbury ends with a confession of sorts. He is unable, it seems, to hold a view
contrary to his understanding of virtue:
This is my best advice; and what I leave with you, as that which I have lived and
shall die by. Let every one answer for their own experience, and speak of
happiness and good as they find it. Thank heaven I can do good and find heaven
in it. I know nothing else that is heavenly. And if this disposition fits me not for
heaven, I desire never to be fitted for it, nor come into the place. I ask no reward
from heaven for that which is reward itself. Let my being be continued or
discontinued, as in the main is best. The author of it best knows, and I trust Him
with it. To me it is indifferent, and always shall be so.7

Shaftesbury's letter to a friend strikes me as more of a personal meditation on the
nature of happiness than the words of a philosopher to a disciple. I believe that this brief
piece reveals much about the worldview of Shaftesbury.

In it we encounter in the

strongest language his dismissal of an afterlife and his contempt for Christianity; his
fondness for ridicule and soaring rhetoric; his emphasis on virtue and praise of friendship;
and his rejection of modern philosophy as debasing (and with modern philosophy, his
former tutor, John Locke). Also present, however subtly, is Shaftesbury's understanding
of true philosophy. Just what that understand is I hope to make clear through a careful
reading of his great work, Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, etc.8

6

Ibid., 344-45.

7

Ibid., 347.

8

Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury, Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, 1732 ed., 3
vols. (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001).

x

The project was undertaken in the belief that Shaftesbury's Characteristicks had
yet to be studied adequately. I mean by this that no scholar had yet to read Shaftesbury as
he himself recommends. While I hold sympathetic reading to be a sound principle of
hermeneutics, at least on first encountering a text, it seems especially wise in the case of
Shaftesbury. One must attend to the manner of presentation in the Characteristicks
because presentation is itself a major theme of the work. The book is not concerned with
presentation as an end in itself, however. Shaftesbury's mode of writing is in the service
of an ambitious philosophical project.

Shaftesbury moves beyond the political

circumstances of his day to address more fundamental questions. He leads us from the
question of the relationship between religion and politics to questions of psychology and
moral anthropology, and ultimately to the question what is man? Such questions were of
course au currant among the thinkers of his age; Shaftesbury stands out, however, as an
early dissenter from the general Enlightenment project as it came to be understood in the
eighteenth century.

In brief, my claim is that scholars have failed to understand

Shaftesbury as he understood himself, that is, as a classical political philosopher in the
Socratic tradition. A defense of this claim, I hope, is sustained in the following chapters.
This work makes the following arguments. Shaftesbury's Characteristicks marks
an important dissent from the general trend of early modern philosophy. The book
undertakes nothing less than the restoration of the classical understanding of philosophy in
contradistinction to the understanding presented by the writings of Descartes, Hobbes,
Locke, and other modern thinkers.

Shaftesbury's primary concern seems to be the
xi

preservation of the distinctly human things as understood by the ancients. This concern is
behind his defense of the noble or the beautiful, which can be seen most conspicuously in
his account of moral virtue and perhaps more subtly in his account of art and in his
cosmological hymns to nature.

In pursuit of this end, Shaftesbury reintroduces the

classical notion of the soul by reasserting the distinction between reason and the passions,
which had been challenged by the moral theories of Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke.
Essential to his project is a critique of Christianity. Shaftesbury shares the critique
of Christianity offered by Hobbes and Locke but he departs their company by his
response. As Shaftesbury presents the matter, modern philosophy had declared war on
Christianity in the name of humanity, which it believed had been degraded morally,
politically, and philosophically by the reign of Christendom. According to Shaftesbury,
modern philosophy introduces a sweeping method of radical skepticism in order to combat
Christianity. Yet according to Shaftesbury, this radical skepticism turns out to be at least
as corrosive to natural human life as the worldview it hopes to undermine. Shaftesbury
proposes as an alternative the restoration of the classical critique of religion. The classical
critique made possible the coexistence of philosophy and religion and was accompanied
by the political toleration of a variety of religious practices. The reassertion of the
classical view is accompanied by an attempt to save a notion of "enthusiasm," which had
come under attack by the Enlightenment as coextensive with zealous and sectarian
Christianity. Shaftesbury tries to distinguish a noble form of enthusiasm, which according
to his account is the source of all higher human aspirations, including Socratic philosophy.
As a companion to his critique of Christianity, Shaftesbury advances an attack on modern
xii

philosophy's political teaching as presented by Hobbes and Locke. He tries to restore the
classical view by showing that man is social by nature.
In order to accomplish this project, Shaftesbury attempts to revive the Socratic
method of dialogue in the form of what he calls "soliloquy." This method is accompanied
by the use of raillery, which I believe is Shaftsbury's way of presenting Socratic irony.
For Shaftesbury, the aim of philosophy is self-knowledge, understood from the point of
view of the individual soul as well as the point of view of human nature. Both of these
presuppose a defense of common sense, which according to the Socratic philosophy
advanced by Shaftesbury, is the only possible beginning place for philosophical inquiry.
Finally, the dissertation suggests that Shaftesbury's reputation as a theistic protoromantic is misguided. The culmination of the Characteristicks, a dialogue entitled The
Moralists, seems to many scholars to advance a teleological cosmology. Scholars have
largely assumed that the philosophical hero of this dialogue is one Theocles; they have
also assumed that Theocles is the spokesman for Shaftesbury's own opinions.

This

interpretation, however, ignores the importance of the dialogue form as presented by
Shaftesbury under the method of "soliloquy." I believe that Shaftesbury's opinions only
emerge by reading The Moralists precisely as a dialogue as opposed to a series of
speeches presented in the garb preferred by the "polite" audience of his day. My reading
of the dialogue consequently attends to its well-planned structure while also placing it
within the interpretive framework of the Characteristicks as a whole.

xiii

I conclude that Shaftesbury's understanding of philosophy is ultimately zetetic
regarding metaphysical questions. This is to say that Shaftesbury himself provides the
tools for raising questions about each of the hypotheses presented by the characters as the
most probable account of the nature of the cosmos. This suggests that Philocles rather
than Theocles is the true hero of the dialogue insofar as the reader is left with more
questions than answers. The aim of this moderate form of skepticism is Socratic as well;
it is an attempt to an foster appreciation for the knowledge of ignorance. It is, therefore,
unclear whether Shaftesbury believes the world is orderly and reflective of an organizing
mind or merely chaotic. For Shaftesbury, the questions and their plausible answers--what
he calls "hypotheses"--remain more apparent than any evidence for preferring one claim
over another.

xiv
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO THE PLAN
OF SHAFTESBURYřS CHARACTERISTICKS
A Neglected Work
There is little question as to the historical importance of the Characteristicks. As
Stanley Grean observed forty years ago, "if the influence of Locke can be gauged by the
nineteen editions that his Essay Concerning Human Understanding went through in the
eighteenth century, the somewhat less but still great influence of Shaftesbury can be seen
in the thirteen editions of his Characteristics between 1711 and 1790."1
While this measure is impressive in itself, it can be added that the
Characteristicks was read (and praised or attacked) by many of the leading minds of the
eighteenth century. A partial list would include Bernard Mandeville, 2 Jonathan Swift,3

1

Stanley Grean, Shaftesbury's Philosophy of Religion and Ethics; a Study in Enthusiasm ([Athens]: Ohio
University Press, 1967), ix.
2

E.g., Bernard Mandeville, Free Thoughts on Religion, the Church, and National Happiness (London: T.
Jauncy & J. Roberts, 1700), p. 239, where Shaftesbury is quoted at length and favorably; and unfavorably
in The Fable of the Bees, or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits, 1924, edited by F.B. Kaye (Indianapolis:
Liberty Classics, 1988), Remark T., p. 233.
3

Swift denies having written or even read Shaftesburyřs Letter concerning Enthusiasm in his ŖAn
Apologyŗ for Tale of the Tub; but as A.O. Aldridge has pointed out, there is considerable reason to doubt
Swiftřs candor here. See Alfred Owen Aldridge, "Shaftesbury and the Deist Manifesto," Transactions of
the American Philosophical Society (Philadelphia), New Series 41, no. 2 (1951), pp. 371-372.
1

2
Francis Hutcheson,4 George Berkeley,5 and David Hume;6 Pierre Bayle,7 Jean Le Clerc,8
Denis Diderot,9 and Rousseau;10 Wieland,11 Lessing,12 Mendelssohn,13 Herder,14 and
4

Hutchesonřs first book is a defense of Shaftesbury. See, for example An Inquiry Into the Original of Our
Ideas of Beauty and Virtue: In Two Treatises, edited by Wolfgang Leidhold (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,
2004), ŖPreface,ŗ pp. 7 ff.
5

Berkelelyřs dialogue ŖAlciphron, or the Minute Philosopherŗ contains an extended response to
Shaftesbury. George Berkeley, The Works of George Berkeley, 1901, Volume II: Philosophical Works,
1732-33, edited by A.C. Fraser (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
6

Hume mentions Shaftesbury in numerous places, including the Enquiry concerning Principles of Morals,
and the Essays.
7

Bayle was a frequent correspondent of Shaftesburyřs and apparently a good friend. D. B. Schlegel,
Shaftesbury and the French Deists (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956).
8

Le Clerc reviewed Letter concerning Enthusiasm in 1709 and approved of the An Inquiry concerning
Morals; Thomas Fowler, Shaftesbury and Hutcheson (G. P. Putnamřs Sons: New York, 1883), pp. 135 ff.
9

In a peculiar passage, Diderot writes that:

there are very few errors in Locke, and too few truths in milord Shaftesbury: the former is only a man of
vast intellect, penetrating and exact, while the latter is a genius of the first order. Locke has seen;
Shaftesbury has created, constructed, and edified. To Locke we owe some great truths coldly preserved,
methodically developed, and dryly presented; and to Shaftesbury, some brilliant schemes often poorly
grounded, though full of sublime truths. Even in his moments of error he pleases and persuades by the
charm of his eloquence.

"Génie," (Philosophie & Littér.), L’Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire Raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des
Métiers. Vol. VII, p. 583; Diderot, Denis, Oeuvres Esthétiques. Paris, Editions Garnier freres [c1965].
10

Jean-Jaques Rousseau, Émile; Éducation, Morale, Botanique, Lettres Morales, Bibliothèque de la
Pléiade, OEuvres Complètes, vol. IV, p. 1091.
11

See Charles Elson, Wieland and Shaftesbury (New York: Columbia University Press, 1913).

12

I think a case could be made for the influence of Shaftesburyřs Second Characters on Lessingřs Laocoön.
See Laokoön [sic.]: Lessing, Herder, Goethe, 1910, edited by William Guild Howard (New York: Henry
Holt and Company), p. lxxviii footnote.
13

Mendelssohn was first loaned Shaftesburyřs works by Lessing. He later undertook a project to translate
Shaftesbury into German. Alexander Altman, Moses Mendelssohn, A Biographical Study. (Tuscaloosa:
University of Alabama Press), p. 109. See also David Dowdeyřs review of Moses Mendelssohn und die
Auklarungsasthetik im 18. Jahrhundert by Klaus-Werner Segreff in The German Quarterly, Vol. 58, No. 4
(Autumn, 1985), pp. 606-608.

3
Kant;15 the neo-classical poets James Thompson and Mark Aikenside,16 Alexander
Pope,17 and the novelist Henry Fielding.18

The catalogue alone of contemporary

Anglican Divines, who praised or attacked (and perhaps even read) Shaftesbury, is itself
quite extensive.19
The philosophical importance of the Characteristicks can be seen in the ideas
taken up by the aforementioned thinkers, but I will single out remarks by Montesquieu
and Leibniz for brief consideration. Montesquieu calls Shaftesbury one of the four great
poets of the West, along with Plato, Montaigne, and Malebranche.20 While this statement
14

ŖBut why do you mention only two people and forget a third name, my dear philosopher, one whose
human wisdom and social temper are just as great? The friend of our old Leibniz, who owes so much to
him and whom he loved to read Ŕ the philosophical scoffer whose laughter contains more truth than do
other peopleřs coughs and spittle Ŕ in short, Lord Shaftesburi [sic.].ŗ Letter to Kant from Johann Gottfried
Herder, November 1768. 15 [41] (39). (Incidentally, Rousseau spells it Shaftesburi too.)
15

ŖFor the time being, I shall lecture on universal practical philosophy and the doctrine of virtue. . .The
attempts of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Hume, although incomplete and defective, have nonetheless
penetrated furthest in the search for the fundamental principles of all morality.ŗ Immanuel Kant,
Theoretical Philosophy, 1755-1770, edited and translated by David Waldorf, Cambridge Edition of the
Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 298.
16

Robert Harrison Marsh, Four Dialectical Theories of Poetry (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1965).
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If perhaps indirectly through Bolingbroke, who is thought by some to have failed in recognizing his own
debt to Shaftesbury. See Cecil A. Moore, Backgrounds of English Literature, 1700-1760 (Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1953), pp. 32 ff.
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Consider the famous conversation between the Rev. Mr. Thwakum and Ŗthe philosopherŗ Mr. Square in
Tom Jones, book 3 chapter 2:
Square said, "It was a mere abuse of words to call those things evils, in which there was no moral unfitness:
that pain, which was the worst consequence of such accidents, was the most contemptible thing in the
world"; with more of the like sentences, extracted out of the second book of Tully's Tusculan questions,
and from the great Lord Shaftesbury.
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Aldridge 1951, pp. 371 ff.

"Platon fait partie des quatre grands « poètes » aux côtés de Montaigne, Malebranche et Shaftesbury."
Charles de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, Oeuvres Completes, Publiees Sous La Direction De Andre
Masson, ed. Andre Masson, 3 vols. (Paris :: Nagel, 1950), 2.490, n° 1092
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would require careful attention (instantly one wonders about Homer, Vergil, Dante, and a
couple others) it is nevertheless striking. Certainly the company of Plato is one that
Shaftesbury himself would be proud to own (although given Shaftesburyřs alleged
disapproval of the modern essay, the relationship to Montaigne might be more troubling
to him). In placing him in this company, I believe that Montesquieu is calling attention to
the inseparability of Shaftesburyřs thought and his mode of presentation.

For

Shaftesbury, poetry and philosophy are ultimately inseparable.
The praise by Leibniz is easier to grasp and can be found in an extended review of
Shaftesburyřs work written at the request of Pierre Coste. Leibniz writes of the fifth part
of the Characteristicks, entitled The Moralists, A Philosophical Rhapsody, that "it lacks
almost nothing but my pre-established harmony, my elimination of death, and my
reduction of matter or of plurality to unities or simple substances. I had expected merely
to find a philosophy like Mr. Lockeřs but was led beyond Plato and Descartes. If I had
seen this work before my Theodicy was published, I should have profited as I ought and
should have borrowed its great passages."21 Shaftesbury indeed looks back to Plato (and
Montaigne) but also forward to Leibniz, Rousseau, Hume, and other dissenters from the
more radical aspects of the Enlightenment project. His interest in authorship and modes
of writing may even be said to anticipate certain Ŗpostmodernŗ trends as well.22 As we
21

Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, "Remarks on the Three Volumes Entitled Characteristics of Men, Manners,
Opinions, Times [1712: G., III, 423-31]," in Philosophical Papers and Letters, Vol. II, ed. Leroy E.
Loemker (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), 1022-32.
22

I have a number of things in mind, but for one example consider Hans Georg Gademerřs Truth and
Method, which explicitly mentions Shaftesbury as a predecessor. Truth and Method. 1975. tr. Joel
Weisenheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2d ed. (London and New York: Continuum, 2004), pp. 10-39.
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shall see, Shaftesbury intends to lead his reader beyond Descartes, and insofar as he must
encounter the claims of revelation as presented in the Bible, perhaps beyond Plato as
well.23
Yet despite the extraordinary enthusiasm which surrounded Shaftesburyřs
Characteristics in the eighteenth century, the nineteenth century saw a steep decline in
his direct influence. By 1902, Sir Leslie Stephen could write that Ŗthe Lord Shaftesbury
is one of the writers whose reputation is scarcely commensurate with the influence which
he once exerted.ŗ24 Insofar as he is remembered by philosophers, Shaftesbury is known
primarily as the progenitor of the Ŗmoral senseŗ doctrine of ethics, as an early expositor
whose work has been developed and improved over time. According to the influential
work of Henry Sidgwick, for example, Shaftesbury initiated an important turn in ethics
Ŗfrom presenting the principle of social duty as an abstract reasonŗ to the attempt to
demonstrate a natural harmony between social affections and manřs Ŗreflective selfregard.ŗ25 Sidgwick rightly worries that a Ŗsenseŗ doctrine of morality quickly yields to
the view that morality is a matter of individual taste; that the Ŗfundamental questions
ŘWhat is rightř and ŘWhyřŗ drop too far into the background; and that the mere existence

23

It is a real question in my mind whether Shaftesbury distinguishes between myth as understood by Plato
and revelation as it comes to light in the Bible. I hope to have something useful to say about this in Chapter
two.
24

Leslie Stephen, History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century, Vol. 2. (New York: Harcourt,
Brace & World, 1963), p. 15.
25

Henry Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics for English Readers, Third Ed. (London: Macmillan
and Company, 1896), p. 184.
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of a moral sentiment is insufficient reason to obey it.26

According to the analytic

tradition, philosophy has continued to wrestle with this last concern especially by trying
to articulate a thesis of Ŗinternalismŗ adequate to the task of making men into authentic
moral agents.27

Alternative interpretations of Shaftesbury trace his thought to his

philosophic predecessors, be they the Stoics,28 neo-Platonists,29 or Cambridge
Platonists.30 While none of these views is wholly wrong, I hope to show that they are
inadequate.
Not surprisingly, the field of literary criticism has been more attentive to the
conspicuous role style plays in the Characteristicks.31 Yet here the scholarship, while
very good, is insufficiently attentive to the main philosophic themes of the
Characteristicks. So too with the field of the history of aesthetics.
Historians of thought have also addressed Shaftesbury, but these scholars have
neglected the substance of his concerns by emphasizing the cultural or political
26

Sidgwick 1896, p 233.

27

See Henry Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics, 1874, Sixth (London, New York: Macmillan and Company,
1901), chapter 9. For a more recent account, see Stephen L. Darwall, The British Moralists and the
Internal "Ought," 1640-1740 (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
28

Ester A. Tiffany, "Shaftesbury as Stoic," Publications of the Modern Languages Association of America
37 (1923): 642-84.
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Ernst Cassirer, The Platonic Renaissance in England, translated by James P. Pettigrove (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1953).
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John A. Passmore, Ralph Cudworth, An Interpretation (Cambridge University Press, 1951).

For examples see Charles Lambřs ŖThe Genteel Style,ŗ in The Works of Charles Lamb; in Two Volumes,
edited by Sir Thomas Noon Talford (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1875); William E. Alderman, "The
Style of Shaftesbury," Modern Language Notes 38, no. 4 (Apr. 1923): 209-15; R. L. Brett, The Third Earl
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environment in which he wrote. While many of these works are indeed excellent,32 none
has yet to construe Shaftesburyřs project accurately in its philosophic context. The recent
and very subtle study by Lawrence E. Klein, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness,
takes Shaftesbury to have a serious project, but one too immediately Whiggish to do
justice to the concerns of the Characteristicks. Once again, the historical scholarship is
good and correct as far as it goes. Still it is insufficient.
Most importantly, perhaps, the decline of his influence might be attributed to
success: on the one hand, to the successful assimilation of many of his ideas by his
progeny; and on the other, the apparent success of the Enlightenment project he resisted.
There is some question as to whether the philosophic approach of Descartes, Spinoza,
Hobbes, and Locke, and later, of Rousseau and Kant, Nietzsche and Heidegger, have
provided an adequate reply to the challenge presented to philosophy by revelation.
Modern philosophy might have been naïve in its belief that it could refute the claims of
revelation through its critique of miracles (Hobbes, Locke, Spinoza, Kant) and through
the production of charitable works (stable political life, economic prosperity, and the
conquest of nature through technology).

The apparently antique philosophy of

Shaftesbury may well present an alternative to this modern approach; at the very least, it
presents an attractive alternative perspective from which one might examine the
successes and failures of modern philosophy. Shaftesburyřs philosophy seeks a solution

32

The work of Isabel Rivers, which considers his influence on the Scottish Enlightenment, is especially
impressive. Isabel Rivers, Reason, Grace, and Sentiment: A Study of the Language of Religion and Ethics
in England, 1660-1780 (Cambridge [England] ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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to the challenges which political life and religion present philosophy that does not
alienate human beings from nature.

In his view, both Christianity and modern

philosophy do this, and by doing this, present new obstacles to the real task of
philosophy, self-knowledge.
What follows in this chapter is a sketch of the Characteristicks. I first explore the
way in which Shaftesbury hoped he would be read. The treatment is necessarily brief but,
I hope, sufficient to prepare the way for the sustained project of the dissertation. Next, I
offer an overview of each of the compositions which make up the Characteristicks. This
overview points us toward what I take to be the central concern of his work, namely, the
relationship among religion, politics, and philosophy. I will conclude with an overview
of the remainder of the dissertation.


Reading Shaftesbury’s Characteristicks
At first glance, Shaftesburyřs Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times,
etc.33 might seem to be nothing more than a collection of occasional pieces. It is well
known, for example, that of the six treatises which make up the Characteristicks, the first
five appeared separately, at different times, and in various forms. Indeed, each piece
seems to confess as much since they bear their original publication dates on separate title
33

Shaftesbury, Characteristicks. There are two other recent scholarly editions of the Characteristicks. The
new Cambridge Text edition has valuable notes and a very helpful general introduction by Lawrence Klein.
I prefer the Liberty Fund edition because it restores the structure and illustrations designed by Shaftesbury
himself. Oxford University Press recently released an edition as well. Anthony Ashley Cooper
Shaftesbury, Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, ed. Philip J. Ayres, 2 vols. (Oxford; New
York: Clarendon Press; published in the United States by Oxford University Press, 1999).
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pages. Yet Shaftesbury claims in the sixth treatise of the Characteristicks that the pieces
were designed to fit together as a unified whole.

This sixth treatise, entitled

Miscellaneous Reflections on the preceding Treatises, and other Critical Subjects, takes
the form of five essays or "miscellanies," with one miscellany devoted to each of the
previous five treatises. As the author of the Miscellaneous Reflections, Shaftesbury
speaks of the author of the other treatises in the third person while he keeps an ironic
distance from the work as a whole. In order to distinguish between the authorial voices
of these works, I will refer to the author of the Miscellaneous Reflections as "the Critic,"
while calling Shaftesbury the author of the work as a whole.34 As we shall soon see, the
Critic offers an interpretation of the first five treatises, and claims to discover a
complicated rhetorical strategy at work in Shaftesburyřs Characteristicks.
We begin with a few observations about the architectural features of the text.
Shaftesbury placed footnotes throughout the Characteristicks and also prepared a
peculiar index for his book. While the footnotes sometimes serve the conventional
scholarly purpose of citing other works, they frequently direct the readerřs attention to
other places in the Characteristicks itself. This complex lattice of footnotes has generally
been ignored or dismissed by scholars of Shaftesbury as an afterthought on his part. For
example, Robert B. Voitle, author of a thorough biography of Shaftesbury, remarks that
the author developed "a huge index and an elaborate system of cross-references."35
34

The Critic does not himself call Shaftesbury the author of the Characteristicks, but refers to him only as
"our author."
35

Robert Voitle, "Shaftesbury's Moral Sense," Studies in Philology 52, no. 1 (1955): 18.
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Nevertheless, Voitle claims that "a study of Shaftesbury's methods of indexing and
footnoting reveals that a principal object of these devices in Characteristics is to give
heterogeneous material a semblance of unity. For Shaftesbury, even the most tenuous of
relationships is sufficient excuse for a cross-reference in the footnotes or a joint entry in
the index."36
Yet contrary to Voitle, these cross-references indicate, if not a unified plan, a
certain consistency of themes addressed by Shaftesbury. The footnotes are also replete
with references to classical authors, particularly to the Roman satirists and to various
stoics. Careful attention to the structure and content of the footnotes will assist us in
uncovering what I will argue is in fact a consistent and unified plan for the
Characteristicks.
The book as originally published was organized into three volumes. Volume I
contains treatises one, two, and three; volume II contains treatises four and five; volume
III contains treatise six. We will see that the first volume serves as a preparation for
reading the second volume, just as the last volume, with its Miscellaneous Reflections,
serves as a commentary on the first two volumes. This seems to suggest that the heart of
the Characteristicks is volume II; but let us leave this question aside for now. Here, then,
is a table of contents for the Characteristicks as originally published:

36

Ibid. This opinion is shared by more recent scholars as well. Lawrence E. Klein somewhat more
generously remarks that "Characteristicks was an expedient reassembling of previously published writings
with a unifying gloss." Lawrence Eliot Klein, Shaftesbury and the Culture of Politeness : Moral Discourse
and Cultural Politics in Early Eighteenth-Century England (Cambridge [England] ; New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 1994), 111.
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Volume I:
Treatise 1)
Treatise 2)
Treatise 3)

A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm to my Lord Sommers
Sensus Communis: an Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humor
Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author

Volume II:
Treatise 4)
Treatise 5)

An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit
The Moralists, A Philosophical Rhapsody

Volume III:
Treatise 6)
Miscellaneous Reflections on the Preceding Treatises, etc.
We can see from the table of contents the remarkable variety of literary forms
which the Characteristicks employs: a letter, an essay, something Shaftesbury calls a
soliloquy, a treatise proper, a dialogue Shaftesbury calls a rhapsody, and the
aforementioned miscellany or common essay. This variety invariably complicates any
attempt to offer an account of the work as a unified whole. And yet this is exactly what
Shaftesbury suggests we should do in the Preface to the book, where he calls this
collection "unified Tracts."37
The Critic who writes the Miscellaneous Reflections seems to agree with this
judgment. This opinion emerges gradually through the five chapters of the sixth treatise
as the Critic discusses a large variety of subjects. The Critic begins his reflections as a
whole by discussing the character of the miscellany as a literary form; we will see that
this character will stand in stark contrast to the method of the Characteristicks as the
Critic explains it. We first learn that the miscellany is a recently invented form of

37

"Preface," Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, 1.xxi.
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writing, and, according to the Critic, a happy one "for the harvest of Wit." 38 In the past,
"Regularity and Order were thought essential in a Treatise." Strict rules of composition
once imposed "a Yoke" which modern writers have thrown off. Literary efforts now
come into the world without "the invidious Distinctions of Bastardy and Legitimacy," and
consequently, a work is received without much "examination of the Kind, or censure of
the Form." As a result of the introduction of the form of miscellany, which is in effect a
loosening of the strict rules of composition observed in the past, more people have
proven willing to try their hand at literary efforts.

According to the old rules of

composition, a work was esteemed graceful and beautiful when it betrayed a unified
"Plan of Workmanship." The miscellany, on the other hand, has made a virtue of the
want of a clear plan; it is more likely to celebrate the "Odd and Pretty over the Graceful
and Beautiful."39 In the old manner, the unity of the work was effected by an intimate
connection between form and content.

What is lost, according to the Critic, by

abandoning the painful constraint of "Justness and Accuracy of Thought" is compensated
by "the agreeable and more easy Commerce of Gallantry and modern Wit." The Critic
attributes this profitable trade to the turning of the miscellany writer from models of form
offered in nature to some other source of inspiration. He writes that "where there is
nothing like Nature, there is no room for the troublesome part of Thought or
Contemplation. . .A Coherence, a Design, a Meaning, is against their purpose, and
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destroys the very Spirit and Genius of their Workmanship."40 It should be clear already
that the Critic is not without an ironic attitude about his own activity. One of the many
things to be considered eventually is the ambiguous relationship borne by the Critic
toward the miscellany as a literary form. However this may be, the Critic wholeheartedly
embraces the "Title of a Miscellaneous Writer" throughout the Miscellaneous
Reflections.41 We, on the other hand, will have to attend to the particular form of each
treatise presented by Shaftesbury.
The Critic tells us in the first "Miscellany" that "my chief Intention in the
following Sheets is to descant cursorily upon some late Pieces of a British Author." He
intends to take full advantage of the "miscellaneous Taste" of his age. "According to this
Method," he writes, "whilst I serve as Critick or Interpreter to this new Writer, I may the
better correct his Flegm, and give him more of the fashionable Air and Manner of the
World; especially in what relates to the Subject and Manner of his two last Pieces, which
are containřd in his second Volume."42 This said, he will not feel confined by the content
of these treatises, but follow ideas as he sees fit (hence the full title of this treatise,
Miscellaneous Reflections on the preceding Treatises, and other Critical Subjects). The
Critic has reserved for himself the right "to use Order or lay it aside."43 This is not,
however, the procedure followed by Shaftesbury in the Characteristicks as a whole. Our
40

Ibid.
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critic tells us in his "Miscellany III," which among other things offers an interpretation of
the Soliloquy, that while the first two treatises of the Characteristicks are very skeptical in
tone, when examined with care they reveal Shaftesbury as a "real Dogmatist, as strong as
any Devotee or Religionist of Řem all."44 In other words, although Shaftesburyřs first two
treatises are largely critical or skeptical of other peopleřs "schemes," he nevertheless
"holds a certain Plan or System peculiar to him-self, or such at least, in which he has at
present but few Companions or Followers."45 The Critic compares Shaftesbury to an
ambitious architect, "who being callřd perhaps to prop a Roof, redress a leaning Wall, or
add to some particular apartment, is not contented with this small Specimen of his
Mastership: but pretending to demonstrate the Unserviceableness and Inconvenience of
the old Fabrick, forms the Design of a new Building, and longs to shew his Skill in the
principal Parts of Architecture and Mechanicks."46 It is far easier to tear down an old
structure than it is to build a new one; and Shaftesbury has thus far "kept up his sapping
Method and unravelling Humour," while offering only "very slender hints" of his
"pretence to a real architect-capacity." The Critic tells us in a footnote where to look for
these hints, and we will look for them presently.
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According to the Critic, the third treatise, the Soliloquy, bears the same "sceptical
mein [sic]" as the first two, but whispers to anyone who is attentive of a larger, positive
project contained in the Characteristicks. "What he [that is, our Author] offers by way of
Project or Hypothesis is very faint, hardly spoken aloud; but mutterřd to himself in a kind
of . . . feignřd Soliloquy."47 A few pages later the Critic tells us that, more than hints
now, Shaftesburyřs "philosophy itself. . .lies concealed in this treatise." 48 The Soliloquy
contains an introduction to Shaftesburyřs philosophy proper, but what he reveals of his
"Form and Method" is presented with the "random Miscellaneous Air" and may be
mistaken for mere raillery. One might remark in passing that the Soliloquy is itself the
central treatise of the five attributed by the Critic to our Author. It certainly will be
central in teaching us how to bring the positive project of Shaftesbury to light as it indeed
contains an introduction to Shaftesburyřs manner of philosophizing.
The Critic claims that Shaftesbury comes out of hiding for An Inquiry concerning
Virtue or Merit, the fourth treatise of the Characteristicks. There, "he discovers himself
openly, as a plain Dogmatist, a Formalist, and Man of Method; with his Hypotheses
tackřd to him, and his Opinions so close-sticking, as wouřd force one to call to mind the
Figure of some precise and strait-lacřd Professor in a University."49

We must ask

ourselves why Shaftesbury would bother to conceal his philosophy in the first three
treatises, only to reveal it outright in the fourth. We are also free to wonder whether the
47
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Critic is himself fully candid; he may put things too simply here. We should also note that
the Critic has not done all the work for us; we still must work to discover just what this
philosophy of Shaftesbury is. Part of this work will be deciding for ourselves what to
make of the alleged "plain dogmatism" of the Inquiry. We will be in a better position to
speculate when we have a better understanding of the plan of the Characteristicks as a
whole.
The Critic reveals more of this plan in the beginning of "Miscellany IV," which is
itself devoted to the Inquiry. Here the Critic tells us that although the five treatises first
appeared separately and at different times, they were designed to fit together as a whole.
He writes that "it will appear therefore in this Joint-Edition of our Authorřs Five
Treatises, that the Three former are preparatory to the Fourth, on which we are now
enterřd; and the Fifth (with which he concludes) a kind of Apology for this revivřd
Treatise concerning Virtue and Religion."50 According to the Critic, the division of the
Characteristicks into three volumes is more than a publisherřs convenience. Each volume
serves its purpose in the design of the whole work: the first as an introduction to the
second, and the third as an interpretation of the first two. The first and third volumes point
to the central importance of the second volume, containing An Inquiry and The Moralists.
What sort of preparation does one need to read the Inquiry? And why does it need an
apology in the form of The Moralists?

In what way are these treatises central to

Shaftesburyřs plan? In short, why does Shaftesbury present his philosophy in such a

50
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complicated manner? An answer to this question will emerge only from a careful reading
of the Characteristicks, with the assistance of the Critic, of course, but also with the good
sense to investigate for ourselves. The remainder of this study will attempt to do precisely
this. In order to see the continuous thread that we will follow throughout the course of our
discussion, however, we need to look briefly at the treatises of "our Author" as they
present themselves.

The first treatise of the Characteristicks is entitled A Letter Concerning
Enthusiasm, to My Lord Sommers. It is, as we have seen, the first of three treatises
contained in Volume I. First published in 1708, A Letter concerning Enthusiasm had as
its occasion the appearance in England of a controversial sect of French Huguenots who
claimed to have personal revelations through the power of the Holy Spirit. 51 The Letter
is only marginally concerned with this sect, however, taking as its real goal the
distinction between a true and false species of enthusiasm. Generally used as a pejorative
by early Enlightenment philosophers, enthusiasm was widely regarded as a presumption
to revelation born only by "laying by reason" and out of the psychological illness of
"melancholy."52 While he is not the first to identify a positive species of enthusiasm,53
51
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Shaftesbury undertakes a radical transformation of the concept and places it at the heart
of his philosophy. In the words of the Critic, "so far is [our Author] from degrading
Enthusiasm, or disclaiming it in himself; that he looks on this Passion, simply considerřd,
as the most natural and its Object as the justest in the World. Even VIRTUE it-self he
takes to be no other than a noble Enthusiasm justly directed, and regulated by that high
Standard which he supposes in the Nature of Things."54 Shaftesbury thinks that it is
essential to preserve the part of the soul where the passion called enthusiasm dwells. This
is essential because of enthusiasmřs connection to all the higher aspirations of human
beings. In short, I believe that enthusiasm occupies for Shaftesbury the central place held
by eros in Platonic philosophy. It is this passion which, when corrected by reason, raises
men above themselves to the contemplation of the apparent "Numbers, Harmony,
Proportion, and Beauty," found naturally in the cosmos.55 So important to Shaftesbury is
enthusiasm rightly understood that he identifies it with the sense of wonder which is the
beginning of genuine philosophic inquiry.56
A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm caused considerable controversy in England,
especially among Anglican divines, who took the piece to be an attack upon Christianity.
While later scholars have often been more likely to allow Shaftesbury the name of
Christian (albeit of the latitudinarian variety) there is good reason to think that
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The reference is to Aristotleřs
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Shaftesburyřs contemporaries were more perspicacious in this regard.

57

Indeed, a

thoughtful reading of the second treatise of the Characteristicks will reveal that
Shaftesbury largely shares the Enlightenment critique of the political effects of
Christianity found in such thinkers as Hobbes and Locke.
Sensus Communis is in part a defense of the "Freedom of Wit and Humor," that is,
raillery or satire, especially as it is applied to religion.

Shaftesbury is also wary,

however, of what he takes to be an overreaction by modern philosophy to the political
influence of Christianity. Throughout the second treatise, and indeed throughout the
Characteristicks as a whole, Shaftesbury is at pains to teach his reader moderation,
which, like Aristotle, he presents as a mean between extremes. Shaftesbury undertakes in
Sensus Communis a defense of common sense not only from what he identifies as the
false enthusiasms of certain understandings of Christianity, but also from the radical
skepticism of modern philosophy.

He recommends a return to an earlier mode of

philosophy, which he thinks is more than adequate for a response to religious fanaticism
and avoids what he presents as the vices of modern philosophy, radical skepticism and
reductionism of the human soul to simplistic and low passions.
It is the task of Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author to offer an alternative to this
reductionism. This third and final treatise in Volume I undertakes nothing less than the
57
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revival of the distinction between reason and the passions which Shaftesbury believes to
have been collapsed by modern philosophy. There he recommends the establishment of
an "Inspector or Auditor" to take account of the opinions and fancies of the soul.
Shaftesbury rejects the new understanding of the passions introduced by Bacon,
Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke, in favor of this older understanding which he identifies
with the philosophy of Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, and Cicero. As Shaftesbury once
explained to his former tutor Locke, "what I count true learning, and all we can profitt by,
is to know ourselves." Toward this end, "there is no labour, no studdy, no learning that I
would not undertake."58 It begins to emerge in Soliloquy that the Characteristicks was
written in large part to reawaken the notion that true learning and the genuine end of
philosophy is self-knowledge in the classical sense.
As we have already seen, the three treatises of Volume I are intended to be
preparatory to the fourth, that is, An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit. It is this treatise
that is best known to contemporary academic philosophers, probably because it is more
recognizable to them as philosophy rather than literature.

The Inquiry is clearly

presented in the form of a "proper" philosophic treatise. Yet itřs difficult to know exactly
what to make of this supposedly straightforward treatise in light of the Criticřs remarks
that Shaftesbury discloses himself as a "plain dogmatist" in it.59 This is presumably not
meant as praise, nor is the description of the treatise as "dry PHILOSOPHY" and the
58
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manner as "grave" and "rigid." The Critic goes so far as to invite the "more humorous
Reader" to skip a chapter or two of the Miscellany as he proceeds, promising to return to
more entertaining topics soon enough!
In fact, An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit seems to be a continuation of "that
moral Speculation or INQUIRY, which we call the Study of our-selves."60 The centrality
of this concern for Shaftesbury cannot be exaggerated. As the Critic remarks, "that all
Knowledg whatsoever depends upon this previous-one: 'And that we can in reality be
assurřd of nothing, till we are first assurřd of What we are Our-selves.' For by this alone
can we know what Certainty and Assurance is."61
The Inquiry has a broader scope than the Soliloquy in that it examines human
nature apart from the internal reflection of the individual. A large part of this treatise is
devoted to demonstrative argument against the individualist anthropology of Hobbes and
Locke. Yet if the Inquiry were merely this, it would hardly be in need of an apology in the
form of the fifth treatise, as we have seen the Critic claim. The Inquiry is also an
extensive consideration of the difference between natural virtue and religion; it explicitly
raises the question of whether religion necessarily entails virtue and whether an atheist can
be virtuous. We will see that while Shaftesbury takes pains to identify himself as "a
Theist" in the Inquiry, there is reason to expect that his positions will not be well received
by the more orthodox members of the British clergy. That Shaftesbury himself has this
60
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concern emerges in a remark by the Critic. The Apology in the form of The Moralists is,
we learn, particularly concerned to address "what relates to reveal’d Religion, and a World
to come."62 This remark of the Critic is illuminating. It calls attention to the fact that
while the Inquiry embraces a peculiar form of natural religion, it is mostly silent on the
importance of revelation. Shaftesbury seems to have been quite alive to the touchiness of
his argument, which we can see from the publication history of this treatise. The Inquiry
seems to have been published first in 1699, but apparently without Shaftesburyřs
permission. In his "Sketch of the Life of the Third Earl of Shaftesbury," Shaftesburyřs
son, the Fourth Earl, reports that "during my fatherřs stay in Holland, an imperfect edition
of his Inquiry after Virtue was printed, surreptitiously taken from a rough draft, sketched
when he was but twenty years of age. He was greatly chagrined at this, and immediately
bought up the whole impression before many of the books were sold, and set about
completing the Treatise which he published himself not long after."63 Some later scholars
have challenged this account, but if the Fourth Earl is correct, it seems that Shaftesbury
did not want the Inquiry to appear outside of the context provided by the Characteristicks
as a whole.
In the "Fifth Miscellany," we receive an interesting suggestion about the
complexity of Shaftesburyřs presentation in The Moralists, which I must quote at
length.64 The Critic remarks there that our author
62
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dares not, in his own Model and Principal performance [namely, The Moralists],
attempt to unite his Philosophy in one solid and uniform Body, nor carry on his
Argument in one continuřd Chain or Thred. Here our Authorřs Timorousness is
visible. In the very Plan or Model of his Work, he is apparently put to a hard
shift, to contrive how or with what probability he might introduce Men of any
Note or Fashion, reasoning expressly and purposely, without play or trifling, for
two or three hours together, on mere PHILOSOPHY and MORALS. He finds
these Subjects (as he confesses) so wide of common Conversation, and, by long
Custom, so appropriated to the School, the University-Chair, or Pulpit, that he
thinks it hardly safe or practicable to treat of them elsewhere, or in a different
tone. He is forcřd therefore to raise particular Machines, and constrain his
principal Characters, in order to carry a better Face, and bear himself out, against
the appearance of Pedantry.65
Shaftesbury is aware that the characteristics of manners and opinions, and
consequently of men themselves, have changed with modernity. He therefore adapts his
rhetoric to be more practicable, to appeal more to the common conversation of his day by
mixing men of note and fashion, at play and trifling, into his considerations of philosophy
and morals. What is more important to note here, however, is that these subjects are
considered by most of his contemporaries to be the proper domain of the Pulpit and the
University (itself of course still largely subject to the Church). For this reason, the Critic
tells us, "[the Authorřs] Gentleman-Philosopher THEOCLES, before he enters into his
real Character, becomes a feignřd Preacher. And even when his real Character comes
on, he hardly dares stand it out; but to deal the better with his Sceptick-Friend, he falls
again to personating, and takes up the Humour of the Poet and Enthusiast."66 Here we
see here another hint about the two antagonists of

Shaftesburyřs Characteristicks:

Christianity and modern philosophy. In this, his "Model and Principal performance,"
65

Miscellaneous Reflections: Miscellany V, 3.176.

66

Ibid., 3.176-77.

24
Shaftesburyřs modern Socratic figure Theocles feigns being a preacher and an enthusiast.
I suspect that the preaching counters the charge of atheism while his enthusiasm resists the
temptation to radical skepticism.
In summary, the Characteristicks hopes to restore a classical worldview to
philosophy. This is the burden of Chapter 2. We will see in Chapter 3 that Shaftesbury
maintains that Christianity introduced a new political challenge to the life of philosophy.
He is an early dissenter, however, from the ambitious project of the Enlightenment to
remake philosophy in the face of this challenge. We examine this concern in Chapter 4.
Shaftesburyřs project ultimately attempts to keep the classical notion of philosophy as
self-knowledge alive in the face of both Christianity and the radical skepticism of modern
philosophy. Shaftesbury writes his dialogue The Moralists as a model of the proper
mode of philosophic inquiry, combining therein each of the concerns we encounter in the
earlier treatises.

We will examine this dialogue in Chapter 5.

Throughout the

dissertation we turn for guidance to the Critic, Shaftesbury's own critical voice leading
readers through the complicated trail of Characteristicks.

CHAPTER 2
AN "AUDITOR ESTABLISH'D WITHIN":
REASON, PASSION, AND RESOLUTION OF CHARACTER
General Introduction: Common Opinion and Philos ophy
It is characteristic of modern philosophy to disparage traditional philosophy for its
uncertainty.

In the words of that famous skeptic Descartes, "philosophy has been

cultivated over several centuries by the most excellent minds who have ever lived
and...nevertheless, there is nothing about which there is not some dispute--and thus
nothing which is not doubtful."1 The judgment of man is weakened by the prejudice he
has been taught through common opinion, and more fundamentally, by the defects of his
own body. Descartes introduces his famous radical doubt of all received opinion as an
attempt to clear the ground of this faulty "pre-scientific" understanding. As he remarks in
the Meditations on First Philosophy, "several years have now passed since I first realized
how numerous were the false opinions that in my youth I had taken to be true, and thus
how doubtful were all those that I had subsequently built upon them. And thus I realized
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that once in my life I had to raze everything down to the ground and begin again from the
original foundations, if I wanted to establish anything firm and lasting in the sciences."2
Anthony Ashley Cooper, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury, is an early dissenter from
this project of modern philosophy.

Shaftesbury rejects this new understanding of

philosophy, along with its practical intention of raising new inventions, in favor of an
older understanding. As he explains in a letter to Locke, "what I count true learning, and
all we can profitt by, is to know ourselves." Toward this end, "there is no labour, no
studdy, no learning that I would not undertake."3
Shaftsbury's Characteristicks of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times, etc. was written
to reawaken the notion that true learning is to know ourselves.4 In the course of this
undertaking, Shaftesbury finds it necessary to confront the radical skepticism advanced by
modern philosophy, a skepticism that would reject all received opinion in favor of
scientifically derived knowledge.

This tendency toward radical skepticism and

Shaftesbury's response to it will be examined more closely in Chapter 4.5 In this chapter
we will consider Shaftesbury's own approach to common opinion, which I hope to show
is primarily indebted to the classical understanding of the relationship the between
philosophy and common life.
2
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Classical philosophy agrees with modern philosophy that opinion is not the same
thing as knowledge. Socrates, for example, formulates the distinction this way: "opinion
is dependent on one thing and knowledge on another, each according to its own power."6
But rather than regarding received opinion as the chief obstacle to knowledge, classical
philosophy takes opinion as the best starting point for obtaining knowledge. While
opinion is not knowledge, it is not complete ignorance either; it is, rather, again in the
words of Socrates, somehow "between the two."7

Classical philosophy starts from

opinions--namely, those opinions "which are accepted by all, or by the majority, or by the
most notable and reputable of them"--and proceeds dialectically, by comparing contrary
opinions and criticizing them in turn.8

This dialectical way of inquiry would test

unexamined opinions for the elements of the truth they contain, and try to draw them
upward toward a better understanding.9 In the words of Shaftesbury, it is a chief goal of
philosophy "rectify opinion, on which all depends."10
Shaftesbury's classical philosophy proves unwilling to assume from the beginning
that all common opinion is the product of "chance" and is held only "according to the
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reign of fashion, and the ascendant power of education."11 The Characteristicks as a
whole encourages men "to trust [their] eyes, and take for real the whole creation, and the
fair forms which lie before us."12
Shaftesbury seems to believe that a naïve trust is the necessary presupposition for
any understanding of the world by human beings, although it need not be--indeed, cannot
be--philosophy's final word. By attacking all pre-scientific understandings as defective,
radical skepticism of the sort introduced by modern philosophy unsettles the natural grasp
men have of the world. As we shall see, Shaftesbury believes that philosophy can change
or disrupt opinions as well as improve them. Shaftesbury undertakes his defense partly to
edify the moral opinions he would like to see flourish; yet he has a theoretical motive as
well, for reputable opinions are the best beginning point for serious contemplation of the
world.
We begin our consideration of Shaftesbury's philosophic project with the third
treatise of the Characteristicks, entitled Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author.13 By
investigating the advice Shaftesbury will offer to writers, we hope to find important clues
as to how we should read Shaftesbury himself.

As we proceed we will take into

consideration what might cautiously be regarded as the definitive commentator on
Shaftesbury, namely the "Critic" responsible for the Miscellaneous Reflections which
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comprise Volume III. The Critic will claim that the subjects taken up in the third treatise,
that is, "reflections upon Authors in general, and the Rise and Progress of Arts," actually
"make the Inlet or Introduction to his Philosophy"14

General Overview of Shaftesbury's Soliloquy, or Advice to an
Author
The Critic begins his account of Shaftesbury's third treatise in his own
ŖMiscellany III.ŗ15 After a brief reminder that this treatise must be understood as part of
Shaftesbury's larger project in the Characteristicks, the Critic tells us that the first two
pieces of our author (namely, A Letter concerning Enthusiasm and Sensus Communis)
"kept up his sapping Method, and unraveling Humor, with tolerable good Grace."16
While this "skeptical Mein" [sic] continues into the Soliloquy, whispers of Shaftesbury's
overall project can be overheard as if the author "mutter'd to himself, in a kind of dubious
Whisper, or feign'd Soliloquy."17 The Soliloquy is feigned in part, of course, because the
author is aware that he has an audience. By the end of ŖMiscellany IIIŗ the critic will be
even clearer.

According to the Critic, "[Shaftesbury's] pretence has been to advise

Authors, and polish Styles; but his Aim has been to correct Manners, and regulate Lives.
He has affected Soliloquy, as pretending only to censure Himself; but he has taken
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occasion to bring others into his Company, and make bold with Personages and
Characters of no inferior Rank."18 As we shall see in this chapter, Shaftesbury "holds a
certain Plan or System peculiar to him-self, or such, at least, in which he has a present but
few Companions or Followers."19 As an author, Shaftesbury has as one of his ambitions to
create an audience capable of following him in his plan. After we bring the plan of
Soliloquy to light we will be in a better position to see what the critic means when he
writes that the treatises of Volume I (that is, A Letter concerning Enthusiasm, Sensus
Communis, and Soliloquy) are "preparatory to the Fourth" treatise (An Inquiry concerning
Virtue and Merit).
Soliloquy is the most symmetrical of the treatises in its structure. The treatise is
divided into three parts, and each part is in turn divided into three sections. The general
discussion of the treatise unfolds as follows. Part I introduces the reader to the theme of
dialogue through the literary conceit of the soliloquy. 20 The first section raises the
question of how one can offer advice effectively when men seldom think of themselves
as unwise. Shaftesbury recommends the method of soliloquy as a way to counterbalance
the defects of human temperament, especially when made worse by modern thought.
Through the soliloquy a man divides himself into two persons, "preceptor and
pupil." The dialogue which emerges when this regimen is applied to private use
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inculcates a habit of self-examination. Section two connects the practice of soliloquy to
the Delphic injunction for men to know themselves. In this section Shaftesbury shows
the reader that soliloquy is no simple practice when pursued properly; there are, it seems,
pretenders to the practice that hardly deserve the name. We also learn that the practice of
soliloquy will allow Shaftesbury to distinguish reason from the passions, which have
been conflated by modern projectors to the detriment of philosophic reflection. Reason,
Shaftesbury will argue, is necessary for a well-ordered soul and manifests itself in what
he will describe as "resolution of will." The third section connects what we must now
call the art of soliloquy to liberal education, primarily as represented by its great
progenitor Socrates. This section will also show the way in which the ancient manner of
the Socratic dialogue as a literary form is the natural companion to the self-examination
Shaftesbury is recommending.

We will discuss the style and substance of self-

examination below, but we will also need to consider the lessons of dialogue as they
relate more broadly to Shaftesbury's writing as a whole.
Part II examines several possible obstacles and helpmates to self-examination.
Section one discusses "grandees" and the way magistrates and patrons can help and
hinder the progress of arts and letters.21 Section two takes up the topic of "the critic," a
category of author that includes what we would generally consider critics today (sophists,
say, or intellectuals) but at its highest involves those engaged in genuine philosophic
reflection. In this section--the middle section of the middle part--Shaftesbury offers a
21
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natural cycle of the rise and progress of the arts; he indicates that this cycle unfolds only
in free societies. The third section of Part II considers the proper relationship between an
author and his public and it argues that authors ought to improve the taste of their
audience rather than pander to their fancies. We will discuss this relationship of the
author to the culture.
Part III undertakes a preliminary consideration of what a "better Self" would look
like.22 In section one, Shaftesbury recalls his reader to the classical notion of philosophy,
namely, that "řtis the known Province of Philosophy to teach us ourselves, keep us the
self-same Persons, and so regulate our governing Fancys, Passions, and Humours, as to
make us comprehensible to our selves, and knowable by other Features than those of a
bare Countenance. For řtis not certainly by virtue of our Face merely, that we are
ourselves."23 In filling out his portrait of self-knowledge, Shaftesbury begins to identify
the philosophic missteps he thinks Descartes, Locke, and other modern projectors have
made. He indicates that these "Counter-Philosophers" neglect the most important job of
philosophy--the examination of opinions.

In the third and final section of Part III,

Shaftesbury connects the art of the soliloquy to the development of noble sentiments and a
love for the truth.
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Advice to an Author , Part I: The Method of Soliloquy
 P art I, § 1: The Regi m en of Self -P racti ce

A closer examination of Soliloquy: Or, Advice to an Author will help us
understand the way in which matters of literary style inform Shaftesbury's overall project
in the Characteristicks. In advising authors Shaftesbury will offer important clues to us
as readers of his book as well. After working through his advice, we should then be
better prepared to undertake an examination of his critiques of religion and modern
philosophy.
The engraved frontispiece of Soliloquy displays a triptych. In the center panel we
see through a balconied window a desk with a book and quill and ink. On the wall in
front of the desk is what appears to be a large mirror, angled so that an author might
glance up and see himself. On either side of the central panel are panels each containing
a standing figure holding a looking-glass. In the panel on the left, the figure examines
himself in the looking-glass. Three birds fly freely overhead. In the right-hand panel, the
figure is distracted by three monstrous creatures, one of whom wears a crown or miter.
The figure is frowning and does not look at himself in his looking-glass. Above the
central panel, two bas-relief faces--perhaps Socrates and Plato--look off toward the left,
in the direction of the self-examining figure. As we will soon see, the frontispiece offers
a glimpse into the deepest concerns of the treatise, how one is to obtain self-knowledge.
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Shaftesbury opens the treatise with a reflection on the common maxim "that, as to
what related to private Conduct, No-one was ever the better for Advice."24 This is not
surprising given the fact that advice-givers generally want to show their own wisdom at
the expense of another's defects. This is especially true in questions relating to the
conduct of our own lives. Men "can bear a Master in Mathematicks, in Musick, or in any
other Science; but not in Understanding and Good Sense "25 This puts authors in a
difficult position, for they are generally the "profess'd Masters of Understanding to the
Age." At one time, poets were considered sages, and it was their custom to disguise their
didactic intention. While ancient authors "profess only to please, they secretly advise and
give Instruction."
Shaftesbury's challenge is all the more serious because he hopes to prescribe to
these professed masters, authors themselves. He is excused, he maintains, because his
pretension is not so much to give Advice, as to consider of the Way and Manner
of advising. My Science, if it be any, is no better than that of a Language-Master,
or a Logician. For I have taken it strongly into my head, that there is a certain
Knack or Legerdemain in Argument, by which we may safely proceed to the
dangerous part of advising, and make sure of the good fortune to have our Advice
accepted, if it be any thing worth.26
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We can expect at the very least, then, to learn about a style of discourse which, through
its artfulness, makes a reader receptive to hearing advice. Since men cannot bear taking a
master when it comes to matters of understanding and good sense, Shaftesbury will
prepare his reader to take advice from himself. He will introduce us to the art of
soliloquy.
Shaftesbury likens his practice to surgery. Where is one to learn the art of his sort
of surgery, he wonders. We are fortunate to have hospitals to train surgeons of the body
and also "meek patients who wou'd bear any Incisions, and be prob'd or tented at our
pleasure." Over time, a surgeon of the body might develop the requisite "tenderness of
hand" and be able to combine it with the "greatest Resolution and Boldness."27 In the case
of Shaftesbury's art there are no such hospitals; and while at first one might wonder
where to find a meek patient for practice, in fact one need not seek far: "we have each of
us Our Selves to practice on."28
At first this seems paradoxical, for after all, how is a man to be two men at once,
serving as physician and patient at the same time? To remedy this difficulty, Shaftesbury
borrows from the poets a literary device of self-conversation called the soliloquy.
Through this device, a character "becomes two distinct Persons.

He is Pupil and

Preceptor." Unlike the stage device of soliloquy, however, Shaftesbury recommends that
when we speak aloud to ourselves, we do it without an audience present, and it is here
27
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that we get our first glimpse of the aim of this self-surgery: "company is an extreme
Provocative to Fancy; and, like a hot Bed in Gardening, is apt to make our Imaginations
sprout too fast.

But by this anticipating Remedy of Soliloquy, we may effectually

provide against the Inconvenience."29
Soliloquy, we will see, will serve the salutary purpose of pruning the imagination.
This is not its only purpose, however. Shaftesbury relates a story about a whole nation
that adopted soliloquy as "their Custom...their Religion, and their Law," with the
intention of being identical to themselves whether they were alone or in the company of
others. He speculates that it was introduced by a wise legislator to cure "the Leprosy of
Eloquence" suffered by that people.30
Shaftesbury has no hopes that "our present Manners" would allow such a drastic
measure, but he does hope to show how soliloquy can be applied to private use,
"especially in the case of Authors."31 All truly great wits, according to Shaftesbury, have
considered themselves laughable in public "for their great Loquacity by themselves, and
their profound Taciturnity in Company."

Whether they are poets, orators, or

philosophers, great wits are generally said to be either "composing or raving," and men of
the world cannot seem to distinguish the two. Shaftesbury calls this odd manner--this
"Method of Evacuation"--somehow natural to them. For the more worldly, however,
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their meditations are "obstructed by the fear of a nonconforming Mein [sic] in
Conversation."32 Modern "writers of Memoirs and Essays" are especially guilty of this
vice. While such authors pretend to be practicing the art of soliloquy, they are of course
keenly aware of their audience. This sort of public soliloquy is indecent, and is no
different than a man "taking his Physick in Public." Because they do not practice the art
of soliloquy in the proper way, these authors are able to bring nothing of value to the
public.

Shaftesbury remarks that "tho they are often retir'd, they are never by

themselves."33 Also guilty are many "sanctify'd" authors who pretend they practice
soliloquy when in fact "they can allow nothing to lie conceal'd, which passes in this
religious Commerce and way of Dialogue between them and their Soul." The sanctified
soliloquizer is even worse because of his scorn for "Rules of Criticism and profane
Learning." As we will see when we consider Part II of Soliloquy, the rules of criticism
must take a central role in this didactic art.
In short, Shaftesbury claims that unless a person has examined himself, he will
always be vulnerable to the criticisms of others. Before an author ventures out to an
audience he had better be sure that his writing and his ideas are sound. "řTis the hardest
thing in the world to be a good Thinker," he cautions, "without being a strong SelfExaminer, and thorow-pac'd Dialogist, in this solitary way."34
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 P art I, § 2: The Daem oni c Com pani on, or t he B ett er Self

Becoming a good thinker is taken up again in section 2 of Part I, and this is
connected by Shaftesbury to moving the conversation more directly to the topic of
morals.

Shaftesbury begins his discussion by reviving a literary conceit from the

ancients, offering us a hint of what his model of good thinking will most resemble. "I
might perhaps very justifiably take occasion here to enter into a spacious Field of
Learning, to shew the Antiquity of that Opinion, 'That we have each of us a Daemon,
Genius, Angel, or Guardian-Spirit, to whom we were strictly join'd, and committed, from
our earliest Dawn of Reason, or Moment of our Birth."35 While Shaftesbury denies that
this notion was taken as literally true by ancient authors, it served as a useful purpose. It is
no slight thing to compare a human faculty to a divine guest in our soul: by elevating the
origin of this companion our reverence is increased; on the other hand, ignoring one's
daemon would be an act of sacrilege. If, as Shaftesbury has suggested, it is possible to
find a patient or pupil in ourselves, it may also be possible to locate an appropriate
preceptor. The duplicity of soul recommended by the art of soliloquy follows this longestablished conceit of the ancients. According to this ancient practice of private retreat,
as this Recess was deep and intimate, and the Dual Number practically form'd in
Us, we were suppos'd to advance in Morals and true Wisdom. This, they thought,
was the only way of composing Matters in our Breast, and establishing that
Subordinacy, which alone cou'd make Us agree with our-selves, and be of a-piece
within. They esteem'd this a more religious Work than any Prayers, or other Duty
in the Temple. And this they advis'd Us to carry thither, as the best Offering
which cou'd be made.36
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The practice was a way of following the famous inscription over the temple of Delphi:
"Recognize Your-self which was as much as to say, Divide yourself, or Be Two. For if
the Division were rightly made, all within wou'd of course, they thought, be rightly
understood, and prudently manag'd."37 This is not only good advice; it is a divine
injunction.
But how are we to make this division in the right way? Shaftesbury indicates that
it is no easy matter. Only philosophers and wise men practice this art in its fullest sense.
Knaves and fools are never truly alone, regardless of their pretense. Shaftesbury does not
mean by this that they are troubled by their conscience whenever they have time for
reflection. The problem is rather that they fail to make the proper division and cannot
raise "a Companion; who being fairly admitted into Partnership, wou'd quickly mend his
Partner, and set his Affairs on a right foot." There are many pretenders to this art of
soliloquy. In fact, Shaftesbury suspects that the reader will think the profound Lover to
be "no stranger to our propos'd Method of Practice."38 Yet even when retiring to the
woods, the impassioned lover imagines himself to be with his mistress. So too with the
Mystic, who "instead of looking narrowly into his own Nature and Mind, that he may be
no longer a Mystery to himself…is taken up with the Contemplation of other mysterious
Natures, which he can never explain or comprehend."39 The false practitioner is not
37
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sincerely seeking self-knowledge, which Shaftesbury identifies with carefully scrutinizing
his own "Nature and Mind."
How is it that man is a mystery to himself? At first glance it might seem a small
thing to know our own minds; people generally think that they do. Who better than each
for himself to say "what our main Scope was; what we plainly drove at, and what we
propos'd to our-selves, as our End, in every Occurrence of our Lives?" Yet this
commonplace opinion fails to see the extent to which our very thoughts are formed by the
world around us. Shaftesbury writes, "our Thoughts have generally such an obscure
implicit Language, that řtis the hardest thing in the world to make 'em speak out
distinctly."40 The goal of philosophy is to make these obscured thoughts of men come
more clearly into view. Philosophy would have us hold a "vocal Looking-Glass" up so
that we can see ourselves honestly or "in the plainest manner."41 The true practitioner of
soliloquy will have at his disposal a method that lays bare his deepest opinions. It is easy
for a man to deceive himself and appear foolish when he is in the company of others; it is
more difficult, however, to appear a fool to one's truest self. When practicing honestly,
the soliloquizer will, it is hoped, come to abhor the lie of the soul, "for so true a
Reverence has every-one for himself, when he comes clearly to appear before his close
Companion, that he had rather profess the vilest things of himself in open Company, than
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hear his Character privately from his own Mouth."42 As we shall see, Shaftesbury is
perfectly aware that men generally lack self-knowledge, and what is more, that they often
go to great lengths to avoid having it. In public especially, men are encouraged to consult
their "interests" above the better aspects of their character. Part of Shaftesbury's intention
in Advice to an Author is to make the prospect of a better self attractive again.
Shaftesbury shares a story to caution the reader that it is no easy thing to know
oneself. The story involves "A VIRTUOUS young Prince of a heroick Soul, capable of
Love and Friendship" and a young nobleman, who was a favorite of the Prince. Once
upon a time the Prince made war on a hateful tyrant, and through his "clemency and
bounty" as much as his martial virtues, the Prince won to his side many of the tyrant's
former subjects. It came to pass, however, that the castle of a potentate still loyal to the
tyrant fell to the forces of the virtuous Prince. The young nobleman discovered in this
castle the new bride of the vanquished potentate, and taking her captive he quickly sought
out his friend the Prince. The youth praised the beauty and manner of the captive as
beyond his ability to describe and urged the prince to see this wonder. Much to the
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surprise of the youth the Prince declines to meet her. The Prince does not want her
beauty to distract him from more urgent business.
"Wou'd you, Sir! persuade me then," said the young Nobleman, smiling, "that a
fair Face can have such Power as to force the Will it-self, and constrain a Man in
any respect to act contrary to what he thinks becoming him? Are we to hearken to
the Poets in what they tell us of that Incendiary Love, and his irresistible Flames?
A real Flame, we see, burns all alike. But that imaginary one of Beauty hurts only
those who are consenting. It affects no otherwise, than as we ourselves are
pleas'd to allow it. In many Cases we absolutely command it: as where Relation
and Consanguinity are in the nearest degree. Authority and Law, we see, can
master it. But 'twou'd be vain as well as unjust, for any Law to intermeddle or
prescribe, were not the Case voluntary, and our Will entirely free."43
In this speech, the youth shows how little he understands about human psychology. Our
freedom of will can be constrained by our passions, which seem to have their own
necessity at times. Don't men fall in love and lose their liberty, wonders the Prince? The
youth replies that this is true only for wretches. Such men use "irresistible Necessity" as
an excuse to commit many offenses. Only the debauched become victims of beauty and
love: "they who are honest and just, can admire and love whatever is beautiful; without
offering at anything beyond what is allow'd." The youth observes that he has spoken with
this beauty and "yet am my-self still." With this, the Prince makes the beautiful captive a
ward of the noble youth, requesting that he "be ever the same Man: and look to your
Charge carefully, as becomes you."44
Of course the noble youth by degrees becomes more familiar with his ward and
eventually falls hopelessly in love; he then sinks into a deep melancholia. It is in this
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shameful condition that the Prince finds him. The Prince assumes responsibility for the
youth's condition, for he should have known better than to match him against "that
unequal Adversary" Love.45 As a remedy for the youth's ailment, the Prince asks him to
"retire only for a while." In his absence the youth learns to study himself more carefully
and upon his return the youth announces that:
"well am I now satisfy'd, that I have in reality within me two distinct separate
Souls. This Lesson of Philosophy I have learnt from that villanous Sophister
Love. For řtis impossible to believe, that having one and the same Soul, it shou'd
be actually both Good and Bad, passionate for Virtue and Vice, desirous of
Contrarys. No. There must of necessity be Two: and when the Good prevails, řtis
then we act handsomly; when the Ill, then basely and villanously. Such was my
Case. For lately the Ill Soul was wholly Master. But now the Good prevails, by
your assistance; and I am plainly a new Creature, with quite another
Apprehension, another Reason, another Will."46
Thus the noble youth learns the philosophic "doctrine of Two Persons in one
individual self," although not, it should be noted, without help from the Prince. Without
assistance he was not able "to form this Distinction justly and according to Art."
Shaftesbury will emphasize the role of art in the pursuit of self-knowledge in the next
section.
Shaftesbury draws the following lesson from the story: "Let Will be ever so free,
Humour and Fancy, we see, govern it."47 As long as we are subject to shifting fancies, we
will never enjoy firmness of will, for our fancies will move us without our consent or
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understanding.

Yet it may be that we are not entirely powerless in their face.

Shaftesbury writes,
and by what I can observe of the World, Fancy and Opinion stand pretty much
upon the same bottom. So that if there be no certain Inspector or Auditor
establish'd within us, to take account of these Opinions and Fancys in due form,
and minutely to animadvert upon their several Growths and Habits, we are as little
like to continue a Day in the same Will, as a Tree, during a Summer, in the same
Shape, without the Gard'ner's Assistance, and the vigorous Application of the
Sheers and Pruning-Knife.42
With the help of an internal inspector or auditor, our opinions and fancies can be examined
and known for what they really are.48 Only by knowing the opinions which inform our
character can we can develop resolution or a firmness of will. Solid character is in this
sense the result of deliberate pruning.

While we will investigate the response of

Shaftesbury to Hobbes at length in Chapter 4, we should note in passing that Shaftesbury's
concern for developing a resolute will stands as a challenge to the definition of will
offered by Hobbes. According to Hobbes, the will is merely the last relevant moment of
deliberation before a man acts.

"In Deliberation," he writes, "the last Appetite, or

Aversion, immediately adhaering to the action or omission, thereof, is that wee call the
WILL; the ACT, (not the faculty,) of Willing."49 Shaftesbury's better self--a second soul-works to restore the common-sense notion that the will is indeed a faculty, free to
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deliberate. It is not merely the pre-determined moment at the end of a sequence of cause
and effect.
Without the assistance of the Prince, the young nobleman found that he could not
govern his passions. The Prince understood this because he understood better the true
nature of mankind. According to Shaftesbury, appetite and reason are brothers, but
appetite is older of the two. It should come as no surprise that appetite, being naturally
older and stronger than reason, will have the advantage in any contest. Shaftesbury
compares the struggle to control the will to a contested "top or foot-ball." The brothers
are poorly matched until "the youngest, instead of now and then a Kick or Lash bestow'd
to little purpose, forsakes the Ball or Top it-self, and begins to lay about his elder
Brother."50 Only after such harsh treatment will the older brother, like a coward, grow
civil and play fair. It is here that Shaftesbury's method of soliloquy must be deployed:
when by a certain powerful Figure of inward Rhetorick, the Mind apostrophizes
its own Fancys, raises 'em in their proper Shapes and Personages, and addresses
'em familiarly, without the least Ceremony or Respect. By this means it will soon
happen, that Two form'd Partys will erect themselves within. For the
Imaginations or Fancys being thus roundly treated, are forc'd to declare
themselves, and take party. Those on the side of the elder Brother Appetite, are
strangely subtle and insinuating. They have always the Faculty to speak by Nods
and Winks. By this practice they conceal half their meaning, and, like modern
Politicians, pass for deeply wise, and adorn themselves with the finest Pretext and
most specious Glosses imaginable; till being confronted with their Fellows of a
plainer Language and Expression, they are forc'd to quit their mysterious Manner,
and discover themselves mere Sophisters and Impostors, who have not the least to
do with the Party of Reason and good Sense.51
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The method of soliloquy compels our fancies and opinions to show themselves as they are.
We will have to see if Shaftesbury is able to trace opinions back to something more solid
than mere convention. He will indicate how we might begin to do this in the third part of
this treatise.
If the company of others is an "extreme Provocative to Fancy" akin to a "hot Bed"
or greenhouse, the art of soliloquy is a tool for the careful gardener. One of Shaftesbury's
aims in Soliloquy is to encourage the reader to undertake the regimen necessary to
develop such a gardener within, whom he calls an inspector or auditor. He confesses "we
hope also that our Patient (for such we naturally suppose our Reader) will consider duly
with himself, that what he endures in this Operation is for no inconsiderable end, since
řtis to gain him a Will, and insure him a certain Resolution; by which he shall know
where to find himself."52 Through a "Legerdemain in Argument" which he had alerted us
to expect, Shaftesbury has assumed the role of Prince to his noble reader. Men in general
will benefit from this advice, but the prospective author must without question undertake
the exercise Shaftesbury recommends. "He who deals in Characters, must of necessity
know his own; or he will know nothing."53
 P art I, § 3: The Art of t he Di al ogue

We remarked that the young nobleman was unable to begin the hard work of
scrutinizing his fancies without the assistance of the Prince.
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encourages his reader to honor reason as a daemon, genius, or angel, he recognizes that
good sense does not spring forth fully-formed. In section 3 of Part I he begins to address
the role of art in shaping human nature. He begins by considering the "Action and Grace"
of a person who has been taught by "Nature only" to one who has benefited from
"Reflection, and the assistance of Art."54 Shaftesbury concedes that there are individuals
whose nature is so extraordinary that they are able to achieve some measure of "Grace
and Comeliness" despite having received the rudest of educations.

There are also

individuals who, while receiving the best of educations, fail to achieve any measure of
gracefulness. Nevertheless, "řtis undeniable however, that the Perfection of Grace and
Comeliness in Action and Behaviour, can be found only among the People of a liberal
Education.

And even among the graceful of this kind, those still are found the

gracefullest, who early in their Youth have learnt their Exercises, and form'd their
Motions under the best Masters."55 Education can make a tremendous difference in the
development of a gentleman. Since the ostensible concern of Shaftesbury in this treatise is
to advise authors, however, he must speak not of a gentleman's tutors but of
"Philosophers, and Philosophy."
Just as a gentleman must practice in private before performing "exercises of the
genteeler kind" in public, so the writer must master the "several Motions, Counterpoises
and Balances of the Mind and Passions." According to Shaftesbury, there are no better
54

Ibid., 1.118.

55

Ibid., 1.118-19.

48

masters for this than Socrates and his disciples. He quotes Horace's Ars Poetica to
illustrate the point:
Sound knowledge is the first requisite for writing well;
The books of Socrates' school will yield you the matter.56
Ordinary gentlemen or writers, those who have no ambition to write for the age or
posterity, need not penetrate the "vast Depths into Learning or Philosophy." But should
writers aspire to produce excellent work and "of a nature to intitle 'em to hold the Rank of
Authors," serious study and practice are necessary.

Even a fraud can acquire the

equipment of an artist without mastering an art:
the Horse alone can never make the Horseman; nor Limbs the Wrestler or the
Dancer. No more can a Genius alone make a Poet; or good Parts a Writer, in any
considerable kind. The Skill and Grace of Writing is founded, as our wise Poet
tells us, in Knowledg and good Sense: and not barely in that Knowledg, which is
to be learnt from common Authors, or the general Conversation of the World; but
from those particular Rules of Art, which Philosophy alone exhibits.57
Nowhere are the rules of this art better exhibited than in the classical form of the Socratic
dialogue, which for Shaftesbury forms the core of a liberal education. As a literary form,
the dialogue works to school a reader in the method of soliloquy. Dialogues educate a
person in soliloquy through their attention to "Characters and Manners." Shaftesbury
seems to disagree with those modern scholars (largely of the analytic school) who would
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distinguish a "philosopher Plato" from a "literary Plato."58 In the account of Soliloquy,
Shaftesbury explains his own approach to reading dialogues.
According to Shaftesbury, it is essential to the dialogic form that:
they were either real Dialogues, or Recitals of such personated Discourses; where
the Persons themselves had their Characters preserv'd thro'out; their Manners,
Humours, and distinct Turns of Temper and Understanding maintain'd, according
to the most exact poetical Truth. řTwas not enough that these Pieces treated
fundamentally of Morals, and in consequence pointed out real Characters and
Manners: They exhibited 'em alive, and set the Countenances and Complexions
of Men plainly in view. And by this means they not only taught Us to know
Others; but, what was principal and of highest virtue in 'em, they taught us to
know Our-selves.59
The action and temperament of the characters in a dialogue are more than a way of
making abstruse arguments agreeable to a reader.

Poetical truth fuses "action and

imitation" to the treatment of the subject. The characters of the dialogue acted and
behaved in such a way that their very "countenances and complexions" were part of the
philosophic argument advanced. It is only by considering character that we can discern
the full lesson of a dialogue; only then will they teach us "to know Our-selves"60
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But just how does this work? Everyone knows that the dialogical poems of
antiquity had a "Philosophical Hero...whose Name they carry'd both in their Body and
Front, and whose Genius and Manner they were made to represent, was in himself a
perfect Character." It is no accident that we speak of a "Socratic Method" and "The
Socratic Dialogue."61 Yet understanding this philosophical hero is not a straightforward
matter; Socrates is notoriously ironical. Shaftesbury observes that while Socrates might
seem easy to reckon in the dialogues, he actually appeared "in some respects, so veil'd,
and in a Cloud, that to the unattentive Surveyor he seem'd often to be very different from
what he really was: and this chiefly by reason of a certain exquisite and refin'd Raillery
which belong'd to his Manner, and by virtue of which he cou'd treat the highest Subjects,
and those of the commonest Capacity both together, and render 'em explanatory of each
other."62 The philosophic hero of the dialogue remains somewhat mysterious because the
dialogue manages to combine "the heroick and the simple, the tragick, and the comick
Vein." It is, however, the secondary characters who hold the most interest for Shaftesbury
here. These "second Characters shew'd human Nature more distinctly, and to the Life"
than Socrates because we recognize ourselves in them immediately.
61
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characters invite us to the hard work of self-knowledge. Shaftesbury writes, "we might
here, therefore, as in a Looking-Glass, discover our-selves, and see our minutest Features
nicely delineated, and suted to our own Apprehension and Cognizance. No-one who was
ever so little a-while an Inspector, cou'd fail of becoming acquainted with his own
Heart."63 Through a long acquaintance with this form of self-scrutiny, a person acquires a
"peculiar speculative Habit such that they have a "Pocket-Mirrour" always at their
disposal. Having internalized the habit of inspection, they are able to see both persons of
their single self when they gaze into the mirror, "One of them, like the commanding
Genius, the Leader and Chief above-mention'd; the other like that rude, undisciplin'd and
headstrong Creature, whom we ourselves in our natural Capacity most exactly
resembled."64 Socratic dialogues teach attentive men the proper relationship between
reason and the passions not simply through so-called Platonic doctrines but through the
very form of writing.
Shaftesbury traces the origin of the dialogue to early poets who wrote "Mimes"
and observes that "poetry it-self was defin'd an Imitation chiefly of Men and Manners:
and was that in an exalted and noble degree, which in a low one we call Mimickry." For
Shaftesbury, Homer, "Father and Prince of Poets," showed the world that poetry could
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mirror reality in a way that provoked contemplation. His descriptions of character and
event are so compelling that they serve as their own interpreter. Homer:
describes no Qualitys or Virtues; censures no Manners: makes no Encomiums,
nor gives Characters himself; but brings his Actors still in view. řTis they who
shew themselves. řTis they who speak in such a manner, as distinguishes 'em in
all things from all others, and makes 'em ever like themselves. Their different
Compositions and Allays so justly made, and equally carry'd on, thro' every
particle of the Action, give more Instruction than all the Comments or Glosses in
the world.65
Similarly, dialogues are so self-contained that the reader is brought into direct contact with
the character as thinker.
As a literary mode, dialogue works to put the reader directly into the
conversation. Shaftesbury observes that, "here the Author is annihilated; and the Reader
being no way apply'd to, stands for Nobody."66 Both author and reader recede into the
background and the reader, should he choose, is presented with the characters and their
arguments directly. Yet in a dialogue it is not simply the soundness of the argument that
is in question. Arguments are presented by a certain character and embedded in a
particular conversation. The reader of a dialogue must survey the drama as well as the
argument and consider the motives, the background, the education, and the moral and
intellectual faculties of the characters. "The understanding here must have its Mark, its
characteristick Note, by which it may be distinguish'd. It must be such and such an
Understanding; as when we say, for instance, such or such a face: since Nature has
65
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characteriz'd Tempers and Minds as peculiarly as Faces."67 Unlike mathematical treatises
and prayers, dialogues are both ab homine and ad hominem.
It should not be thought that lending the flavor of a particular place and time to a
work is sufficient to make a dialogue, however. Shaftesbury briefly recounts a dialogue,
"fram'd, after the manner of our antient Authours." In his parody, the characters have
affected archaic speech: "You are going then...to pay your Devotions yonder at the
temple?"68 As he borrows this sketch from Plato's Euthyphro, Shaftesbury anticipates "a
thousand Ridicules arising from the Manner, the Circumstances and Action it-self,
compar'd with modern Breeding and Civility." He proposes introducing modern clothing
and accents, and modern mores as well: "bows, and simpering Faces...Preludes, Excuses,
Compliments," and other affectations of "Ceremony."69
This remedy proves inadequate. Much as he deplores the fact, Shaftesbury fears
that the "Coquetry of a modern Author" somehow suits the manners and mores of the
modern "fashionable world." Should an author hold the mirror of dialogue up to a
modern face, modern man would recoil at his own ugliness. "If we avoid Ceremony, we
are unnatural: if we use it, and appear as we naturally are, as we salute, and meet, and treat
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one another, we hate the Sight." Sadly, one might have to conclude that the art of
"dialogue is at an end."70
The Ancients could bear the honest tool of dialogue but moderns apparently
cannot: "Ugly Instrument! And for this reason to be hated." Yet modern authors still
have the written works of antiquity, "those Philosophical Sea-Cards, by which the
adventurous Genius's of the Times were wont to steer their Courses, and govern their
impetuous Muse."71 To find one's better self, Shaftesbury recommends taking ancient
masters:
and thus Poetry and the Writer's Art, as in many respects it resembles the
Statuary's and the Painter's, so in this more particularly, that it has its original
Draughts and Models for Study and Practice; not for Ostentation, to be shown
abroad, or copy'd for publick view. These are the antient Busts; the Trunks of
Statues; the Pieces of Anatomy; the masterly rough Drawings which are kept
within; as the secret Learning, the Mystery, and fundamental Knowledg of the
Art.72
Since the writer deals immediately with matters of the soul, Shaftesbury maintains that by
submitting to "real masters" writers will inevitably improve and be amended "in their
better Part."
Shaftesbury does not call on authors to become mere antiquarians, however.
Having obtained a truer notion of writing, and consequently of soulcraft, through the study
of dialogue, Shaftesbury hopes that authors will come to "deserve the Name of Poet." A
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true poet "can describe both Men and Manners, and give to an Action its just Body and
proportions." Such is the art of the poet, but according to Shaftesbury this activity is
inevitably moral in its compass:
such a Poet is indeed a second Maker; a just Prometheus, under Jove. Like that
Sovereign Artist or universal Plastick Nature, he forms a Whole, coherent and
proportion'd in it-self, with due Subjection and Subordinacy of constituent Parts.
He notes the Boundarys of the Passions, and knows their exact Tones and
Measures; by which he justly represents them, marks the Sublime of Sentiments
and Action, and distinguishes the Beautiful from the Deform 'd, the Amiable from
the Odious. The moral Artist, who can thus imitate the Creator, and is thus
knowing in the inward Form and Structure of his Fellow-Creature, will hardly, I
presume, be found unknowing in Himself or at a loss in those Numbers which
make the Harmony of a Mind. For Knavery is mere Dissonance and
Disproportion. And tho Villains may have strong Tones and natural Capacitys of
Action; řtis impossible that true Judgment and Ingenuity shou'd reside, where
Harmony and Honesty have no being.73
The true poet "forms a Whole" in imitation of the Creator. But what exactly is the poet to
take as his model for imitation? It is defensible to argue that poetry has an inevitable
moral effect, but is it equally defensible to claim that the effect is salutary? Shaftesbury
himself argues that modern poets fail to improve men. How then are we to know what the
true model for man is, apart from the "coquetry" we find around us? What evidence is
there that "řtis impossible that true Judgment and Ingenuity shou'd reside, where Harmony
and Honesty have no being?" We will have to see whether Shaftesbury, beyond leading
men to a certain aporia, is also able to make them moral, and whether he is able to offer us
a naturally defensible model of the good. It is a question we must return to in our
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consideration of Part III. (Even a tentative answer to that question will have to await
Chapter 5.)

Advice to an Author , Part II: the Rise and Progress of the Arts
Having introduced the reader to the "Discipline, and qualifying Method of SelfExamination," Shaftesbury interrupts his account of "this Mystery" to consider other
important matters. Part II, to which we now turn our attention, calls us from looking
inward to look outward: now "we shou'd consider the Advantages or Disadvantages our
Authors may possibly meet with, from abroad: and how far their Genius may be
depress'd or rais'd by any external Causes, arising from the Humour or Judgment of the
World."74 In Part II, Shaftesbury presents a complicated analysis of morals and manners
and their relationship to the arts.

The first section considers the way political

arrangements shape the culture by setting the conditions for the rise and progress of the
arts.

This analysis continues in the second section, where Shaftesbury presents an

account of this progress in more detail and with an eye toward poetic craftsmanship. I
will show that Shaftsbury is especially interested in the "serious play" of the comic style,
which enables the philosopher to examine the solemn and grave opinions of his age with
greater freedom. We will take that opportunity to consider the role humor plays in
Shaftesbury's own work by casting a glance at the account of "raillery" Shaftesbury offers
in the treatise Sensus Communis. This will allow us to understand better the way Volume
I works to prepare the reader for the treatises of Volume II. The last part of section two
74
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draws parallels between the poetical styles he has discussed and the development of
philosophy.

Finally, we will turn to the last section of Part II, which invites

contemporary authors to take the lead in polishing the tastes of the public.
 P art II, § 1: Grandees and t he Im port ance Of Li bert y

While Shaftesbury takes Socrates as his literary and philosophic model, he is not
as likely as Socrates to be "overwhelmed with ridicule" on account of his political
schemes.75 Unlike Plato's Socrates, who seems to have proposed a regime where
philosophers ruled, Shaftesbury proposes the opposite. Shaftesbury does not hope for
another Solomon who will be an "Author-Sovereign." He writes that "however it be, I
wou'd not willingly take upon me to recommend this Author-Character to our future
Princes. Whatever Crowns or Laurels their renown'd Predecessors may have gather'd in
this Field of Honour; I shou'd think that for the future, the speculative Province might
more properly be committed to private Heads."76 Shaftesbury's advice is based in part on
his doubt that absolute monarchs are likely to practice the art of soliloquy. "Single and
absolute Persons in Government, I'm sensible, can hardly be consider'd as any other than
single and absolute in Morals. They have no Inmate-Controuler to cavil with 'em, or
dispute their Pleasure." They are unlikely to have an occasion to call themselves into
question. "Inclination and Will in such as these, admit as little Restraint or Check in
private Meditation as in publick Company. The World, which serves as a Tutor to
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Persons of an inferior rank, is submissive to these Royal Pupils; who from their earliest
days are us'd to see even their Instructors bend before 'em, and hear every thing applauded
which they themselves perform."77
This passage might come as a surprise given the general tenor of Part I. It is not
so surprising that magistrates will seldom find compelling reasons to doubt their own
opinions; but in what way are we to see "the World" as a tutor, given Shaftesbury's
concern that company inflames and confuses the imagination?
The reader is offered a clue in the Critic's "Third Miscellany."

The Critic

observes there that the scope of "our Author" extends beyond the reform of the literary
style of individual writers.

His "design is to advance something new, or at least

something different from what is commonly current in Philosophy and Morals."78 While
Shaftesbury begins close to home with the method of soliloquy, this art of "selfdiscourse" is not self-sufficient. The method itself is to be learned at the hand of ancient
masters; but the content of the self is to be drawn from the world around us; and the
practice is to be undertaken by individuals for themselves. While reflection requires a
habit of solitary contemplation, the world provides the opinions to be considered. The
Critic writes,
this Correspondence, according to his Computation, is wholly impracticable,
without a previous Commerce with the World: And the larger this Commerce is,
the more practicable and improving the other, he thinks, is likely to prove. The
Sources of this improving Art of Self-correspondence he derives from the highest
77
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Politeness and Elegance of antient Dialogue, and Debate, in matters of Wit,
Knowledg, and Ingenuity.79
While Shaftesbury has shown disdain for modern fashions and mores and while he will
prove critical of the sophisticated opinions of his day, his philosophy is meant to be a
living activity. Just as dialectic begins by considering opinions "which are accepted by
all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable of them," Shaftesbury will
address the most prominent opinions of his day. In Chapter 3 ("A Storm of Devotion and
Zeal") we will consider his treatment of Christianity and political life. In Chapter 4 ("The
Œconomy of the Passions") we take up the prominent opinions of modern philosophy.
Throughout the Characteristicks Shaftesbury will show particular interest in morally
serious gentlemen, those "gentlemen of fashion…to whom a natural good genius, or force
of good education, has given a sense of what is naturally graceful or becoming."80 We'll
see that it is such gentlemen who are the most receptive to "the fair forms," are most likely
to "call the universe an order but not a disorder," and are most likely to follow
Shaftesbury's lead in seeking self-knowledge.81 As the Critic observes,
nothing, according to our Author, can so well revive this self-corresponding
Practice, as the same Search and Study of the highest Politeness in modern
Conversation. For this, we must necessarily be at the pains of going further
abroad than the Province we call Home. And, by this Account, it appears that our
Author has little hopes of being either relish'd or comprehended by any other of
his Country-men, than those who delight in the open and free Commerce of the
World, and are rejoic'd to gather Views, and receive Light from every Quarter; in
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order to judg the best of what is perfect, and according to a just Standard, and true
Taste in every kind.82
Not willing to leave matters to chance, however, the Characteristicks as a whole will be
working to help such views make their way in the world.83 In section two, we will see that
he is concerned with cultivating such conversation among his countrymen as well.
Toward this end, Shaftesbury has turned his attention to the ways authors receive
advantages and disadvantages from "Grandees and Men in Power." We have already
remarked Shaftesbury's preference that the Sovereign abstain from writing books. This
concern will reappear in his policy recommendations to the magistrate regarding
Christianity, and is connected to his desires to see greater liberty for authors and
thinkers.84 Shaftesbury's Whiggery is apparent in this concern:
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řtis scarce a quarter of an Age since such a happy Balance of Power was settled
between our Prince and People, as has firmly secur'd our hitherto precarious
Libertys, and remov'd from us the Fear of civil Commotions, Wars and Violence,
either on account of Religion and Worship, the Property of the Subject, or the
contending Titles of the Crown. But as the greatest Advantages of this World are
not to be bought at easy Prices; we are still at this moment expending both our
Blood and Treasure, to secure to our-selves this inestimable Purchase of our Free
Government and National Constitution.85
In Soliloquy, however, he is most concerned about tilling to make the soil better for
authors. Shaftesbury traces the rise and progress of the arts to the existence of free
government: poetic liberty correlates with political liberty. The Critic emphasizes that
Shaftesbury's reflections on authors combined with "the Rise and Progress of Arts"
provides "the Inlet or Introduction to his Philosophy." As we will see in our discussion
of the central section of Part II, "Philosophy it-self, as a Science and known Profession
worthy of that name, cannot with any probability be suppos'd to have risen (as our Author
shews) till other Arts had been rais'd, and, in a certain proportion, advanc'd before it."86
According to the Critic, Shaftesbury has noticed in his study of the ancients "the real
Lineage and Succession of Wit." This lineage is "plainly founded in Nature: as our Author
has endeavour'd to make appear both from History and Fact."87 While many early
nations seemed to have discovered useful arts (the Critic mentions the Egyptians and
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others), it is only in "the Greek Nation" that the polite arts and sciences developed. The
Critic traces this fact to the "fortunate Constitution of that People." He writes,
for tho compos'd of different Nations, distinct in Laws and Governments, divided
by Seas and Continents, dispers'd in distant Islands; yet being originally of the
same Extract, united by one single Language, and animated by that social, publick
and free Spirit, which notwithstanding the Animosity of their several warring
States, induc'd them to erect such heroick Congresses and Powers as those which
constituted the Amphictonian Councils, the Olympick, Isthmian, and other
Games; they cou'd not but naturally polish and refine each other.88
The Critic denies that the Greeks imported their arts from other nations. "The
utmost which cou'd be nam'd, wou'd amount to no more than raw Materials, of a rude and
barbarous form. And thus the Nation was evidently Original in Art." This is a very
important distinction, for in it we see that for Shaftesbury the progress of the arts is
connected to nature more than what will come to be called the spirit of history. His model
appeals to the way human beings naturally respond to a confluence of circumstances.
With the Greeks, the arts were "self-form 'd, wrought out of Nature, and drawn from the
necessary Operation and Course of things, working, as it were, of their own accord, and
proper inclination."89 Having said this, however, it seems reasonable to see the roots of
historical thinking in this account, especially as it comes to light in Shaftesbury's
descendants in the Scottish Enlightenment.
Be that as it may, Shaftesbury connects the flourishing of the arts to free
government. For this reason, he is hopeful that England is ripe for a revival and advance
88

Ibid., 3.85-86.

89

Ibid., 3.87.

63

of the arts and sciences. "We are now in an Age when Liberty is once again in its
Ascendant. And we are our-selves the happy Nation, who not only enjoy it at home, but
by our Greatness and Power give Life and Vigour to it abroad; and are the Head and
Chief of the European League, founded on this Common Cause."90 On account of this,
Shaftesbury suggests that only a respite from war would be needed for the "arts and
studys" to enjoy great improvement.
Shaftesbury encourages the grandees to maintain a "generous and impartial regard
to Merit in the arts," for "wherever the Author-Practice and Liberty of the Pen has in the
least prevail'd, the Governors of the State must be either considerable Gainers, or
Sufferers by its means." Still, he exhorts them to patronize the arts generously while
leaving the making of art to the true poets.
 P art II, § 2: Cri t i cks and t he Im port ance of Craf t sm anshi p

In section one of Part II, Shaftesbury introduced the reader to the importance of
liberty for the "the Rise and Progress of Arts." He continues this theme into section two,
where he will offer a natural pattern for that progress as a corrective to the modern view
of poetry and philosophy. According to Shaftesbury, the modern understanding of poetic
creation holds "that by his Genius alone, and a natural Rapidity of Style and Thought,
[the poet] is able to carry all before him; that he plays with his Business, does things in
passing, at a venture, and in the quickest period of Time."91
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The model is one of inspiration, emphasizing the role of the divine and
minimizing the role of craftsmanship in the making of poetry. What is more, the modern
style encourages boasting in the form of "prefaces, dedications, and introductions." This
is the opposite of the spirit responsible for the greatness of antiquity. Shaftesbury
recommends an "Attick Elegance" which hides the labor of the writer under a demeanor
of carelessness:
when [ancient poets] had so polish'd their piece, and render'd it so natural and
easy, that it seem'd only a lucky flight, a hit of thought, or flowing vein of humour;
they were then chiefly concern'd lest it should in reality pass for such, and their
artifice remain undiscover'd. They were willing it shou'd be known how serious
their play was; and how elaborate their freedom and facility.92
While Shaftesbury's style is always playful, it is always in the service of a serious purpose.
(We discuss Shaftesbury's use of serious play when we turn to his treatment of "raillery,"
below.)
Excellent craftsmanship requires judgment honed by what Shaftesbury calls
Criticism. He writes, "accuracy of Workmanship requires a Critick's Eye. řTis lost upon
a vulgar Judgment. Nothing grieves a real Artist more than that indifference of the
Publick, which suffers Work to pass uncriticiz'd." A man's genius alone is insufficient,
which at best accomplishes an outward show serving to "to turn the Eye from a direct and
steddy Survey of his Piece."93 For this reason, Shaftesbury resists the tendency of his age
to complain about "criticks." Far from being the enemy of the "Commonwealth of Wit
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and Letters," he argues that "they are the Props and Pillars of this Building; and that
without the Encouragement and Propagation of such a Race, we shou'd remain as
Gothick Architects as ever."
According to Shaftesbury, the faculty of language in human beings is open to
extensive refinement.

The highest achievements of such refinement come about,

however, as the result of deliberate advancing of the art of poetry by men. One is
unlikely to find mastery of language when men are in a rude state; language would at best
facilitate mutual understanding for the sake of providing for necessities:
their expos'd and indigent State cou'd not be presum'd to afford 'em either that full
Leisure, or easy Disposition which was requisite to raise 'em to any Curiosity of
Speculation. They who were neither safe from Violence, nor secure of Plenty,
were unlikely to engage in unnecessary Arts. Nor cou'd it be expected they shou'd
turn their Attention towards the Numbers of their Language, and the harmonious
Sounds which they accidentally emitted.94
As society came to rest on a more solid foundation, however, and matters of public
importance had to be debated and decided, men soon learned the value of persuasion.
Shaftesbury suggests that "the Goddess Persuasion must have been in a manner the
Mother of Poetry, Rhetorick, Musick, and the other kindred Arts." Those men who were
able to form not only the best arguments but those who could speak most beautifully
came to the fore in a polity; such men used speech "to charm the Publick Ear, and to
incline the Heart, by the Agreeableness of Expression."95

94

Ibid., 1.146.

95

Ibid.

66

Shaftesbury points out that the most ancient traditions suggest that the founders of
great cities were musicians and poets. Such men were students of "the Numbers of
Speech," and through their "proportionable Improvements in the Study of mere Sounds
and natural Harmony" they contributed to the softening of the manners of their newly
formed nation. Because persuasion is unnecessary where public affairs are decided by
force, it is only the free society, "made by Consent and voluntary Association," that acts
as a nursery for the arts. Because free societies esteem elocution, public men undertake
the study of rhetoric. The softer manners and temperament of free people made them
"more treatable in a way of Reason and Understanding, and more subject to be led by
Men of Science and Erudition." In turn, "they who rose by Science, and Politeness in the
higher Arts, cou'd not fail to promote that Taste and Relish to which they ow'd their
personal Distinction and Pre-eminence."96
While the advance of the "persuasive Arts" would attract the "forward Wits and
aspiring Genius's of the Times," they would also give encouragement to those interested
in the arts as ends in themselves. Those interested in "Contemplation" alone would arise.
Such men, identified by Shaftesbury as "Criticks," would make extensive contributions
to the refinement of the arts themselves and also raise the standards of taste in society:
for to all Musick there must be an Ear proportionable. There must be an Art of
Hearing found, ere the performing Arts can have their due effect, or any thing
exquisite in the kind be felt or comprehended. The just Performers therefore in
each Art wou'd naturally be the most desirous of improving and refining the
publick Ear; which they cou'd no way so well effect as by the help of those latter
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Genius's, who were in a manner their Interpreters to the People; and who by their
Example taught the Publick to discover what was just and excellent in each
Performance.97
Those critics who sought a public reputation were called Sophists, which did not begin as
a pejorative title. Even the "gravest Philosophers, who were Censors of Manners, and
Criticks of a higher degree"--perhaps especially these moral philosophers--attended to "the
power of Argument and Persuasion."
Drawing on accounts found in Aristotle's Poetics, Horace's Ars Poetica, and
Longinus's On the Sublime, Shaftesbury presents a genealogy of styles as they grew up in
the poetic arts. He imagines that the earliest style "was the Miraculous, the Pompous, or
what we generally call the SUBLIME."98 The sublime style works on the passion of
"astonishment," and is most prevalent among children and rude peoples who are still in
their infancy as nations.

Barbarians, he says, make music filled with "hideous and

astonishing Sounds" and are attracted to enormous figures of odd colors. The sublime
appears in poetry in the form of metaphors and images. This manner of expression is the
most distant from "ordinary Use." As we saw earlier, Homer the "Father-Poet" was the
first to purge poetry of the most extravagant elements of the sublime: "he retain'd only
what was decent of the figurative or metaphorick Style, introduc'd the natural and simple;
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and turn'd his thoughts towards the real Beauty of Composition, the Unity of Design, the
Truth of Characters, and the just Imitation of Nature in each particular."99
Homer was also the first poet of repute to show a model of both tragedy and
comedy.

According to Shaftesbury (who follows Aristotle here), tragedy naturally

reaches perfection as an art before comedy. The art of comedy is more subtle than that of
tragedy, and while the elements of comedy arise early, it is only with the art of criticism
that it reaches its true form. Prior to just criticism, comic poetry lacked "Truth of
Characters, the Beauty of Order, and the simple Imitation of Nature."100
Although comedy reached a perfection only late in the development of the arts, it
served a supremely important purpose from the beginning. Comedy "řtwas of admirable
use to explode the false Sublime of early Poets, and such as in its own Age were on every
occasion ready to relapse into that vicious Manner. The good Tragedians themselves
cou'd hardly escape its Lashes. The pompous Orators were its never-failing Subjects.
Every thing which might be imposing, by a false Gravity or Solemnity, was forc'd to
endure the Trial of this Touchstone."101 Shaftesbury suggests that there is something
natural in the order of this development. The bombast of early sublime poetry gives way
to more measured tragic presentations, which in turn invite comic parodies. He compares
this development to the way a natural body works to preserve itself:
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for in healthy Bodys, Nature dictates Remedys of her own, and provides for the
Cure of what has happen'd amiss in the Growth and Progress of a Constitution.
The Affairs of this free People being in the Increase; and their Ability and
Judgment every day improving, as Letters and Arts advanc'd; they wou'd of
course find in themselves a Strength of Nature, which by the help of good
Ferments, and a wholesom opposition of Humours, wou'd correct in one way
whatever was excessive, or peccant (as Physicians say) in another. Thus the
florid and over-sanguine Humour of the high Style was allay'd by something of a
contrary nature. The Comick Genius was apply'd, as a kind of Caustick, to those
Exuberances and Fungus's of the swoln Dialect, and magnificent manner of
Speech. But after a-while, even this Remedy it-self was found to turn into a
Disease: as Medicines, we know, grow corrosive, when the fouler Matters on
which they wrought are sufficiently purg'd, and the Obstructions remov'd.102
These two passages offer us important clues to the proper relationship between
nature and the arts according to Shaftesbury. Art is not presented here as an alternative to
nature but as a complement arising from the natural social activity of men. Shaftesbury's
own rhetorical style seems to arise from the understanding of comedy he presents here.
For Shaftesbury, comedy can act to dispel the power of "false Sublime;" it can also run to
excess. While we will consider Shaftesbury's treatment of the opinions of his age more
directly in the next two chapters, we should note here that Shaftesbury uses a similar
strategy in dealing with both Christianity and modern philosophy.

It is, therefore,

appropriate to digress from our consideration of progress in the arts to examine
Shaftesbury's own use of comedy, which he calls "raillery."
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As I mentioned earlier, the Critic claims that the "skeptical Mein" [sic] of the
treatises in Volume I is accompanied by a "sapping Method, and unraveling Humor."103
In the comic style of antiquity, "Manners and Characters, as well as Speech and Writings,
were discuss'd with the greatest freedom." It is this model, especially as exemplified by
the classical satire of Horace, Persius, and Juvenal, that Shaftesbury adopts for the first
Volume of the Characteristicks. The second treatise, which has as its primary task the
defense of raillery, takes up this theme explicitly.104
Sensus Communis employs aspects of the art of the dialogue, for allows the reader
to listen in on a conversation between a wise friend and his decent companion. As
readers we must reconstruct the action of this dialogue because its narration is concealed
under the conceit of a letter written from one friend to another. The epistolary form in
the context of the Characteristicks is to be read neither as private correspondence nor as a
straightforward formal treatise or essay.105 According to the Critic, Sensus Communis is
indeed to be approached as a real letter rather than a "treatise, design'd for publick view."
Shaftesbury intends it as part of the artifice that the reader imagines the particular person
to whom (or the character to which) the fictional letter was written. The Critic indicates
that in this Shaftesbury follows the classical tradition of philosophical letter-writing as
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practiced by Cicero and Horace. He explains that the thoughtful reader of Horace's
epistles "will comprehend that the concealment of order and method, in this manner of
writing, makes the chief beauty of the work."106 As one might expect from the account of
dialogue we have considered--and, for that matter, from a book whose very title is
Characteristicks of Men, etc.--Shaftesbury the author creates a friend we can recognize as
one of the fine gentlemen with whom Shaftesbury the moralist is particularly concerned.
We learn that Shaftesbury writes his letter in response to a friend's surprise that he
had recently spoken in "commendation of Raillery." The friend seems to understand by
raillery an unjust form of conversation in which a speaker ridicules any opinion which
disagrees with his own. Shaftesbury explains that his friend's caution would have been
proper had Shaftesbury left his own opinions aside as too "grave or solemn" for ridicule.
He asks "whether it be not just and reasonable, to make as free with our own opinions, as
with those of other people," and agrees that to spare one's own opinions would be
considered "a piece of selfishness."107 (One might go farther in light of Soliloquy and call
it a piece of folly as well.) In the opinion of some people such hypocrisy would betray a
blind adherence to unexamined opinions.

Shaftesbury describes this accusation in

language reminiscent of Bacon's New Organon:
we may be charg'd perhaps with willful Ignorance and blind Idolatry, for having
taken opinions upon trust, and consecrated in our-selves certain Idol-Notions,
which we will never suffer to be unveil'd, or seen in open light. They may perhaps
be monsters and not divinities, or sacred truths, which are kept thus choicely, in
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some dark corner of our minds: the specters may impose on us, whilst we refuse
to turn 'em every way, and view their shapes and complexions in every light.108
Shaftesbury knows that there may be some received opinions which would wither under
the attack of raillery; and we will see that some of the opinions considered most solemn
and grave may actually be "Deform'd" and "Odious."109 But the defenders of raillery hold
that the truth has nothing to fear from this style of conversation. He writes that "truth, řtis
supposed, may bear all lights; and one of those principle lights or natural mediums, by
which things are to be view'd, in order to a thorow recognition, is ridicule it-self."110
This is not the impression of Shaftesbury's friend, however, who had recently
observed a free conversation between Shaftesbury and his friends which left him
unsettled. The friend is of the opinion that Shaftesbury ought to have condemned the
group with "great gravity" for their speech. The friend seems to have been upset in part
by the skeptical manner of the conversation, which ending abruptly and in "a sort of
Confusion...almost brought to nothing whatever had been advanc'd in the discourse
before."111 Regarding the substance of the conversation Shaftesbury provides few details
because "some particulars of this conversation may not perhaps be so proper to commit to
paper." We learn a few pages later, however, that the conversation had a very serious
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subject indeed, namely "morality and religion."112 The aporia of the conversation must
have been especially disturbing to his upright friend given its topics.

Shaftesbury

concedes that "a great many fine schemes...were destroy'd; many grave reasonings
overturn'd," but observes that the conversation was conducted "without offense to the
partys concern'd."113
Surely this is not correct, for the friend was sufficiently indignant to wonder why
Shaftesbury had not condemned the free conversationalists. Yet Shaftesbury understands
that people do not like to see their moral and religious opinions ridiculed, and he
condemns the callous mockery of men's opinions as an unjust form of speech.
Shaftesbury remarks that a certain style of raillery has become the fashion of the age.
Men of business, politicians, and authors, have all become practiced at banter, buffoonery,
and burlesque.114 Even the most solemn Divines attempt to lend their "grim aspect" a
playful mien when entering into controversies. They find they must "be jocose and
pleasant with an adversary, whom they wou'd chuse to treat in a very different manner" if
they could.115
Shaftesbury blames the spread of this vulgar raillery on the fierceness of religious
persecution in his day. Buffoonery is a natural reaction against zealotry which brooks no
disagreement. Persecution has raised a "bantering" spirit which "strains the just measure
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of what we call urbanity."116 This excessive raillery grows worse with the increase of
persecution: "the higher the slavery," he writes, "the more exquisite the buffoonery."117 It
has the consequence of leading the railleur himself to acquire the habit of
"inconsiderateness."118 A "gross sort of raillery" indulges in ridicule for its own sake; its
temper, "all air and humour," takes nothing seriously.119 So while buffoonery has the ill
effect of offending the decent opinions of gentlemen, it also is a symptom of enfeebled
reason. He writes,
nor is it a wonder that men are generally such faint reasoners, and care to argue
strictly on any trivial subject in company; when they dare so little exert their
reason in greater matters, and are forc'd to argue lamely, where they have need of
the greatest activity and strength. The same thing therefore happens here as in
strong and healthy bodys, which are debar'd their natural exercise, and confin'd to
narrow space. They have a sort of action, and move still, tho with the worst grace
imaginable.120
Buffoonery, a vice which attends the exercise of raillery, openly ridicules received
opinions. This leads some gentleman (such as Shaftesbury's friend) to condemn all
raillery as a threat to decency.

Buffoonery itself discredits reason and encourages

gentlemen to prefer foolish diversion to thinking about serious matters.121 Shaftesbury
holds that there is a just form of raillery, however.
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Just raillery arises from the climate of persecution because the zealot opposes not
only the ridicule of received opinions but the very questioning of them. "When [zealots]
hear principles examin'd, sciences and arts inquir'd into, and matters of importance
treated with this frankness of humour, they imagine presently that all professions must
fall to the ground, all establishments come to ruin, and nothing orderly or decent be left
standing in the world."122 They oppose all liberty of thought and speech, even when it is
privately and prudently managed. As a result of this fact, serious men turn to a just form
of raillery, also known as irony. "If men are forbid to speak their minds seriously on
certain subjects, they will do it ironically. If they are forbid to speak at all upon such
subjects, or if they find it really dangerous to do so; they will then redouble their disguise,
involve themselves in mysteriousness, and talk so as hardly to be understood, or at least
not plainly interpreted, by those who are dispos'd to do 'em a mischief."123
Shaftesbury explains that there is a kind of "defensive raillery" which might be
employed "when the spirit of curiosity wou'd force a discovery of more truth than can
conveniently be told."124 This defensive raillery protects the truth--not to mention the
truth-teller--by disguising it, because "we can never do more injury to truth, than by
discovering too much of it on some occasions." We have yet to see whether Shaftesbury
agrees that the truth itself may bear all lights, but he clearly does not think human beings
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are equally suited to see the truth. '"Tis the same with understandings as with eyes: to
such a certain size and make just so much light is necessary, and no more. Whatever is
beyond brings darkness and confusion."125 For this reason it is "real humanity and
kindness, to hide strong truths from tender eyes."
Shaftesbury identifies Socrates as the supreme practitioner of this humane art.
This observation helps us understand better what Shaftesbury meant when he remarked
that Socrates was "so veil'd, and in a Cloud, that to the unattentive surveyor he seem'd
often to be very different from what he really was; and this chiefly by reason of a certain
exquisite and refin'd raillery which belong'd to his manner."126 Through his "genius and
manner," Socrates would "treat the highest subjects, and those of the commonest capacity
both together, and render 'em explanatory of each other."
Shaftesbury praises the friends who out of respect for decent opinion took their
freedom only amongst their fellow gentlemen. "To start questions, or manage debates,
which offend the publick ear, is to be wanting in that respect which is due to common
society." Delicate subjects, he writes, "shou'd either not be treated at all in publick, or in
such a manner as to occasion no scandal or disturbance."127 This is surely prudent advice
to anyone who would prefer not to experience the anger of the public, and it seems to be
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the policy followed by Shaftesbury himself.128 While, as we have seen, Shaftesbury
prefers that the magistrate foster an environment of liberty, he nevertheless relies on the
prudence of authors not to abuse their liberty.
While defensive raillery protects the reputation of the truth-seeker, it also protects
the reputation of the activity of truth-seeking. By distinguishing just raillery from unjust
raillery, Shaftesbury tries to preserve the reputation of serious inquiry among gentlemen
like his friend. Shaftesbury insists that the difference between just and gross raillery is as
real "as between fair-dealing and hypocrisy; or between the genteelest wit and the most
scurrilous buffoonery."129 Just raillery is distinguished by its genuine concern for the
truth.

As Shaftesbury want to discourage thoughtless raillery which takes nothing

seriously, he also denounces dishonest raillery which sets out "industriously to confound
men, in a mysterious manner, and to make advantage or draw pleasure from that
perplexity they are thrown into, by such uncertain talk."130 It is a foolish sort of wit that
amuses all but "leaves the most sensible man, and even a friend, equally in doubt, and at
a loss to understand what one's real mind is, upon any subject." When divorced from a
concern for the truth, raillery is merely a tool for sophistry.
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Yet concern for the potential free thinker is not Shaftesbury's only motivation. He
seems to be motivated by real humanity and kindness in his efforts not to disrupt
common opinion. He writes that "it belongs to men of slavish principles, to affect a
superiority over the vulgar, and to despise the multitude. The lovers of mankind respect
and honor conventions and societies of men."131
Shaftesbury writes to his friend that in addition to offending no one, the goodhumored style of raillery left the friends eager to continue their debate in the future.
Indeed, Shaftesbury continues, reason gained more from the easy manner of free raillery
than from the "usual stiff adherence to a particular opinion."132 Shaftesbury commends
raillery as the style most suitable to his age. "The Temper of the Pedagogue sutes not
with the Age," he writes, "and the world, however it may be taught, will not be tutor'd."133
The pedagogue "demands reverence and awe," but his temper serves only "to keep
understandings at a distance, and out of reach."134 According to Shaftesbury, it is no
small thing that pleasure be found in the "unraveling or refuting of any argument," for
"řtis the habit alone of reasoning, which can make the reasoner."135 Shaftesbury's notion
of reasoning, he tells us, cannot be learned from the "written treatises of the learned" or
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from hearing long orations and declamations. It is only the "question and reply" of a
"free conference"--that is, dialogue--which develops the ability to reason.

Having considered, then, the deeper meaning of raillery for Shaftesbury, we can
return to Soliloquy. We have already seen, Shaftesbury identifies his notion of reasoning
with the art of the dialogue as practiced by the writers of antiquity. The free give and
take of a polite conversation or a dialogue is an image of the thinker engaged in
soliloquy. Under the discipline of the soliloquy as taught by our philosopher-critic, the
rallieur's works will be more likely to discern the "truth of Characters, the Beauty of
Order, and the simple Imitation of Nature." Corrected by the proper self-reflection,
authors will be in a position to improve their readers in addition to pleasing them. At the
very least, they are likely to start thinking about the opinions that they had heretofore
taken for granted. This would be the beginning of a real liberal education.
Yet Shaftesbury does not think that the authors of his age are prepared for the
simple imitation of Nature. The spirits of banter and buffoonery are in fashion; there is
little taste for "real simplicity" among his contemporaries.

Because of this, a

straightforward methodical manner will not find a suitable audience. So too he rejects
most of the other forms available to authors; the sublime and the didactic forms are
unsuitable. This leaves only one option to be recommended:
the only Manner left, in which Criticism can have its just Force amongst us, is the
antient Comick; of which kind were the first Roman Miscellanys, or Satirick
Pieces: a sort of original Writing of their own, refin'd afterwards by the best
Genius, and politest Poet of that Nation; who, notwithstanding, owns the Manner
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to have been taken from the Greek Comedy above-mention'd. And if our HomeWits wou'd refine upon this Pattern, they might perhaps meet with considerable
Success.136
As we have seen, this is precisely what Shaftesbury himself strives to do in the
Characteristicks. He closes the section of Part II devoted to critics by reminding his
readers that in modern times as well as ancient, the interests of the critic is the same as
"that of Wit, Learning, and Good Sense."
 P art II, § 3: The P ubl i ck

Having considered the mixed influence of the "grandees," and the salutary
influence of true criticism on authors, Shaftesbury turns to consider the mutual influence
of author and audience. Shaftesbury playfully professes surprise that modern authors are
so insipid when even the common artisan strives to produce works of integrity. He writes
that "when one considers this Zeal and Honesty of inferiour Artists, one wou'd wonder to
see those who pretend to Skill and Science in a higher kind, have so little regard to Truth,
and the Perfection of their Art. One wou'd expect it of our Writers, that if they had real
Ability, they shou'd draw the World to them; and not meanly sute themselves to the
World, in its weak State."137
Again, Shaftesbury makes an unfavorable comparison with the poets of antiquity.
Those poets did not always expect to receive applause for their work; had they done so,
"they had not done their Countrymen such Service, nor themselves such Honour as we
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find they did, by conforming to Truth and Nature. The generous Spirits who first essay'd
the Way, had not always the World on their side: but soon drew after 'em the best
Judgments; and soon afterwards the World itself."125 As we can see from the account of
raillery, Shaftesbury does not advocate treating the public with open contempt. Modern
authors will have to write with an understanding of the fancies and opinion of their times.
Yet, as authors, Shaftesbury hopes that they will look to form their work with the advice
of a better self. With the proper use of their "geniuses," authors would command their
audience rather than the reverse, and the public would learn "good taste" from moderns
too.
"And thus," he writes, "we are return'd to our old Article of Advice; that main
Preliminary of Self-study and inward Converse, which we have found so much wanting in
the Authors of our Time." It is for this reason that "the Poet must necessarily borrow of
the Philosopher."138

We have yet to see, however, what constitutes good taste for

Shaftesbury. For an understanding of this question we have to consider Part III.

Advice to an Author , Part III:
Beautiful

Truth and the Love of the

 P art III, § 1: Count erf ei t P hil osophers

Shaftesbury opens Part III with a reflection on the moral character of the self,
observing that men take great pleasure in being complimented on their character. This
suggestion, which is rooted in our common sense of the matter, he connects with a bold
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claim: that human beings are naturally able to recognize moral beauty. He does not mean
by this that men have good "Taste or Judgment" fully formed by nature, of course. As
the Critic explains,
whatever Principles or Materials of this kind we may possibly bring with us;
whatever good Facultys, Senses, or anticipating Sensations, and Imaginations,
may be of Nature's Growth, and arise properly, of themselves, without our Art,
Promotion, or Assistance; the general Idea which is form'd of all this
Management, and the clear Notion we attain of what is preferable and principal in
all these Subjects of Choice and Estimation, will not, as I imagine, by any Person,
be taken for innate.139
As we have already seen, and as the Critic confirms, "Use, Practice and Culture
must precede the Understanding and Wit of such an advanc'd Size and Growth as this. A
legitimate and just Taste can neither be begotten, made, conceiv'd, or produc'd, without
the antecedent Labour and Pains of Criticism."140 Shaftesbury has suggested as a prelude
to his philosophy that men adopt the practice of soliloquy. Through soliloquy they will
gain a distance from themselves. From the perspective of their nurtured daemon, they
will be able to view themselves dispassionately, that is, they will view their fancies and
opinions as objects rather than as inescapable truths. He has also suggested that this
practice is connected to the art of the dialogue, an art which itself must be practiced and
developed with great effort and that presupposes a certain level of cultural sophistication.
Shaftesbury is now ready to give us a better look at what he means by "the Reality of a
better Self" and the standard by which it is judged: taste. A full understanding of taste,
139
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however, will require that we undertake the labor of Criticism, which at its highest is a
sort of contemplation by the philosopher.

This happens most powerfully in The

Moralists, which will occupy our attention in our final chapter.
Shaftesbury first reminds us that there are rivals to his classical philosophy which
have their own notions of self. "The misfortune is, we are seldom taught to comprehend
this Self, by placing it in a distinct View from its Representative or Counterfeit."141 The
chief obstacle to our natural self is religion. Shaftesbury writes, "in our holy Religion,
which for the greatest part is adapted to the very meanest Capacitys, řtis not to be
expected that a Speculation of this kind shou'd be openly advanc'd."142 The other rival is
the false philosophy of those "noted Headpieces," the modern projectors, who have
introduced a radical skepticism which cuts men off from common opinion and establishes
abstruse theoretical systems in their place. He writes,
for the Philosopher, who pretends to be wholly taken up in considering his higher
Facultys, and examining the Powers and Principles of his Understanding; if in
reality his Philosophy be foreign to the Matter profess'd; if it goes beside the
mark, and reaches nothing we can truly call our Interest or Concern; it must be
somewhat worse than mere Ignorance or Idiotism. The most ingenious way of
becoming foolish, is by a System. And the surest Method to prevent good Sense,
is to set up something in the room of it. The liker any thing is to Wisdom, if it be
not plainly the thing it-self, the more directly it becomes its opposite.143
We will deal with these rivals and Shaftesbury's response in the next two chapters.
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Shaftesbury's vision of true philosophy is Socratic and it is especially indebted to
Xenophon's Socrates.

Shaftesbury praises that "noble Disciple" of Socrates, who

managed to combine a life of action with the life of contemplation. Xenophon "join'd
what was deepest and most solid in Philosophy, with what was easiest and most refin'd in
Breeding, and in the Character and Manner of a Gentleman."144 According to the Critic,
it is to Xenophon that "we owe an original System of Works, the politest, wisest,
usefullest, and (to those who can understand the Divineness of a just Simplicity) the most
amiable, and even the most elevating and exalting of all un-inspir'd and merely human
Authors."145 Socratic philosophy teaches us to know ourselves, and consequently allows
us to maintain consistency of character through the examination of fancy.

Like

Xenophon and other Socratics, Shaftesbury will only call free that man whose passions
are ordered by reason.
It is here that Shaftesbury must begin the work of challenging modern philosophy
since its account of the will contradicts the Socratic distinction between reason and the
passions. According to Shaftesbury, modern philosophy has fallen into a neo-scholastic
mode which seeks "a method to confound Reason, and degrade the Understanding of
Mankind; they could not perhaps succeeded better, than by the Establishment of such a
mock-science."146 To illustrate the sort of method he means, Shaftesbury tells the story
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of an imprisoned thinker who, given the amount of time he had on his hands, might well
have benefited from soliloquy. This prisoner "was one of those whom in this Age we
usually call Philosophers, a Successor of Paracelsus, and a Master in the occult
Sciences."147 As we shall see from the description of his activities, the prisoner is a more
a methodical natural scientist than an alchemist (although in truth there is not much of a
difference between the two for Shaftesbury).148 He tells us that while the prisoner was
accomplished in his field, he had abandoned "moral science, or any thing relating to Selfconverse" and consequently had to apply a different method. The prisoner was not
practiced in music but he was accomplished at making a variety of distinct sounds with
his voice by manipulating his mouth and throat in a variety of ways, and he undertakes an
important experimental study, "and thus bellowing, roaring, snarling, and otherwise
variously exerting his Organs of Sound, he endeavour'd to discover what Letters of the
Alphabet cou'd best design each Species, or what new Letters were to be invented, to
mark the undiscover'd Modifications."149

Having used his time well in "profound

Speculation and long Exercise," the prisoner is able to compose a "philosophical treatise"
when he is released. Shaftesbury offers us the following assessment of his scholarship:
"he esteem'd himself the only Master of Voice and Language on the account of this his
radical Science, and fundamental Knowledg of Sounds. But whoever had taken him to
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improve their Voice, or teach 'em an agreeable or just manner of Accent or Delivery,
wou'd, I believe, have found themselves considerably deluded."150 Having endeavored
through his "radical science" to break the human voice into its component sounds, the
imprisoned philosopher becomes an expert in exactly that: sounds. Shaftesbury forces his
reader to ask about the purpose of such a science. He is quick to say that he "wou'd not
condemn as useless this speculative Science of Articulation." It may belong with other
subordinate concerns such as grammar. He doubts, however, that it will lead men "in the
Discovery of [their] own Natures."151 Shaftesbury is profoundly interested in human
speech, as our reflections on his account of dialogue suggests; but he is interested not in
the sounds of speech but its meaning to human beings. By looking into the "machine of
this world and their own frame" through a physiological and radical science, philosophers
learn little about moral life or the frame of their own passions. In fact, Shaftesbury fears
that such a science undermines our willingness to look into moral questions. "I know not
to what purpose such a Philosophy can serve, except only to shut the door against better
Knowledg, and introduce Impertinence and Conceit with the best Countenance of
Authority."152 Shaftesbury offers the method of soliloquy to serve as a corrective to the
new scholasticism he sees around him. He writes, "a small Help from our familiar
Method of Soliloquy may serve turn: and we may perhaps decide this matter in a more

150

Ibid., 1.179.

151

Ibid.

152

Ibid., 1.180.

87

diverting way; by confronting this super-speculative Philosophy with a more practical
sort, which relates chiefly to our Acquaintance, Friendship, and good Correspondence
with our-selves."153 For Shaftesbury, a true science of human nature cannot be separated
from questions of purpose as they arise in common life. He offers the reader the analogy
of a watch. If we were to wonder about an object in the window of a watchmaker's shop
is, would we try identifying its sounds, metal, colors and parts without asking "what the
real Use was of such an Instrument?" He asks which method is most likely to reveal "the
real Nature of the Instrument." So too, one cannot identify man to himself without an
analogous concern:
shou'd a Philosopher, after the same manner, employing himself in the Study of
human Nature, discover only, what Effects each Passion wrought upon the Body;
what change of Aspect or Feature they produc'd; and in what different manner
they affected the Limbs and Muscles; this might possibly qualify him to give
Advice to an Anatomist or a Limner, but not to Mankind or to Himself: Since
according to this Survey he consider'd not the real Operation or Energy of his
Subject, nor contemplated the Man, as real Man, and as a human Agent; but as a
Watch or common Machine.154
Here Shaftesbury refers to Descartes, whose account of the passion of fear is known first
through the mechanism of the body. While Shaftesbury concedes that he grits his teeth
when afraid, he denies that he knows fear and courage better because of this. As a man he
is not able to connect the mechanism to his practical concerns. He remarks, "I may
depend upon it, that by the most refin'd Speculation of this kind, I shall neither learn to
diminish my Fears, or raise my Courage. This, however, I may be assur'd of, that řtis the
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Nature of Fear, as well as of other Passions, to have its Increase and Decrease, as it is fed
by Opinion, and influenc'd by Custom and Practice."155 According to Shaftesbury, a
moral science must approach the passions first through opinion, and opinion first comes to
light as "influenc'd by Custom and Practice." It is on this point that Shaftesbury is most
clearly a student of Xenophon. The Socrates of Xenophon's Memorabilia seems to have
had a similar suspicion about natural science and its desire to create novelties:
[Socrates] did not even discuss that topic so favoured by other talkers, "the Nature
of the Universe": and avoided speculation on the so-called "Cosmos" of the
Professors, how it works, and on the laws that govern the phenomena of the
heavens: indeed he would argue that to trouble one's mind with such problems is
sheer folly…Students of human nature, he said, think that they will apply their
knowledge in due course for the good of themselves and any others they choose.
Do those who pry into heavenly phenomena imagine that, once they have
discovered the laws by which these are produced, they will create at their will
winds, waters, seasons and such things to their need? Or have they no such
expectation, and are they satisfied with knowing the causes of these various
phenomena?156
Like Shaftesbury, Xenophon's Socrates was more interested in humane moral questions:
his own conversation was ever of human things. The problems he discussed
were, What is godly, what is ungodly; what is beautiful, what is ugly; what is just,
what is unjust; what is prudence, what is madness; what is courage, what is
cowardice; what is a state, what is a statesman; what is government, and what is a
governor;--these and others like them, of which the knowledge made a
"gentleman," in his estimation, while ignorance should involve the reproach of
"slavishness."157
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According to Shaftesbury, moral philosophy is most properly the queen of all the sciences.
First philosophy is for him, as it was for Xenophon, the study of human beings in a way
that leads to self-knowledge:
and thus Philosophy, which judges both of her-self, and of every thing besides;
discovers her own Province, and chief Command; teaches me to distinguish
between her Person and her Likeness; and shews me her immediate and real self,
by that sole Privilege of teaching me to know my-self, and what belongs to me.
She gives to every inferior Science its just rank; leaves some to measure Sounds;
others to scan Syllables; others to weigh Vacuums, and define Spaces, and
Extensions: but reserves to her-self her due Authority, and Majesty; keeps her
State, and antient Title, of Guide of life, investigator of virtue, and the rest of
those just Appellations which of old belong'd to her.158
In following Socrates and the method of soliloquy, Shaftesbury directs his reader
to begin his inquiry into nature with the opinions he finds around him, those opinions
"which are accepted by all, or by the majority, or by the most notable and reputable of
them."159 It is by comparing contrary opinions and criticizing them in turn that dialectic
hopes to move from false views to gain a better understanding of nature. For this reason,
Shaftesbury undertakes a consideration of the most notable opinions of his day, and he
undertakes the inquiry with the most reputable men of his day.
 P art III, § 2: Gent l em en of F ashi on

We have seen that Shaftesbury began the last treatise of Volume I with the "home
method" of the soliloquy. The importance of this as an inlet to the overall design of the
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work cannot be overstated.

In fact, its importance is indicated by the epigraph

Shaftesbury sets at the head of Soliloquy:
And you need not have looked beyond yourself.160
While this is our beginning point, however, we have also learned that it is not a sufficient
account of the method of soliloquy for Shaftesbury. Soliloquy is more than a kind of
solipsism and in fact in its literary form it is more akin to dialogue with another person.
The Critic suggested that the proper practice of soliloquy presupposed a "previous
commerce with the world." The Critic remarks that "to support this Design of his,
[Shaftesbury] seems intent chiefly on this single Point; 'To discover, how we may, to best
advantage, form within our-selves what in the polite World is call'd a Relish, or Good
Taste.'"161
The Critic is emphatic about the important role the concept of taste plays in the
philosophical design of the Characteristicks and he invites us to begin our reflections in
"the polite World." This is of a piece with the general concern Shaftesbury shows for
morally serious gentlemen, that is, those "gentlemen of fashion...to whom a natural good
genius, or force of good education, has given a sense of what is naturally graceful or
becoming."162 We met one such character briefly in our treatment of raillery in Sensus
Communis, and we will have to renew our acquaintance momentarily. According to the
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Critic, gentlemen of fashion have a familiarity with the world such that they have the
resources within themselves to practice the "improving Art of Self-correspondence."163
In taking up the subject of taste, the Critic directs our attention first to the polite
world. The distinguished members of this world are not themselves philosophers, or at
least not generally so, and Shaftesbury has a special name for them: "VIRTUOSI, or
refin'd Wits of the Age." In this "general Denomination" are included:
the real fine Gentlemen, the Lovers of Art and Ingenuity; such as have seen the
World, and inform'd themselves of the Manners and Customs of the several
Nations of Europe, search'd into their Antiquitys, and Records; consider'd their
Police, Laws, and Constitutions; observ'd the Situation, Strength, and Ornaments
of their Citys, their principal Arts, Studys, and Amusements; their Architecture,
Sculpture, Painting, Musick, and their Taste in Poetry, Learning, Language, and
Conversation.164
Why would such men need the method of soliloquy at all? Here we should recall
the friend of the virtuous prince who assumed that "they who are honest and just, can
admire and love whatever is beautiful; without offering at anything beyond what is
allowed."165

Through philosophy, the gentleman comes to see that the self, while

seemingly unified in its will and consequently free, is in fact governed by a bundle of
fancies and opinions. It is the work of philosophy to establish an auditor within the breast
of man to distinguish unhealthy "Idol-Notions" from sound and healthy opinions.
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In Sensus Communis, Shaftesbury is at pains to defend the natural sociability of
man and the virtues which attend society because of the corrupting power of philosophy.
The noble gentleman to whom he writes the letter has himself been fortunate enough to
avoid a philosophic education at the hands of the modern projectors. At the close of
Sensus Communis, Shaftesbury congratulates his friend on the fact that his education
involved little of the "philosophers of our days."166 There was a time when the best youth
could safely be entrusted to philosophy with the confidence that he would learn "right
practice of the world" and "a just knowledge of men and things," but it is no longer so.
Had Shaftesbury's friend learned ethics and politics from modern philosophers, he writes,
"I shou'd never have thought of writing a word to you upon common sense or the love of
mankind." The gentleman loves virtue for its own sake rather than for some further
reward or fear of reprisal. As we will see in the next two chapters, Shaftesbury takes
both Christianity and modern philosophy to attack this natural perspective of the
gentleman. A modern gentleman is likely to understand his passions in light of selfinterest, and yet according to Shaftsbury a gentleman who asks "why should I not be
nasty in private?" is no gentleman. Shaftesbury thinks that this question is more likely to
arise for the person educated by modern philosophy than for a person guided by common
sense. He proposes that
the truth is: as notions stand now in the world, with respect to morals, honesty is
like to gain little by philosophy, or deep speculations of any kind. In the main,
řtis best to stick to common sense, and go no further. Mens first thoughts, in this
166
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matter, are generally better than their second: their natural notions better than
those refined by study, or consultation with casuists. According to common
speech, as well as common sense, honesty is the best policy: but according to
refin'd sense, the only well-advised persons, as to this world, are errant knaves.167
Shaftesbury's recommends the sober use of raillery to counterbalance the confusion found
in common life, for "řtis in reality a serious study, to learn to temper and regulate that
humour which nature has given us, as a more lenitive remedy against vice, and a kind of
specific against superstition and melancholy delusion.

There is a great difference

between seeking how to raise a laugh from every thing; and seeking, in every thing, what
justly may be laughed at. For nothing is ridiculous except what is deformed."168 Having
heard a defense for balanced raillery, the gentleman of fashion will be more likely to
begin the hard work of thinking critically about the most important matters.
 P art III, § 3: Trut h i n B eaut y

Shaftesbury tells us near the close of the Characteristicks that "it has been the
main scope and principle end of these volumes, 'To assert the reality of a beauty and
charm in moral as well as natural subjects; and to demonstrate the reasonableness of a
proportionate taste, and determinate choice, in life and manners.'"169 He seems to believe
that it is necessary to assert such a reality if the true nature of moral subjects is to come to
light. Indeed, should men come to lose their appreciation of the nobility of moral life,
men would come to resemble animals. Such a view might "leave us probably no other
167
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employment than that of satisfying our coarsest appetites at the cheapest rate; in order to
the attainment of a supine state of indolence and activity."170
So too is it necessary to assert, at least initially, the reality of a beauty and charm
in natural subjects, for without such a presupposition of "a coherence, a design, a
meaning," there is no possibility of knowledge as it was understood in classical
philosophy.171 Modern philosophy denies nature is to be contemplated, for it understood
as well as Shaftesbury that "where there is nothing like Nature, there is no room for the
troublesome part of thought and contemplation," and therefore no room for the
persecution which can arise from the disagreement about such matters.172

Modern

projectors are concerned that "the habit of admiration and contemplative delight, wou'd,
by over-indulgence, too easily mount into high fanaticism, or degenerate into abject
superstition."173 Ultimately it is the intention of Shaftesbury to show that the cultivation
of such habits need not run to such extremes.
Shaftesbury

accordingly

ends

Sensus

Communis

with

an

enthusiastic

consideration of the relationship between beautiful manners and other forms of beauty.
He directs his speech to those "gentlemen of fashion…to whom a natural good genius, or
force of good education, has given a sense of what is naturally graceful or becoming."174
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He introduces this appeal to the most notable and reputable of men in the hopes of
keeping alive the possibility that the world itself is an ordered whole or cosmos
(κόζμος).175 Common sense, he believes, has a natural appreciation of "those natural rules
of proportion and truth" which are necessary for there to be natural knowledge at all.155
He is confident that "even rude nature it-self, in its primitive simplicity, is a better guide
to judgment, than improv'd sophistry, and pedantick learning."176 He therefore turns from
modern philosophy, with its "wrong ground of education," for "redress, and amendment,
from that excellent school which we call the world."177 So, too, Soliloquy ends by praising
the beautiful, calling on authors in their private capacity to practice his method of self
examination:
resolution enough to criticize ourselves, and call in question our high
Imaginations, florid Desires, and specious Sentiments, according to the manner of
Soliloquy above prescrib'd; we shall, by the natural course of things, as we grow
wiser, prove less conceited; and introduce into our Character that Modesty,
Condescension, and just Humanity which is essential to the Success of all friendly
Counsel and Admonition. An honest Home-PHILOSOPHY must teach us the
wholesom Practice within ourselves. Polite Reading, and Converse with Mankind
of the better sort, will qualify us for what remains.178
If the Soliloquy has done its work, the reader is now prepared to begin Volume II, which
raises questions of religion and natural morality directly.
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We have yet to learn whether or not Shaftesbury has an account of metaphysics
that will support connecting moral life to nature in general. This question will receive its
proper treatment only in chapter 5, "Shaftesbury's 'Principal Performance'--A reading of
The Moralists." Before considering the evidence he offers, however, we must first
consider the two chief obstacles he sees blocking deeper reflection, that is, Christianity
and modern philosophy. We will take up these subjects in turn.

CHAPTER 3
"A STORM OF DEVOTION AND ZEAL":
CHRISTIANITY AND POLITICAL LIFE
General Introduction
In the previous chapter we examined Shaftesbury's understanding of philosophy,
primarily as it comes to light in the treatise Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author. In this
chapter we will consider Shaftesbury's treatment of religion. It would be difficult to
exaggerate the prominence given to religion in the Characteristicks. While Shaftesbury
is frequently (and quite reasonably) identified with eighteenth-century deism,1 his own
treatment of religion is fairly subtle. To understand his teaching we will need to consider
his critique of Christianity, his critique of religion as such, and his critique of revelation.
I contend that Shaftesbury shares the Enlightenment critique of Christianity as it is
advanced in the works of Hobbes and Locke. In the opinion of these "modern projectors"
the consequences of Christianity have been disastrous for human beings. While I believe
that aspects of what I am calling the Enlightenment critique can be observed in the
writings of many philosophers, I focus attention in this chapter on Hobbes and Locke. I
consider Hobbes because Shaftesbury identifies him so clearly as a philosophical foe. I
will also present what I regard as Locke's iteration of this same critique.
1
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While the religious opinions of any one of these important figures generates
legitimate scholarly controversy, I believe that Hobbes, Locke, and Shaftesbury treat
Christianity in nearly identical ways.

This can be seen by concentrating on three

important topics, namely the psychology, rhetoric, and clericism of Christianity.
Scholarly subtleties aside, I believe that Shaftesbury himself will vouchsafe this
interpretation.
Shaftesbury's understanding of religion in general is self-consciously indebted to
antiquity. Shaftesbury contrasts two possible policies toward religion, one ancient and one
modern. The ancient policy treats religion as an aspect of politics; the modern policy
treats politics as an aspect of religion. Shaftesbury's critique of revelation comes to light
through his treatment of enthusiasm. Shaftesbury is often credited with having restored a
positive valence to the term enthusiasm, especially as it gets taken up by poets and literary
critics. Here too Shaftesbury seeks advice from classical philosophy. Just as he turns to
Socratic dialogue in his attempt to distinguish reason from the passions, so he offers a
classical account of the soul when considering man's relationship to the divine.

Shaftesbury and Religion
 The Q uest i on of Shaf t esbury' s Si nceri t y

From the beginning scholars have disagreed over Shaftesbury's personal opinions
about Christianity--in part, I suspect, because they disagree about what constitutes sincere
adherence to Christianity. Noted divine William Warburton reports a comment made by
Alexander Pope about the Characteristicks that puts Shaftesbury's adherence to
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Christianity into considerable doubt.

He writes, "Mr. Pope told me, that, to his

knowledge, the Characteristics had done more harm to Revealed Religion in England than
all the works of Infidelity put together."2 One might contend, of course, that Christianity
can be adequately presented as a natural religion, that is, without recourse to revelation. It
would be enough for our purposes, however, to determine whether Shaftesbury himself
thought this true. Noted Shaftesbury scholar A. O. Aldridge seems tempted by the
contention. He argues that while Shaftesbury undeniably held to a controversial theology,
much of the controversy surrounding his piety can be traced to his playful demeanor rather
than the particular opinions he held.3

While Aldridge himself offers an impressive

catalogue of these controversial opinions, which includes a denial of miracles, the
mockery of scripture, and an admiration for the apostate Emperor Julian, he seems to
believe that much of Shaftesbury's contempt was directed at religious establishment rather
than religion per se. An animus against religious establishment is undeniable, as we will
see in our consideration of priestcraft; yet Shaftesbury's own religious opinions do not
suggest much in the way of sincere piety even when his criticism of established religion is
taken into account.
Shaftesbury was deliberately guarded in his treatment of Christianity. Aldridge
himself claims that Shaftesbury's irony infuriated his contemporary critics, according to
whom Shaftesbury "eludes the arguments of the defenders of Christianity and at the same
2
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time artfully enregisters himself among the number of faithful Christians."4 There is
substantial evidence for this opinion. John Leland, for example, in A View of the Principal
Deistical Writers, concedes that some have claimed that Shaftesbury was a true friend of
Christianity. He writes that
passages are produced out of some of his writings, in which [Shaftesbury]
expresseth very favourable sentiments of Christianity. This he doth particularly in
a preface, which, and I believe justly, is ascribed to his Lordship as the author,
prefixed to a volume of select sermons of Dr. Benjamin Whichcot, published in
1698. In that preface he finds fault with those in this profane age that represent
not only the institution of preaching, but even the gospel itself, and our holy
religion, to be a fraud. He expresseth his hope, that from some things in these
sermons, even they that are prejudiced against Christianity may be induced to like
it the better; and that the vein of goodness which appears throughout these
discourses will make such as are already Christians prize Christianity the more;
and the fairness, ingenuity, and impartiality, which they learn from hence, will be
a security to them against the contrary temper of those other irreconcilable
enemies to our holy faith. In 1716 some of his letters were published at London,
under the title of Several Letters written by a noble Lord to a Young Man in the
University. In these letters, which were written a few years before the Earl of
Shaftesbury's death, in the years 1707, 1708, 1709, there are excellent sentiments
and advices, and some which seem to discover a real regard for the Christian
religion.5
Nevertheless, Shaftesbury does not elude the careful eye of John Leland. Leland
advances evidence that Characteristicks contains many passages "which seem to have a
bad aspect on religion, and to be of a dangerous influence and tendency."6 Leland quotes
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several which deny and contemn "the doctrine of future rewards and punishments."7
According to Leland this opinion alone is sufficient evidence of Shaftesbury's hostility to
Christianity, but there is more. Shaftesbury
hath taken occasion to expose the Scripture, as far as in him lay, to ridicule and
contempt, of which many instances might be produced. Not to mention the
insinuations he has thrown out relating to particular passages both in the Old
Testament and the New, he hath endeavoured to expose the spirit of prophecy,
and made a ludicrous representation of it, and compared it with the extravagancies
of the maddest enthusiasts. Miracles he will not allow to be any proofs, though
ever so certain; or that there is any ground to believe their having been done, but
the authority of our governors, and of those whom the state hath appointed the
guardians of holy writ. He speaks with ridicule, as other deistical writers have
often done, of what he calls the specious pretence of moral certainty, and matter
of fact, and insinuates, that the facts recorded in the gospels are absolutely
uncertain, and that, he that relies upon those accounts must be a sceptical
Christian. He represents St. Paul as speaking sceptically, and as no way certain or
positive as to the revelation made to him, though the contrary is manifest from the
apostle's own most express declarations.8
Some apparently have difficulty reconciling the Shaftesbury of the preface to
Whichcote and the patron of a young theologian with the seemingly deistical author of
Characteristicks.

Leland himself takes note that on several occasions Shaftesbury

declares himself an orthodox believer. "He hath assured us, in his ironical way, of his
steady orthodoxy, and entire submission to the truly Christian and Catholic doctrines of
our holy church, as by law established: and that he faithfully embraces the holy mysteries
of our religion even in the minutest particulars, notwithstanding their amazing depth."9
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The confusion is dispelled, however, when we remember what Shaftesbury's "ironical
way" involves. As we saw in the previous chapter, Shaftesbury did not believe people
were equally capable of enlightenment: "řtis the same with understandings as with eyes:
to such a certain size and make just so much light is necessary, and no more. Whatever is
beyond brings darkness and confusion."10 Robert Voitle shows that Shaftesbury carried
this view into his active life. Voitle writes that
for his servants, for his farmers, for the great mass of mankind there is no hope
except by earnest and continued attention to the moral dictates of religion from
the earliest age…Even among the better favored who have special opportunities
or education to help them turn out right, there is always the danger of backsliding-witness the letters he was later to write…Only the very few who through
intensive reading of the ancients have come to love virtue for her own sake may
not need religion.11
While Voitle is correct to observe this distinction in Shaftesbury's opinions, his
suggestion that it reflected "paternalism of the system" and moral snobbery fails to take
note of Shaftesbury's political intention.
Here I believe Leland is more persuasive, largely because he relies on
Shaftesbury's own explanation. He quotes Shaftesbury, who writes that "where the
supreme Powers have given their Sanction to any religious Record, or pious writ…it
becomes immoral and profane in any one, to deny absolutely, or dispute the sacred
Authority of the least Line or Syllable contained in it."12 This is actually one of several
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statements in the Characteristicks maintaining the importance of obeying the lawfully
established religion. The Critic reports of "our Author" that he "on all occasions submits
most willingly, and with full Confidence and Trust, to the Opinions by Law
establish’d."13 Elsewhere the Critic remarks, "it is certainly no small Interest or Concern
with Men, to believe what is by Authority establishřd; since in the Case of Disbelief there
can be no Choice left but either to live a Hypocrite, or be esteemřd profane."14 Wherever
the law does not leave men to themselves, only two alternatives are available to those
who do not believe what the law requires. They can pretend to believe, in which case
they are guilty of hypocrisy; or they can make no pretense about their unbelief and be
regarded as profane. As the violent experience of the English Civil Wars suggests, such a
choice is "no small Interest or Concern with Men."
The Critic offers proof that he is mindful of his own circumstances as he writes.
In assessing his own work he claims that
the only Subject on which we are perfectly secure, and without fear of any just
Censure or Reproach, is that of FAITH, and Orthodox BELIEF. For in the first
place, it will appear, that throř a profound Respect, and religious Veneration, we
have forborne so much as to name any of the sacred and solemn Mysterys of
Revelation. And, in the next place, as we can with confidence declare, that we
have never in any Writing, publick or private, attempted such high Researches,
nor have ever in Practice acquitted our-selves otherwise than as just Conformists
to the lawful Church; so we may, in a proper Sense, be said faithfully and
dutifully to embrace those holy Mysterys, even in their minutest Particulars, and
without the least Exception on account of their amazing Depth. And tho we are
sensible that it wouřd be no small hardship to deprive others of a liberty of
examining and searching, with due Modesty and Submission, into the nature of
13
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those Subjects; yet as for our-selves, who have not the least scruple whatsoever,
we pray not any such Grace or Favour in our behalf: being fully assurřd of our
own steddy Orthodoxy, Resignation, and intire Submission to the truly Christian
and Catholick Doctrines of our Holy Church, as by Law establish’d.15
While the Critic neglects to mention whether he is a believing Christian or not, his tone
seems overly earnest given his earlier raillery. Either way, the statement is inconclusive
evidence because it could as easily be attributed to hypocrisy as sincerity.
Leland connects Shaftesbury's lawful adherence to the Church of England with
his political teaching on religion in general. He writes:
that according to [Shaftesbury], Christianity has no other foundation than what
will serve a false religion as well as the true. And elsewhere, in the person of the
sceptick, he talks of our visible sovereign's answering for us in matters of religion.
In this his Lordship exactly agrees with Mr. Hobbes: he is, indeed, far from
asserting with that writer, that there is nothing good or evil in its own nature, and
that virtue and vice depend wholly on human authority and laws; this he on all
occasions strenuously argueth against. But he comes into another part of his
scheme, the making the magistrate or supreme civil power, the sole judge of
religious truth and orthodoxy, and resolving all doctrines and opinions in religion,
and the authority of what shall be accounted holy writ, into the appointment of the
state, a scheme which absolutely destroyeth the rights of private judgment and
conscience, and which evidently condemneth the conduct and judgment of Christ
and his apostles, and the primitive Christians at the first plantation of Christianity,
and of those excellent men that stood up for the reformation of it since.16
Leland accuses Shaftesbury of sharing Hobbes' view that religion is to be
subordinated to political ends. As we shall see in Chapter 4, Shaftesbury was undeniably
familiar with the writings of Hobbes. A closer look at the Characteristicks, however,
suggests that Shaftesbury offers a different origin for his policy toward religion. This
15
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alternative, which is identified by Shaftesbury as the "antient policy" toward religion, will
turn out to be important for understanding Shaftesbury's project as a whole. To see this,
however, it is necessary to explain the view Shaftesbury is rejecting. While Shaftesbury
identifies Hobbes and Locke as a philosophical foes, there is a remarkable amount of
agreement among these philosophers about the character of Christianity. I now turn to an
overview of Hobbes and Locke on Christianity. This overview allows us to contrast the
important departure Shaftesbury makes from modern philosophy in his critique of
religion.

Religion and the Enlightenment
 H obbes’ s Cri ti que of Chri st i ani t y

While there are few subjects treated in the works of Thomas Hobbes that do not
provoked controversy, contemporary scholars are especially divided on the question of
Hobbes' teaching on religion.

According to the prominent Hobbes scholar Howard

Warrender, for example, Hobbes' Leviathan presents a traditional natural law theory
which itself presupposes the existence of God.17 The claim that Hobbes was a sincere
Christian has found support more recently in A. P. Martinich's The Two Gods of
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Leviathan: Thomas Hobbes on Religion and Politics.18 Other scholars--many of whom
follow the interpretation of Hobbes offered by Leo Strauss-- have challenged this view.19
In my opinion it is difficult to reconcile Hobbes' apparent materialism with the
view that he is a sincere Christian. Hobbes scandalized his contemporaries when he
described "the World" as "Corporeal, that is to say Body…and consequently every part of
the Universe, is Body, and that which is not Body, is no part of the Universe."20
Elsewhere he writes that "the Word Body…signifieth that which filleth, or occupyeth
some certain room, or imagined place; and dependeth not on the imagination, but is a
reall part of that we call the Universe. For the Universe, being the Aggregate of all
Bodies, there is no reall part thereof that is not also Body; nor any thing properly a Body,
that is not also part of (that Aggregate of all Bodies) the Universe."

21

According to

Hobbes, bodies exist of themselves and are not dependent upon the imagination.
Contrary to the "sense of common people," there is no part of the universe that is not
body. In common speech men falsely lend reality to the supernatural. This happens in
part because bodies frequently operate beneath the ability of unaided human senses to
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detect them. When men speak of spirits, they actually refer to one of two things: "either
a subtile, fluid, and invisible Body, or a Ghost, or other Idol or Phantasme of the
Imagination."22 What seems not to be a possibility, according to Hobbes, is that a
spiritual being in the sense of something supernatural, that is, something gratuitously
given to rational beings by God and exempt from the operation of cause and effect,
appears in the world or directly influences the world. This is indicated by the sequel to
this passage.
Hobbes is quick to observe that there are many metaphorical senses of "spirit."
As he explains,
sometimes [spirit] is taken for Disposition or Inclination of the mind; as when for
the disposition to controwl the sayings of other men, we say, A Spirit
Contradiction; For A Disposition to Uncleannesse, An Unclean Spirit; for
Perversenesse, A Froward Spirit; for Sullennesse, A Dumb Spirit, and for
Inclination To Godlinesse, And Gods Service, the Spirit of God: sometimes for
any eminent ability, or extraordinary passion, or disease of the mind, as when
Great Wisdome is called the Spirit Of Wisdome; and Mad Men are said to be
Possessed With A Spirit.23
Metaphorical speech here presents noticeable phenomena in ghostly language,
whereas Hobbes suggests that most of these can be explained by reference to the natural
world. Common speech reflects the ease with which men will attribute any departure
from what they take to be the ordinary course of things to a supernatural force; that is, to
a "phantasme of the imagination." Wise men are said to be divine; men are said to be
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possessed when they are actually mad, that is, moved by passion in excess of what is
normally seen in common life.
Hobbes' materialism quickly gets us to the essence of his critique of religion.
Because he rejects the possibility of spiritual agency, Hobbes traces all religious
experiences to prior physiological facts. It follows that any revelation is false, for divine
powers do not--cannot--disclose special knowledge to men. This means that all claims to
revelation must reflect delusion or fraudulent intentions on the part of the alleged
prophet. It will be useful for our purposes to consider briefly the psychology of religion
as it is presented by Hobbes. We will see that Hobbes presents religiosity as a form of
mental illness. While it may ultimately have a physical seat, religiosity is for Hobbes a
social as well as individual phenomenon. Religiosity is potentially contagious (perhaps
quite literally in light of the fact that a spirit might betray the action of "a subtile, fluid,
and invisible Body"). Because many men are vulnerable to the passions of piety, they are
easily manipulated by others who will use fraudulent appeals to the spiritual world to
extend their own power. For Hobbes, ecclesiastical politics emerges from the fact that
men are prone to superstition. This becomes apparent in his account of priestcraft. We
will also see that Hobbes presents heresy as the rhetorical tool by which Christian
priestcraft was advanced.
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 Mel anchol y and t he ps ychol ogi cal basis of rel i gi ous zeal i n H obbes

Hobbesřs explanation of religiosity relies on his account of the passions as forms
of appetite and aversion.24 When a man has an aversion because he expects to be hurt, he
is said to have the passion of fear; when this aversion is less urgent, he also may be
experiencing grief. A common source of grief in men is the opinion of powerlessness.
This sort of grief is called "dejection of mind."25
Hobbes treats the psychology of religion in a chapter entitled "Of the Vertues commonly
called INTELLECTUAL; and their contrary DEFECTS."26 As it turns out, the passions
surrounding religion are among the chief contributors to defects of the intellect. The
general discussion is presented under a form of "madnesse" known as melancholy.
According to Hobbes, "stronger and more vehement Passions for any thing, than is
ordinarily seen in others" is called madness by men.27 He explains of madness that
"sometimes the extraordinary and extravagant Passion, proceedeth from the evill
constitution of the organs of the Body, or harme done them; and sometimes the hurt, and
indisposition of the Organs, is caused by vehemence, or continuance of the Passion. But
in both cases the Madnesse is of one and the same nature."28
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Melancholy is a form of madness whereby "dejection, subjects a man to causeless
fears."29 Dejection, we know, is grief arising from an opinion of powerlessness. One
prominent symptom of melancholia is superstition. Sometimes a man will come to hold
"an opinion of being inspired." While inspiration is hard to spot in one person, the
opinion shows itself in groups: "when many of them conspire together, the Rage of the
whole multitude is visible enough." In other words, the opinion of inspiration has
political consequences because it often issues in clamorous, seditious behavior. While it
ultimately has a physical seat, then, religiosity is for Hobbes a social as well as individual
phenomenon. Religiosity is potentially contagious--perhaps quite literally in light of the
fact that a spirit might betray the action of "a subtile, fluid, and invisible Body." Even
when no action comes of such melancholia, the very opinion of being inspired is for
Hobbes sufficient evidence of madness. He proposes that "if some man in Bedlam
should entertain you with sober discourse, and you desire in taking leave, to know what
he were, that you might another time requite his civility; and he should tell you, he were
God the Father; I think you need expect no extravagant action for argument of his
Madnesse." 30
This opinion of being inspired or having "private spirit" often begins when a man
notices a common error in others but fails to notice how he came to understand the error
for what it is. (We should say, rather, for what he thinks it is, because he himself may
29
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well be mistaken either about the error or his own preferred account!) The man attributes
his purported insight to a special grace from God. Hobbes identifies such opinions as
madness because of their similarity to the excess passion seen in drunkards--sober men,
he remarks, are rarely willing to own to such passions. To put a finer point on the matter,
the origin of the idea of inspiration seems to be ignorance. Indeed, weřll soon see that
credulity in man is directly connected to his ignorance. It seems fair to say that Hobbes
presents religiosity as a phenomenon arising from fear, more specifically that fear known
as dejection of mind arising from an opinion of powerlessness. Weakness inclines men
toward superstition and over time may even drive them mad.
Hobbes identifies two explanations for madness common both in ancient times
and later. Sometimes madness is attributed to the natural workings of the passions; at
other times madness is attributed to supernatural "Daemons, or Spirits, either good, or
bad."31 Men who are mad by virtue of the passions are simply mad. The inspired mad
are known by a variety of names, for example "daemoniacks."32
Ancient peoples, Gentile and Jew, tended to attribute madness to spirits. The
Jews, he tells us, called madmen "prophets," even when they could be explained by
natural passions. Hobbes remarks that Greeks and Romans naturally blamed all sorts of
things to spirits, but such an explanation is surprising in the Jews because "neither Moses,
nor Abraham pretended to Prophecy by possession of a Spirit; but from the voice of
31
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God." Nor did the laws they gave indicate a belief in "any such Enthusiasme; or any
Possession."33 For that matter, "neither did the other Prophets of the old Testament
pretend Enthusiasme."
Hobbes explains the confusion of the Jewish people by their "want of curiosity to
search naturall causes." Given their ignorance, when something seemed unusual in the
operation of a manřs mind, "they must needs thinke it supernaturall; and then what can it
be, but that either God or the Divell is in him?" (Lest we attribute the opinion of Hobbes
to anti-Semitism, it should be mentioned that Hobbes points to an exception among the
Jews: the Sadducees did not themselves believe in spirits. According to Hobbes, such
lack of belief "is very neere to direct Atheism." One wonders whether this remark
implies something about his own theism. 34)
Hobbes concedes that the New Testament seems at times to agree with the view
held by the more vulgar Gentiles and Jews on this matter, but when "our Saviour" speaks
of unclean spirits, "it is manifestly a Parable, alluding to a man, that after a little
endeavour to quit his lusts, is vanquished by the strength of them; and becomes seven
times worse than he was." Indeed, says Hobbes, "I see nothing at all in the Scripture, that
requireth a beliefe, that Daemonicks were any other thing but Mad-men."35
Hobbes next reminds his readers of another sort of madness, whereby men speak
nonsense through the misapplication of words. Such word-abuse is called "absurdity,"
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which he described earlier in the chapter "Of Reason, and Science." With absurdity, the
possibility of making sense of words and the ideas they are supposed to convey is
"unconceivable."36 This sort of madness requires education of a refined sort, and in
general is the product of "the Schoole-men" and "abstruse Philosophy." Common men
do not speak absurdly until they are confused by philosophers. Some men fall into
absurdity through "misunderstanding of the words they have received, and repeat by
rote;" others, however, willingly practice absurdity "from the intention to deceive others
by obscurity."37 What can one say, Hobbes wonders, about theologians who speak of
"transubstantiation" and "free will"? "When men write whole volumes of such stuffe, are
they not Mad, or intend to make others so?" For Hobbes absurd speech is an acquired,
artificial sort of madness. Madmen go mad themselves because of a variety of possible
defects, but some madness is an affliction traceable to the desire of some men to lord it
over others.
Hobbes famously defines religion as a "fear of power invisible, or imagined from
tales publiquely allowed; not allowed, Superstition. And when the power imagined is
truly such as we imagine, True Religion.38 The psychology of religiosity has prepared us
to consider religion in its more political manifestation.

To round out our own

consideration of religion and superstition in Hobbes we must turn to chapter 12, "Of
Religion."
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publically allowed tales from proscribed tales. (The question of their truth is not our
concern at the moment.)
Hobbes reminds his readers of a point made earlier in the book (again, in the
chapter on science), that "it is peculiar to the nature of Man, to be inquisitive into the
Causes of Events they see," and especially so when an individualřs own fortune is
involved. So powerful is this curiosity, that "when he cannot assure himself of the true
causes of things, (for the causes of good and evill fortune for the most part are invisible,)
he supposes causes of them, either such as his own fancy suggesteth; or trusteth to the
Authority of other men, such as he thinks to be his friends, and wiser than himself."39
Manřs ability to foresee his own suffering in pain, scarcity, and death, gives him little rest
from anxiety about the future. Hobbes speculates that it is for this reason "that some of
the old Poets said, that the Gods were first created by human feare." (He may well have
Lucretius in mind here.40) Monotheism, he suggests, is more philosophic insofar as it is
born from a persistent desire to know the causes of things. It leads the mind ever
backward to some, "first, and an eternall cause of all things, which is that which men
mean by the name of God: And all this without thought of their fortune, the solicitude
whereof, both enclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the causes of other
things."41 This cause is so remote it can barely be understood as material. It is a short
39
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intellectual movement from this opinion to the suspicion that man, too, has a cause which
is not manifest to the senses.

Since invisible causes must, generally speaking, be

inferred, manřs mind is led to other sorts of invisible causes and the desire to
prognosticate and predict their effects. Given that man is primarily interested in his own
fortunes, he will be led almost naturally to honor and worship "powers invisible."
Hobbes, then, partly explains religion through his account of its "natural seeds."
Since the fancies and passions of men vary by place and time, a variety of religions arise,
such that the ceremonies "used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to another."42
Religious rites are most often the conventions of societies, existing "according to their
own invention," although Hobbes says that some developed "by Gods [sic]
commandment, and direction."
Men are not indifferent to the origin of their sacred laws. According to Hobbes,
those religions which are due to the invention of men, are part of "humane Politiques,"
handed down to make men "more apt to Obedience, Laws, Peace, Charity, and civill
Society."43 This sort of religion is given by "the founders of Commonwealths, and the
Law-Givers of the Gentiles." The latter sort of religion--that given by the command and
direction of God--is of "Abraham, Moses, and our Blessed Saviour; by whom have been
derived unto us the Lawes of the Kingdom of God."44 Among the Gentiles, there are few
things which have not been worshiped in one place or another, or attributed occult
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qualities by their poets. The world taken as a whole was "chaos"; natural forces and
passions were regularly personified; each man was assumed to have his own "genius."
The Gentiles "invoked also their own Wit, by the name of Muses; their own Ignorance,
by the name of Fortune; their own Lust, by the name of Cupid," and indeed, there was no
end to their poetic invention. Such inventions served to explain things about which the
causes were remote and unseen.
The Gentiles developed "sciences" of divination such as "necromancy, conjuring,
and witchcraft," "theomancy," and "judiciary astrology" out of their hopes to discern and
control the future.

Hoping for such insights they would look for revelations from

prognosticators of all sorts:

"sometimes in the insignificant speeches of mad-men,

supposed to be possessed with a divine Spirit; which possession they called
Enthusiasm."45 In short, because of their fear and ignorance, and misled by the poets and
charlatans, men were led to believe many improbable things.
Such religious beliefs were not without their utility, of course. Hobbes observes
that
the first Founders, and Legislators of Common-wealths amongst the Gentiles,
whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and peace, had in all
places taken care; First, to imprint in their minds a beliefe, that those precepts
which they gave concerning Religion, might not be thought to proceed from their
own device. . .Secondly. . .to make it believed, that the same things were
displeasing to the Gods, which were forbidden by the Lawes. Thirdly, to
prescribe Ceremonies.46
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These prescriptions are clear examples of publically allowed tales.

This usage is

deceptive but not necessarily coercive. Hobbes points out that among the Romans, "men
were not forbidden to deny, that which in the Poets is written of the paines, and pleasures
after this life." Indeed, men "of great authority, and gravity in that state have in their
Harangues openly derided" such beliefs about the gods as vulgar superstition.47
Nevertheless, the belief of rewards and punishments in the afterlife was a cherished (and
of course, useful) view. Since "the Religion of the Gentiles was a part of their Policy,"
they were inclined toward toleration. Hobbes writes,
the Romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the then known World, made
no scruple of tolerating any Religion whatsoever in the City of Rome it-self;
unless it had something in it, that could not consist with their Civill Government;
nor do we read, that any Religion was there forbidden, but that of the Jewes; who
(being the peculiar Kingdom of God) thought it unlawfull to acknowledge
subjection to any mortall King or State whatsoever.48
Regarding his natural account of the origin of religion, then, Hobbes offers the
following summary: "from the propagation of Religion, it is not hard to understand the
causes of the resolution of the same into its first seeds, or principles; which are only an
opinion of the Deity, and Powers invisible, and supernaturall; that can never be so
to the Public Peace, and to the Obedience of Subjects necessary thereunto; and to make some of them Good
Daemons, and others Evill; the one as a Spurre to the Observance, the other, as Reines to withhold them
from Violation of the Laws."
47
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abolished out of humane nature, but that new Religions may againe be made to spring out
of them, by the culture of such men, as for such purposes are in reputation."49
One might wonder whether or not Hobbes truly regards religion as ineradicable,
for much of the first part of Leviathan is dedicated to articulating a scientific method
whereby certain knowledge of cause and effect can be established.50 One can imagine
interest in judicial astrology waning insofar as other accounts of cause and effect come to
be accepted. So too, dejection of mind would become less common as nature becomes
less mysterious--that is, as nature comes to be mastered through careful anticipation of
effects. As for the sincere fascination held by some for "the doctrine of Aristotle,"
Hobbes may well hope that his clearer science will offer an attractive and superior
alternative. (After all, pure curiosity about the "First, and an Eternall cause of all things"
has been, according to Hobbes, fruitless and vain: natural philosophy in the ancient
schools "was rather a Dream than Science.") 51
In order for a religion to become established, the multitude must have confidence
that its founder is a man of good will, holiness, and superior wisdom. These attributes
are taken by people to be the signs of supernatural grace. (These attributes seem to fall
under the metaphorical usage of spirit we encountered earlier.) Over time, however, the
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government of religion, which must be administered by men of a more ordinary sort, will
find its wisdom, sincerity, or love in doubt. Without the "feare of the Civill Sword" at its
disposal, a religion will eventually be "contradicted and rejected."52 Incoherencies in its
theology, scandalous behavior of its adherents, and suspicion of motives all contribute to
the erosion of respect. This natural decay is not restricted to ancient Gentile religion, for
it has a common source. Hobbes remarks, "I may attribute all the changes of Religion in
the world, to one and the same cause; and that is, unpleasing Priests; and those not onely
amongst Catholiques, but even in that Church that hath presumed most of
Reformation."53 The concern over eroding esteem seems to contradict the earlier claim
that men of authority had been able to deride religion openly "in their Harangues." If
magistrates introduce religion to reinforce public order, how could they indulge the few
in their contemptuous opinions? If religion can be described as civil religion, how did it
become such a problem for the political community?
To answer these questions we must consider the role heresy and priestcraft play
Hobbesř critique.

We will first look to a work entitled A Dialogue between a

Philosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England.54 In that dialogue the origin
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and development of the idea of heresy is explained. (A very similar account is present in
Behemoth as well.55) Heresy reveals the possible consequences of absurd speech.
We have seen Hobbes distinguish religions given by men to other men "according
to their own invention" from the religions given "by Gods commandment, and direction."
We have also seen that the Roman magistrate did not tolerate a religion that refuses to
subject itself "to any mortall King or State whatsoever." The origin of rivalry between
the State and religion can be explained by the political history of priesthood. Hobbes
presents an historical account of what later thinkers will call "priestcraft" in several
places.

We will consider a brief catalogue of historical priesthoods presented in

Behemoth: The History of the Causes of the Civil Wars of England, and of the Counsels
and Artifices by Which They Were Carried on from the Year 1640 to the Year 1660.56
We will be then in a position to see the extent to which Shaftesburyřs account of
Christianity is harmonious with the general "Enlightenment."
 H obbes on t he devel opm ent of heresy

In the course of their conversation in A Dialogue, two characters known only as
the Philosopher and the Lawyer come to discuss heresy.57 According to the lawyer, under
Henry IV the law laid down heresy "as preaching or writing of such doctrine as is
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contrary to the determination of Holy Church." The philosopher is quick to point out that
what is taken for the Church changed considerably between the reigns of Henry IV (when
the Roman Church was Holy) and Queen Elizabeth (when an independent Church of
England ruled). The philosopher comes to his assistance by offering a definition of
heresy which avoids the problem of historical shifts in the Church: "I say, heresy is a
singularity of doctrine or opinion contrary to the doctrine of another man, or men; and the
word properly signifies the doctrine of a sect, which doctrine is taken upon trust of some
man of reputation for wisdom, that was the first author of the same."58 The philosopher
moves from the lawyerřs definition in terms of orthodoxy as understood by the magistrate
to a definition in terms of opinion. Opinions vary from man to man and from group to
group. Indeed, we see in the course of the dialogue that the philosopher hopes to show
the political consequences of this insight. The philosopherřs definition is agnostic on
whether a particular opinion is true--it may or may not be right (ortho—) ). Either way,
orthodoxy remains an opinion (that is, doxa) rather than knowledge. The philosopher
immediately indicates that the acceptance of an opinion rests on the trust in one "of
reputation for wisdom" who, as it happens, is "the first author of the same." What, then,
is the basis of this trust? As we shall see, trust is connected to authority.
The philosopher explains to the lawyer that the word heresy originally belonged
to the ancient Greeks.59 In the days before Alexander, Greece was home to "many
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excellent wits, that employed their time in search of the truth in all manner of sciences
worthy of their honour."60 These classical "authors" and "wits"--namely "Pythagoras,
Plato, Zeno, Epicurus and Aristotle"-- did not pursue philosophy for the sake of material
gain. We learn that they "did not get their bread by their philosophy, but were able to
live of their own." Still, the philosopher slyly suggests that their "deep and laborious
meditation" was not without its rewards. As a consequence of their work these authors
were "in honour with princes and other great personages." Indeed, they published their
writings "to great honour and applause." While these great philosophers were free from
necessity, the philosopher consistently calls attention to their attachment to honor. (One
wonders whether Hobbes believes that there is even such a thing as the disinterested love
of truth.)

As wise as philosophers were, they disagreed with each other in "their

doctrine." Over time, the men who followed various philosophical doctrines came to be
known as Pythagoreans, Academics, Epicureans, or Peripatetics. These are examples of
"heresy" for the Greeks, "which signifies no more but taking of an opinion."61
Since philosophy was "so much in fashion," men of wealth and repute sought out
philosophers to educate their children. The trade of educator was soon recognized to be
very profitable, and it "suggested to many idle and needy fellows an easy and
compendious way of maintenance, which was to teach the philosophy, some of Plato,
some of Aristotle, &c: whose books to that end they read over, but without capacity or
60
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much endeavor to examine the reasons of their doctrines, taking only the conclusions, as
they lay."62 We can see from this account that the reasoned opinions of philosophers
were soon transmitted to others by foolish professors of philosophy. Since the opinions
were not accompanied by understanding they must have been accepted on trust. The
competition for students and gainful employment encouraged nastiness in these
philosophy professors, yet as each was a "chooser" of a particular doctrine, the word
"haereticus" was not regarded as a term of reproach.
The various schools maintained themselves in Greece and eventually made their
way to Rome. As luck would have it, the disagreement between schools reached its
height "in the times of the apostles and in the primitive Church."63 While the doctrines of
Plato and Aristotle were still esteemed, other schools found themselves in lesser demand.
After the death of "our Saviour," the Apostles carried the Gospel around the
world, "especially in Asia the Less, in Greece, and Italy, where they constituted many
Churches." The Apostles left behind bishops to "teach and direct" converts "by setting
forth the life and miracles of our Saviour, as they had received them from the writings of
the apostles and evangelists." The bishops were neither expected nor asked to instruct the
converts in philosophy, yet former heathens entered the priesthood of the Church from
"all professions and dispositions," including the academic life.
explains,
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some that had never thought of philosophy at all, but were intent upon their
fortunes or their pleasures; and some that had a greater, some a less use of reason;
and some that had studied philosophy, but professed it not, which were commonly
the men of the better rank; and some had professed it only for their better
abstinence, and had it not farther than readily to talk and wrangle; and some were
Christians in good earnest, and others but counterfeit, intending to make use of
the charity of those that were sincere Christians, which in those times was very
great.64
The philosopher draws our attention to the variety of motives and abilities among the
converts. Fortune and pleasure were common motives; and while some men had a
sincere belief (perhaps those with "a less use of reason," in Hobbesřs view?) others a had
nothing more than a desire to milk sincere Christians for charitable support.
Those who were able to "make the best use of Aristotleřs rhetoric and logic"
became priests and bishops. Those who were proudest of their knowledge of Plato and
Aristotle were "prone to innovation" because they wanted to advance their reputation by
bending scripture to their philosophical doctrines. It is here that "heresy, amongst the
Christians, first came to be a reproach."65 Men eventually became so quarrelsome that
Councils of local bishops would meet to resolve disputes. They would issue authoritative
decrees, calling themselves "Catholic" and those who refused to abandon their
philosophic sects "heretics."
The Catholic Church was now officially declaring which doctrines were orthodox
and which heresy but as their decrees lacked the force of law disputes continued. This
changed under "the first Christian Emperor," Constantine. A theological dispute arose
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among the bishops around the opinions of Arius of Alexandria that provoked "sedition
and much bloodshed both of citizens and soldiers of that city."66 In order to restore order
and prevent future sedition, Constantine himself called a council of bishops, promising
that "whatsoever they agreed on he would cause to be observed."

The council

temporarily succeeded in having Arius banished. While he was restored to grace by the
Emperor by promising future obedience, Arius "died before he could repossess his
benefice."67 The philosopher seems to suggest that it is easier to recover state of spiritual
grace than it is to recover property; both seem to be the purview of the magistrate.
Clearly Hobbes intends for us to investigate the worldly motives of the Church in
identifying heretics. As for the motives of Constantine we learn that "the Emperor
caused this confession to be made, not for the regard of truth of doctrine, but for the
preserving of the peace, especially among his Christian soldiers, by whose valour he had
gotten the empire, and by the same was to preserve it."68
Over time, the relatively mild punishment of banishment was stiffened and heresy
became a capital crime under imperial law. We learn that that the papacy grew in power
such that it eventually commanded obedience from emperors. "The Popes from time to
time made heresies of many other points of doctrine (as they saw it conduce to the setting
up of the chair above the throne)." While the magistrate first used the Church for his
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purposes, soon the Church was using him for its own.

Apparently this precedent

continued for some time, for the conversation abruptly returns to the subject of common
law under Henry IV. Under Henry, the law added the penalty of "forfeiture of lands and
goods" to the burning of heretics by the magistrate. The monarchs of England were wont
to shift and modify the laws concerning religion and by the time of Edward VI "not only
all punishments of heresy were taken away, but also the nature of it was changed to what
it originally was, a private opinion."69
Hobbes makes it clear in Behemoth that problems persisted into the English
Revolutions. Even though the monarchs of England, beginning with Henry VIII, are able
to reassert the sovereignty of the magistrate over that of the Church, Christianity
remained the source of political conflict. The problem of seditious opinions which
seemed to have been corrected once the Church of Rome had ascendency, reemerge with
the Protestant Reformation.

To see this we must turn to consider the account of

priestcraft as Hobbes presents it in Behemoth.
 P ri est s and Presbyt eri ans

In Part 1 of Behemoth, Speaker ŘAř offers an epitome of the English Civil wars.
In 1640, England was governed under the monarchy of Charles I, whose rule might have
been expected to be stable as he was king by a 600 year old lineage. But Charles
inherited a kingdom of people who had been corrupted by a variety of seducers. ŘAř
identifies seven groups of seducers but we will only consider the first four.
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The first three sorts of seducers were religious sects. First and most numerous
were the Presbyterian ministers: "ministers, as they called themselves, of Christ; and
sometimes, in their sermons to the people, Godřs ambassadors; pretending to have a right
from God to govern every one his parish, and their assembly the whole nation."70 Second
but still substantial were "Papists," this "notwithstanding that the Popeřs power in
England, both temporal and ecclesiastical, had been by Act of Parliament abolished."
Third were a collection of other sects, born partly in the wake of the troubles between the
first two sorts: Independents, Anabaptists, Fifth-monarchy-men, Quakers, Adamites, and
others too numerous for ŘAř to recall the doctrinal differences. As ŘAř summarizes,
"these were the enemies which arose against his Majesty from the private interpretation
of the Scripture, exposed to every manřs scanning in his mother-tongue."71 The fourth
sort are not inspired by religious motives. They are glory-lovers and seekers of honor
who have received a classical education: Ŗthere were an exceeding great number of men
of the better sort, that had been so educated, as that in their youth having read the books
written by famous men of the ancient Grecian and Roman commonwealths concerning
their polity and great actions; in which books the popular government was extolled by
that glorious name of liberty, and monarchy disgraced by the name of tyranny; they
became thereby in love with their forms of government.ŗ72
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We can see in these four kinds of seducers the two overriding political concerns
which led Hobbes to construct his political theory, that is, religious factionalism and the
love of glory. Both of these problems are manifestations of pride as he defines it in
Leviathan and they are consequences of pernicious but authoritative opinions. Later in
the conversation presented by in Behemoth, Hobbes explores the way in which
philosophy, political ambition, and pretentions to divine inspiration have colluded in the
past. In the course of the account of the revolt of the Presbyterians, ŘAř remarks that the
ministers envisioned a constitution where they could "have the delight of sharing the
government, and consequently of being able to be revenged on them that do not admire
their learning and help to fill their purses, and win to their service them that do."73
In the course of the conversation ŘBř expresses worry about a commonwealth
divided between two factions, wherein "their quarrels should be only about opinions, that
is, about who has the most learning; as if their learning ought to be the rule of governing
all the world." While they call it learning in divine matters, ŘBř sees only philosophical
disputes at work. ŘAř replies that some of them do in fact "give themselves out for
prophets by extraordinary inspiration." Most, however, boast of their greater skill in
reading and interpreting Scripture "by reason of their breeding in the Universities, and
knowledge there gotten of the Latin tongue, and some also of the Greek and Hebrew
tongues, wherein the Scripture was written; besides their knowledge of natural
philosophy, which is their publically taught." Philosophy and the divine studies have
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"conduced to the advancement of the professors thereof to places of the greatest
authority, next to the authority of kings themselves, in most of the ancient kingdoms of
the world."74
In the account that follows, ŘAř offers historical evidence for this claim, citing the
historians of antiquity. The Druids of Brittany and France, he reports, had among them
"philosophers and theologians, that [were] exceedingly honoured, whom they also [used]
as prophets." These men had the multitude obedient to them because of their skills at
augury. The Magi of Persia were philosophers and astrologers, and were taken by
Christians to be kings.75 In Egypt, perhaps the oldest nation, "priests had the greatest
power in civil affairs, that any subjects ever had in any nation."

Their priesthood

employed many priests at the sacrifices to the Gods, and they would "leave the same
employment to their posterity, which, next to the King, have the greatest power and
authority."76 The power of the Egyptian priesthood extended to the courts, and the
"chief-justice" would wear a necklace with a jewel called "truth."

Such was the

"power…acquired in civil matters by the conjecture of philosophy and divinity."77
ŘAř remarks that just as the Egyptians, so too the Jews established a priesthood by
family right. Among the Assyrians and Chaldeans, the priests were also a political sect,
and their priesthood was also heritable. Quoting Diodorus Siculus, ŘAř says of the
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Chaldeans that they were "like to that of the Egyptian priests; for being ordained for the
service of the Gods, they spend the whole time of their life in philosophy; being of
exceeding great reputation in astrology, and pretending much also to prophesy..and to
find out by certain incantations the preventing of harm, and the bringing to pass of good."
Similar observations are made about India and Æthiopia.78
We learn that in the earlier days, Kings did not obey priests "as mastered by force
and arms, but as having their reason mastered by superstition."79 Yet in this history, one
example stands out. 'A' relates that "in the time of Ptolemy II, Ergamenes, King of the
Æthiopians, having had his breeding in philosophy after the manner of the Greeks, being
the first that durst dispute their power, took heart as befitted a King; came with soldiers to
a place called Abaton, where was then the golden temple of the Æthiopians; killed all the
priests, abolished the custom, and rectified the kingdom according to his will."80
The account of priestcraft in Hobbes is meant to show the dire political
consequences of religious sectarianism. In light of the fact that priests wield their power
not through strength of arms but through the power of superstition, it is significant that
Ergamenes had studied Greek philosophy.

Ergamenes evidently does not hold the

priesthood of the Æthiopians as sacred; presumably philosophy has freed him from such
superstition and allowed him to restore the sovereignty of the state. Yet Hobbes takes
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Greek philosophy to be a problem in itself, especially insofar as it encourages young men
to undertake violent actions in the name of liberty. He does not himself look to restore
the ancient policy of religion by recommitting to the classical understanding of
philosophy.
A consideration of Locke's critique of Christianity is necessary in order to
evaluate Shaftesbury's claim that modernity is to be understood as a project undertaken
by philosophers. As it turns out, the account of Christianity offered by Hobbes finds a
striking parallel in the writings of John Locke. Lockeřs account is complicated in itself
and a proper evaluation would consider his entire work; yet one can see in Locke the
three concerns identified above. A psychological account of religiosity can be seen
clearly in the account "Of Enthusiasm," which Locke added to the fourth edition of his
Essay Concerning Human Understanding.81 On the basis of this psychological account
of enthusiasm, Locke is able to present a largely political account of Christianity. A
close analysis of his Letter concerning Toleration and Reasonableness of Christianity,
not to mention the whole of Part IV of the Essay, is beyond the scope of this chapter. For
our purposes it is enough to consider also two essays from Lockeřs common-place books
which were unpublished during his lifetime. The concern over heresy can be seen in a
little essay entitled "Error." The concern over priestcraft can be seen in an essay entitled
"Sacerdos."
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 Ent husi asm and t he psychol ogi cal basis of zeal i n Locke

As the groundbreaking studies of Ronald Knox and Susie Tucker have shown,
enthusiasm enters English as a theological term of art but by Lockeřs day becomes a term
of abuse.82 In the words of Jan Goldstein, "Řenthusiasmř functioned in the eighteenth
century as a powerful term of opprobrium. It conjured up everything antithetical to, and
rejected by, enlightened rationality."83
From the pen of a believer the term tried to distinguish false claims of divine
revelation from true revelation; in the hands of a non-believer it was a term of scorn for
revelation as such; either way, it had become a term with a negative valence. While
Shaftesbury played an important role in shifting the meaning closer to our contemporary
understanding (a word with a generally positive valence suggesting eagerness), Lockeřs
account in the Essay concerning Human Understanding clearly shows that he shares the
pejorative use.
When considering what constitutes genuine evidence in support of an opinion,
Locke writes that "whatsoever credit or authority we give to any proposition more than it
receives from the principles and proofs it supports itself upon, is owing to our
inclinations that way, and is so far a derogation from the love of truth as such; which, as
82
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it can receive no evidence from our passions or interests, so it should receive no tincture
from them."84
With this in mind, Locke considers a "ground of assent" called enthusiasm, which
some men would claim has the authority of (genuine) faith or reason; and which, "laying
by reason, would set up revelation without it." The consequence of enthusiasm is that it
"substitutes in the room of [reason and revelation] the ungrounded fancies of a manřs
own brain, and assumes them for a foundation both of opinion and conduct."85
According to Locke, it is much harder for a person to reason about something, or
strive for authentic revelation--which is also a sort of reasoning as he defines it, that is,
"natural reason enlarged by a new set of discoveries communicated by God
immediately"--than it is "to pretend to revelation." Such pretentions to revelation have
been found in all ages in men "whom melancholy has mixed with devotion, or those
whose conceit of themselves has raised them into an opinion of a greater familiarity with
God, and nearer admittance to his favour, than is afforded to others."86
Such melancholic spirits are ripe to accept whatever opinion is offered to their
fancies. Enthusiasm is a sort of delusion which comes to men apart from reason, "rising
from the conceits of a warmed or overweening brain." It is an especially tenacious weed
in a manřs soul, because it is "freed from all restraint of reason and check of revelation,"
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and worse, "it is heightened into a divine authority, in concurrence with our own temper
and inclination."87 Locke writes that enthusiasm "is nothing but an ignis fatuus, that
leads them constantly round in this circle; It is a revelation because they firmly believe it;
and they believe it, because it is a revelation."88
It is against this formulation that Shaftesbury's own account of enthusiasm takes
shape. Locke's psychological account of enthusiasm prepares the way for a more specific
critique of Christianity.
 H eresy i n Locke

In his essay "Error," Locke writes that "the great division among Christians is
about opinions. Every sect has its set of them, and that is called Orthodoxy; and he who
professes his assent to them, though with an implicit faith, and without examining, he is
orthodox and in the way to salvation."89 Unfortunately, however, this concern for right
opinion is inseparable from a disdain for wrong opinion. Locke continues: "but if he
examines, and thereupon questions any of them, he is presently suspected of heresy, and
if he oppose them or hold the contrary, he is presently condemned as in a damnable error,
and in the sure way to perdition."
Like Hobbes before him, Locke denies that this demand to adhere to orthodoxy is
a requirement of Christ; it is rather a later innovation made by the Church. So attached to
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the particular dogma and articles of faith are the various sects in Christendom that Locke
remarks, "opinions are preferred to life, and orthodoxy is that which they are concerned
for, not morals."90
A similar account of heresy can be found in Of the Conduct of the
Understanding.91 In section 34, entitled "Indifferency," Locke argues that menřs opinions
should always follow clear evidence. "In any other way but this," he writes,
all the world are born to orthodoxy; they imbibe at first the allowed opinions of
their country and party, and so never questioning their truth, not one of an
hundred ever examines. They are applauded for presuming they are in the right.
He that considers is a foe to orthodoxy, because possibly he may deviate from
some of the received doctrines there. And thus men, without any industry or
acquisition of their own, inherit local truths (for it is not the same every where)
and are inured to assent without evidence. This influences farther than is thought;
for what one of an hundred of the zealous bigots in all parties, ever examined the
tenets he is so stiff in; or ever thought it his business or duty so to do?92
Unfortunately for political life, however, men are not likely to examine the evidence for
and the sources of their opinions. This leaves men vulnerable to those who would
manipulate opinions for their own advantage.
In Christendom, Locke argues, the priesthood did just that.

In The

Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke writes that priests have conspired to keep men
from gaining true knowledge of God.
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in this state of darkness and ignorance of the true God, vice and superstition held
the world. Nor could any help be had, or hoped for, from reason; which could not
be heard, and was judged to have nothing to do in the case; priests, everywhere, to
secure their empire, having excluded reason from having any thing to do in
religion…The rational and thinking part of mankind, it is true, when they sought
after him, they found the one supreme, invisible God; but if they acknowledged
and worshipped him, it was only in their own minds. They kept this truth locked
up in their own breasts as a secret, nor ever durst venture it amongst the people;
much less amongst the priests, those wary guardians, of their own creeds and
profitable inventions. Hence we see, that reason, speaking ever so clearly to the
wise and virtuous, had never authority enough to prevail on the multitude.93
Concealing oneřs true thoughts on such matters became necessary as a result of
the persecution which followed the demand for orthodoxy. As this passage suggests,
Locke tends to trace the promulgation of such pernicious opinion to the power of the
priesthood. Locke explains these views at greater length in an essay entitled "Sacerdos."
 P ri est craf t i n Locke

We have already remarked that in the enlightenment account, heresy is not an
original concern of what might be called "primitive" Christianity; it is, rather, a later
innovation of the Church, articulated with the intention of exerting control over the lives
of men. As Locke explains it in his essay "Sacerdos," there were in antiquity two sorts of
teachers: priests and philosophers. Priests were responsible for "the arts of propitiation
and atonement;" they were the official mediators between men and the gods and they
concerned themselves with the traditional religious ceremonies and rites. Philosophers, on
the other hand, "meddled not with the public religion, worship, or ceremonies, but left
them entirely to the priests, as priests left the instruction of men in natural and moral
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knowledge wholly to the philosophers."94

These two sorts of teachers appealed to

different authorities, philosophers to reason and priests to revelation, and neither sort
showed much interest in the authorities of the other. Locke draws here a division between
piety and true morality, which may or may not be found among the pious.
According to Locke, pagan religion was concerned not with right opinion but with
right action. He writes in Reasonableness of Christianity that in antiquity "all men,
indeed, under pain of displeasing the gods, were to frequent the temples: every one went
to their sacrifices and services: but the priests made it not their business to teach them
virtue. If they were diligent in their observations and ceremonies; punctual in their feasts
and solemnities, and the tricks of religion; the holy tribe assured them the gods were
pleased, and they looked no farther."95
Such practices were less demanding than the practice of virtue; a quick sacrifice
would suffice to clear a guilty conscience.96

Contrary to the understanding which

developed in the wake of Christianity, "religion was everywhere distinguished from, and
preferred to virtue; and…it was dangerous heresy and profaneness to think the contrary."
Pagan religion was interested only in practice, and the magistrate took a special interest
in religion for political reasons:
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so much virtue as was necessary to hold societies together, and to contribute to
the quiet of governments, the civil laws of commonwealths taught, and forced
upon men that lived under magistrates. But these laws being for the most part
made by such, who had no other aims but their own power, reached no farther
than those things that would serve to tie men together in subjection; or at most
were directly to conduce to the prosperity and temporal happiness of any
people.97
Little by little, this policy changed with the spread and growing influence of
Christianity. According to Locke, Jesus Christ himself "reunited these two again, religion
and morality, as inseparable parts of the worship of God."98 This is not the good news
one might have suspected. In the wake of this reunion,
the ministers of it, who also called themselves priests, have assumed to
themselves the parts both of the heathen priests and philosophers, and claim a
right not only to perform all the outward acts of the Christian religion in public,
and to regulate the ceremonies to be used there, but also to teach men their duties
of morality towards one another and towards themselves, and to prescribe to them
in the conduct of their lives.99
Locke famously argues that the magistrate should not interfere in those religious
matters "indifferent in the commonwealth under his jurisdiction," where he is not himself
a professor.100 He may, of course, "forbid such things as may tend to the disturbance of
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the peace of the commonwealth to be done by any of his people, whether they esteem
them civil or religious. This is his proper business." It is not proper, however, to enforce
a set of opinions without such disruptive consequences. Absent such a concern, it would
be a matter of "the greatest tyranny, to prescribe him a way of worship." So unreasonable
and tyrannical was this practice that "we find scarce any attempt toward it by the
magistrates in the several societies of mankind till Christianity was well grown up in the
world, and was become a national religion." After that, Locke writes, "it hath been the
cause of more disorders, tumults, and bloodshed, than all other causes put together."101
This is a remarkably strong claim for the usually temperate Locke and one might
mistake it as powerful evidence against Christianity itself. The blame for such disorder,
however, cannot be laid at the foot of the Cross per se:
Antichrist has sown those tares in the field of the Church, the rise whereof hath
been only hence, that the clergy, by degrees, as Christianity spread, affecting
dominion, laid claim to a priesthood, derived by succession from Christ, and so
independent of civil power, receiving (as they pretend) by the imposition of
hands, and some other ceremonies agreed (but only variously) by the priesthoods
raised upon it. It is not that I do not think every one should be persuaded of the truth of those opinions he
professes. It is that I contend for; and it is that which I fear the great sticklers for orthodoxy often fail in.
For we see generally that numbers of them exactly jump in a whole large collection of doctrines, consisting
of abundance of particulars; as if their notions were, by one common stamp, printed on their minds, even to
the least lineament. This is very hard, if not impossible, to be conceived of those who take up their opinions
only from conviction. But, how fully soever I am persuaded of the truth of what I hold, I am in common
justice to allow the same sincerity to him that differs from me; and so we are upon equal terms. This
persuasion of truth on each side, invests neither of us with a right to censure or condemn the other. I have
no more reason to treat him ill for differing from me, than he has to treat me ill for the same cause. Pity
him, I may; inform him fairly, I ought; but contemn, malign, revile, or any otherwise prejudice him for not
thinking just as I do, that I ought not. My orthodoxy gives me no more authority over him, than his (for
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of several factions, an indelible character, particular sanctity, and a power
immediately from Heaven to do several things which are not lawful to be done by
other men.102
Locke goes on to identify three aspects of the political character and consequences of this
priestcraft: "1st, To teach opinions concerning God, a future state, and ways of worship.
2nd, To do and perform themselves certain rites exclusive of others. 3rd, To punish
dissenters from their doctrines and rules."103 These privileges obviously provided the
priesthood immense influence over the political affairs of men. While not generally
claiming for themselves the right of theocracy, the priesthood nevertheless "pressed, as a
duty on the magistrate, to punish and persecute those whom they disliked and declared
against."104 In short, the priest would excommunicate and the magistrate would be
expected to execute the heretic.

The practical fruit of such an arrangement was

instability, persecution, and warfare.

Locke writes, "that ordination, that begins in

priesthood, if it be let alone, will certainly grow up to absolute empire."
Lest one think that the Protestant Reformation solved this difficulty, however,
Locke ends with this observation: "The Popedom hath been a large and lasting instance
of this. And what Presbytery could do, even in its infancy when it had a little humbled
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the magistrates, let Scotland show."105 This is parallel, of course, to the influence of
Presbyterian ministers in Hobbesřs Behemoth.
According to Shaftesbury, both Hobbes and Locke undertake a radical project to
rid common life of superstitious opinions by adopting a radical skepticism toward
opinion as such. Shaftesbury regarded this attack on common opinion as an attack on
philosophy itself, as I will try to show in Chapter 4. He will propose what neither
Hobbes nor Locke do, a restoration of classical philosophy as an antidote to religious
sectarianism.
Shaftesbury's preference for the ancient policy toward religion does not arise from
a different understanding of Christianity. To see this we now turn to Shaftesbury's
critique of Christianity in Characteristicks. A full understanding of his preference for
antiquity must look beyond his critique of Christianity to his understanding of religion
per se. As I have suggested, it is in his account of religion that Shaftesbury presents what
might be regarded as the essence of human life, eros.

Religion in the Characteristicks
Beginning with the frontispiece of Volume I, religion recurs as a sort of leitmotiv
throughout the Characteristicks. While each of the treatises could be cited extensively to
demonstrate the importance of religious subjects to Shaftesbury's project, the following
observations are important for our purposes. The first treatise of Volume I, A Letter
concerning Enthusiasm opens with a discussion of revelation and takes prophetic
105
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inspiration as its general theme. In this way it seems fair to say that the Characteristicks
as a whole opens by reflecting on religious subjects. In his private correspondence
Shaftesbury indicates that the second treatise, Sensus Communis, belongs with the first:
indeed as Robert Voitle shows, Sensus Communis was initially undertaken as a defense of
A Letter.106 As we have seen, Sensus Communis offers a defense of raillery--that is,
Socratic irony--in the service of the philosophical treatment of controversial subjects.
The first part of An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit also treats religion extensively.
There he presents a systematic taxonomy of theological opinion. The treatise as a whole
takes the relationship between religion and virtue as its primary concern. The Moralists
contains extensive conversations about religion among Theocles (whose name itself
suggests a religious concern) and the other characters.

Finally, the aforementioned

treatises find commentary in Miscellaneous Reflections, where the Critic defends,
sharpens, and elaborates Shaftesbury's opinions on religious matters. Indeed, Volume III
and therefore the Characteristicks as a whole comes to an abrupt end as the Critic offers
the apology of an unnamed controversial author. This author seems to lack a "sufficient
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caution and reserve in religious matters," despite his awareness that such a reserve is
desirable.107
Soliloquy might at first seem to be an exception to this running treatment of
religion. Yet while religious questions are less prominent in Soliloquy, Shaftesbury
himself points out that this is exceptional:
IT MAY here perhaps be thought, that notwithstanding the particular Advice we
have given, in relation to the forming of a Taste in natural Characters and
Manners; we are still defective in our Performance, whilst we are silent on supernatural Cases, and bring not into our consideration the Manners and Characters
deliverřd us in Holy Writ. But this Objection will soon vanish, when we consider,
that there can be no Rules given by human Wit, to that which was never humanly
conceivřd, but divinely dictated, and inspirřd.108
I have argued that Soliloquy offers readers a model of thinking appropriate to the
philosopher as understood by Shaftesbury. According to Shaftesbury, the philosopher at
thought treats questions both of morality and the cosmos as natural rather than
supernatural phenomena. Insofar as Shaftesbury's philosopher thinks about religion, it is
from a naturalistic perspective. Apparently soliloquy as a method has little to say about
the matter.

By calling attention to his silence on scriptural criticism, however,

Shaftesbury subtly plants the question of how one does approach those writings which
trace their origin to revelation. All men would approach writings believed to be "divinely
dictated" with reverence, but as we shall see, Shaftesbury regards many such writings as
deceitful "impostures."
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Even in Soliloquy, however, Shaftesbury cannot resist offering a peek at what the
art of criticism might imply for sacred writings. One page after calling his attention to
the silence on "supernatural cases," Shaftesbury writes that "the Christian Theology; the
Birth, Procedure, Generation, and personal Distinction of the DIVINITY, are Mysterys
only to be determinřd by the initiated, or ordain’d; to whom the State has assignřd the
Guardianship and Promulgation of the Divine Oracles. It becomes not those who are uninspirřd from Heaven, and un-commissionřd from Earth, to search with Curiosity into the
Original of those holy Rites and Records, by Law establish’d." 109 This is likely to be an
acceptable view to an orthodox Church of England Christian, and again we see his
emphasis on following the legal custom on religion. Yet in the sequel Shaftsbury points
to a problem that would arise for anyone practicing his art of criticism:
should we make such an Attempt, we should in probability find the less
Satisfaction, the further we presumřd to carry our Speculations. Having darřd
once to quit the Authority and Direction of the Law, we shouřd easily be subject
to Heterodoxy and Error, when we had no better Warrant left us for the Authority
of our sacred Symbols, than the Integrity, Candour, and Disinterestedness of their
Compilers, and Registers. How great that Candour and Disinterestedness may
have been, we have no other Historys to inform us, than those of their own
licensing or composing.110
Without a reliable authority to vouch for the authenticity of the "holy rites and records" of
Christianity, an individual believer would have to make his own investigation into the
transmission of rites and scripture. This would entail asking about the character and
trustworthiness not only of the tradition but also of the authors of the scriptures
109

Ibid., 1.221.

110

Ibid., 1.221-22.

145

themselves. Such an inquiry would leave most believers vulnerable to unscrupulous men
and unable to distinguish genuine revelation from pretenders. Shaftesbury writes that,
"busy Persons, who officiously search into these Records, are ready even from hence to
draw Proofs very disadvantageous to the Fame and Character of this Succession of Men.
And Persons moderately read in these Historys, are apt to judg no otherwise of the
Temper of antient Councils, than by that of later Synods and modern Convocations."111
If Soliloquy generally avoids discussing the "manners and characters" discussed
by scripture, the same cannot be said about Miscellaneous Reflections. Shortly after
introducing A Letter concerning Enthusiasm, the Critic turns to the topic of "controversial
writing."112 The Critic compares the popular contemporary practice of "Controversy, or
the Method of Answer and Refutation" with the practice of ancient authors. According to
the Critic, authors were evaluated in antiquity on the basis of their artistic and intellectual
merits: "if Authors writ ill, they were despisřd: If well, they were by some Party or other
espousřd."113 Given the tendency of human beings to disagree, it seems likely that in
antiquity, as well as in modernity, "partys there wouřd necessarily be, and Sects of every
kind, in Learning and Philosophy." Yet the Critic observes the curious fact that ancient
authors did not develop a written art of controversial disputation. Since Shaftesbury was
a careful student of Socratic dialogue it is likely he knew that antiquity had sophists and
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that Socrates himself practiced an art of refutation.114 The Critic nevertheless claims of
ancient sectarianism, "every one sided with whom he likřd; and having the liberty of
hearing each side speak for it-self, stood in no need of express Warning-Pieces against
pretended Sophistry, or dangerous Reasoning."115
Such tolerance finds sharp contrast with the Critic's portrait of modern
sectarianism, which betrays a strong "zeal of Party-causes." He writes:
let a zealous Divine and flaming Champion of our Faith, when inclinřd to shew
himself in Print, make choice of some tremendous Mystery of Religion, opposřd
heretofore by some damnable Heresiarch; whom having vehemently refuted, he
turns himself towards the orthodox Opinion, and supports the true Belief, with the
highest Eloquence and profoundest Erudition; he shall, notwithstanding this,
remain perhaps in deep Obscurity, to the great affliction of his Bookseller, and the
regret of all who bear a just Veneration for Church-history, and the antient Purity
of the Christian Faith. But let it so happen that in this Prosecution of his deceasřd
Adversary, our Doctor raises up some living Antagonist; who, on the same foot of
Orthodoxy with himself, pretends to arraign his Expositions, and refute the
Refuter upon every Article he has advancřd; from this moment the Writing
gathers Life, the Publick listens, the Bookseller takes heart; and when Issue is
well joinřd, the Repartees grown smart, and the Contention vigorous between the
learned Partys, a Ring is made, and Readers gather in abundance.116
As the Critic's satire makes clear, this modern mode of polemical writing is, according to
Shaftesbury, connected to Christianity.
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The Critic's account might seem self-serving, given the controversial reception of
Shaftesbury's own A Letter concerning Enthusiasm.117 Yet the refusal to engage the
dispute directly is consistent with Shaftesbury's overall strategy. I would argue that for
Shaftesbury, a public dispute would be an occasion for scandal in sense of "perplexity of
conscience occasioned by the conduct of one who is looked up to as an example."118 As
the quotation from Voitle (on page 102) suggests, Shaftesbury's opinions on religion and
politics are not egalitarian. His account of the ancient policy presupposes a natural
heterogeneity of intellect among men.

According to the ancients, this natural

heterogeneity has consequences both for political life and for the activity of philosophy.
This concern is brought to the forefront of the Characteristicks by the frontispiece
to Volume I. Since the content and placement of the illustrations are themselves part of
Shaftesbury's plan for the revised edition of his work, it is instructive to consider them as
they relate to Shaftesbury's thematic concerns. 119 Taken together, the frontispieces for
Volumes I and III point to the importance of religion and politics for understanding the
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Characteristicks; together they provide an interpretive context for the dominant themes
of Volume II.
The frontispieces for the "framing" volumes present what Shaftesbury identifies
in his correspondence as the ancient and modern models for religion and politics.
Shaftesbury writes of these rivals approaches:
The FEL. TEM. of the first volume-plate (which is all happiness from the right
balance, liberty, and ancient model of religion) is a noted medal-inscription for
felicitas temporum or felicia tempora.
The EN QUO of the last volume-plate (which on the other side is all misery and
the modern model) is a poetical ejaculation, as much as to say, "Behold ! whither
we are brought ? to what state reduced ?"120
The frontispiece for volume first, then, portrays what Shaftesbury elsewhere calls
the "ancient policy" of magistrates.121 According to Shaftesbury, it was the wise policy
of ancient magistrates to indulge superstition by permitting subjects the freedom to
practice a wide variety of religions. At the feet of a magistrate reclines a woman with
crown and scepter, holding a balance. On one side of the balance rests "the Egyptian
systrum, the mitre, the lituus or augurřs instrument."

On the other rests a lyre, a

caduceus, and the breastplate of Minerva. Here we are reminded that Shaftesbury
associates liberty with the "rise and progress of the arts."

It is Shaftesburyřs

recommendation to the magistrate to indulge superstition while also allowing philosophy
the freedom to pursue its own activities in private. Two scenes reflect this happy
120
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situation. To the left we see four figures representing "religionists, supplicants, votaries,
prophets." One seems to be an enraptured Sibyl; one holds a "thyrsus"; one pleads to the
sky; and the last, as Shaftesbury describes it, performs a rite over a "dark pit or chasm in
the earth." In the background there are busts of gods surrounded by a stormy sky. On the
right side of the engraving a very different scene unfolds.

There are poets and

philosophers, men contemplating both ideas and actions. Behind them stands Mount
Olympus (suggested by the Pegasus). The boarder of the frontispiece shows the many
fruits and blessings of a society where the arts and sciences flourish. In the words of
Felix Paknadel, "freedom, maintained by a wise ruler, breeds social harmony and fosters
the development of civilization."122
The plate for volume third portrays the consequences of allowing religion to rule
the magistrate. The second motto is drawn from Virgil's Eclogues. "En, quo discordia
civis/ produxit miseros!" See where strife has brought our citizens!
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Shaftesbury's

account of the origin and development of Christianity, including the political devastation
arising from Christian sectarianism, is presented most forcefully by the Critic in his
Miscellaneous Reflections, and the plate matches the Critic's manner. This frontispiece is
appropriately wanting for clear order, but when read from left to right the viewer can
discern three episodes in the history of religion. To the left we see that Egypt provides a
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G. P., Rev ed., Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 30-31. As we
shall see in Chapter 5, the Eclogues hold special importance for Shaftesbury.
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model of priestly rule. Such an arrangement is presented as wasteful by spilled baskets
and an upset cornucopia. In the second scene naked diminutive men skirmish before
classical temples, now obscured by dark copse; one barbarian marches with trophies from
despoiled classical Rome. The scene suggests that sectarianism following the fall of
Rome leads to barbarism. In the background to the right stands a Gothic Church. A
figure kneels in the foreground to the Bishop of Rome (suggested by Mitre and key) and
offers up what appears to be a globe. A monarch watches, with hands raised as if to
suggest powerlessness to intervene.124 At the foot of the Successor of Peter lies the
symbol of old Roman power, the fasces. . There are two references in the text to fasces,
each in the context of exhorting the magistrate to a policy of tolerance.125 Roman
strength through unity, seen in the bundled birch rods, has given way to the uniformity of
dogma and the suppression of heresy.
Taken together the frontispieces for Volumes I and III present the alternatives as
Shaftesbury understands them: either political life will tolerate a variety of religions or
one understanding of religion will determine political life. According to Shaftesbury, it
was the policy of ancient governments to establish a "public leading in religion." This
established religion seldom came into conflict with private opinions, whether philosophic
or religious in character, for ancient piety was concerned with proper conduct
(orthopraxy) rather than the holding of certain opinions (orthodoxy). Since heathen
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religion was polytheistic, the magistrate did not take additional practices of piety to be a
threat to the publicly established order. "Why shouřd there not be public walks, as well
as private gardens?" Shaftesbury asks. Since superstitious fears were thought to be
natural to men, magistrates following the "polite" views of the ancients would enter into
the enthusiastic concern of the people with "a kind sympathy…and taking, as it were,
their passion upon him…endeavour, by chearful ways, to divert and heal it." The ancient
magistrate was inclined to tolerate "visionaries and enthusiast of all kinds," and allowed
philosophy a free course "as a balance against superstition." This is not to say that the
magistrate was indifferent to religious practice, for open atheism was not tolerated.
Nevertheless, the polite heathen magistrate was tolerant and gentle in his treatment of
religion.
This seems to have changed over time, however, due in part to the "unnatural
union of religion and philosophy" which emerged during the Roman Empire. Among the
"polite heathens of the ancient world," the refined thoughts of the philosopher were kept
separate from the observance of religious customs. Philosophy was a private activity of
the few, and difficult matters of "profound speculation and inquiry" were carefully
concealed from public view.126 Over time, those matters which were once understood by
philosophers to be merely probable accounts of the nature of things became in the hands
126

The discussion of defensive raillery is especially relevant here. The Critic elsewhere claims that this
moderation extended to the writings of philosophers as well: "but that they really were [eminent in critical
practice], witness, among the ancients, their greatest philosophers, whose critical pieces lie intermixt with
their profound philosophical works, and other politer tracts ornamentally writ, for public use." Miscellany
V, 3.172. In the footnotes here we read "the distinction of treatises was into the  and
." (esoteric and exoteric)."

152

of decayed ancient schools the source of contentious and dogmatic opinion.127 According
to Shaftesbury, early Christianity did not share the concern for orthodoxy that eventually
developed. This only emerges as a result of the influence of philosophy. "There is
nothing more evident," he writes in the Miscellanies, "than that our Holy Religion, in its
original constitution, was set so far apart from philosophy or refinřd speculation, that it
seemřd in a manner diametrically opposřd to it. A man might have been not only a
sceptick in all the controverted points of the academys, or schools of learning, but even a
perfect stranger to all of this kind; and yet compleat in his religion, faith, and worship."
After the mixture of religion and philosophy, however, "mysteries, which were heretofore
treated with profound respect, and lay unexposřd to vulgar eyes, became public and
prostitute; being enforcřd with terrors, and urgřd with compulsion and violence, on the
unfitted capacities and apprehension of mankind."128 In this combination, questionable
matters for inquiry became "the necessary subject of a strict and absolute assent."
Shaftesbury obviously intends this comingling of philosophy and religion to
describe the Christianity of his day. In the course of time, the magistrate himself adopted
a "new sort of policy." This modern policy, "which extends itself to another world, and
considers the future lives and happiness of men rather than the present, has made us leap
the bounds of natural humanity; and out of a supernatural charity, has taught us the way
of plaguing one another most devoutly. It has raisřd an antipathy which no temporal
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interest couřd ever do; and entailřd upon us a mutual hatred to all eternity."129 The
"saving of souls" is considered a most heroic passion by the modern world, and this
passion has "become in a manner the chief care of the magistrate, and the very end of
government itself."130 Shaftesbury writes that "in the process of time it was thought
decent to mend men's countenances, and render their intellectual complexions uniform
and of a sort."131 The magistrate became "a dresser, and in his turn was dressřd" by "tiremen," (that is, theologians or priests). While all priests agreed that "there was only one
certain and true dress. . . to which all people shouřd conform," neither the magistrate nor
the attire-men knew which of the thousands of possible modes of dress was "the exact
true one." Men were pressed from every side to adjust their mien according to the
"fashion and the humour of the times," with the result that human nature itself became
obscured by Christian mores.132
As we shall see in Chapter 4, modern philosophy responds to this hiding of nature
by recommending the distrust of all convention. For Shaftesbury, the customs of men
while perhaps conventional are not simply contrary to nature; some customs may in fact
be the precondition of the perfection of human nature. Shaftesbury offers a fable to
illustrate how one might begin to think about the complicated relationship between nature
and convention.
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Imagine an Ethiopian visitor who arrives in Paris or Venice at the time of
Carnival, when almost everyone is wearing a mask. Taking the strange way of the
Europeans to be their natural way, the visitor would for a while regard the festivities with
a serious eye. It would not occur to him that "a whole people couřd be so fantastical, as
upon Agreement, at an appointed time, to transform themselves by a variety of habits,
and make it a solemn practice to impose on one another, by this universal confusion of
characters and person."133 Eventually, however, he would discover "the cheat," and while
the Europeans might laugh at his simplicity for being fooled, the Ethiopian would have
still better reason to laugh--after all, the revelers are indeed ridiculous in their costumes.
But were the Ethiopian, now on the lookout for masks, to conclude that the pale
complexion of Europeans was also part of their costume, he would become ridiculous
himself. "By a silly presumption he took nature for mere art, and mistook perhaps a man
of sobriety and sense for one of those ridiculous mummers."

This, according to

Shaftesbury, is an example of immoderate skepticism, a case of "carrying the jest too
far."
The Ethiopian is right to laugh when he discovers that the Europeans wear masks,
but wrong to conclude that all countenances are therefore masks. Shaftesbury suggests
that there is something ridiculous about the fact that menřs opinions are usually the
product of art or convention.

It is because of this insight that opinions must be

investigated. When taken to an extreme, however, this insight will mislead judgment.
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Some opinions may actually be in harmony with nature. We should also notice that the
Ethiopian comes by his original misunderstanding honestly. The Ethiopian did not have
any reason to expect the deception of Carnival because he bore a naïve trust of the world
as it appeared to him.

It is indeed surprising that a whole people would adopt a

transformation of their characters, and even more so that they would do so universally
and solemnly. This insight--a moment of wonder--might lead men to ask whether one set
of customs is superior to others. In anticipation of excessive passion here, Shaftesbury
suggests that there is less disagreement among men than the modern skeptic might claim.
Also, the discovery of the cheat presupposes that the Ethiopian had some prior
understanding that men have faces, whatever their exact complexion may be.
Shaftesbury will insist that the possibility of human knowledge presupposes an initial
insight that there is something to be known about the nature of the thing in question. We
have already seen in Chapter 2 that Shaftesbury introduces his Socratic method of
soliloquy as a tool for distinguishing natural from unnatural opinions.
Shaftesbury, then, presents two possible policies regarding politics and religion.
The ancient policy distinguishes the superstitious religion of the people from the sublime
inquiries of the philosopher. The magistrate is able to pursue a policy of tolerance toward
a great variety of religious rites because religion concerns itself not with right opinion
(that is, orthodoxy) but practice. It is the philosopher who is most serious about seeking
the truth. Ancient philosophers, he suggests, pursued their inquiries with discretion,
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being careful not to confuse or corrupt the people. Philosophers assisted the magistrates
as well by offering them an education in virtue.
If Shaftesbury's account is to be credible, he must explain why this ancient policy
eventually failed. We have already seen that Shaftesbury, like Hobbes before him,
regarded Christianity as an unfortunate mixture of philosophy and vulgar religion. What
does it mean that philosophy "became public and prostitute; being enforcřd with terrors,
and urgřd with compulsion and violence, on the unfitted capacities and apprehension of
mankind?" To answer this question we must consider his account priestcraft, which
appears in the Miscellaneous Reflections. There the Critic pursues a long digression on
the establishment and growth of religion in Egypt; in it one can see a thinly veiled portrait
of the growth of Christendom.
 Shaf t esbury and P ri est craf t

It is characteristic of Shaftesburyřs ancient sympathies that he does not regard
Christianity as a singular religious phenomenon. In treating priestcraft in general, he
seems to prefer a "sociological" approach to the question of religion.134
The Egyptian religion, as opposed to religions in the classical age, was shrouded
in mysteries and secret rites. Egypt is the "Mother-Land of Superstition," partly because
of natural conditions of climate and partly as a result of foolish policies set by the
magistracy. According to the Critic, the government of Egypt overregulated the trade of
priestcraft and changed the proportion between the supply of priests and the natural
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demand for superstition. What is worse, the government made the office of Priest
heritable, so that the children of priests themselves became priests. The Egyptians had
many Gods and Temples, and each temple was allowed more than one priest. The
Egyptian priesthood was allowed to maintain itself without restriction through donatives,
and these donatives became the entailed property of the religious. By Law the property
of the religious was protected such that "they might retain what they couřd get; and that it
might be lawful for their Order to receive such Estates by voluntary Contribution, as
couřd never afterwards be converted to other Uses."135 Over time, of course, the priests
accumulated considerable wealth for they were able to exploit the superstitious part of
mankind for considerable profit. In addition to making the priesthood heritable, the
magistrate also allowed people to become priests voluntarily, which combined with the
expanding wealth and power of the priesthood, acted as a powerful incentive for growth.
These policies flourished in a climate especially conducive to "Prodigy in
Nature." The heat of the African Sun combined with the fertile Nile river valley brings
forth endless creatures and phenomena to be explained. Since the Egyptians needed ways
to measure the land, predict floods, and navigate the rivers, they gave birth to astronomy
and other sciences. The priesthood, however, turned these sciences to their advantage
and to the "immense Growth of Superstition" and further growth of the priesthood. The
Critic sums the effect of policy and conditions in the following principle of "political
Arithmetic: "in every nation whatsoever; "That the Quantity of Superstition (if I may so
135
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speak) will, in proportion, nearly always answer the Number of Priests, Diviners,
Soothsayers, Prophets, or such who gain their Livelihood, or receive Advantages by
officiating in Religious Affairs." For if these Dealers are numerous, they will force a
Trade."136 Once the priesthood grows powerful, a magistrate will have to be cautious in
his attempts to institute reform. The power of the priesthood does not depend on force of
arms.137 As we will see in chapter 4, its power is derived chiefly from its ability to shape
the opinions and characters of men.

There are professions which depend on the

"infirmitys and defects of mankind, (as for instance. . .law and physick)" that with the
least bit of help from the magistrate will proliferate by creating new problems demanding
new solutions which in turn create problems.
Shaftesburyřs formulation of the problem of priestcraft is striking, for it suggests
that it is possible to describe the growth of social phenomena according to natural laws.
Thanks to such political arithmetic, one may gather "what, in the process of time, must
therefore naturally have happenřd in the case of Religion, among the Egyptians."138 The
Egyptians form a striking contrast to the "rise and progress of the arts" among the
Greeks.139 As we saw in Chapter 2, Shaftesbury drew on Aristotle's account of the
"Lineage and SUCCESSION of Wit"140 to dampen the modern emphasis on "Genius
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alone."141 The Greeks enjoyed a "fortunate Constitution" which contributed to their
originality in the Arts.
The plague of priests was visited on nations beyond Egypt. The Critic says that
the Syrians, the Ethiopians, the Persians, the Babylonians, and Chaldeans each followed
this model. While each nation developed peculiar rites and mysteries, each followed a
natural pattern. Shaftesbury does not seem to recommend a simplistic social science in
his natural history of religion, though. It is unclear, for example, whether the Egyptians
imitated the Ethiopians or vice versa.

Some of the kingdoms (Chaldea, say) are

influenced by Egypt directly; others (the Persians) seem to develop independently. These
"Asiatick Priesthoods" do have certain identifiable conditions for their flourishing,
however. The priestly hierarchy seems to rely on a strong monarchy to take root. The
Magi, for example, gain control of Persia at a moment when it is poised to establish
"Universal Empire."142 Their control grows when the magistrate allows the priesthood to
secure its own property.

As the Critic remarks, monarchy cannot long resist for

"dominion must naturally follow property." Because of human weakness, there is an
inexhaustible fund of credulity among the "ignorant and vulgar," just waiting to be
exploited by the crafty and unscrupulous. Shown a little favor, the priesthood will
multiply the number of rites, gods, objects of worship, and priests beyond counting. In
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the case of Egypt, it was almost inevitable that it would seek to export its model of
religion:
no wonder if by a Nation so abounding in religious Orders, spiritual Conquests
were sought in foreign Countrys, Colonys led abroad, and Missionarys detachřd,
on Expeditions, in this prosperous Service. ŘTwas thus a Zealot-People,
influencřd of old by their very Region and Climate, and who throř a long Tract of
Time, under a peculiar Policy, had been raisřd both by Art and Nature to an
immense Growth in religious Science and Mystery; came by degrees to spred
their variety of Rites and Ceremonys, their dinstinguishing marks of separate
Worships and secret Communitys, throř the distant World; but chiefly throř their
neighbouring and dependent Countrys.143
While the priesthood lacks force of arms, it is not without material consequences.
According to the Critic, strangers are especially vulnerable to priestcraft because they
often depend on others for their "maintenance and bread."

While the account of

priestcraft was removed from Christendom by nation and time, the natural history
becomes more proximate in the discussion of the "Hebrew Race," which is presented as
something of a digression from the main argument about priestcraft. 144 According to the
Critic, ancient historians indicate that many important Jewish rites have their origin in the
long captivity in Egypt. Circumcision, for example, was a religious rite instituted by the
Egyptians. While he is unwilling to go so far as to say that Abraham picks this custom
up because he wants to emulate the Egyptians, his qualification is so thin that it is
unlikely to be sincere:
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Řtis certain that if this holy Patriarch, who first instituted the sacred Rite of
Circumcision within his own Family or Tribe, had no regard to any Policy or
Religion of the Egyptians; yet he had formerly been a Guest and Inhabitant in
Egypt (where Historians mention this to have been a natural Rite); long ere he had
receivřd any divine Notice or Revelation, concerning this Affair.145
Nor is circumcision the most interesting thing Abraham learned in Egypt. According to
the Critic, Abraham also learned occult sciences such as a "judicial Astrology" 146 more
proper to the Magi, just as his successors did. In the history presented by the Critic, the
exodus of the Jews was hardly an act of liberation by God. Twice the Egyptians tried to
expel the Jews; probably, he adds in a footnote, because they were leprous, at least "from
what appears in Holy Writ."147
The Criticřs authoritative guide to scripture seems to be the Emperor Julian II, or
as he was known to Christendom, Julian the Apostate, a convert (revert?) to neoPlatonism. As Julian and the Critic interpret Scripture, "Moses stole the sacred objects of
the Egyptians; and when the Egyptians tried to recapture these, they were driven home by
storms." To be fair, however, the Critic notes that the expulsion from Egypt was in fact
due to a divine command: the oracle of Hammon bid the Egyptian king to purge the
lepers because they were offensive to the Gods.148 Among the sacred things carried out
of Egypt by the Jews were strong influences on the "manners, the Religion, Rites, Diet,
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Customs, Laws, and Constitution of their tyrannical Masters." Not surprisingly, after 400
years of living among the Egyptians, the "manners, Opinions, Rites and Customs" of the
Egyptians "gainřd a powerful Ascendency over their Natures."149

While Moses

attempted to institute reforms, the habits ran so deep that "it was almost necessary to God
(it is right to say humane) to indulge them. . .and adapt his laws to their habit and
standard." Moses, as the Scripture indicates, received a strong and privileged education
at the hands of the Egyptians. The Critic cites the Acts of the Apostles (translated
loosely) to say that Moses was educated in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, which "as is
well known," was the bailiwick of the priesthood. In other words, Moses himself was
exposed to philosophy.
From the Egyptians, the "religious Profession" spread widely through the East.
As the number of priests waxed, so the number of laymen waned, and soon the
magistrates lost all power to govern or check the spread of priestcraft. According to the
Critic, the glut of priests led to a scarcity of worshipers; and priests responded by
elevating the dignity their own worship by asserting its singularity, and thereby moving
political life toward "religious antipathy and mutual discord."150
Shaftesbury's account of priestcraft betrays considerable agreement with Hobbes
as to the pernicious consequences of religion governing magistrates. Yet Shaftesbury,
unlike Hobbes, prefers to restore the classical solution to the challenge of religion. From
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a political point of view his project recommends a return to the "antient policy" on
religion. As John Leland rightly observes, Shaftesbury advocates subordinating religion
to political ends; but his reason is not Hobbes's.

For Shaftesbury, the relationship

between religion and political life flows from the fact that the concerns of the philosopher
point beyond the moral life. This perspective finds its political consequences in the
ancient policy.
Shaftesbury's account presents, then, three modes of religion. The people are
inclined to the practice of superstitious rites which they regard as proper worship of the
gods. The magistrate, on the other hand, establishes a "public leading in religion" for his
polity-- that is, a civil religion--which works to mitigate the excessive passions of the
people and thereby improve their morals. Finally, the philosopher pursues a religion of
"profound speculation and inquiry" into nature. This natural religion can be said to
balance superstition in part because philosophy rightly understood can introduce more a
more reasonable understanding of the divine.151 This distinction, which can be seen in
the writings of Cicero152 and is made explicit in the writings of Varro, would have been
familiar to Shaftesbury at least through Cudworth's True Intellectual System of the
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Universe.153

In that work, which Shaftesbury references a number of times in the

Characteristicks, we read that
not only the Egyptians, but also the Syrians, Persians, Indians, and other barbarian
Pagans, had, beside their vulgar theology, another more arcane and recondite one,
amongst their priests and learned men; and that the same was true concerning the
Greeks and Latins also, is unquestionably evident from that account, that hath
been given by us of philosophic theology; where, by the vulgar theology of the
Pagans, we understand not only their mythical or fabulous, but also their political
or civil theology, it being truly affirmed by St. Austin [that is, Augustine]…that
both the fabulous theology of the Pagans was in part their civil, and their civil was
fabulous.--And by their more arcane and recondite theology, is doubtless meant
that, which they conceived to be the natural and true theology. Which distinction
of the natural and true theology, from the civil and political, as it was
acknowledged by all the ancient Greek philosophers, but more expressly by
Antistines, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics; so it was owned and much insisted
upon, both by Scaevola, that famous Roman Pontifex, and by Varro, that most
learned antiquary.154
According to the account offered by St. Augustine, Seneca and other prominent Romans
also subscribed to this three-fold distinction.155
Shaftesbury's own account of the origin and dissemination of quasi-philosophic
religion confronts us with an important question:

how can philosophy, which for

Shaftesbury is an elevated love of wisdom, become a pernicious force in political life? In
order to answer this important question we first need to consider the way classical
philosophy regarded the relationship between religion, politics, and philosophy.
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The Ancient Policy Considered
 Rel i gi on, P ol i ti cs, and P hi l osophy according t o Socrat es

According to Fustel de Coulanges, in the earliest times of the polis, no distinction
was made between religion and politics. He writes that "the state was closely allied with
religion; it came from religion, and was confounded with it. For this reason, in the
primitive city all political institutions had been religious institutions, the festivals had
been ceremonies of the worship, the laws had been sacred formulas, and the kings and
magistrates had been priests."156 The claim that religion and politics were inseparable in
the earliest days of the polis has been confirmed by contemporary scholars as well.157
Weřll see that confirmation can also be found in the treatment that the topic of religion
and politics receives in Plato.
It appears that the speculations of the earliest philosophers were coeval with a
rejection of the myths of the polis. Indeed, some have argued that philosophy was born
when men began to distinguish nature from the laws of men, which from their variety
appeared to be convention and from the point of view of a science of nature, arbitrary or
contingent on accident. Since rites concerning the gods varied considerably from place to
place, philosophers tended to relegate religion especially to the realm of the conventional
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rather than the natural.158 The political consequences of the distinction between law or
convention on the one hand and nature on the other were profound, for with it philosophy
became virtually indistinguishable from atheism, at least in the public mind. The moral
authority of the city, however, rested on and drew strength from the belief in the gods. It
would not, perhaps, take much sophistication to doubt that Zeus literally hurled
thunderbolts at sinners, but the myths of the city seem to have been accepted on some
level by even sophisticated citizens.159 Gradually, the influence of philosophy changed
this:
philosophy appeared, and overthrew all the rules of the ancient polity. It was
impossible to touch the opinions of men without also touching the fundamental
principles of their government. Pythagoras, having a vague conception of the
Supreme Being, disdained the local worships; and this was sufficient to cause him
to reject the old modes of government, and to attempt to found a new order of
society. Anaxagoras comprehended the God-Intelligence which reigns over all
men and all beings. In rejecting ancient religious notions, he also rejected ancient
polity. As he did not believe in the gods of the prytaneum, he no longer fulfilled
all the duties of a citizen; he avoided the assemblies, and would not be a
magistrate. His doctrine was an attack upon the city; and the Athenians
condemned him to death.160
The essential principle seems to have been the presenting of nature as being opposed to
the laws and customs of men.161 This consequence of such thought, especially as spread
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through the influence of sophistry, "was to attack the ancient political system at its
foundation."162
A famous fragment from Critiasřs play, Sisyphus, will help us see how political
life came to be viewed by these early philosophers:
there was a time when the life of men was unordered, bestial and the slave of
force, when there was no reward for the virtuous and no punishment for the
wicked. Then, I think, men devised retributory laws, in order that Justice might
be dictator and have arrogance as its slave, and if anyone sinned, he was
punished. Then, when the laws forbade them to commit open crimes of violence,
and they began to do them in secret, a wise and clever man invented fear of the
gods for mortals, that there might be some means of frightening the wicked, even
if they do anything or say or think it in secret.163
This view seems to have been a commonplace of "pre-Socratic" philosophy, namely that
the gods were invented by men to reinforce human justice with a fear of divine
retribution. Through the influence of philosophy there arose a tension between the city
and its mythology on the one hand, and philosophy on the other.
The portrait of Socrates offered by Aristophanes in the Clouds seems to offer
further evidence to this effect. Perhaps earlier in his life, taken by the power of natural
philosophy, Socrates too found himself indifferent to political matters. (This portrait, in
turn, receives confirmation in the intellectual autobiography offered by Socrates at the
end of Platořs Phaedo.) Aristophanesř Socrates is not especially interested in political
questions, although his inquiry into natural subjects has inescapable consequences for
162
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political life. In the Clouds, the natural philosopher Socrates (and his unsubsidized
graduate assistants) disdain the deepest concerns of the average Athenian citizen.
Socrates appears floating aloft in a basket, looking down on the average citizen,
Strepsiades.

From the vantage point of Socrates, the concerns of Strepsiades are

ephemeral (he even greets him as "Ephemeral").164 This indifference is shown at once in
the exchange between the pupil of Socrates and Strepsiades. The pupils study geometry
for its own sake, and when pressed for a reason on why it is useful, they mention
measuring the land.165 But as it turns out, they measure the land "in general" rather than
for allotment, and their maps are not political--the pupil has reckon just were the cities
are for Strepsiades.166
The indifference seems to flow from the concern with the abiding natural things
as opposed to conventional things, which are assumed to be fleeting and relative to place.
Among the most important conventional things (to Strepsiades, at least) are the Gods.
Socrates offers a naturalistic account of thunder and rain, but Strepsiades is incapable of
following it.167 He cannot conceive of the possibility that the Olympic gods do not exist.
When Strepsiades asks who forces the clouds to drift, "Doesnřt Zeus?" Socrates replies,
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"not at all; itřs the whirl of the upper air." Strepsiades assumes that Whirl is a new god
who has supplanted Zeus. 168
Yet pre-Socratic philosophy did have a teaching on political things. This teaching
takes as its starting point a naturalistic perspective on human beings. Here human beings
are seen in a continuum with other animals, different in degree but not in kind. In the
Clouds this view emerges in the willingness of Phidippides to beat his father. 169 It is
natural for the stronger to rule the weaker, and the young are stronger than the old. As
Phidippides points out, the treatment of children and parents is customary. Having been
convinced that there are no Olympic gods but only natural phenomena, Phidippides
argues to his father that he is no longer bound to respect his parents. "Wasnřt it a man
like you and me who originally proposed this law and persuaded the ancients to adopt it?
If so, am I any less free to establish in my turn a new law for the sons of tomorrow?"170
One can see various formulations of this view throughout the dialogues of Plato
as well. In book one of the Republic, for example, Thrasymacus claims that "the just is
nothing other than the advantage of the stronger," or that "in every city the same thing is
just, the advantage of the ruling body." Adeimantus soon points out that an adequate
statement of this position (as revised by Glaucon in book two) must take into account the
promise of divine rewards and punishments for the just--that is, those with at least a
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reputation for being just.171 Presumably a reputation for justice is sufficient "if there are
not gods, or if they have no care for human beings." A similar concern could be shown
to arise in the Gorgias and other dialogues of Plato.
Philosophy seems to have become more self-conscious of its political influence in
the person of Socrates, and in the works of Plato we encounter a very different account of
the relationship between political life and philosophy, and consequently, between politics
and religion. As Cicero remarks in his Tusculan Disputations, "Socrates was the first
who brought down philosophy from the heavens, placed it in cities, introduced it into
families, and obliged it to examine into life and morals, and good and evil." 172 The
Socratic innovation seem not to lie in his willingness to ask about human beings, but
rather to bring philosophy from its lofty preoccupation with eternal things and examine
human life and morality as phenomena which might have a nature of their own. He had
to "oblige" philosophy to do so perhaps because philosophyřs natural inclination is not in
this direction. This Socratic approach, especially as presented in the works of Plato and
Xenophon, attempts to darn the rift that philosophy opened between political life and
religion. Philosophy as it originally emerged could speak of political life, but only by
recognizing the conventional character of the divine myths needed to support the laws of
the city. Socrates seems to offer a way to think of politics which allows religion to
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remain a force in political life while keeping open the possibility for philosophers that it
is somehow less than true.
As Thomas Pangle has shown in an important article, "The Political Psychology
of Religion in Platořs Laws," Plato saw theology as an essential aspect of healthy
political life.173 His theology, however, was not identical to the mythology as presented
in Homer and the early Greek tragedians. (This can be seen in Aristophanesř Clouds but
also in the famous criticism of Homer appearing in the early books of Platořs
Republic.174) In presenting a defense of the gods from atheism while also presenting a
philosophical critique of theology, Plato is able to show that a proper theology will
support the law code of the polis through more salutary myths. Interestingly, the account
of theology in book 10 arises in the context of a discussion of the penal code of the city
being sketched by the Athenian Stranger (in books 9 and 11). It becomes clear that the
Cretan legislator Klinias find it almost inconceivable that a serious person would deny
that the gods exist, given the orderliness of "the earth, the sun, the stars, and all things,"
including seasons, months, and years.175 At most, he suspects, it is a pose to allow a
person to rationalize immoral behavior. Klinias is sophisticated enough to distinguish the
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Olympic gods from the orderliness of the cosmos, but much like the more ridiculous
Strepsiades he does not imagine that the world might be attributed to chance.176
In the course of his account, the Athenian Stranger first introduces the most
powerful arguments of atheistic philosophers and then mounts a defense against them.
While the defense is adequate to the moral demands of the polis by lending persuasive
support to the claim that the cosmos is orderly and consequently reflective of mind, it
serves an even more important function.

Platořs theology simultaneously leads

thoughtful souls to philosophic contemplation of the natural world by asking about the
truth of the matter.177 Since neither Klinias nor Megillus have ever encountered atheistic
natural philosophy, it is presumably possible to protect a city from the influence of such
pernicious thought. Yet the Athenian Stranger explains their arguments at great length.178
Since the conversation of the Laws is itself meant to become the law code of the new city
being founded by Klinias, the Athenian has himself imported "pre-Socratic" philosophy
into the polis. Yet his account also introduces the Platonic account of the soul, and the
idea that human nature has an affinity through reason with an orderly cosmos. In the
words of Pangle, "the city and its gods can become home to the mind to the degree that
they can become home to philosophy."179
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The Platonic solution to the tension which arose between political life and
philosophy was to show how philosophy could support the city--indeed, as it is presented,
it is essential if the city is to be just--without compromising on its own concern to
understand the nature of things. In short, Plato presents what might have appeared to preSocratics as a contradiction in terms:

a way of constructing a philosophical "civil

religion."
The model for theology offered in Plato moves men away from superstitions he
found pernicious toward a more rational, natural theology. It is worse morally, perhaps,
for a man when he "believes [the gods] are easily persuaded if they are brought sacrifices
and prayers," than when he denies the existence of gods outright.180 These men are "the
worst," that is, those who believe "that if the gods receive small sacrifices and flatteries
theyřll aid in robbing great amounts of money and release them from many sorts of great
penalties." In this view, the outright atheist lacks such an incentive to pursue injustice.181
According to many philosophers, atheism may be morally benign in a way that divinely
inspired religion often is not.
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In his conversation with Euthyphro, Socrates goes so far as to confess his
irritation with myths, at least in the way they are generally understood.182

In that

dialogue we see Socrates encounter an enthusiastic believer in the gods who is engaged in
what might be called a morally questionable act: in an apparent inversion of the charges
against philosophy presented in the Clouds, Euthyphro has bound his father for
committing a crime condemned by the gods. Euthyphro is awaiting word, not from the
political authorities but from the religious authorities to see what to do with his father.183
It comes to light that Euthyphro himself is an expert in "divine matters," and knows what
is pious and what impious. He claims to know these things better than most people do. 184
Socrates, who finds the myths hard to accept, might have to accept them simply on
authority: "People will say I am wrong. Now if you, who know so much about such
things, accept these tales, I suppose I too must give way. For what am I to say, who
confess frankly that I know nothing about them." Presumably, given his knowledge of
Homer and the tragedians, Socrates does not mean he is unfamiliar with the myths, but
rather that he doesnřt know that they are the true, and he says as much.
While Socrates seems to have made it his project to present philosophy as civicminded, he does not accomplish this by accepting the myths of the city at face value. As
he remarks in the Phaedrus, "If, like the wise, I distrusted [mythical speech], I would not

182

Euthyphro, 6a

183

Euthyphro,4e4

184

Euthyphro, 6b

175

be out of place."185 That said, he is unwilling to say goodbye to myth simply. In part he
doesnřt think it is worth his time to "straighten out" all the myths as the "too terribly
clever, laborious, and not altogether fortunate man" might. He claims to be too busy
trying to "know himself," and proves "persuaded by what is conventionally believed
about them, as I was saying just now I examine not them but myself." It should also be
added that he is himself quite a spinner of myth, although Plato embeds his myths in a
context where, with work, one can indeed straighten things out. As we saw in the
previous chapter, Shaftesbury himself wants to distinguish a willingness to pursue daring
thoughts from a desire to flout common opinion.

Such a temptation shows itself

throughout the Platonic dialogues (for example in the Gorgias in the person of Callicles)
and the works of Xenophon.
Socrates plays a dangerous game of questioning these myths and offering salutary
corrections of them, while at the same time obeying the laws set down by the city
regarding devotions to be offered to the gods. Concerning the religious attitudes of
Socrates Xenophon writes, "his deeds and words were clearly in harmony with the
answers given by the Priestess at Delphi to such questions as, 'What is my duty about
sacrifice' or about 'cult of ancestors.' For the answer of the Priestess is, 'Follow the
customs of the city: that is the way to act piously.' And so Socrates acted himself and
counseled others to act. To take any other course he considered presumption and folly.
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In this way we can see what Fusel de Coulanges meant by suggesting that while

Socrates reproved the abuses of the sophists, he remained one of their school.
 The Anci ent P ol i cy encount ers Chri st i anit y

The willingness of philosophy to accommodate itself to political life seems to
have persisted through the influence of Stoicism and Ciceronian Academic Skepticism.
This "Platonic humanism" is also apparent, I believe, in the way the Romans first
encountered Christianity. That Christianity seems to have brought a new challenge to
political life can be seen in the consequences of the turn from practice to faith. The
classical distinction between philosophic pursuits for the few and religious practice for
the many can be seen in the reaction by contemporary Romans to the early Christians.
Roman contemporaries drew on the resources of a naturalistic humanism, as we shall see.
In the year 64 AD, according to the Annuls of Tacitus, the Emperor Nero diverted
attention away from the rumor that he had ordered Rome to be burned by blaming the fire
on a group "abhorred for their crimes" [per fiagitia invisos] and "known to the people as
Christians," [vulgus Chrestianos appeilabat]. Tacitus goes on to explain that this name
came from one "Christus" who had been put to death by the Procurator Pontius Pilate.
Soon, however, this "detestable superstition" [exitiabiiis superstitio] broke out again, not
just in the backwaters of Judea, but even in the city of Rome herself, where all atrocious
and shocking things flow and are celebrated, [quo cuncta undique atrocia aut pudenda
confluunt ceiebranturque]. Tacitus tells us that when men subsequently acknowledged
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themselves to be Christians they were condemned not so much for arson as for their
"hatred of the human race," [odio humani generis]. Worthy of punishment as Christians
may have been, he observes, they were tortured in the cruelest ways. Consequently, the
persecution did not serve the public good. Contrary to Nerořs intentions, such cruelty
merely aroused pity for the tormented Christians.
Suetonius mentions a "Chrestus" who constantly incited the Jews to tumult during
the reign of Claudius (41-54).187 When listing the accomplishments of Nero, Suetonius
mentions that "punishment was inflicted on the Christians, a class of men given to a new
and mischievous superstition," [superstitionis nova et maieficæ].
By the year 111, Pliny the Younger, then governor of Bithynia, writes to the
Emperor Trajan for advice on how to handle Christians. I quote it at length because it is
a clear expression of Roman concerns:
It is with me, sir, an established custom to refer to you all matters on which I am
in doubt. . .I have never been present at trials of Christians, and consequently do
not know for what reasons, or how far, punishment is usually inflicted or inquiry
made in their case. Nor have my hesitations been slight: as to whether any
distinction of age should be made or persons however tender in years should be
viewed as differing in no respect from the full-grown: whether pardon should be
accorded to repentance, or he who has once been a Christian should gain nothing
by having ceased to be one: whether the very profession itself if unattended by
crime, or else the crimes necessarily attaching to the profession, should be made
the subject of punishment. Meanwhile, in the case of those who have been
brought before me in the character of Christians, my course has been as follows: I
put it to themselves whether they were or were not Christians. To such as
professed that they were, I put the inquiry a second and a third time, threatening
them with the supreme penalty. Those who persisted, I ordered to execution. For,
indeed, I could not doubt, whatever might be the nature of that which they
187
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professed, that their pertinacity, at any rate, and inflexible obstinacy, ought to be
punished. . . An anonymous paper was put forth containing the names of many
persons. Those who denied that they either were or had been Christians, upon
their calling on the gods after me, and upon their offering wine and incense before
your statue, which for this purpose I had ordered to be introduced in company
with the images of the gods, moreover upon their reviling Christ--none of which
things it is said can such as are really and truly Christians be compelled to do-these I deemed it proper to dismiss. Others named by the informer admitted that
they were Christians, and then shortly afterwards denied it, adding that they had
been Christians, but had ceased to be so, some three years, some many years,
more than one of them as much as twenty years, before. All these, too, not only
honoured your image and the effigies of the gods, but also reviled Christ.
We should notice the "crime" of Christianity is sufficiently well known to ask Trajan how
to handle it; in fact, it is so widespread that it is of concern even in what is now northern
Turkey. Pliny is not especially interested in the details of opinions held by Christians. If
they recant, they are set free. They are punished, however, should they refuse to obey
their governor because of pervicacia et inflexibilis obstinatio. Pliny will pardon them if
they will participate in sacrifices to the gods, which he seems to associate with the
Emperor (the Emperorřs statue is "introduced in company with the images of the gods.")
He has heard that Christians would never so honor the Emperor and Roman gods, nor
would they consent to revile Christ.
Pliny has learned through his investigation that Christians have the custom of
meeting on certain days at dawn and "offering in turns a form of invocation to Christ, as
to a god; also of binding themselves by an oath, not for any guilty purpose, but not to
commit thefts, or robberies, or adulteries, not to break their word, not to repudiate
deposits when called upon." (He also mentions in an apparent reference to the Eucharist
that they enjoy a harmless little meal after these prayers!) They apparently desisted from
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public assembly at the edict of Pliny, but to be certain he administered torture to two
slaves said to "officiate" at their rites. Unfortunately, all he learns is "that these people
were actuated by an absurd and excessive superstition." Pliny decides to end proceedings
against the Christians until he can consult the Emperor, "indeed, the matter seemed to me
a proper one for consultation, chiefly on account of the number of persons imperilled.
For many of all ages and all ranks, ay, and of both sexes, are being called, and will be
called, into danger. Nor are cities only permeated by the contagion of this superstition,
but villages and country parts as well." Pliny believes it is not too late to curb this
superstition, and offers as a hopeful sign of progress that the pagan temples which had
been practically deserted were beginning to be frequented again. Plinyřs concern seems
to be connected to his responsibility to keep civil order. He reports the moral decency of
Christian oaths but will not permit the law to be disregarded. Presumably swearing
morally decent oaths to a new god would be acceptable as long as it didnřt interfere with
the public rites associated with the Emperor. Whatever his own view, however, the
problem seems to have been widespread and was responsible for keeping people out of
the Roman temples. This, we should notice, is a matter of public concern to Pliny, for
professed Christians would not participate in the religion established by the law.
The reply by Trajan is a model of classical humanism, and shows the Emperor to
have no special animus against Christians. He confirms that Pliny acted properly and
says, prudently, that no single rule will cover every circumstance. He asks that Pliny not
undertake inquiry as an extension of his office, although certainly the crime must be
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punished when proven.

Trajan instructs Pliny that any party denying that he is a

Christian should be released if he can prove it, that is, by "supplicating our Gods,"
[supplicando diis nostris]. Trajan adds that anonymous testimony should not be accepted
since it is a poor precedent and not in keeping with his reign (that is, I think, with the just
magistracy he practices as Emperor).
According to Tacitus, the Christians were abhorred for their crimes; in particular
they were reproached for their "hatred of the human race." He calls Christianity a
detestable superstition and remarks its spread. Suetonius connects "Chrestus" to sedition
in Judea and praises Nero for taking action against a new and mischievous superstition.188
Pliny thinks this superstition to be absurd and excessive, but is most concerned about an
obstinate refusal to worship the gods of Trajan and Rome.
Such an attitude toward religion on the part of sophisticated Romans might come
as a surprise given the famous piety of Rome. Yet leading Romans were traditionally
indifferent to the superstitions (as they saw them) of the vulgar and were concerned with
religion more for its political effects or utility than its truth. We see this attitude in a
statement of Gaius Cotta in Cicerořs De Natura Deorum. In replying to an Epicurean
account of the gods, Cotta remarks:
In an inquiry as to the nature of the gods, the first question that we ask is, do the
gods exist or do they not? ŘIt is difficult to deny their existence.ř No doubt it
would be if the question were to be asked in a public assembly, but in private
conversation and in a company like the present it is perfectly easy. This being so,
I, who am a high priest, and who hold it to be a duty most solemnly to maintain
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the rights and doctrines of the established religion, should be glad to be convinced
of this fundamental tenant of the divine existence, not as an opinion merely
[opinione solum] but as plain truth [veritatem plane]. For many disturbing
reflections occur to my mind, which sometimes make me think that there are no
gods at all.189
This remark is especially striking from a pontifex, who was, after all, an official of the
state. Cotta very clearly distinguishes his public duty to defend public doctrine and his
private opinions, which find the existence of gods, let alone any providential care for
human life, doubtful. Christianity, from this point of view, is the worst of both worlds-vulgar superstition without redeeming utility of a civil religion.
 Trans pol i t i cal concerns: St . P aul and Ent husi asm

While the Roman pagan reaction shows a practical concern with the spread of
superstition, the concern that Christianity encouraged excessive enthusiasm can be seen
even in the testimony of Christians themselves. As attention shifted away from practice
toward faith, a new sort of political challenge arose: that of distinguishing true from false
revelations. The ancient policy avoided this concern by treating all revelation as equal-and equally false, from the sophisticated point of view. As the enlightenment will come
to argue, this policy was not equal to the challenge.
Even a devout Christian might be concerned about erroneous accounts of
revelation; indeed, one need only read the New Testament to see evidence for this.
Excessive "enthusiasm" as it reveals itself in the early Church is reflected in the Pauline
letters, although I would argue not so much by Paul himself as many late thinkers have
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argued. It is, however, seen clearly in the local Churches Paul hopes to instruct. Many
examples of what enlightenment thinkers will call "enthusiasm" could be offered, but to
illustrate this point I will discuss Paulřs First Epistle to the Corinthians.190 According to
the account found in Acts,191
Paul visited Corinth on his second mission after a rather unsuccessful visit to
Athens. It was at Corinth, during his Second Journey, that Paul conducted a mission
(from perhaps the winter of the years 49 and 50 to the summer of the year 51), described
by Luke in Acts 18:1-18. Later, during his Third Journey, he conducted a considerable
correspondence with the Christian community at Corinth, writing from Ephesus between
the years 54 and 57, during which time he also paid a brief visit to Corinth.192 It should
be remarked that the people of Corinth were Greeks, some formerly pagan and many still
pagan; also many of the converts were Gentiles, that is, collectively speaking, nonJews.193
In First Corinthians, Chapter 12, Paul undertakes a discussion of "spiritual gifts."
Paul begins by claiming "that no man can say that Jesus is the Lord, but by the Holy
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Ghost."194 While Paul traces all professions of faith to the inspiration of God, he also
seems concerned that such a claim will lead to people to identify all things that they do to
inspiration by God and, what is more, to make proud claims about the supernatural gifts
they have received. He continues, "now there are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit.
And there are differences of administrations, but the same Lord . And there are diversities
of operations, but it is the same God which worketh all in all. But the manifestation of
the Spirit is given to every man to profit withal."195 The full diversity of gifts seems not
to be present at once in every believer. Some are given wisdom; others knowledge; or
faith, healing, miracles, prophesy, discernment, or the interpretation of tongues. "But,"
he writes, "all these worketh that one and the selfsame Spirit, dividing to every man
severally as he will." The full range of these gifts is enjoyed not by the individual
believer but rather by whole community of believers. Paul observes that God has set
some in the church, first with the apostles, secondarily with prophets, thirdly with
teachers.

"Are all apostles? are all prophets? are all teachers? are all workers of

miracles? Have all the gifts of healing? do all speak with tongues? do all interpret?"196
Presumably the answer is "no," for he encourages his flock to desire in "a more excellent
way."
Though I speak with the tongues of men and of angels, and have not charity, I am
become as sounding brass, or a tinkling cymbal. And though I have the gift of
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prophecy, and understand all mysteries, and all knowledge; and though I have all
faith, so that I could remove mountains, and have not charity, I am nothing. And
though I bestow all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be
burned, and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing. Charity suffereth long, and
is kind; charity envieth not; charity vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, Doth not
behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no
evil; Rejoiceth not in iniquity, but rejoiceth in the truth; Beareth all things,
believeth all things, hopeth all things, endureth all things. Charity never faileth:
but whether there be prophecies, they shall fail; whether there be tongues, they
shall cease; whether there be knowledge, it shall vanish away. For we know in
part, and we prophesy in part. But when that which is perfect is come, then that
which is in part shall be done away.197
Paul councils that the gift which seems least astonishing from the outside is the truest and
most valuable to a soul. Hope for the gift of charity and other gifts may follow; or they
may not. He seems to advise the Corinthians not to be disappointed by this, however.
"Yet in the church I had rather speak five words with my understanding, that by my voice
I might teach others also, than ten thousand words in an unknown tongue."198
I take these passages to suggest that as early as 50 years after the death of Jesus of
Nazareth, some Christians were inclined to a certain "enthusiastic" disposition. It is a
very different matter to suggest that the Church taught or encouraged such enthusiasm. I
think not, but candor requires noticing that Paul writes of himself that "I thank my God, I
speak with tongues more than ye all."199 Be this as it may, the Enlightenment diagnosis
of enthusiasm may not do justice to the perennial character of the desire to transcend
human finitude. From the classical philosophical perspective, the fact that Christianity
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draws men away from political life is not altogether bad. As Shaftesbury himself will
argue, enthusiasm in the soul of man leads him not only to sectarianism but also to the
appreciation for "true revelation," including "natural revelations" of order and beauty to
which the human heart seems to aspire. The separation of religion and politics might be a
necessary consequence of the desire of philosophy to transcend political life.
 Transpol i t i cal concerns: Just i ce hum an and di vi ne

The history of Christian replies to these concerns is itself very complicated, but
brief mention of perhaps the most influential reply is necessary. Augustineřs City of God
against the Pagans undertakes a refutation of the charge that Christians are poor citizens.
The seriousness of the Roman concern is reflected by the seriousness (not to mention the
length) of the reply. In the first ten books, Augustine argues that the political woes of the
collapsing Roman Empire around 410 AD can be blamed neither on Christianity nor on
the turning away from the traditional gods of the city. Rome had always been perverse
and the pagan gods were hardly good civic role models (books 1-4). Christianity, in fact,
could better account for what the traditional notion of fate claimed to explain, and
anyway, a belief in fate, strictly speaking, would recommend accepting the sack of Rome
(book 5). He observes that Rome had always accepted new gods and there was a long
tradition on the part of the educated class of not believing in the gods anyway (books 6 &
7). The best thinkers, that is, Plato and the philosophers, actually held better views than
the vulgar pagan religion would suggest, and these philosophic views actually are more
harmonious with Christianity than polytheism (8-10).
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Following this, however, Augustine does not quite argue that there are no tensions
between the duties of a citizen and the duties of a Christian; in fact, he follows Plato,
Aristotle, Cicero, and others in arguing that the just man and the just citizen are only the
same in the perfectly just regime.200 It is in this claim that Augustine finds his famous
account of two cities, the City of Man and the City of God (in book 19, especially). The
perfectly just city, he claims, is not to be expected on earth. The City of Man is always
defective; only the City of God is just. Augustine claims to recognize the legitimacy of
both the political community and the Church. Nevertheless, in calling Christians to be
loyal to the True City, he might seem to be leading men away from political life just as
classical philosophy did. Reflection on the fate of Socrates suggests that there is a long
precedent for worrying about this sort of "transpolitical" advice.201
As we shall see in his account of "enthusiasm," Shaftesbury attempts to restore
just such a transpolitical aim to human life but without an element of "true" revelation.
Yet given the ability of Christian philosophers to absorb transpolitical ends into their
account of the highest goals for human beings, one might wonder if Shaftesbury offers a
reply equal to the theological-political problem.

Shaftesburyřs account of the

problematic character of Christianity is nearly identical to other enlightenment thinkers.
He, like Hobbes, regarded Christianity as an unnatural mixture of vulgar religion and
200
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philosophy. Yet unlike Hobbes, Shaftesbury does not propose bringing enlightenment to
the opinions of people. To understand why we must consider Shaftesbury's own account
of religious psychology, especially as it comes to light in his treatment of "enthusiasm."

Religion in the Characteristicks , continued
 The P sychol ogi cal
Ent husi asm

Root s

of
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We have now seen that Shaftesbury shares many elements of the Enlightenment
account of Christianity. He agrees especially with the pernicious character of priestcraft
and he also seems to trace the political trouble with Christianity to a monstrous
combination of universal philosophic sectarianism and religious practice. Yet we have
also seen the beginning of dissent in his desire to distinguish what is natural in opinion
from what is unnatural. Like Hobbes, Shaftesbury traces religious zeal to a sort of
melancholia--what he also calls "ill humour." Yet it is here that the most profound
difference in Shaftesbury is found. Hobbes and Locke see little good in enthusiasm,
which they do not distinguish from religious zeal; Shaftesbury identifies a noble aspect of
enthusiasm. In considering this distinction in types of enthusiasm, we will come to see
why Shaftesbury prefers the ancient policy to the philosophic solutions of the modern
projectors Hobbes and Locke. Shaftesbury is not afraid of being another Renaissance
because his goals are primarily philosophical rather than political; or rather, they are
political only because of his understanding of philosophy.
The engraved plate at the head of A Letter concerning Enthusiasm is a triptych in
which the central concern of the treatise is anticipated. We are directed by a page

188

number in the boarder to the opening of section 4, where we read that "the melancholy
way of treating Religion is that which, according to my apprehension, renders it so
tragical, and is the occasion of its acting in reality such dismal Tragedys in the World.
And my Notion is, that provided we treat Religion with good Manners, we can never use
too much good Humour, or examine it with too much Freedom and Familiarity."202
The center picture of the plate is of a darkened room where two children have
been imprisoned. (On the walls are chains and shackles.) In the background a Greek
goddess (perhaps Athena) is opening a door to allow light into the room. The child to the
left covers his eyes, the other stops his ears. On each side of this picture are happier
scenes. In the left-hand picture, three boys are well-illuminated and at leisure in a
pastoral scene. One operates a telescope. Overhead the sun can be seen shining. To the
right, three boys dance to the music of a pan flute. Overall one can see the different
consequences of good and ill humor. Again, taking a cue from the page directions in the
boarder we learn that "the melancholy way in which we have been taught Religion,
makes us unapt to think of it in good Humour. řTis in Adversity chiefly, or in ill Health,
under Affliction, or Disturbance of Mind, or Discomposure of Temper, that we have
recourse to it. Tho in reality we are never so unfit to think of it as at such a heavy and
dark hour."203

Presumably the imprisoned boys are in just such a circumstance.

According to Shaftesbury,
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we can never be fit to contemplate any thing above us, when we are in no
condition to look into ourselves, and calmly examine the Temper of our Mind and
Passions. For then it is we see Wrath, and Fury, and Revenge, and Terrors in the
Deity; when we are full of Disturbances and Fears within, and have, by
Sufferance and Anxiety, lost so much of the natural Calm and Easiness of our
Temper.204
As we saw in our consideration of the art of soliloquy, Shaftsbury looks to
philosophy (and her patroness, Athena) to free men from such terrors and restore their
natural temper. Only then can they properly begin to consider "any thing above us." As
it turns out, the melancholy way of considering religion is not, according to Shaftesbury,
the only way. Once again, the Critic offers several valuable observations regarding the
alternative as Shaftesbury understands it.
At the beginning of ŖMiscellany II,ŗ the Critic undertakes a discussion of "our
Authorřs" review and modification of enthusiasm. He begins by raising a question about
the existence of the supernatural. "WHETHER in fact there be any real Enchantment, any
Influence of Stars, any Power of Daemons or of foreign Natures over our own Minds, is
thought questionable by many. Some there are who assert the Negative, and endeavour to
solve the Appearances of this kind by the natural Operation of our Passions, and the
common Course of outward Things."205
The Critic playful indicates the Letter concerning Enthusiasm has given him
pause on this topic. He confirms in his own experience what Shaftesbury suggests in the
Letter, namely, "that we all of us know something of this Principle." The principle in
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question is enthusiasm. According to the Critic, enthusiasm is extremely contagious.
Merely reading treatises devoted to the examination of melancholy is apt to give rise to
the passion itself. For this reason alone, perhaps, the Critic is "led to write on such
Subjects as these, with Caution, at different Reprises; and not singly, in one breath."206
(One might also consider, however, the indiscrete author discussed in the last part of the
Miscellaneous Reflections.)
The Critic is encouraged by another lesson he has learned from Shaftesbury, that
is, "that there is a Power in Numbers, Harmony, Proportion, and Beauty of every kind,
which naturally captivates the Heart, and raises the Imagination to an Opinion or Conceit
of something majestick and divine."207

Shaftesbury opens the Letter by recalling

the ancient tradition of invoking the Muses at the beginning of a great literary endeavor.
He remarks that this custom has not lost favor in the modern age; still he wonders why
such an "Air of Enthusiasm, which fits so gracefully with an Ancient, shouřd be so
spiritless and aukard [sic] in a Modern."208 Shaftesbury tells us that ancient poets could
with greater plausibility "feign an Extasy" here where we cannot. Since the ancients
"derivřd both their Religion and Polity from the Muses Art," and actually knew the
worship of Apollo, such petitions would be received as sincere by their readers, however
poetic the conceit.

206

Ibid., 3.20.

207

Ibid., 3.21.

208

Enthusiasm, 1.4.

191

Shaftesbury's contemporaries must look for other resources. Christians, who lack
generosity when they consider heathen religion, overlook the persistence of a similar
ecstasy in their own time. We learn of a Christian prelate who offered "a full account of
his Belief in Fairys."209 A poetřs faith, he remarks, is raised with his imagination. The
imagination can still raise genius, although contemporary opinions are an impediment to
such activity. Nevertheless, Shaftesbury claims, an author must draw his inspiration from
somewhere.

Shaftesbury offers the friend to whom he writes as a fit model for

developing the "better self."
This prelude sets the stage for Shaftesburyřs discussion of enthusiasm. After a
short plea for freedom of raillery and an allusion to the ancient policy toward superstition
and philosophy, Shaftesbury turns to his own remedy for the "devout melancholy" of
enthusiasm, good humor:
Good Humour is not only the best Security against Enthusiasm, but the best
Foundation of Piety and true Religion: For if right Thoughts and worthy
Apprehensions of the Supreme Being, are fundamental to all true Worship and
Adoration; řtis more than probable, that we shall never miscarry in this respect,
except throř ill Humour only. Nothing beside ill Humour, either natural or forcřd,
can bring a Man to think seriously that the World is governřd by any devilish or
malicious Power.210
Good humor is the foundation for true religion. It is ill humor, he argues, that
leads men to believe "that the World is governřd by any devilish or malicious Power."
What is more, "I very much question whether any thing, besides ill-humour, can be the
209
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Cause of Atheism." It is good humor, he suggests, that makes a man open to the
possibility that the world is orderly and beautiful. Good humor is for Shaftesbury the
natural disposition of man in the world.

As we saw in the previous chapter, the

temperament of man is deeply rooted in opinions, whether they be true or fanciful.
Shaftesbury recommends self-study to separate our natural temper from the acquired and
often questionable character we form as a result of our contact with society. He writes,
it wouřd be well for us, if before we ascended into the higher Regions of Divinity,
we wouřd vouchsafe to descend a little into our-selves, and bestow some poor
Thoughts upon plain honest Morals. When we had once lookřd into our-selves,
and distinguishřd well the nature of our own Affections, we shouřd probably be
fitter Judges of the Divineness of a Character, and discern better what Affections
were sutable or unsutable to a perfect Being.211
Among other things, the strategy we now recognize as soliloquy would help
protect men from the contagious character of enthusiasm--what Shaftesbury calls
"Enthusiasm of second hand."212 Resolution of character in the sense discussed in Advice
to an Author would serve to inoculate a man against the dangers of melancholy "panick."
In panic, "the evidence of the Senses lost, as in a Dream; and the imagination so inflamřd,
as in a moment to have burnt up every particle of judgment and reason." 213 This is
perfectly harmonious with the account of chapter 2, where we saw that "company is an
extreme Provocative to Fancy; and, like a hot Bed in Gardening, is apt to make our
Imaginations sprout too fast. But by this anticipating Remedy of Soliloquy, we may
211
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effectually provide against the Inconvenience."214 Such ill-humored enthusiasm accounts
for the horrific description of the Sybil preserved by Virgil as well as other prophets both
ancient and modern.215 Yet Shaftsbury extends the distemper of enthusiasm to include
more surprising company.
According to Shaftesbury, Epicurus himself could not do without the imagination
when attacking superstition. "It is hard to imagine, that one who had so little religious
faith as Epicurus, shouřd have so vulgar a credulity, as to believe those accounts of armys
and castles in the air, and such visionary phaenomena. Yet he allows them; and then
thinks to solve Řem by his effluvia, and aerial looking-glasses, and I know not what other
stuff."216 In the case of Lucretius the treatment is more subtle. Lucretius was convinced
that "there was a good stock of visionary spirit originally in human nature." While he
denied that religion was natural, he allowed that men could not be convinced to reject
supernatural objects outright. Here, remarks Shaftesbury, "a Divine, methinks, might
raise a good Argument against him, for the truth as well the usefulness." 217 Poets--even
atheistic poets--are as guilty of enthusiasm as the religious. "Even the cold Lucretius
makes use of Inspiration, when he writes against it; and is forcřd to raise an Apparition of
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Nature, in a Divine Form, to animate and conduct him in his very Work of degrading
Nature, and despoiling her of all her seeming Wisdom and Divinity."218
This observation brings Shaftesbury to a central conclusion:
enthusiasm is wonderfully powerful and extensive; that it is a matter of nice
Judgment, and the hardest thing in the world to know fully and distinctly; since
even Atheism is not exempt from it. For, as some have well remarkřd, there have
been Enthusiastical Atheists. Nor can Divine Inspiration, by its outward Marks, be
easily distinguishřd from it. For Inspiration is a real feeling of the Divine
Presence, and Enthusiasm a false one. But the Passion they raise is much alike.219
According to Shaftesbury, it is characteristic of the human mind to receive the
world in images through the action of the imagination. He writes that
when the Mind is taken up in Vision, and fixes its view either on any real Object,
or mere Specter of Divinity; when it sees, or thinks it sees any thing prodigious,
and more than human; its Horror, Delight, Confusion, Fear, Admiration, or
whatever Passion belongs to it, or is uppermost on this occasion, will have
something vast, immane, and (as Painters say) beyond Life. And this is what gave
occasion to the name of Fanaticism, as it was usřd by the Antients in its original
Sense, for an Apparition transporting the Mind.220
Here we find the grave problem Shaftesbury has identified with the "modern
projectors." For Shaftesbury compels us to ask whether we rid ourselves of fanaticism
without doing away with our experience of the fantastic? This is a serious question.
When the human mind is too narrow to contain the "ideas or images" it receives,
"extravagance and fury" is the natural result. Shaftesbury suggests that this overflowing
imagination is recognized by men to be something extraordinary.
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inspiration "may be justly callřd Divine Enthusiasm: For the Word it-self signifies Divine
Presence, and was made use of by the Philosopher whom the earliest Christian Fathers
callřd Divine, [that is, Plato] to express whatever was sublime in human Passions."221
Shaftesbury distinguishes between an enthusiasm born of ill-humor, and a "noble
enthusiasm," proper to "Heroes, Statesmen, Poets, Orators, Musicians, and even
Philosophers themselves."222 It is here that Shaftesbury remarks that all men know
something of this principle.
imperfectly.

Enthusiasm is known by all human beings, however

He nevertheless goes on to caution us against embracing enthusiasm

naively. There is only one sure way to distinguish noble and base enthusiasm, and to
thereby avoid delusion.

"to judg the Spirits whether they are of God, we must

antecedently judg our own Spirit; whether it be of Reason and sound Sense; whether it be
fit to judg at all, by being sedate, cool, and impartial; free of every biasing Passion, every
giddy Vapor, or melancholy Fume."223

Self-knowledge as understood by classical

philosophy--as presented in Soliloquy--is the proper antidote to excessive enthusiasm. He
writes that
this is the first Knowledg and previous Judgment: "To understand our-selves, and
know what Spirit we are of." Afterwards we may judg the Spirit in others,
consider what their personal Merit is, and prove the Validity of their Testimony
by the Solidity of their Brain. By this means we may prepare our-selves with
some Antidote against Enthusiasm. And this is what I have darřd affirm is best
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performřd by keeping to Good Humour. For otherwise the Remedy it-self may
turn to the Disease.224
Shaftesburyřs preference for ancient policy is inseparable from his preference for
Socratic philosophy. The Critic makes clear that in Shaftesburyřs opinion, the stakes for
human life are very high:
Whatever this Subject may be in it-self; we cannot help being transported with the
thought of it. It inspires us with something more than ordinary, and[31] raises us
above our-selves. Without this Imagination or Conceit, the World wouřd be but a
dull Circumstance, and Life a sorry Pass-time. Scarce cou’d we be said to live.
The animal Functions might in their course be carryřd on; but nothing further
sought for, or regarded. The gallant Sentiments, the elegant Fancys, the Bellepassions, which have, all of them, this Beauty in view, wouřd be set aside, and
leave us probably no other Employment than that of satisfying our coarsest
Appetites at the cheapest rate; in order to the attainment of a supine State of
Indolence and Inactivity.225
Shaftesbury himself indicates that Plato is the source of his distinction between a
noble and a base form of enthusiasm, and he points our attention to several dialogues,
including the Apology, Meno, and Phaedrus. We can confirm this for ourselves by
looking briefly at the treatment enthusiasm receives in Plato.
 P oet ry, P hil osophy, and t he Ent husi asm of Eros

Enthusiasm receives treatment in many Platonic dialogues, but its poetic aspects
are seen most extensively in the Ion and the Phaedrus. At first these two dialogues seem
to offer similar perspectives on poetry, especially regarding the divine in the act of
making a poem. Poetry is presented again and again as a sort of enthusiasm, literally
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speaking.

(Enthusiasm coming from the Greek enthousiάzo, meaning literally to be

inspired or possessed by a god). In his conversation with Ion, Socrates at one point
describes the interpretive power of Ion as a mere patient of the Muse. Unlike other
artists, the rhapsode seems to not to understand the nature of his own activity. Ion agrees
and asks Socrates to explain why this is. Socrates explains:
as I was saying just now, this is not an art (téchne) in you, whereby you speak
well on Homer, but a divine power (theía dè dýnamis), which moves you like that
in the stone which Euripides named a magnet, but most people call "Heraclea
stone." For this stone not only attracts iron rings, but also imparts to them a power
whereby they in turn are able to do the very same thing as the stone, and attract
other rings; so that sometimes there is formed quite a long chain of bits of iron
and rings, suspended one from another; and they all depend for this power on that
one stone. In the same manner also the Muse inspires men herself, and then by
means of these inspired persons the inspiration spreads to others (hoúto dè kaì he
Moûsa enthéous mèn poieî auté, dià dè tôn enthéon toúton állon enthousiazónton
hormathòs eksartâtai), and holds them in a connected chain. For all the good epic
poets utter all those fine poems not from art, but as inspired and possessed, and
the good lyric poets likewise; just as the Corybantian worshippers do not dance
when in their senses, so the lyric poets do not indite those fine songs in their
senses, but when they have started on the melody and rhythm they begin to be
frantic, and it is under possession--as the bacchants are possessed, and not in their
senses, when they draw honey and milk from the rivers--that the soul of the lyric
poets does the same thing, by their own report.
The rhapsode does not have a teachable art. Rather he is moved from the outside, just as
iron is moved by a magnet. In this way it is said that a divine power takes possession of
the rhapsode. So too with the good epic and lyric poets--they are inspired and possessed.
Under such possession, men leave their senses and become frantic, much like the
Corybantian worshipers do, although under such possession they can produce beautiful
things--draw honey and milk from rivers, as it were.
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We see the same claim made in the Apology of Socrates, where Socrates remarks
of the poets "that they do not make what they make by wisdom, but by some sort of
nature (phusei) and while inspired (enthousiázontes), like the diviners and those who
deliver oracles."226 Poets are able to speak many beautiful things, but they do not really
know what they are doing. The reference to nature here is interesting, because Socrates
seems to suggest that a poetic gift may be natural to the poet; it is unclear how such a gift
relates to the intellect.
Near the close of the Meno a similar point is made by Socrates. There he remarks
that:
we would correctly call "divine" all those whom we were speaking of just now,
soothsayers and prophets and all those skilled at poetry. And we might assert that
the political men are, above all these, both divine and inspired, being breathed
upon and possessed by the god (enthousiázein) when they succeed by speaking
about many great matters, thought they know nothing of what they say. 227
In short, one might come away from Plato with the opinion that poets have an ineffable
gift, perhaps sent by the gods, but one that has little to do with the faculty of reason so
beloved by a philosopher. (This view might seem even more tempting given the famous
"quarrel between poetry and philosophy" at the end of the Republic.228)

Poetic

enthusiasm, from this perspective, might be taken as an inferior experience of the soul
and without a rational aspect.

226

22c.

227

99c-d.

228

Rep. 595 ff.

199

At first the Phaedrus too seems to lend credence to this view of poetry. After
denigrating the passions, or desire without reason, in a speech he composes on behalf of
Phaedrus,229 Socrates presents as compensation his famous account of love as a sort of
"divine madness." The view that madness is divine, that "the greatest of good things
come into being for us" through it, requires a defense, and Socrates witnesses a variety of
prophets, including the Sibyl, as examples. So impressed are the ancients by prophesy,
he says, that the name for prophesy and madness share in etymology. (Here it seems
more important that Socrates is trying to persuade rather than demonstrate, because the
etymology is a bit questionable.) Indeed, the ancients testify that "madness coming from
a god is more beautiful than soundness of mind from a human being."
This prophecy, which can reveal to men wisdom otherwise unattainable, is one of
four sorts of divine madness Socrates mentions. In addition to prophesy, the gods send
purification rites, poetry, and love. The description of inspired poetry here is worth
considering:
possession and madness from the Muses, seizing a tender and untried soul,
arousing it and exiting it to a Bacchic frenzy toward both odes and other poetry,
adorns ten thousand works of the ancients and so educates posterity; but he who
comes to poetic doors without the Musesř madness, persuaded that he will then be
an adequate poet from art, himself fails of his purpose, and the poetry by the man
of sound mind is obliterated by that of madmen.230
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This is not such an absurd claim, of course. Many would-be poets have found that
merely loving and studying poesy cannot lift a poetaster to greatness. This seems to fit
with the other accounts of poetic inspiration weřve mentioned. And yet we are still at the
beginning of Socratesř famous account, and this view will have to be modified in light of
what follows.
Socrates warns of the account (namely that madness is divine and a blessing) that
what he says will be "untrustworthy for the terribly clever, but trustworthy for the wise."
Here one must grasp the truth about the soul, both divine and human, and such a grasp
seems to rely on an element of trust (for it to be taken as trustworthy, that is). After a
brief argument for the immortality of soul, Socrates introduces his famous image of the
charioteer. Regarding the souls of human beings, Socrates describes a condition of
thwarted ascent by a winged chariot to the realm of true being apart from a cycle of
coming into being and passing away. Human beings have had to varying degrees a
glimpse of true being, but unlike gods, none have spent eternity looking at true things.
Not all souls fare equally poorly, but "despite their having much toil, all go away
unfulfilled in respect to the sight of being, and having gone away, they make use of
opinion for their nourishment." Human souls, lacking the ability or inclination to follow
god, become weighed down and lose their wings and fall toward earth and conjoin with
bestial nature. Not all souls are equal in their fate: "the one that has seen the most things
shall implant in that which will engender a man who will become a philosopher or lover
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of the beautiful or someone musical and erotic." Such a soul is most fully human. As
Socrates explains,
a human being must understand that which is said in reference to form, that
which, going from many perceptions, is gathered together into one by reasoning.
And this is the recollection of those things that our soul saw once upon a time,
when it proceeded along with god and looked down upon the things that we now
assert to be, and lifted up its head into the being that really is.
For this reason, "only the philosopherřs thought is furnished with wings."

The

philosopher is able to use the glimpses and reminders around him to perfect himself, but
this activity makes little sense to most people: "standing back from matters of human
seriousness and coming to be near the divine, he is rebuked by the many as moved out of
his senses, but that he is inspired by god (enthousiázon) escaped the notice of many." It
is here that we see that love--the fourth sort of madness or enthusiasm--is not only not
incompatible with the Socratic account of philosophy, but essential to it. Love furnishes
wings whenever someone seeing a lower beauty recollects true beauty. Socrates links the
philosopher (the lover of wisdom) with the lover of beauty and the musical or erotic
person. Most souls recollect very little of true beauty and are less moved that the true
lover of beauty (that is, the philosopher). It is interesting to note that the prophet and
mystic are now demoted to the fifth rank of winged souls, below the king or commander,
the statesman or businessman, and the lover of gymnastics and doctors. In the soul of the
true lover of beauty, the "black horse" of the soulřs chariot, not content to rest with the
decent opinion of convention (that is, "what is praised by the multitude as virtue"), puts
the whole soul in motion, moving it toward the beautiful, beloved being. At its highest,
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this motion is brought into order through the cooperation of the charioteer and the white
horse to lead the soul into a "well-arranged way of life and philosophy." According to
Socrates, "there is no greater good than this that either human moderation or divine
madness is capable of providing to a human being."
Here Socrates seems to join human moderation and divine madness. Earlier in the
Phaedo Socrates playfully describes himself as "a lover of speeches," "one who is sick,"
and as a "Corybantic reveler." Like all lovers of the beautiful, Socrates is consumed by
an illness for erotic things.231 Socrates has an erotic longing for speeches, which might
be described as a sort of sickness insofar as it betrays a longing for wisdom or knowledge
rather than the confident possession of wisdom as a guide to life. Yet this erotic longing
is also that which keeps him in motion toward the beautiful, beginning with the beauty
displayed even in the realm of coming to be, but ascending toward the idea of true beauty
itself. In the words of Diotima in the Symposium,
beginning from these beautiful things here, always to proceed on up for the sake
of that beauty, using these beautiful things here as steps: from one to two, and
from two to all beautiful bodies; and from beautiful bodies to beautiful pursuits;
and from pursuits to beautiful lessons; and from lessons to end at that lesson,
which is the lesson of nothing else than the beautiful itself; and at last to know
what is beauty itself.232
231

This is the formulation of Diotima in Symposium 207. I feel free in borrowing from her because her
speech seems especially directed through Socrates to Phaedrus at 212b. Ultimately, it is inadequate to
equate what Diotima says with what Socrates thinks -- Diotima seems to equivocate on the relationship
between the good and the beautiful, for example, whereas Socrates seems to think that the good is highest.
In this sense Aristophanes is better when he suggests that love is a longing pointing to something
unobtainable.
232

Symposium 211c. It would be interesting to explore the implications of the fact that the Symposium is
itself narrated by the very enthusiastic Apollodorus.
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In the account of Socrates, the enthusiasm of eros is a kind of illness potentially
leading to tyrannical excess. Yet Socrates would never have us cured, even if it were a
possibility. For Socrates it is the task of philosophy to show man what he really desires
and to indicate the most likely path to obtaining it.

The connection between eros and what is highest in human beings informs the
entire project of Shaftesbury's Characteristicks. For Shaftesbury, the modern projectors
are correct to suggest that Christianity tends to diminish liberty and stir sectarian
violence.

He disagrees with Hobbes and Locke about both the possibility and the

desirability of eradicating the root of religion he locates in enthusiasm. Enthusiasm lies
beneath all aspirations to the divine. Shaftesbury's classical understanding of human
nature leads him to prefer the "antient policy" of mitigating the harm of religion while
permitting philosophy the freedom to correct opinions and investigate nature.
When we turn to consider the Moralists we will see that Theocles reintroduces a
hierarchy of beauty as a ladder to the divine. Just as Socrates is present to disagree with
Diotima in the Symposium, Philocles is present to disagree with Theocles. We will see
that the presence of two credible characters in dialogue acts to preserve two rival
hypotheses about the cosmos--theism and atheism.

Keeping both of these serious

hypotheses alive as genuinely plausible accounts seems to be the condition for the
practice of soliloquy recommended by Shaftesbury.

For this reason above all,
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Shaftesbury must challenge the threat of the modern projectors. In Chapter 4 we examine
Shaftesbury's critique of this threat.

CHAPTER 4
ŖTHE ŒCONOMY OF THE PASSIONS":
MODERN PHILOSOPHY AND THE DIMINUTION OF THE HUMAN
General Introduction: Betw een the Wolf and the Dog
Shaftesbury placed the following quotation from Horace as an epigraph to Sensus
Communis:
On the one side a wolf attacks, on the other a dog.1
Insofar as Shaftesbury saw his philosophical project as engaging enemies on two
fronts, the epigraph could serve Shaftesburyřs work as a whole. The Characteristicks
might be described as a defense of common sense against radical attacks from two fronts.
In chapter 3 we considered Shaftesburyřs account of Christianity.

According to

Shaftesbury, Christianity is particularly prone to theological ire given the doctrinal
character it developed from the "unnatural Union of Religion and Philosophy."2
Shaftesbury engages his first enemy--Christianity--on the front first fortified by classical
philosophy. (We have yet to discover whether or not this front becomes a Maginot line!)
By distinguishing between two sorts of enthusiasm, Shaftesbury is able to offer a reply to
religious zealotry without condemning all higher longings in men. As a practical matter
he recommends toleration and ridicule as the best weapons to fight zealotry. He is able to
1

Sensus Communis, 1.37. The quotation is from the second satire of book 2.

2

Miscellaneous Reflections: Miscellany II, 3.51.
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recommend these weapons because of his confidence that they are available to all
thoughtful men.
Yet in Shaftesburyřs opinion, it is not just the religious believers who are
vulnerable to excessive enthusiasm. As the Critic of Miscellaneous Reflections reminds
us, "our Author" asserts "that even ATHEISM it-self was not wholly exempt from
Enthusiasm; That there have been in reality Enthusiastical Atheists; and That even the
Spirit of Martyrdom couřd, upon occasion, exert it-self as well in this Cause, as in any
other".3
The Critic quotes Ralph Cudworthřs True Intellectual System of the Universe on
the enthusiastic atheist, "that they are Fanaticks too; however that word seem to have a
more peculiar respect to something of a Deity: All Atheists being that blind GoddessNATUREřS Fanaticks."4 As we shall see in chapter 5, Shaftesbury himself holds a divine
notion of nature, although he is ever concerned to avoid fanaticism in his own devotion.
According to Shaftesbury, the modern philosopher seems to be especially motivated by a
kind of "pneumatophobia,"--that is, fear of soul--which makes him adverse to any nonmaterial explanation of the world. As the Critic explains,
řtis indeed the Nature of Fear, as of all other Passions, when excessive, to defeat
its own End, and prevent us in the execution of what we naturally propose to our3
4

Ibid., 3.42.

The influence of the Cambridge Platonists on Shaftesbury is discussed in Ernst Cassirer, The Platonic
Renaissance in England, trans. James Pettegrove (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1953), Stephen L.
Darwall, The British Moralists and the Internal "Ought", 1640-1740 (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), John Arthur Passmore, Ralph Cudworth; an Interpretation (Cambridge [Eng.]:
University Press, 1951), Chapter 8, Ernest Tuveson, "The Importance of Shaftesbury," ELH 20, no. 4
(1953).
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selves as our Advantage. SUPERSTITION it-self is but a certain kind of Fear, which
possessing us strongly with the apprehended Wrath or Displeasure of Divine
Powers, hinders us from judging what those Powers are in themselves, or what
Conduct of ours may, with best reason, be thought suitable to such highly rational
and superior Natures. Now if from the Experience of many gross Delusions of a
superstitious kind, the Course of this Fear begins to turn; řtis natural for it to run,
with equal violence, a contrary way. The extreme Passion for religious Objects
passes into an Aversion. And a certain Horror and Dread of Imposture causes as
great a Disturbance as even Imposture it-self had done before. In such a Situation
as this, the Mind may easily be blinded; as well in one respect, as in the other.5
Shaftesbury is as critical of the anti-theological ire he finds in modern philosophy
as he is of religious zealotry, and it is here he opens a second front. In running to a
contrary but equally passionate extreme, modern philosophers depart from the good sense
Shaftesbury thought essential to decent human life. What is more, such enthusiasm
obscures the proper beginning place for contemplation of the world and makes
impartiality in thought unlikely. Neither the religious nor the anti-religious position is
reasonable in this sense:
řtis plain, both these Disorders carry something with them which discover us to be
in some manner beside our Reason, and out of the right use of Judgment and
Understanding. For how can we be said to intrust or use our Reason, if in any case
we fear to be convincřd? How are we Masters of our-selves, when we have
acquirřd the Habit of bringing Horror, Aversion, Favour, Fondness, or any other
Temper than that of mere Indifference and Impartiality, into the Judgment of
Opinions, and Search of Truth?6
The chapter epigraph from Horace captures the predicament of modern men,
caught as they are caught between the lupine teachings of modern philosophers and the

5

Miscellaneous Reflections: Miscellany II, 3:42 in footnotes.

6

Ibid.
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tamer writings of contemporary theologians; Shaftesbury writes the Characteristicks to
present an alternative to the two enthusiasms.

It is clear that Shaftesbury had this predicament in mind from his first published
writing, the "Preface" to his edition of Select Sermons of Benjamin Whichcote.7 In that
brief essay Shaftesbury anticipated the position he would later elaborate in the
Characteristicks, namely an alternative to the "unwearied Zeal of present Divines" and
their avowed enemy Thomas Hobbes. In the "Preface," Shaftesbury writes of Hobbes:
this is He who reckoning up the Passions or Affections by which Men are held
together in Society, live in Peace, or have any Correspondence one with another,
forgot to mention Kindness, Friendship, Sociableness, Love of Company and
Converse, Natural Affection, or any thing of this kind; I say Forgot, because I can
scarcely think so ill of any Man, as that he has not by Experience found any of
these Affections in himself, and consequently, that he believes none of them to be
in others. But in place of other Affections, or good Inclinations, of whatever kind,
this Author has substituted only one Master-Passion, Fear, which has, in effect
devour'd all the rest, and left Room only for that infinite Passion towards Power
after Power, Natural (as he affirms) to All Men, and never ceasing but in Death.
So much less Good Nature has he left with Mankind, than what he allows the
worst of Beasts: Having allotted to us, in the way of our Nature, such
mischievous Passions as are unknown to them; and not so much as allowed us any
Degree of their good ones, such as they All are known to have, and are never
wanting to exert towards their own Kind: By which Excellency of Nature (so
little reckon'd upon, in the Case of Mankind) their common Interest is duly
served, and their Species propagated and maintain'd.8
7

Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury, "Preface," in Select Sermons of Benjamin Whichcote (Delmar, New
York: Scholar's Facsimilies & Reprints, Inc., 1977; reprint, Photoreprint of the 1742 ed. published in
Edinburgh). While the Preface was published anonymously, there is no dispute among scholars that
Shaftesbury is the author of it. For an account of its publication, see Voitle, The Third Earl of Shaftesbury,
1671-1713, 111-18.
8
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Hobbes had indeed been vigorously denounced as an atheist by leading Divines of
the Church of England,9 yet, according to Shaftesbury, "had the same Industry been
applied to the Correction of his Moral Principles, as has been bestowřd in refuting some
other of his Errors, it might perhaps have been of more Service to Religion."10
Shaftesbury seems to be less concerned with any strictly Scriptural error Hobbes may
have advanced, but as we saw in chapter 5, he does recognize a connection between
religion and morality. Both the religious and the atheistic zealot make war on virtue by
teaching that manřs nature is essentially bad.

On the one hand, the Divines were

suspicious of any claims that human nature is praiseworthy apart from grace.
Shaftesbury writes in the "Preface,"
some Men, who have meant sincerely well to Religion and Vertue, have been
afraid, lest by advancing the Principle of good Nature, and laying too great a
Stress upon it, the apparent Need of Sacred Revelation (a Thing so highly
important to mankind) should be, in some Measure, taken away. So that they
were forced in a manner, to wound VERTUE, and give way to the Imputation of
being Mercenary, and of Acting in a slavish Spirit, in the ways of Religion, rather
than admit a sort of Rival (in their Sense to the Faith of Divine Revelation).11
9

Mintz, The Hunting of Leviathan : Seventeenth-Century Reactions to the Materialism and Moral
Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes. John Bowle, Hobbes and His Critics : A Study in Seventeenth Century
Constitutionalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952).
10
11

Shaftesbury, "Preface," xxv.

Ibid., xxix. Consider for example Jean Calvin in Institutes of the Christian Religion, Book 2, Chapter 1,
on what develops into a doctrine of post-lapsarian total depravity: "For our nature is not only utterly
devoid of goodness, but so prolific in all kinds of evil, that it can never be idle. Those who term it
concupiscence use a word not very inappropriate, provided it were added (this, however, many will by no
means concede), that everything which is in man, from the intellect to the will, from the soul even to
the flesh, is defiled and pervaded with this concupiscence; or, to express it more briefly, that the whole
man is in himself nothing else than concupiscence." Jean Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans.
Esq. Henry Beveridge, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1869), 218.
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On the other hand, opponents of religion had presented a low portrait of human
nature as part of their strategy to diminish the influence of religion over political life. By
presenting man's nature as passionately selfish, modern philosophy hoped to provide
compelling reasons to obey civil authorities above religious authorities. In short,
one Party of Men, fearing the Consequences which may be drawn from the
Acknowlegment of Moral and Social Principles in Humankind, to the Proof of a
Deity's Existence, and, another Party fearing as much from thence, to the
Prejudice of Revelations; each have in their Turns made War (if I may say so)
even on Vertue itself: Having exploded the Principle of Good Nature; all
Enjoyment or Satisfaction in Acts of Kindness and Love; all Notion of Happiness
in temperate Courses and moderate Desires; and, in short, all Vertue or
Foundation of Vertue which is left remaining, when all Generosity, free
Inclination, Publick spiritedness, and every thing else besides private Regard, is
taken away.12
Throughout the Characteristicks, Shaftesbury tries to reestablish the grounds for
connecting man's nature to life as it is ordinarily lived, that is, within a political
community. In this attempt to preserve the sociability of man as a credible philosophical
idea, he undertakes a critique of modern philosophy, both in its political and its
epistemological guises. It is the task of this chapter to explain Shaftesbury's critique and
the alternative approach he recommends.

In discussing Shaftesburyřs response to modern philosophy, it is fair, I believe, to
gather Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke together under the same totem; in treating them as

12

Shaftesbury, "Preface," xxx.
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one tribe I follow the lead of Shaftesbury. While recent scholarship challenges any
monolithic notion of "the Enlightenment,"13 Shaftesbury himself found no fundamental
differences among the projects of Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke. It is clear from his
personal correspondence that by 1694 Shaftesbury had already identified himself with the
ancients in la querelle des Anciens et des Modernes.14 (The first, unauthorized version of
An Inquiry concerning Virtue or Merit did not appear until 1699.) As he explained in a
letter to his tutor Locke,
itt [sic; et al.] is not with mee as with an Empirick, one that is studying of
Curiositys, raising of new Inventions that are to gain credit to the author, starting
of new Notions that are to amuse the World and serve them for Diversion or for
tryall of their Accuteness (which is all one as if it were some new Play, a Chess,
or a Game of cards that were envented.) Itt is not in my case as with one of the
men of new Systems, who are to build the credit of their own invented ones upon
the ruine of Ancienter and the discredit of those Learned Men that went before.
Descartes, or Mr. Hobbs, or any of their Improvers have the same reason to make
a-doe, and bee Jealouse about their notions, and Discoveryřs, as they call them; as
a practizing Apothecary or mountebank has to bee Jealouse about the
Compositions that are to goe by his name, for if it bee not a Livelyhood is aimřd;
Řtis a Reputation.15

13

According to J. G. A. Pocock, for example, "we can no longer write satisfactorily of 'The Enlightenment'
as a unified and universal intellectual movement." J. G. A. Pocock, Barbarism and Religion: V. 1. The
Enlightenments of Edward Gibbon (Cambridge, U.K. ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 12.
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literature more than he valued the modern achievement in natural philosophy and epistemology."
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Shaftesbury, then, rejected the pretense of modern philosophy that it was engaged in a
radically new project. Unlike most of his contemporaries, for example, Shaftesbury was
not interested in the Baconian project to transform nature for the relief of manřs estate;
nor does he answer Descartes' call for men to become the masters and owners of nature. 16
"For my part," he continued, "I am so far from thinking that mankind need any new
Discoverys, or that they lye in the dark and are unhappy for want of them; that I know not
what wee could ask of God to know more then wee doe or easily may doe." Nor was he
persuaded that man was in his nature asocial: "If there bee any one who…cannot see that
hee himself is a Rationall and Sociable Creature by his nature, and has an End to which
he should refer his slightest actions; Such a one is indeed wanting of knowledge."17
Clearly Hobbes was one who denied that man was a sociable creature by nature.
While Hobbes is mentioned only once by name in the Characteristicks,18 he certainly is
to be counted also among those whom Shaftesbury accuses of making "silly
comparisons" between wolves and men.19 So too we must think of Hobbes in the several
discussions we find of the state of nature doctrine (and which we examine below.)20

16

Benjamin Farrington, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon : An Essay on Its Development from 1603 to
1609, Phoenix Books. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon: From
Magic to Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), Jerry Weinberger, Science, Faith, and
Politics : Francis Bacon and the Utopian Roots of the Modern Age : A Commentary on Bacon's
Advancement of Learning (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).
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Locke, The Correspondence of John Locke, 151. If he were not a Lord, one might think it impertinent of
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In the Index to the Characteristicks prepared by Shaftesbury himself, we find the following entry:
"Wolf: Silly Comparison of Men and Wolves. i. 88, 93, 118." These references take us to the mention of
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Given the intimate relationship between Shaftesbury and John Locke, it may seem
strange that Locke is not mentioned by name in the Characteristicks, especially in this
political context.

One should not conclude from this silence that Shaftesbury was

impressed with Locke's identification of the state of nature as a condition of peace rather
than war, as Hobbes would have it.21 Unlike some contemporary scholars22 who argue
that Locke substantially modifies or revises Hobbesř state of nature teaching, Shaftesbury
is more impressed with the effectual conclusion of Locke's state of nature teaching.
Shaftesbury identifies Locke with Hobbes in a letter to his young friend and protégé
Michael Ainsworth:
it was Mr. Locke that struck the home blow: for Mr. Hobbes's character and base
slavish principles in government took off the poyson of his philosophy. 'Twas Mr.
Locke that struck at all fundamentals, threw all order and virtue out of the world,
and made the very ideas of these (which are the same as those of God) unnatural,
and without foundation in our minds.23
In other words, Shaftesbury thought Locke more pernicious than Hobbes on account of
the Locke's apparent respectability. As Jason Aronson suggests in his "Critical Note:
Hobbes. Anthony Ashley Cooper Shaftesbury, "'Shaftesbury's Index'," in Characteristicks of Men,
Manners, Opinions, Times (Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2001), 3.291.
20
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Shaftesbury on Locke," the silence of the Characteristicks on Locke may be better
explained by filial piety than acceptance of Locke's account of the state of nature. 24 In a
private letter to his confidant General Stanhope, Shaftesbury writes:
I have ventured to make you the greatest confidence in the world, which is that of
my philosophy, even against my old tutor and governor, whose name is so
established in the world, but with whom I ever concealed my differences as much
as possible.25
While he allowed that Lockeřs writings could be useful, especially "against the rubbish of
the schools in which most of us have been bred up," Shaftesbury had deep reservations
about Lockeřs philosophical project. Locke, writes Shaftesbury, was "an ill builder."26
Shaftesbury professed to Ainsworth respect for Lockeřs treatment of more political
subjects--"vis., on government, policy trade, coin, education, toleration, &c."--but he
attacks Locke for his arguments rejecting innate ideas. "Innate is a word [that Locke]
poorly plays upon," Shaftesbury wrote to Ainsworth.27 Shaftesbury was more candid
with General Stanhope: "As for innate principles which you mention, it is, in my
opinion, one of the childishest disputes that ever was."28
24

Jason Aronson, "Critical Note: Shaftesbury on Locke," The American Political Science Review 53, no. 4
(1959): 1102.
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Shaftesbury, Philosophical Regimen, 416.

26

Ibid.

27

Ibid., 403.

28
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As some scholars have remarked, Shaftesbury seems to have had Lockeřs Essay
concerning Human Understanding in mind when he composed parts of the
Characteristicks, and he seems to be referring to Book I of the Essay here.29 Thus
Shaftesbury dismisses the famous controversy between what come to be called
"rationalists"30 and "empiricists"31 over innate ideas.32 (As we shall also see, Descartes is
mentioned by name twice in the Characteristicks and is also a target of concern for
Shaftesbury.) He is more impressed that over time human beings in their common life
form strikingly similar notions about the world. Shaftesbury looks to classical authors to
clarify his own opinions here. For classical authors, the real question was:
not whether the very philosophical propositions about right and wrong were
innate; but whether the passion or affection towards society was such; that is to
say, whether it was natural and came of itself, or was taught by art, and was the
product of a lucky hit of some first man who inspired and delivered down the
prejudice.33
Again Shaftesbury identifies a kind of fear at work among the detractors of human
sociability. Classical authors--even those who, like Epicurus, may have denied that men
have an innate sociability--were more courageous than modern authors in distinguishing
29

See John A. Dussinger, "The Lovely System of Lord Shaftesbury: An Answer to Lock in the Aftermath
of 1688?," Journal of the History of Ideas 42 (1981).
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nature from convention. "For the opposers of the social hypothesis in those days were
not so over frightened with the consequences as to deny every idea to be innate, lest this
should be proved to be so." Shaftesbury expresses a similar doubt about the value of the
innate ideas dispute to Ainsworth, and it is a recurring theme in the Characteristicks as
well.34 To Ainsworth he writes,
the right word, though less used, is connatural. For what has birth or progress of
the foetus out of the womb to do in this case? The question is not about the time
the ideas entered, or the moment that one body came out of the other, but whether
the constitution of man be such that, being adult and grown up, at such or such a
time, sooner or later (no matter when), the idea and sense of order, administration,
and a God, will not infallibly, inevitably, necessarily spring up in him.35
Both Hobbes and Locke are led astray by their denial that men are sociable by
nature. Shaftesbury, following Horace, urges Stanhope to consider species in nature in
order to see the defect of the state of nature teaching: "but all of this I must leave to your
author and you after you have considered him with Locke, whose State of Nature he
supposes to be chimerical, and less serviceable to Mr. Lockeřs own system than to Mr.
Hobbes, that is more of a piece, as I believe."36 Locke's work is also of a piece with
Hobbes on the question of liberty and necessity: "You will be satisfied more in particular
when you happen to read again what this latter gentleman [that is, Hobbes] has written
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upon the subject of liberty and necessity, and have compared it with Mr. Locke, as well as
Mr. Locke with himself; I mean his several editions."37
Shaftesbury may have treated the modern projectors as a group in part because of
an underlying account of philosophy he seems to have held. In an letter to Pierre Coste
he writes: "nor were there, indeed, any more than two real distinct philosophies, the one
derived from Socrates, and passing into the old Academic, the Peripatetic, and Stoic; the
other derived in reality from Democritus, and passing into the Cyrenic and Epicurean."38
One philosophy, the Socratic, recommended engagement in political and religious affairs
because it held that nature was orderly and that human beings have a proper place in the
cosmos; the other treated society with contempt because it held nature "not so sensible as
a doting old woman." The point seems to be more theoretical than historical, for the two
philosophies are derived from two fundamental alternatives regarding nature. "The first,
therefore, of these philosophies is to be called the civil, social, Theistic; the second, the
contrary," presumably asocial and Atheistic, if not strictly speaking uncivil.39 So too,
then, we shall see that Shaftesbury approaches the modern projectors as a group in the
Characteristicks, and as revivers of this ancient "contrary" philosophy.
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Having seen that Shaftesbury holds the political teaching of Hobbes and Locke to
be essentially the same, we now turn to Shaftesburyřs critique of modern philosophy.
Taking another cue from our miscellanist-critic, we can learn that Shaftesbury gives an
extended, if playful, treatment of modern philosophers in his second treatise. We have
already examined Sensus Communis for its teaching on raillery; but the ambition of the
treatise extends beyond the defense of "the freedom of wit and humour." Shaftesbury,
the Critic tells us, also "reasons at large in his second Treatise" against certain "overfrightened anti-superstitious Gentlemen."40 Shaftesbury's footnote directs our attention
to several places in Sensus Communis where the political teaching of Hobbes is
discussed. It is the primary work of Sensus Communis to argue against this teaching and
to recommend to philosophers a more moderate approach.

The Visible World
While Shaftesburyřs criticisms of modern philosophy run throughout the
Characteristicks, they come to light most clearly in the second treatise.

41

As the subtitle

suggests, the most conspicuous task of the treatise is the defense of raillery, rightly
understood. In Chapter 2 I argued that raillery in its highest form is a mode of ironic
dissembling. According to Shaftesbury there is a "defensive raillery" which is employed
by some authors "when the spirit of curiosity wou'd force a discovery of more truth than

40
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can conveniently be told."42

This observation, while important, only scratches the

surface. Sensus Communis also constitutes a sustained attack on the radical skepticism of
modern philosophy; both in its style and content, it tries to give modern philosophy a
taste of its own satirical medicine. Shaftesbury treats common sense together with
raillery in order to show his reader that attempts to depart from common sense are
themselves ridiculous.
 The P l an and St yl e of Sensus Com m uni s

At the theoretical level, Shaftesburyřs Sensus Communis has the following rough
structure: Part I introduces the problem of skepticism through an epistolary dialogue
with a young friend. It is in this part that Shaftesbury explains the way an author might
deploy irony to protect his audience. Part II, as the Critic indicated to us above, presents
an extended reflection on the character of modern epistemological and political thought.
Part III praises the beauties of nature. This praise is intended to restore our naïve, prephilosophical trust that the world is orderly. According to Shaftesbury such trust is
naturally present in common opinion when it has not been disrupted by philosophical
skepticism.
We learned in chapter 2 that for Shaftesbury it is only the "question and reply" of
a "free conference" that develops the ability to reason. For Shaftesbury, as for Plato's
Socrates, free and good-humored reasoning is a powerful caustic against the "usual stiff
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adherence to a particular opinion."43 As a philosopher, Shaftesbury holds that "the truth
itself may bear all lights," yet as a friend and tutor he brings a softer light to the
examination of beloved opinions.

44

The humane art of dialogue permits him to take up

the most serious concerns while protecting his friend, and with him, the reader. As I have
already remarked, Sensus Communis is addressed to a morally serious but indignant
friend.

The friend's indignation arose from the scandal of a confusing philosophic

conversation, which threatened to tarnish human reason by its failure to reach a certain
conclusion. Shaftesbury undertakes his defense of raillery in order to distinguish a
frivolous sort of ridicule from satire with a serious intent.
Shaftesbury anticipates that his friend will be skeptical of this praise of raillery.
He writes: "you may continue to tell me, I affect to be paradoxical, in commending a
conversation as advantageous to reason, which ended in such a total uncertainty of what
reason seemingly so well established."45 Shaftesbury notices that his friendřs moral
qualms arise from his desire to know the truth. The friend is apparently worried that
raillery thwarts all attempts to reach solid knowledge by thinking.
Shaftesbury reminds his friend that in the midst of the many opinions put forward
and challenged by the gentlemen, each speaker would now and again "take the liberty to
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appeal to common sense."46 Everyone allowed this appeal and each felt confident the
case in dispute would be decided in his favor. And while the friends found repeatedly
that no clear judgment was to be rendered, they nevertheless renewed their appeal to
common sense on each occasion. No one thought to challenge the authority of common
sense until one of the gentlemen asked if someone "wouřd tell him what common sense
was." The gentleman observed that,
if by the word Sense we were to understand Opinion and Judgment, and by the
word common the Generality or any considerable part of Mankind; řtwouřd be
hard, he said, to discover where the Subject of common Sense couřd lie. For that
which was according to the Sense of one part of Mankind, was against the Sense
of another. And if the Majority were to determine common Sense, it wouřd
change as often as Men changřd. That which was according to common Sense to
day, wouřd be the contrary to morrow, or soon after. 47
Now of course disagreement can be found on all serious matters. In the case of religion,
"what to one was absurdity, to another was demonstration."48 In matters of policy, "if
plain British or Dutch sense [i.e., republicanism] were right, Turkish and French sense
[monarchy] must certainly be wrong." As for morals, there is a great difference of
"opinions and customs" between barbarian and civilized nations. Perhaps it is no wonder
that "some even of our most admirřd modern philosophers had fairly told us, that virtue
and vice had, after all, no other law or measure, than mere fashion and vogue."49
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We can now see that Shaftesburyřs friend may have had good reason for concern.
The realization that intelligent men disagree with one another about the most important
matters in life can disturb the confidence we place in our own opinions; one may even be
tempted to draw the conclusion that all moral opinions are arbitrary or equally false.
Socratic aporia may be insufficient to address the young gentlemanřs deepest moral
concerns. Even the most admired philosophers of his day (those modern projectors) hold
that virtue and vice are as changeable as fashion. Here he seems to have Locke, at least,
in mind.

Drawing again from a letter to Michael Ainsworth, we can see what

Shaftesbury thought: "virtue, according to Mr. Locke, has no other measure, law, or rule,
than fashion and custom; morality, justice, equity, depend only on law and will."50
Shaftesbury himself does not lose his characteristic good humor in the face of this
challenge. Instead he praises the friends for their consistent adherence to the liberating
method of raillery. They are to be commended, he says, for their willingness to use
raillery with playful as well as serious matters. In an attempt to help his friend maintain
his own good humor, Shaftesbury turns raillieur against the wild application of raillery
itself. He will attempt to show that skeptical ridicule of common sense is itself ridiculous
and thereby restore confidence in the court of common sense. "The fault is, we carry the
Laugh but half-way. The false Earnest is ridiculřd, but the false jest passes secure, and
becomes as errant deceit as the other…There is nothing so foolish and deluding as a
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partial Scepticism."51

Fortunately the gentlemen proved "more fair in their way of

questioning receivřd opinions, and exposing the ridicule of things." Shaftesbury offers to
follow their example, carrying just raillery throughout and to see "what certain
Knowledge or Assurance of things may be recoverřd, in that very way, by which all
Certainty, you thought, was lost, and an endless Scepticism introducřd." Shaftesbury
thinks that the modern philosophers--Descartes, Hobbes, Locke--are ridiculous for having
abandoned a "fair way of questioning receivřd opinions" in favor of a new method, which
is equally uncertain but far more damaging to the decent opinions of common life.
 Sensus Com m uni s , Part II: t he P arabl e of t he Magi and t he Absurdi t y
of Ant i- Theol ogi cal Ire

In Part II of Sensus Communis, Shaftesbury asks his correspondent-friend to
imagine he lived in Persia at the time that the Magi, through "an egregious imposture,"
took control of the Empire.52 Carried away by indignation, it would have been easy for
his friend "to propose the razing all Monuments and Memorials of these Magicians." But
suppose that the Magi had collected or written books of philosophy, science, and morals.
Would the friend have destroyed them, Shaftesbury asks, "and condemnřd every Opinion
or Doctrine they had espousřd, for no other reason than merely because they had
espous’d it?" Not even a barbarian would be so absurd. As it turns out, the Magi wove
good and bad opinions together. What, then, is the sensible response to such a situation?
"How shouřd we have carryřd our-selves towards this Order of Men, at the time of the
51
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Discovery of their Cheat, and Ruin of their Empire? Shouřd we have fallřn to work
instantly with their Systems, struck at their Opinions and Doctrines without distinction,
and erected a contrary Philosophy in their teeth?"53
According to Shaftesbury, this is exactly what Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, and
other "modern projectors" have done.

Driven by their pneumatophobia, modern

philosophers strike indiscriminately in their attempts to destroy all vestiges of
Christianity.

Since Christendom had woven traditional philosophy into Christian

doctrine, modern projectors were willing to assail philosophy itself, whereas their real
quarrel was with Scholastic philosophy alone. Shaftesbury makes this very point to
Stanhope:
well it is for our friend Mr. Locke, and other modern philosophers of his sire [sic],
that they have so poor a spectre as the ghost of Aristotle to fight with. A ghost
indeed! Since it is not in reality the Stagyrite himself nor the original Peripatetic
hypothesis, but the poor secondary tralatitious system of modern and barbarous
schoolmen which is the subject of their continual triumph. Tom Hobbes, whom I
must confess a genius, and even an original among these latter leaders in
philosophy, had already gathered laurels enough, and at an easy rate, from this
field.54
As we have seen, while Shaftesbury thought modern philosophers did in fact clear
away some of the errors of Scholasticism, they carried their attack too far by erecting a
contrary philosophy. Shaftesbury identifies "Mr. Hobbes" as one so "overfrightened by

53
54

Ibid., 1.56.

Philosophical Regimen, 414. The distinction between Aristotle and his alleged mis-interpreters was also
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the Magi" that "both with respect to Politicks and Morals, he directly acted in this Spirit of
Massacre."55 Having been frightened by abuse of authority in the name of the people,
Hobbes developed "an Abhorrence of all popular Government, and the very Notion of
Liberty it-self."

In his one mention of Hobbes by name in the Characteristicks,

Shaftesbury draws our attention to passages where Hobbes attacks ancient writers for
praising liberty.56 On this point, we can see that Shaftesbury connects Lockeřs modified
teaching on constitutions, including the balance of powers and rule of law, to Hobbesian
anthropology. He writes that
supposing one another to be by Nature such very Savages, we shall take care to
come less in one anotherřs power: and apprehending Power to be insatiably
coveted by all, we shall the better fence against the Evil; not by giving all into one
Hand (as the Champion of this Cause wouřd have us) but, on the contrary, by a
right Division and Balance of Power, and by the Restraint of good Laws and
Limitations, which may secure the publick Liberty.57
In the case of religion, Hobbes "had nothing before his Eyes beside the Ravage of
Enthusiasm, and the Artifice of those who raisřd and conducted that Spirit."58 In moral
matters, Hobbes portrays "the good sociable Man, as savage and unsociable as he wouřd
make himself and all Mankind appear by his Philosophy." In short, Hobbes "did his
utmost to shew us, 'That both in Religion and Morals we were imposřd on by our
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Governors; that there was nothing which by Nature inclinřd us either way; nothing which
naturally drew us to the Love of what was without, or beyond our-selves.'"59
Yet according to Shaftesbury, the practice of the modern skeptic contradicts the
radical principles he espouses in speculation. He remarks that Hobbes had humanitarian
motives for teaching that human beings are naturally selfish; indeed, Hobbes exposed
himself to considerable personal risk to deliver men from the terrors he saw.60 Of the
"fierce prosecutors of superstition," he writes, "whatever savages they may appear in
philosophy, they are in their common capacity as civil persons, as one can wish. Their
free communicating of their principles may witness for them."61

Were the modern

philosopher actually a thoroughgoing knave, he would keep his teaching secret, all the
better to prey on his fellow man.62 But modern philosophers, "if they have hard thoughts
of human nature; Řtis a proof still of their humanity, that they give such warning to the
world."63 As we saw in our consideration of the Soliloquy in chapter 2, Shaftesbury will
not let us forget that the philosopher must justify the activity of philosophy, and that
justification is impossible without resorting to common life.
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Shaftesbury is therefore able to suggest that not even the "modern reformer" is
convinced of the radical skepticism he introduces. "The Reason, perhaps, why Men of
Wit delight so much to espouse these paradoxical Systems, is not in truth that they are so
fully satisfyřd with řem; but in a view the better to oppose some other Systems, which by
their fair appearance have helpřd, they think, to bring Mankind under Subjection." 64 In
Shaftesburyřs judgment the modern philosopher himself probably does not believe that
the world is as doubtful as his principles would suggest. General skepticism is only put
forward as part of a strategy to combat the "dogmatical spirit" of zealots. The projectors
hope to debate more subtly and in safety once men become accustomed to "contradiction
in the main, and hear the nature of things disputed, at large."65
This strategy may seem sensible enough, and Shaftesbury, qua philosopher,
would likely have been more sympathetic had such maxims been suggested and received
without ire. In playing down the radical character of the modern philosophy Shaftesbury
seems to be motivated by moral considerations of his own. He attempts to encourage his
friend to keep an even temper so that he can judge rationally. "The only Poison to
Reason, is Passion. For false Reasoning is soon redressřd, where Passion is removřd. But
if the very hearing certain Propositions of Philosophy be sufficient to move our Passion;
řtis plain, the Poison has already gainřd on us, and we are effectually prevented in the use
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of our reasoning Faculty."66 Yet we have already seen that Shaftesbury distinguishes
conversations held publically from those held privately. In public, it seems inevitable
that such propositions of philosophy would move men to passion. How is one to react to
claims such as these:
that we were the most mistaken Men in the world, to imagine there was any such
thing as natural Faith or Justice? for that it was only Force and Power which
constituted Right. That there was no such thing in reality as Virtue; no Principle
of Order in things above, or below; no secret Charm or Force of Nature, by which
every-one was made to operate willingly or unwillingly towards publick Good,
and punishřd and tormented if he did otherwise.67
A scandal is inevitable when modern philosophers openly declare war on virtue.
Could such "modes of opinions" be vetted in good humor, Shaftesbury would be far less
concerned. Given his belief in human nature, it is hard to see where the exact threat of
such opinions lies. Indeed, absent imposition by authority and the addling of reason by
excessive passion, he Ŗcan hardly imagine that in a pleasant way they shouřd ever be
talkřd out of their Love for Society, or reasonřd out of Humanity and common Sense. A
mannerly Wit can hurt no Cause or Interest for which I am in the least concernřd: And
philosophical Speculations, politely managřd, can never surely render Mankind more unsociable or un-civilizřd.ŗ68 In the case of morals
men have not been contented to shew the natural Advantages of Honesty and
Virtue. They have rather lessenřd these, the better, as they thought, to advance
another Foundation. They have made Virtue so mercenary a thing, and have talkřd
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so much of its Rewards, that one can hardly tell what there is in it, after all, which
can be worth rewarding. For to be bribřd only or terrifyřd into an honest Practice,
bespeaks little of real Honesty or Worth.69
The wolf and the dog show their common ancestry in this mercenary disposition.
Shaftesbury writes in An Inquiry that a man,
if in following the Precepts of his supposřd GOD, or doing what he esteems
necessary towards the satisfying of such his DEITY, he is compelřd only by Fear,
and, contrary to his Inclination, performs an Act which he secretly detests as
barbarous and unnatural; then has he an Apprehension or Sense still of Right and
Wrong, and, according to what has been already observřd, is sensible of Ill in the
Character of his GOD; however cautious he may be of pronouncing any thing on
this Subject, or so thinking of it, as to frame any formal or direct Opinion in the
case. But if by insensible degrees, as he proceeds in his religious Faith and devout
Exercise, he comes to be more and more reconcilřd to the Malignity,
Arbitrariness, Pariality, or Revengefulness of his believřd DEITY; his
Reconciliation with these Qualitys themselves will soon grow in proportion; and
the most cruel, unjust, and barbarous Acts, will, by the power of this Example, be
often considerřd by him, not only as just and lawful, but as divine, and worthy of
imitation.70
While Shaftesbury holds that human beings have a nature, it is in their nature to
develop manners based on their opinions. Men would, he fears, quickly come to disregard
virtue should they believe that the only motives to virtue were fear of punishment or hope
for gain. Both the modern projector and the religious zealot hold a version of this
mercenary morality. (Strangely enough, Shaftesbury seemed to think that Locke held both
versions of this opinion!)
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 Sensus Com m uni s , Part III:
St at e

t he St at e of Nat ure and Man’ s Nat ural

"Modern projectors" deny the natural affections which are our universal
experience. They would prefer to do away with the natural materials human nature offers
them so they might "build after a more uniform way."71 Shaftesbury observes that "they
wouřd new-frame the human heart; and have a mighty fancy to reduce all its motions,
balances and weights, to that one principle and foundation of a cool, deliberate
selfishness."72

All those passions known to a person living in common life to be

generous in character are presented by modern philosophy in a lower light: "an honest
heart is only a more cunning heart: and honesty and good-nature, a more deliberate, or
better regulated self-love."
As we saw earlier, Shaftesbury thinks that modern philosophy partly follows in
the footsteps of Epicurean philosophy. Epicurus, Lucretius, and the other followers of
this ancient philosophy of selfishness hoped to improve their happiness by retiring from
public life altogether. They held that "the interest of private nature is directly opposite to
that of the common one, the interest of particulars directly opposite to that of the public
in general."73 Yet they did not go so far as to deny the naturalness of public life--in fact,
their exhortations suggest quite the opposite: Epicurus himself "saw well this Power of
Nature, and understood it so far, that he earnestly exhorted his Followers neither to beget
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Children, nor serve their Country. There was no dealing with Nature, it seems, while
these alluring Objects stood in the way."74 The modern "revivers of this philosophy,"
however, make no such concession to public affection, and they would deny the word
natural to social affection. In this, they are inferior to their ancient forefathers, for "they
seem to have understood less of this force of Nature, and thought to alter the Thing, by
shifting a Name."75
As we shall consider at greater length below,76 Shaftesbury rejects this
psychology which tries to reduce all human passions to self-interest, or to fear, or to any
other "lower" passion, as far too simple to do justice to human experience. "řTis of too
complex a kind, to fall under one simple view, or be explainřd thus briefly in a word or
two. The studiers of this mechanism must have a very partial eye, to overlook all other
motions besides those of the lowest and narrowest compass."77 Modern philosophy, he
worries, gives an account of the passions that allows "nothing shouřd be understood to be
done in kindness, or generosity; nothing in pure of any kind."78 This teaching would
have disastrous effects on virtue.
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It is this low estimation of man that allows Hobbes to say that "the State of Nature
was a State of War."79 Shaftesbury rejects the contract theory of government because it
rest on this "ridiculous" notion called "the state of nature."80 Contrary to this teaching,
Shaftesbury claims that man is inclined by nature toward society. He reports that "in the
fashionable language of modern philosophy: Society being founded on a compact; the
surrender made of every manřs private unlimited right, into the hands of the majority, or
such as the majority shouřd appoint, was of free choice and by a promise."81 But this
suggests that the promise to respect the civil union is an obligation found in the state of
nature, that is, prior to the contract itself. "That which couřd make a Promise obligatory
in the State of Nature, must make all other Acts of Humanity as much our real Duty, and
natural Part."82 At the very least, it is hard to conceive how such a promise could be
made by men prior to their living together, for such creatures would not have any of the
characteristics which accompany social life. As Shaftesburyřs Theocles observes in The
Moralists, if it ever were manřs condition to live separately, such creatures would have
been be "unassociated, unacquainted, and consequently without any language or form of
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art."83 In fact, the "imaginary" creature of man in the state of nature would not be a man
at all, "for tho his outward Shape were human, his Passions, Appetites, and Organs must
be wholly different. His whole inward Make must be reversřd, to fit him for such a
recluse Œconomy, and separate Subsistence."84
Shaftesbury observes that in speaking of what is natural to man, it seems to make
more sense to begin by considering the species as a whole--what he calls "the Kind itself" rather than the individual creature.85 If this is allowed, then insofar as something is
natural it must also be somehow shared by the kind as a whole. "If Eating and Drinking
be natural, Herding is so too. If any Appetite or Sense be natural, the Sense of Fellowship
is the same. If there be any thing of Nature in that Affection which is between the Sexes,
the Affection is certainly as natural towards the consequent Offspring; and so again
between the Offspring themselves, as Kindred and Companions, bred under the same
Discipline and Œconomy."86 While one can see that there is on occasion a tension
between what is good for the individual and what is good for the kind, 87 Shaftesbury does
not think that they can be separated in a proper account of the human being.
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 A Ret urn t o Com m on Sense

Shaftesbury seems to believe that there is a delicate relationship between the
natural inclinations toward sociability and their incarnation in the partly conventional
rules of morality. This comes to light in his explicit discussion of the term common
sense, which he presents as a gloss on the remark by Juvenal that "common sense is rare
in men of high rank."88 At first glance, Juvenal seems to threaten the very possibility of
common sense by suggesting that common sense could be absent among the "nobility and
court." According to Shaftesbury, however, "ingenious commentators" take this remark
in a way that is different from this ordinary reading:
they make this Common Sense of the Poet, by a Greek Derivation, to signify
Sense of Publick Weal, and of the Common Interest; Love of the Community or
Society, natural Affection, Humanity, Obligingness, or that sort of Civility which
rises from a just Sense of the common Rights of Mankind, and the natural
Equality there is among those of the same Species.89
According to Shaftesbury, Juvenal actually suggests that there is little sense of the
common good in the court of Nero because there is no real community between a tyrant
and his courtiers. The education received by the young at court leads them to have
"thorow Contempt and Disregard of Mankind, which Mankind in a manner deserves,
where Arbitrary Power is permitted, and a Tyranny adorřd."90 A public spirit has its origin
in "a social Feeling or Sense of Partnership with human Kind" which arises only among
those who live as partners in a community. It is for this reason that Shaftesbury claims
88
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that "Morality and good Government go together."91 For Shaftesbury, where there is no
freedom, there is no authentic community. Although common sense arises from our
political experience, and is therefore in a sense learned, its lessons are taught by nature to
the reason of man. While such lessons will continually offer themselves to human beings,
human beings can misunderstand them fairly easily. It is for this reason, perhaps, that
Shaftesbury is so concerned about the power of philosophy to confuse men about virtue.
This is seen in his vigorous response to modern skepticism, but also in his account of
philosophy offered to Coste: "As for that mere sceptic, and new Academic" he writes, "it
had no certain precepts, and so was an exercise of sophistry rather than a philosophy."92
Shaftesbury claims, then, that human beings are naturally sociable. So strong is
the human affection for social relations that even under that worst form of government,
tyranny, it is natural for men to pay "Allegiance and Duty" to the public order.
Shaftesbury remarks the good fortune of the Britons, for they had received:
the Notion of a Publick, and a Constitution; how a Legislative, and how an
Executive is modelřd. We understand Weight and Measure in this kind, and can
reason justly on the Balance of Power and Property. The Maxims we draw from
hence, are as evident as those in Mathematicks. Our increasing Knowledg shews
us every day, more and more, what Common Sense is in Politicks: And this must
of necessity lead us to understand a like Sense in Morals; which is the
Foundation.93
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Shaftesbury anticipates the more organic notion of the development of the English
Constitution that Montesquieu and Hume will explore in their work on government.94 He
seems to deny that an abstruse account of the origin of government will make statecraft
into a clear science.
Shaftesbury consequently reverses Hobbes by claiming that warfare actually
arises from manřs natural sociability. "To cantonize" he writes, "is natural." 95 Men are
naturally inclined to associate, but the good of all human kind in general is too remote a
"philosophical object" for them to apprehend readily.96 While they naturally have a taste
for a good that is beyond their narrow self-interest, "unless corrected by right reason"
human beings also tend to associate in bands of smaller scope than a body politic. "Thus
the social aim is disturbřd, for want of certain scope."97 Shaftesbury offers as evidence of
the natural instinct for confederation the fact that "the knot of fellowship is closest
drawn" in war. The "associating genius of man" is proven by the very existence of the
spirit of faction, which Shaftesbury holds to be "the abuse or irregularity of that social
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love, and common affection, which is natural to man."98 One might say that Shaftesbury
finds here that the apparent exception actually proves the rule of sociability.
While he was a great admirer of Marcus Aurelius and the Emperor Justin,
Shaftesbury is skeptical of the ability of philosophy and political power to be joined
wisely.

He does not seem to think it is the job of philosophy to provide the full

correction of scope to the body politic, and remains content to turn philosophy toward the
consideration of morals in the individual soul. In a discussion of royal authors of the
past, for example, Shaftesbury remarks, "whatever Crowns or Laurels their renownřd
Predecessors may have gatherřd in this Field of Honour; I shouřd think that for the future,
the speculative Province might more properly be committed to private Heads."99
As we have mentioned, Shaftesbury is forced to defend the natural sociability of
man and the virtues which arise within society because of the corrupting power of
philosophy. He congratulates his correspondent-friend on the fact that his own education
involved little of the "Philosophy, or Philosophers of our days."100 There was a time
when the best youth could safely be entrusted to philosophy with the confidence that they
would learn "right Practice of the World, or a just Knowledg of Men and Things," but it
is no longer so.101 Had Shaftesburyřs friend learned ethics and politics from modern
philosophers, he writes, "I shouřd never have thought of writing a word to you upon
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Common Sense, or the Love of Mankind."102 Apparently, those teachings present a
serious impediment to approaching moral life naturally. Contrary to the instrumentalist
or selfish system of morals, the gentleman loves virtue for its own sake rather than for
some future reward or fear of reprisal.

Shaftesbury, as we have seen, sees both

Christianity and modern philosophy as threats to this natural perspective of the
gentleman. A gentleman who asks "why I wouřd avoid being nasty, when nobody was
present?" is no gentleman. Shaftesbury thinks that this cynical question is more likely to
arise for the person educated by modern philosophy than for a person guided by common
sense:
the truth is; as Notions stand now in the world, with respect to Morals, Honesty is
like to gain little by Philosophy, or deep Speculations of any kind. In the main,
řtis best to stick to Common Sense, and go no further. Mens first Thoughts, in this
matter, are generally better than their second: their natural Notions better than
those refinřd by Study, or Consultation with Casuists. According to common
Speech, as well as common Sense, Honesty is the best Policy: But according to
refinřd Sense, the only well-advis’d Persons, as to this World, are errant
Knaves.103
Shaftesbury recommends the sober use of raillery to counterbalance the confusion
found in common life (both the confusion indigenous to common life and those forms
bred by Christianity and uncivil philosophy). In recollection of his discussion of just
raillery and in anticipation of Soliloquy, he writes:
řtis in reality a serious Study, to learn to temper and regulate that Humour which
Nature has given us, as a more lenitive Remedy against Vice, and a kind of
Specifick against Superstition and melancholy Delusion. There is a great
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difference between seeking how to raise a Laugh from every thing; and seeking,
in every thing, what justly may be laughřd at. For nothing is ridiculous except
what is deformřd: Nor is any thing proof against Raillery, except what is handsom
and just.104
The Critic tells us near the close of the Characteristicks that "IT HAS been the
main Scope and principal End of these Volumes, 'To assert the Reality of a Beauty and
Charm in moral as well as natural Subjects; and to demonstrate the Reasonableness of a
proportionate Taste, and determinate Choice, in Life and Manners.'"105 He seems to
believe that it is necessary to assert such a reality if the true nature of moral subjects is to
come to light. Indeed, should men come to lose their appreciation of the nobility of
human life, men would come to resemble animals. Such a view, he fears, might "leave us
probably no other Employment than that of satisfying our coarsest Appetites at the
cheapest rate; in order to the attainment of a supine State of Indolence and Inactivity."106
So too is it necessary to assert, at least initially, the reality of a beauty and charm
in natural subjects, for without such a presupposition of "a Coherence, a Design, a
Meaning," there is no possibility of knowledge as it was understood by classical
philosophy.107 This is of course part of the very intention of modern philosophy. They
too also understand that "where there is nothing like Nature, there is no room for the
troublesom part of Thought or Contemplation," and, therefore, no room for the
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persecution which can arise from disagreement over such matters. 108 Shaftesbury knows
this but parts company with them over the character of virtue. Modern projectors are
more concerned that "the Habit of Admiration and contemplative Delight, wouřd, by
over-Indulgence, too easily mount into high Fanaticism, or degenerate into abject
Superstition."109 Ultimately it is the intention of Shaftesbury to show that the cultivation
of such habits need not run to such extremes.
Shaftesbury

accordingly

ends

Sensus

Communis

with

an

enthusiastic

consideration of the relationship between beautiful manners and other forms of beauty.
He directs his speech to those "gentlemen of fashion,"
to whom a natural good Genius, or the Force of good Education, has given a
Sense of what is naturally graceful and becoming. Some by mere Nature, others
by Art and Practice, are Masters of an Ear in Musick, an Eye in Painting, a Fancy
in the ordinary things of Ornament and Grace, a Judgment in Proportions of all
kinds, and a general good Taste in most of those Subjects which make the
Amusement and Delight of the ingenious People of the World. Let such
Gentlemen as these be as extravagant as they please, or as irregular in their
Morals; they must at the same time discover their Inconsistency, live at variance
with themselves, and in contradiction to that Principle, on which they ground their
highest Pleasure and Entertainment.110
He introduces this appeal to the most notable and reputable men in the hope of
keeping alive the possibility that the world itself is an ordered whole or cosmos.111
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Common sense, he believes, has a natural appreciation of "those natural Rules of
Proportion and Truth" which are necessary for there to be natural knowledge at all.112 He
is confident that "rude Nature it-self, in its primitive Simplicity, is a better Guide to
Judgment, than improvřd Sophistry, and pedantick Learning."113 He therefore turns our
attention from modern philosophy, with its "wrong…ground of Education" for "Redress,
and Amendment, from that excellent School which we call the World."114

Miscellaneous Reflections on Terra Incognita
In Chapter 2 we examined the soliloquy as Shaftesbury's primary model of
philosophy. Shaftesburyřs method of soliloquy is a reassertion of the classical search for
self-knowledge.

As we saw, this approach takes its bearing from the opinions of

common life, treating them initially as the fruit of naïve but genuinely concerned
reflection on the world; and then proceeds to distinguish those opinions most in accord
with nature from cheats and impostors (that is, opinions which by their authority pretend
to be natural). Since Shaftesbury begins his inquiry from the perspective of ordinary life,
human beings are taken to be inevitable participants in his philosophy. It is through the
practice of soliloquy that Shaftesbury restores the classical distinction between reason
and the passions, and, consequently the view that philosophy provides "Mastership in

112

Sensus Communis, 1.92.

113

Ibid.

114

Soliloquy, 1.206.

242

LIFE and MANNERS."115 We have now seen that Shaftesburyřs response to modern
skepticism in Sensus Communis is undertaken both for the sake of and through an appeal
to common sense. Both of these claims stand in contrast to the modern approach, which
might be said to examine human beings as objects in nature, generally by placing them in
a system built up from ideas we can grasp clearly and distinctly, but which are remote
from our daily experience. Throughout the Characteristicks, Shaftesbury detracts from
the abstruse method inaugurated by Descartesř Discourse on the Method, Meditations on
First Philosophy, as well as by Lockeřs Essay Concerning Human Understanding. He
writes in Soliloquy that
the Philosopher, who pretends to be wholly taken up in considering his higher
Facultys, and examining the Powers and Principles of his Understanding; if in
reality his Philosophy be foreign to the Matter professřd; if it goes beside the
mark, and reaches nothing we can truly call our Interest or Concern; it must be
somewhat worse than mere Ignorance or Idiotism. The most ingenious way of
becoming foolish, is by a System. And the surest Method to prevent good Sense,
is to set up something in the room of it. The liker any thing is to Wisdom, if it be
not plainly the thing it-self, the more directly it becomes its opposite.116
Philosophical systems are foolish insofar as they obscure access to the very thing
they were erected to examine.

When discussing the modern philosophers here,

Shaftesbury finds little reason to distinguish them from the medieval scholastic
philosophers they despise.
According to Shaftesbury, modern philosophers prefer the terra incognita of
epistemology to what Shaftesbury himself holds to be the plain forms suggested by the
115
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visible world. Since he denies the modern approach will actually reveal human nature-which, ultimately, must also be understood from the perspective of human beings and
common sense--Shaftesburyřs reply to modern philosophy will be dialectical rather than
demonstrative. He makes it clear, however, that he understands the claims made by the
projectors. "What can one do?" he asks,
or how dispense with these darker Disquisitions and Moon-light Voyages, when
we have to deal with a sort of Moon-blind Wits, who tho very acute and able in
their kind, may be said to renounce Day-light, and extinguish, in a manner, the
bright visible outward World, by allowing us to know nothing beside what we can
prove, by strict and formal Demonstration?117
Motivated by pneumatophobia, modern projectors introduced a method to
undermine all teachings on soul and form.

Shaftesbury himself admits that certain

sublime philosophers (Plato, for example) used the superstitious opinions of common life
in their presentation.118 Yet for Shaftesbury, the modern method of self-reflection is itself
an impediment to genuine self-knowledge.
We get a glimpse of Shaftesburyřs understanding of the modern epistemological
project in the Criticřs discussion of An Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit.119 In
ŖMiscellany IVŗ we encounter the radical skepticism of Descartes directly (if not fully).
Before entering into an examination of what he has called Shaftesburyřs "principal
performance," namely The Moralist, the Critic playfully laments that Ŗwe have here no
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other part left us, than to enter into the dry Philosophy, and rigid Manner of our Author;
without any Excursions into various Literature; without help from the Comick or Tragick
Muse, or from the Flowers of Poetry or Rhetorick.ŗ120
So foreboding does the task seem at the moment, however, that the Critic goes so
far as to suggest that the "more humourous Reader fore-knowing, may immediately, if he
pleases, turn over; skipping (as is usual in many grave Works) a Chapter or two, as he
proceeds."121 The Critic promises to help clear the palate later with more cheerful fare.
An Inquiry, apparently, is intended for the more serious reader. The Critic remarks: "to
the patient and grave Reader, therefore, who in order to moralize, can afford to retire into
his Closet, as to some religious or devout Exercise, we presume thus to offer a few
Reflections, in the support of our Authorřs profound Inquiry."122
The Critic begins by summarizing the concern that would have motivated "our
Author" to undertake the Inquiry of the fourth treatise:
HOW LITTLE regard soever may be shewn to that moral Speculation or Inquiry,
which we call the Study of our-selves; it must, in strictness, be yielded, That all
Knowledg whatsoever depends upon this previous-one: "And that we can in
reality be assurřd of nothing, till we are first assurřd of What we are Our-selves."
For by this alone we can know what Certainty and Assurance is.
But what does it mean to study ourselves? We can see already that our study of
the Soliloquy; or Advice to an Author is likely to have been necessary preparation for
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understanding what Shaftesbury means by self-knowledge. (This is also reflected in the
remark of the Critic that the "grave reader" will retire to his closet to engage in this sort of
moral inquiry.) One reason for the Criticřs warning does not become clear until the
second chapter of ŖMiscellany IV,ŗ where he suggests that the reader passes back "from
Terra Incognita to the visible World."123 In the first chapter of the miscellany, however,
the Critic must lead us into the dark internal landscape of the mind and the passions. We
stand at the beginning point for modern philosophical inquiry. Such terra incognita must
be distinguished from another way of encountering the passions, which Shaftesbury will
demonstrate in An Inquiry.

First, however, the Criticřs summary considers the

philosopher taken by many to be the father of "modern projectors," René Descartes.
 Ego- i t y and Ident i t y

The Critic begins his exploration thus: "that there is something undoubtedly which
thinks, our very Doubt it-self and scrupulous Thought evinces."124

Shaftesbury

presumably refers to Descartes' famous statement, "I think, therefore, I am," which first
appeared in the Discourse on the Method for Rightly Conducting One's Reason and
Searching for Truth in the Sciences.125 (In fact a footnote soon confirms this when it
directs our attention to "a famous Modern," namely "Monsieur DES CARTES."126)
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Descartes introduced his famous and radical method of doubting in part four of
the Discourse on the Method and reaffirmed it in his first Meditation.127 He did so, we
learn, in order to find an unshakable foundation for knowledge. In part one of the
Discourse, Descartes writes of the philosophy he learned as a youth, that it had "been
cultivated for many centuries by the best minds that have ever lived, and nevertheless no
single thing is to be found in it which is not subject of dispute, and in consequence is not
dubious."128 Descartes compares the status of the sciences under the influence of schoolphilosophy to a building with poorly planned additions or a city erected over a long time
without the benefit of a master plan:
Thus we see that buildings planned and carried out by one architect alone are
usually more beautiful and better proportioned than those which many have tried
to put in order and improve, making use of old walls which were built with other
ends in view. In the same way also, those ancient cities, which originally mere
villages, have become in the process of time great towns, are usually badly
constructed in comparison with those which are regularly laid out on a plain by a
surveyor who is free to follow his own ideas.129
As for the opinions he had learned from common life, they were filled with errors
and accidental truths. "Since it has for long fallen to us to be governed by our appetites
"ego cogito, ergo sum." As a philosophical doctrine, of course, it is known as the "cogito." Descartes,
Œuvres, 8:7. Philosophical Works, 1:221.
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and by our teachers…it is almost impossible that our judgments should be so excellent or
solid as they should have been had we had complete use of our reason since our birth, and
had we been guided by its means alone."130 As a remedy to these problems, Descartes
resolves "to accept nothing as true which I did not clearly recognize to be so: that is to
say, carefully to avoid precipitation and prejudice in judgments, and accepting in them
nothing more than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I could
have no occasion to doubt it."131
Descartes is clearly aware that such a principle would pose a danger to common
life. He admits that "we do not find that all the houses in a town are razed to the ground
for the sole reason that the town is to be rebuilt in another fashion, with streets made
more beautiful."132 This would be an extraordinarily ambitious and dangerous project.
"In the case of great bodies," he writes, "it is too difficult a task to raise them again when
they are once thrown down, or even to keep them in their places when once thoroughly
shaken; and their fall cannot be otherwise than very violent."133 Still, there is nothing
stopping an individual from undertaking such a project in his own life, for we can also
"see that many people cause their own houses to be knocked down in order to rebuild
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them, and that sometimes they are forced to do so where there is danger of the houses
falling of themselves, and when the foundations are not secure."134
Descartes suggests at first that he is content to adhere to common opinion. For
example, in section two of the Discourse he writes of the customary opinions of his youth
that "their imperfections, if they have any (and the mere fact of their diversity suffices to
assure one that many of them are imperfect), usage has doubtlessly mitigated them and
has even imperceptibly averted or corrected a great number of them, for which deliberate
foresight could not have provided so well."135 Indeed, he writes, "for a long time I had
remarked that it is sometimes requisite in common life to follow opinions which one
knows to be most uncertain, exactly as though they were indisputable."136

This is

especially true in matters of faith and morals. He consequently formulates for himself a
"provisional code of morals," which includes the maxim "to obey the laws and the
customs of my country, firmly holding on to the religion in which, by God's grace, I was
instructed from childhood, and governing myself in all other things according to the most
moderate opinions and those furthest from excess that were commonly accepted in
practice by the most sensible people with whom I would have to live."137
While this is a very sensible course for a person who wants to avoid giving
offense, it is difficult to reconcile with the principle of radical doubt. Descartes calls his
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moral code "provisional," and indeed, he emphasizes the practical utility of his maxims
rather than their scientific value. He writes of his moral maxims that they Ŗwere founded
merely on the plan I had of continuing my self-instruction; for since God has given each
of us a certain light by which to distinguish the true from the false, I should not believe I
ought to be content for a single moment with the opinions of others, had I not proposed to
use my own judgment to examine them when there was time.ŗ138
For Descartes himself, the moral code he proposes to accompany his method of
radical doubt is provisional and utilitarian. His higher duty is to question everything.
Still, he first presents his project as a private rather than a public matter. Descartes denies
that he wants to encourage those "turbulent and unrestful spirits" who are not suited to
the task of planning grand reforms.139 "My design has never extended beyond trying to
reform my own opinion and to build on a foundation which is entirely my own."140 And
yet why would Descartes publish his Discourse if his ambitions were so private, let alone
offer it as "the method for rightly conducting one's reason and searching for truth in the
sciences?" This is a fair question and one raised by Descartes himself. In part VI of the
Discourse, he writes that: "as long as I had reaped no other fruits from the method which
I used, aside from my own satisfaction, in regard to certain problems that pertain to the
speculative sciences or my attempt at governing my moral conduct by means of the
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reasons which the method taught me, I believed I was under no obligation to write
anything."141

As it turns out, however, Descartes believes his method is especially

fruitful for the natural sciences, particularly in applied physics:
As soon as I had acquired some general notions in the area of physics, and,
beginning to test them on various specific difficulties, I had noticed just how far
they can lead and how much they differ from the principles that people have used
up until the present, I believed I could not keep them hidden away without greatly
sinning against the law that obliges us to procure as best we can the common
good of all men. For these general notions show me that it is possible to arrive at
knowledge that is very useful in life and that in place of the speculative
philosophy taught in the Schools, one can find a practical one, by which, knowing
the force and the actions of fire, water, air, stars, the heavens, and all the other
bodies that surround us, just as we understand the various skills for our craftsmen,
we could, in the same way, use these objects for the purposes for which they are
appropriate, and thus make ourselves, as it were, the masters and possessors of
nature.142
As I have mentioned, this Baconian (and Cartesian) project to master nature is
rejected by Shaftesbury, who as a young man wrote that he was "so far from thinking that
mankind need any new Discoverys, or that they lye in the dark and are unhappy for want
of them; that I know not what wee could ask of God to know more then wee doe or easily
may doe."143 Shaftesbury seems to have Descartes' project in mind when the Critic plays
on the image of an architect to describe Shaftesbury's own project:
On this account I look upon his Management to have been much after the rate of
some ambitious Architect; who being callřd perhaps to prop a Roof, redress a
leaning Wall, or add to some particular Apartment, is not contented with this
small Specimen of his Mastership: but pretending to demonstrate the Un141
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serviceableness and Inconvenience of the old Fabrick, forms the Design of a new
Building, and longs to shew his Skill in the principal Parts of Architecture and
Mechanicks.144
It is through this method that Descartes hopes to raze the philosophy of the
ancients to establish a "firm and permanent structure in the sciences." (Shaftesbury seems
to be struck by this claim when he indicates a different way to find "certainty and
assurance."145) Having established radical doubt as the beginning point of philosophical
reflection, Descartes too must find a way to reconnect with the world he hopes to explain.
As he also shows through the movement of thought in his first Meditation--from the
unreliability of the senses, through the difficulty of distinguishing dreaming from
wakefulness, to the "thought experiment" of a deceptive, evil genius--Descartes tries to
bring his reader to a place where he will withhold assent from any view that seems
dubious. By the second Meditation, Descartes gives voice to despair that perhaps there is
nothing which is beyond doubt. "What then can be esteemed as true?" he writes, "perhaps
nothing at all, unless that there is nothing in the world that is certain." It is from this crisis
that Descartes' famous solution emerges:
I was persuaded that there was nothing at all in the world, that there was no
heaven, no earth, that there were no minds, nor any bodies: was I not then
likewise persuaded that I did not exist" Not at all; of a surety I myself did exist
since I persuaded myself of something or merely because I thought of
something…I am, I exist, is necessarily true each time that I pronounce it, or that I
mentally conceive it.146
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Shaftesburyřs Critic writes on behalf of the Author that this Cartesian claim is
fine as far as it goes, but that it does not penetrate deeply enough for the person who
desires genuine self-knowledge. The Critic writes:
but in what Subject that Thought resides, and how that Subject is continuřd one
and the same, so as to answer constantly to the supposřd Train of Thoughts or
Reflections which seem to run so harmoniously throř a long Course of Life, with
the same relation still to one single and self-same Person; this is not a Matter so
easily or hastily decided, by those who are nice Self-Examiners, or Searchers after
Truth and Certainty.147
The Critic expresses contempt for the sophistical circularity of Descartes famous
"first item of knowledge," the so-called cogito: I think; I am. "'What is, is.'--Miraculously
arguřd! 'If I am; I am.'--Nothing more certain!"148

He then draws attention to the

philosophic worries that inevitably arise from this method of reflection:
the Question is, "What constitutes the We or I?" And, "Whether the I of this
instant, be the same with that of any instant preceding, or to come." For we have
nothing but Memory to warrant us: and Memory may be false. We may believe
we have thought and reflected thus or thus: but we may be mistaken. We may be
conscious of that, as Truth; which perhaps was no more than Dream: and we may
be conscious of that as a past Dream, which perhaps was never before so much as
dreamt of. This is what Metaphysicians mean, when they say, "That Identity can
be provřd only by Consciousness; but that Consciousness, withal, may be as well
false as real, in respect of what is past." So that the same successional We or I
must remain still, on this account, undecided. 149
It is here that Shaftesbury seems to turn his attention in part to Locke. Such
concerns, now known collectively as the problem of "personal identity," arise from the
147
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view that the idea of a person is separable from the idea we have of a human being. 150 In
the words of Locke, a person is:
a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself
as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only
by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking, and, as it seems to me,
essential to it: it being impossible for any one to perceive, without perceiving that
he does perceive.151
By this definition, a parrot might conceivably be a person. On the other hand, a
man is merely a sort of animal, "a living organized body; and consequently the same
animal, as we have observed, is the same continued life communicated to different
particles of matter, as they happen successively to be united to that organized living
body."152 While common sense might connect or equate the identity of a person with the
persistence of his "living organized body," Locke insists that personal identity depends
only on the subjective reflection of a thinking being: "the same consciousness that makes
a man be himself to himself."153 Known from the outside, man is known corporeally. In
other words, only I can have direct knowledge of my personhood. Also, I can only know
my own personhood; the personhood of others is merely inferred. Man, like all corporeal
substances we identify, is a merely a name for the bundle of sensible (secondary) qualities

150

Harold W. Noonan, Personal Identity (London ; New York: Routledge, 1989), Derek Parfit, Reasons
and Persons, Reprinted with corrections, 1987. ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), part 3.
151

Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, 1:448-49.

152

Ibid., 1:445.

153

Ibid., 1:451.

254

which customarily hang together because of a characterless, unperceivable substratum.
Locke writes in a chapter entitled Of Our Complex Ideas of Substances,
when we talk or think of any particular sort of corporeal substances, as horse,
stone, &c. though the idea we have of either of them be but the complication or
collection of those several simple ideas of sensible qualities, which we used to
find united in the thing called horse or stone; yet because we cannot conceive how
they should subsist alone, or one in another, we suppose them existing in and
supported by some common subject; which support we denote by the name
substance, though it be certain we have no clear or distinct idea of that thing we
suppose a support.154
Our grasp of the substance of "spirit" is no different from this: "by supposing a
substance, wherein thinking, knowing, doubting, and a power of moving, &c. do subsist,
we have as clear a notion of the substance of spirit, as we have of body."155
Leaving aside, with Shaftesbury, the alleged controversy between "rationalists"
and "empiricists" over innate ideas, we can see that both Descartes and Locke separate
body and mind, at least conceptually: body is known first by the perception of extension,
just as the operations of the mind are known by thinking. Both philosophers seem to
separate the inferred form of a thing from whatever "existing" stuff makes it up.
Shaftesbury portrays the Critic as impatient with such questions. Both Descartes
and Locke build up to an acknowledgement that human beings encounter something very
much like things, and their own thoughts tell them (eventually) that they are themselves
some sort of thing, albeit a mysterious one. Indeed, connecting the mind and body
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inevitably falls back on the recognition of an intuition that mind and body, apart from
speculation, generally travel together; that is, it leans on our common sense.
Shaftesbury suggests that unless one is willing to concede that oneřs
consciousness has some contact with reality, there is no ascending (descending?) from
the mind to the body or vice versa. "To the force of this Reasoning I confess I must so
far submit, as to declare that for my own part, I take my Being upon Trust. Let others
philosophize as they are able: I shall admire their strength, when, upon this Topick, they
have refuted what able Metaphysicians object, and Pyrrhonists plead in their own
behalf."156
Shaftesburyřs lack of interest in modern introspection is clear. His ridicule for
what he calls "metaphysical" speculation, however, should not be understood as a
rejection of all philosophy. As we have seen in chapter two, Shaftesbury presupposes that
genuine philosophical inquiry properly begins for men where they find themselves, that is,
in the visible, human world. As the Critic says here, "for my own part, I take my Being
upon Trust." According to Shaftesbury, accepting human beings as they first present
themselves provides "sufficient Ground for a Moralist. Nor do I ask more, when I
undertake to prove the reality of Virtue and Morals."157 We will see when we turn to The
Moralists in chapter 5 that Shaftesbury by no means suggests that he is abandoning
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philosophy for less noble pursuits; he is, rather, beginning to philosophize at the only
place available to human beings as such--the realm of common sense.
 Moral f ooti ng: O pi nions and t he passi ons

Having glanced at modern epistemology, as he says, "to have a Knowledg in this
part of Philosophy, sufficient to satisfy him that there is no Knowledg or Wisdom to be
learnt from it," the Critic turns to modern reflections on the passions or affections.158 Just
as Shaftesbury objects to the reduction of knowledge to a foundation of subjective
thinking, so he opposes the modern tendency to reduce human passions from the rich
complexity we encounter in common life to simple drives that are ultimately
physiological. The Critic returns his attention to Descartes, this time to the Treatise of
the Passions.
In that work, Descartes identifies the primitive passions to which he claims all
other passions may be reduced. According to Descartes, this method is very different
from the approach of traditional philosophy. As he writes in the 68th article, his own
Treatise follows:
the order which seems best to me for reckoning of the passions. Wherein, I know
very well I digress from the opinion of all who have written before me. But I do it
not without great cause. For they deduce their numeration thus: they distinguish in
the sensitive parts of the soul two appetites, the one they call concupiscible, the
other irascible. And because I understand not any distinction of parts in the soul
(as I said before), me thinks it signifies nothing, unless that it has two faculties,
one to desire, another to be angry. And because it has, in the same manner,
faculties to admire, love, hope, fear, and also to admit into it every one of the
other passions, or to do the actions whereunto these passions impel them, I see not
what they meant by attributing them all to desire, or anger. Besides, their
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catalogue comprehends not all the principal passions, as, I believe, this does. I
speak here only of the principal, because one might yet distinguish many more
particular ones, and their number is indefinite.159
Contrary to Aristotle's distinction, there are in fact only six primitive passions, "to
wit, admiration, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness."

All other passions "are

compounded of some of these six, or are sorts of them."
There is no question Shaftesbury was familiar with Descartes' Treatise as he cites
it in Soliloquy; or Advice to an Author. He writes,
"the Passion of Fear (as a modern Philosopher informs me) determines the Spirits
to the Muscles of the Knees, which are instantly ready to perform their Motion;
by taking up the Legs with incomparable Celerity, in order to remove the Body
out of harmřs way."--Excellent Mechanism! But whether the knocking together of
the Knees be any more the cowardly Symptom of Flight, than the chattering of the
Teeth is the stout Symptom of Resistance, I shall not take upon me to determine.
In this whole Subject of Inquiry I shall find nothing of the least Self-concernment.
And I may depend upon it, that by the most refinřd Speculation of this kind, I
shall neither learn to diminish my Fears, or raise my Courage. This, however, I
may be assurřd of, that řtis the Nature of Fear, as well as of other Passions, to
have its Increase and Decrease, as it is fed by Opinion, and influencřd by Custom
and Practice.160
The modern philosopher, we are told, is "Monsieur DES CARTES, in his Treatise of
the Passions." For Shaftesbury, human passions do not stand apart from opinion, custom,
and practice--at least, not without the difficult self-scrutiny recommended in Soliloquy.
What is more, it is irrelevant to the investigation of the passions as we encounter them in
common life whether or not they are accompanied by physiological reactions.
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for instance, if SUPERSTITION be the sort of Fear which most oppresses; řtis not
very material to inquire, on this occasion, to what Parts or Districts the Blood or
Spirits are immediately detachřd, or where they are made to rendevouz. For this
no more imports me to understand, than it depends on me to regulate or change.
Far from distilling the essence of human passions, such an approach neglects the
thing which makes them human in the first place, namely, opinions. "But when the
Grounds of this superstitious Fear are considerřd to be from Opinion, and the Subjects of it
come to be thorowly searchřd and examinřd; the Passion it-self must necessarily diminish,
as I discover more and more the Imposture which belongs to it." Since the passions rest
on opinions, moral inquiry must ultimately ask about the aims articulated by the opinions
themselves. Again, self-knowledge is to be found by taking up the perspective of the
human world:
the Examination, therefore, of my Humours, and the Inquiry after my Passions,
must necessarily draw along with it the Search and Scrutiny of my Opinions, and
the sincere Consideration of my Scope and End. And thus the Study of human
Affection cannot fail of leading me towards the Knowledg of human Nature, and
of My-self.161
The Critic, too, moves quickly from what seems to be a parody of Descartesř
Treatise of the Passions to the importance of opinion. The Critic writes, "The Affections,
of which I am conscious, are either GRIEF, or JOY; DESIRE, or AVERSION. For whatever
mere Sensation I may experience; if it amounts to neither of these, řtis indifferent, and no
way affects me." The Critic establishes a sort of formula to parse out happiness: that joy
which when present causes grief when absent; and vice versa. Love, he says is a desire
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accompanied by hope for the good. Descartes indicates something similar in his 86th
article, where he finds that:
the passion of desire is an agitation of the soul caused by the spirits which
disposes it to will hereafter the things that she represents unto herself convenient.
So a man not only desires the presence of an absent good, but the conservation of
a present, and moreover, the absence of an evil, as well of that he now endures as
that which he believes may befall him hereafter.162
Yet mention of the good immediately leads the Critic to opinion. He argues that
the good, if absent, cannot but cause the mind regret; something absent which leaves us
indifferent cannot be called good. But we have affections toward things we hold to be
good, whether or not they are so. He writes, "affection towards it, as suppos’d Good, is an
ill Affection, and creative only of Disturbance and Disease." From this observation it is a
quick movement to the conclusion: "So that the AFFECTIONS of Love and Hatred, Liking
and Dislike, on which the Happiness or Prosperity of the Person so much depends, being
influencřd and governřd by Opinion; the highest Good or Happiness must depend on right
Opinion, and the highest Misery be derivřd from wrong."163
Shaftesbury seems to draw on traditional philosophy to call attention to the
underlying claims of modern philosophy. In book IV of Tusculan Disputations, for
example, Cicero and his interlocutors discuss what the Stoics called perturbations or
disorders of the mind. The perturbations were considered by Stoics to be appetites or
passions which removed men from the constancy of reason. Cicero explains,
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[Stoics] would have the divisions of perturbations[] to arise from two
imagined goods, and from two opinions of evils; and thus they became four: from
the good proceed desire and joy--joy having reference to some present good, and
desire to some future good. They suppose fear and grief to proceed from evils:
fear from something future, grief from something present; for whatever things are
dreaded as approaching always occasion grief when present.164
Cicero then explains that such passions actually arise from opinions. He says,
Joy and desire depend upon the opinion of good; as desire, being inflamed and
provoked, is carried on eagerly towards what has the appearance of good; and joy
is transported and exults on obtaining what was desired: for we naturally pursue
those things that have the appearance of good, and avoid the contrary.165
From this it would naturally follow that one would seek to know which of our
opinions are right and which are wrong. As we have seen, for Shaftesbury this sort of
self-knowledge cannot be obtained through a method of reduction.
Here the Critic returns the "grave Inquirer" to the world with a characteristic
"fable," the humor of which (he says) makes a moral at the end unnecessary. He tells of
two travelling dogs who arrive at the sea shore. They see offshore the flotsam of a
shipwreck and convince themselves "by…rhetorical Arguments, after long Reasoning,"
that the wrecked ship contains an unspeakably valuable prize. Since neither dog is
practiced at swimming, they decide it would be unwise to go out of their depth to satisfy
their desire. Instead they decide to drink the sea that lies between the shore and the
shipwreck. The Critic remarks,
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řtis pretty evident that they who live in the highest Sphere of human Affairs, have
a very uncertain View of the thing callřd Happiness or Good. It lies out at Sea, far
distant, in the Offin; where those Gentlemen ken it but very imperfectly: And the
means they employ in order to come up with it, are very wide of the matter, and
far short of their proposřd End.166
According to Shaftesbury, it is foolish to try to satisfy desire before thinking
carefully about the good.

The Œconomy of the Passions
 The P l an and St yl e of An Inqui ry concerni ng Vi rt ue or Merit

The Critic indicates in the second chapter of ŖMiscellany IVŗ that the reader is
about to make a "passage from Terra Incognita to the visible World."167 Even though the
Critic has "paid sufficient deference" to the "Metaphysical part" of philosophy, he warns
that hard work still lies ahead. He writes
when we are even past these empty Regions and Shadows of Philosophy; řtwill
still perhaps appear an uncomfortable kind of travelling throř those other invisible
Ideal Worlds: such as the Study of Morals, we see, engages us to visit. Men must
acquire a very peculiar and strong Habit of turning their Eye inwards, in order to
explore the interior Regions and Recesses of the MIND, the hollow Caverns of
deep Thought, the private Seats of Fancy, and the Wastes and Wildernesses, as
well as the more fruitful and cultivated Tracts of this obscure Climate.168
The Critic suggests that in turning from epistemology to moral questions,
Shaftesbury is not yet free of the modern projectors. Having rejected "strict and formal
demonstration"--that is, the epistemological and moral reduction of the moderns--the
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Critic draws back to consider morality from a broader perspective. Heretofore, he says, he
has tried to proceed on the basis of "our very Perceptions, Fancys, Appearances,
Affections, and Opinions themselves, without regard to any thing of an exterior World,
and even on the supposition that there is no such World in being."

169

He compares this

Cartesian approach in philosophy to the Egyptian punishment of the Hebrews:
Such has been our late dry Task. No wonder if it carrys, indeed, a meagre and raw
Appearance. It may be lookřd on, in Philosophy, as worse than a mere Egyptian
Imposition. For to make Brick without Straw or Stubble, is perhaps an easier
labour, than to prove Morals without a World, and establish a Conduct of Life
without the Supposition of any thing living or extant besides our immediate
Fancy, and World of Imagination.170
Henceforth, the Critic suggests we should "trust our eyes, and take for real the
whole Creation, and the fair Forms which lie before us."171 This accords with the strategy
of Sensus Communis, which ends with a praise of moral and visual beauty. The Critic
now shifts our attention from the subjective experience of the individual to our common
experience of human beings in the world.
In his Soliloquy, Shaftesbury offers his own method for tracing opinions back to
nature. Yet an adequate reply to the modern projectors would also involve some account
of how we can recognize what opinions and passions truly are in accord with nature.
This concern receives its most extended treatment in An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and
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Merit, where Shaftesbury explains the context for claiming that the passions should be
seen as an "oeconomy" or harmonious disposition of parts and the whole.172
Shaftesburyřs Inquiry, then, has the following structure.173 The treatise is divided
into two books. Book I, which is itself divided into three parts, compares religion and
virtue. After establishing the concerns of the treatise as a whole, part 1 offers a taxonomy
of possible religious opinions. Part 2 explains Shaftesburyřs account of the nature of
virtue. Naturally enough, part 3 goes on to compare religion and virtue.
Book II is divided into two parts, and considers what obligation there is for man
to be virtuous as he has defined it. To this end, part 1 distinguishes types of affections;
part 2 examines these types of affections and asks whether they are conducive to
happiness. Since the work of this chapter is devoted to Shaftesburyřs reaction to the
modern projectors, I will only offer an account of Book I here.
In general one might say that the Inquiry treats the passions (or as Shaftesbury
usually prefers to call them, the "affections") within the context of the "visible world."
For reasons we shall see below, he prefers the term affection to passion because it retains
the presence of mind as a factor in human motivation.174 His account of the visible world
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by necessity arises within that world. Rather than approaching the world with a posture
of doubt, however, Shaftesbury offers an account based in common sense, that is, on an
initial trust in the world as it appears to men in ordinary circumstances.
 The Vi si bl e Worl d: Syst em s and Ends

After a general introduction in Book I, part 1, section 1, of the concerns pursued
in An Inquiry, Shaftesbury offers a systematic look at religion. Section 2 has an abstract,
logical quality. It sets forth a series of possible opinions about divine matters, divided
into categories. The possibilities fall under four main heads, namely: theism, atheism,
polytheism, and daemonism. He begins his inquiry with the broadest horizon imaginable
to natural reason, the cosmos(). The first distinction to be drawn regarding
opinions of the divine is whether "in the Whole of things (or in the Universe) either all is
according to a good Order, and the most agreeable to a general Interest: or there is that
which is otherwise, and might possibly have been better constituted, more wisely
contrivřd and with more advantage to the general Interest of Beings, or of the Whole."175
If the cosmos accords with order, it seems to follow that "there is no such thing as real
ILL in the Universe, nothing ILL with respect to the Whole." Should the world (writ
large in terms of the "general interest") be orderly, then with respect to the parts of the
world things are what they seem to be: orderly. This opinion would not, of course,
preclude the possibility that ill would exist with respect to parts of the whole, at least
Edition of the Oxford English Dictionary : Complete Text Reproduced Micrographically, 39, original page
153.
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when viewed from the perspective of those parts. (When seen from the perspective of
partial interests, we should probably speak of apparent ill.)
Should there be "real ill" in the world, it would have to come about by either
design (that is, intelligence) or by chance. If there is ill by design, one would have to
conclude that there is "no one good designing Principle." Either the one designing
principle is not good, or there is some contrary principle responsible for the existence of
ill. Alternatively, if there is real ill as a result of chance, then "a designing Principle or
Mind, whether Good or Bad, cannot be the Cause of all things."176 Presumably chance
can coexist with mind only if there is room for it to work outside of the control of mind.
It then follows that either the designing principle is either good but not omnipotent; or if
omnipotent it is not actually good, for it allowed ill to exist in the cosmos.
We now have what is necessary for our main categories. Shaftesbury writes, and
I quote at length, that:
Whatsoever is superior in any degree over the World, or rules in Nature with
Discernment and a Mind, is what, by universal Agreement, Men call GOD. If there
are several such superior Minds, they are so many Gods: But if that single, or
those several Superiors are not in their nature necessarily good, they rather take
the name of DAEMON.
To believe therefore that every thing is governřd, orderřd, or regulated for the
best, by a designing Principle, or Mind, necessarily good and permanent, is to be a
perfect THEIST.
To believe nothing of a designing Principle or Mind, nor any Cause, Measure, or
Rule of Things, but Chance; so that in Nature neither the Interest of the Whole,
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nor of any Particulars, can be said to be in the least designřd, pursuřd, or aimřd
at; is to be a perfect ATHEIST.
To believe no one supreme designing Principle or Mind, but rather two, three, or
more, (tho in their nature good) is to be a POLYTHEIST.
To believe the governing Mind, or Minds, not absolutely and necessarily good,
nor confinřd to what is best, but capable of acting according to mere Will or
Fancy; is to be a DAEMONIST.177
This last category is of special interest in light of what we learned in chapter 2
about the importance of will and fancy (or opinion). In his Advice to an Author we heard
the lesson from the tale of the noble prince: "let WILL be ever so free, Humour and
Fancy, we see, govern it." There, we recall, Shaftsbury offered us a solution to the
tyranny of fancy in his method of soliloquy:
By what I can observe of the World, Fancy and Opinion stand pretty much upon
the same bottom. So that if there be no certain Inspector or Auditor establishřd
within us, to take account of these Opinions and Fancys in due form, and minutely
to animadvert upon their several Growths and Habits, we are as little like to
continue a Day in the same Will, as a Tree, during a Summer, in the same Shape,
without the Gardřnerřs Assistance, and the vigorous Application of the Sheers and
Pruning-Knife.178
As we saw above, Shaftesbury follows the ancients by connecting fancy to
opinion. By setting forth the possible opinions on the divine, An Inquiry is establishing
the grounds for allowing both religion and moral virtue their proper provenance. This will
be accomplished by indicating which opinions are more in accord with human nature, and
consequently, with moral virtue as Shaftesbury understands it.
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"daemonism," we note, bears a striking resemblance to the Calvinist religious doctrines
Shaftesbury especially deplored. (He attributes something like this view to Locke, whose
sincere if eccentric Christianity he thought made it impossible for him to live or die as a
philosopher.179)
Since men seldom adhere to their opinions with any constancy, Shaftesbury offers
a sensible definition for what places men into a category of opinion: "That alone,
therefore, is to be callřd a Manřs Opinion, which is of any other the most habitual to him,
and occurs upon most occasions."180 As it turns out, men are seldom pure in their
opinions, and in fact the opinions concerning the divine may be compounded: "All these
both of sorts Daemonism, Polytheism, Atheism, and Theism, may be mixřd. Religion
excludes only perfect Atheism."181 Constancy may not be a virtue when the opinions held
are unsound. Shaftesbury emphasizes that there are indeed perfect Daemonists, who
offer prayers and offering to a malicious god on account of fear. His exception here
indicates how closely connected are melancholia and false enthusiasm for Shaftesbury.
As we saw in chapter 3, this view is coextensive with religious zealotry.
Having made it through the "thorny part" of Book I, Shaftesbury turns to the
subject of An Inquiry proper. He will ask which of the foregoing opinions is compatible
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"with an honest or moral Character." In order to do this, Shaftesbury must first explain
what virtue is. This requires Shaftesbury to consider the passions at the level of the
human species.

Part 2 of Book I opens by identifying the place of human beings within the
cosmos.182 Shaftesburyřs account relies on the identification of kinds or species by
indicating the end to which nature directs them. According to Shaftesbury, it may not be
necessary to have a complete knowledge of "the Whole" for a subordinate part to be
contemplated. The Whole seems to be articulated into heterogeneous parts which are
themselves wholes of a sort. He writes:
WHEN we reflect on any ordinary Frame or Constitution either of Art or Nature;
and consider how hard it is to give the least account of a particular Part, without a
competent Knowledg of the Whole: we need not wonder to find our-selves at a
loss in many things relating to the Constitution and Frame of Nature her-self. For
to what End in Nature many things, even whole Species of Creatures, refer; or to
what purpose they serve; will be hard for any-one justly to determine: But to what
End the many Proportions and various Shapes of Parts in many Creatures actually
serve; we are able, by the help of Study and Observation, to demonstrate, with
great exactness.183
Each complete part (or "Creature") is known by the fact that it has a "private Good
and Interest of his own; which Nature has compelřd him to seek, by all the advantages
afforded him, within the compass of his Make." Given that each kind has a private good,
Shaftesbury concludes that "there must be also a certain END, to which every thing in his
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Constitution must naturally refer."184 Based on this claim, Shaftesbury reasons that a
creatureřs "Appetites, Passions, or Affections" will either accord with its proper end or
work against it. It is therefore possible for a creature to be good or ill to others of his
species and even to be ill himself.
Now in the constitution of rational creatures,
the same Irregularitys of Appetite which make him ill to Others, make him ill also
to Him-self; and if the same Regularity of Affections, which causes him to be
good in one sense, causes him to be good also in the other; Goodness, then is that
Goodness by which he is thus useful to others, a real Good and Advantage to
himself. And thus Virtue and Interest may be found at last to agree.185
Why would these irregularities make the rational creature ill to himself as well as
to others? Shaftesbury must realize that this claim is controversial, to say the least, for it is
precisely this that sets the moral teaching of "modern projectors" apart from classical
political philosophy. It is the burden of the remainder of An Inquiry to make good on the
claim that virtue and self-interest can be reconciled.
Shaftesburyřs first step in this direction is to clarify what he means by goodness
or virtue. He begins by imagining a traveler who upon returning from a foreign land
describes "a certain Creature of a more solitary Disposition than ever was yet heard of;
one who had neither Mate nor Fellow of any kind; nothing of his own Likeness, towards
which he stood well-affected or inclinřd; nor any thing without, or beyond himself, for
which he had the least Passion or Concern." Common sense would first suspect that
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happiness would not belong to this creature. But if the traveler were to insist that the
creature is, with respect to himself, properly constituted and actually not a monster, we
would have to concede that insofar as he were a complete but solitary system, he must be
called good. But, "shouřd there be any where in Nature a System, of which this living
Creature was to be considerřd as a Part; then couřd he no-wise be allowřd good; whilst
he plainly appearřd to be such a Part, as made rather to the harm than good of that
System or Whole in which he was included." Shaftesbury indicates here that while
travelers chronicle the immense variety of kinds to be found in the world, he has yet to
see evidence requiring a reassessment of the principles of nature he observes at home.
The Characteristicks makes several references to the travel writings of explorers and
missionaries so popular among his contemporaries.

In Soliloquy, for example, he

ridicules the "Incredulity, which fashions the Taste and Judgment of many Gentlemen,
whom we hear censurřd as Atheists, for attempting to philosophize after a newer manner
than any known of late."186 Shaftesbury finds such gentlemen, who follow the modern
mode of philosophizing, more credulous than the vulgar. They have, he writes, "far more
Pleasure in hearing the monstrous Accounts of monstrous Men, and Manners; than the
politest and best Narrations of the Affairs, the Governments, and Lives of the wisest and
most polish’d People."187 He may well have had Locke in mind here. As he wrote to
Michael Ainsworth,
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then comes the credulous Mr. Locke, with his Indian, barbarian stories of wild
nations, that have no such idea [of God] (as travellers, learned authors! and men
of truth! and great philosophers! have informed him), not considering that is but a
negative upon hearsay, and so circumstantiated that the faith of the Indian danger
may as well be questioned as the veracity or judgment of the relater; who cannot
be supposed to know sufficiently the mysteries and secrets of those barbarians.188
Given the posture of trust, Shaftesbury finds it odd to prefer the exception to the
rule when reasoning. Stipulating, then, that nature could produce such a solitary creature,
Shaftesbury says that the creature would be itself a "private system," and have its own
proper end in solitude and be good. Seen as part of a broader system, however, such a
creature might well be called harmful and ill.
This insight leads to the interesting conclusion that a whole species of animals can
contribute to the good of another species. Such a species would then be "a Part only of
some other System."189 From this broader perspective one can say that predator and prey
(spider and fly, say) are part of one system: "The Web and Wing are suted to each
other."190

All life is properly "included in one and the same Order of Beings."

Shaftesbury describes a system or "Œconomy" of all animals in the way that we now
casually speak of the "food chain." He does not say that the fly likes to be eaten by the
spider; only that their interaction indicates a wider order.
From here Shaftesbury steps back even further to describe the Earth as a part of
the solar system or galaxy, until he is able to state that:
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Therefore if any Being be wholly and really Ill, it must be ill with respect to the
Universal System; and then the System of the Universe is ill, or imperfect. But if
the Ill of one private System be the Good of others; if it makes still to the Good of
the general System, (as when one Creature lives by the Destruction of another;
one thing is generated from the Corruption of another; or one planetary System or
Vortex may swallow up another) then is the Ill of that private System no real Ill in
it-self; any more than the pain of breeding Teeth is ill, in a System or Body which
is so constituted, that without this occasion of Pain, it wouřd suffer worse, by
being defective.191
Having concluded that the private ill of a system is not sufficient evidence that the
cosmos as a whole is flawed, Shaftesbury describes the way species of sensible creatures
are reflective of their "systems" in their internal constitution.192 With respect to its
passions taken as a whole, he calls the posture of a creature to the world its "temper."
Should there be "an Affection towards Self-Good, as it actually, in its natural degree,
conducing to his private Interest" while being "at the same time inconsistent with the
publick Good," this would deserve the name ill. One would still be saying, however,
with Hobbes and Locke, that the private good of the creature is incompatible with the
public good. This sort of creature he found improbable. Shaftesbury clearly understands
that private interests, and therefore the passions, can come into conflict with "the common
Nature, or System of the Kind."193 But having followed Shaftesbury through Volume I,
though, we are now prepared to approach this apparent problem moderately.
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Shaftesbury indicates that some self-regarding passions are only a problem when
they are excessive or immoderate. Even when a passion is commonly regarded as selfish,
it may not in fact be incompatible with the public interest; it may actually contribute to
the public interest. It would in fact be injurious to the species if individuals wholly
lacked self-regard. He writes:
if the want of such an Affection as that towards Self-preservation, be injurious to
the Species; a Creature is ill and unnatural as well throř this Defect, as throř the
want of any other natural Affection. And this no-one wouřd doubt to pronounce,
if he saw a Man who minded not any Precipices which lay in his way, nor made
any distinction of Food, Diet, Clothing, or whatever else related to his Health and
Being. The same wouřd be averřd of one who had a Disposition which renderřd
him averse to any Commerce with Womankind, and of consequence unfitted him
throř Illness of Temper (and not merely throř a Defect of Constitution) for the
propagation of his Species or Kind.194
For a sensible creature to be good, it must have a natural temperament such that its
passions are directed to the general welfare of its species. "Indeed," he writes, "whatever
exterior Helps or Succours an ill-disposřd Creature may find, to push him on towards the
performance of any one good Action; there can no Goodness arise in him, till his Temper
be so far changřd, that in the issue he comes in earnest to be led by some immediate
Affection, directly, and not accidentally, to Good, and against Ill."195 If the temper of a
creature is selfish, Shaftesbury calls the creature ill, regardless of whether the temper leads
to a public or private benefit. We see once again that, unlike Hobbes and other moderns
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on the one hand, and certain sectarian Christians on the other, Shaftesbury will not praise
good behavior when it is coerced or bribed. He explains:
for instance; if one of those Creatures supposřd to be by Nature tame, gentle, and
favourable to Mankind, be, contrary to his natural Constitution, fierce and savage;
we instantly remark the Breach of Temper, and own the Creature to be unnatural
and corrupt. If at any time afterwards, the same Creature, by good Fortune or right
Management, comes to lose his Fierceness, and is made tame, gentle, and
treatable, like other Creatures of his Kind; řtis acknowledgřd that the Creature
thus restorřd becomes good and natural. Suppose, now, that the Creature has
indeed a tame and gentle Carriage; but that it proceeds only from the fear of his
Keeper; which if set aside, his predominant Passion instantly breaks out: then is
his Gentleness not his real Temper; but, his true and genuine Nature or natural
Temper remaining just as it was, the Creature is still as ill as ever.
Seen in the context of his cosmology, Shaftesbury emphasizes the "real temper" as
opposed to the "breach of temper" in creatures. A real temper, it seems, can be expected
to be naturally suited to the place a species finds in the whole. Not to grant this claim
would be monstrous.
Shaftesbury is now ready to consider human beings per se.196 It is here that we
see the introduction of what comes to be called a "moral sense." Shaftesbury seems to
mean something relatively modest by this claim.
 Reason and t he Moral Sense

Section 3 of Book I, part 2, treats "that which is callřd VIRTUE or MERIT, and is
allowřd to Man only."197 For Shaftesbury, man's unique sort of goodness is connected to
his ability to reason. Shaftesbury writes that "in a Creature capable of forming general
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Notions of Things, not only the outward Beings which offer themselves to the Sense, are
the Objects of the Affection; but the very Actions themselves, and the Affections of Pity,
Kindness, Gratitude, and their Contrarys, being brought into the Mind by Reflection,
become Objects."198 For Shaftesbury, mental and moral subjects as well as bodies can
become objects of reflection. Just as objects in the world betray color, shape, and
proportion to the mind, so in "Behaviour and Actions, when presented to our
Understanding, there must be found, of necessity, an apparent Difference, according to
the Regularity or Irregularity of the Subjects."199 Through this "reflected sense" there
arises in men "another kind of Affection towards those very Affections themselves,
which have been already felt, and are now become the Subject of a new Liking or
Dislike."200

This second-order affection is, like other human passions, not wholly

separable from opinion.201 In explaining what he means by this, Shaftesbury refers to
"the Mind," which in this context he calls "Spectator or Auditor of other Minds." He
writes:
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the Mind, which is Spectator or Auditor of other Minds, cannot be without its Eye
and Ear; so as to discern Proportion, distinguish Sound, and scan each Sentiment
or Thought which comes before it. It can let nothing escape its Censure. It feels
the Soft and Harsh, the Agreeable and Disagreeable, in the Affections; and finds a
Foul and Fair, a Harmonious and a Dissonant, as really and truly here, as in any
musical Numbers, or in the outward Forms or Representations of sensible Things.
Nor can it with-hold its Admiration and Extasy, its Aversion and Scorn, any more
in what relates to one than to the other of these Subjects. So that to deny the
common and natural Sense of a Sublime and Beautiful in Things, will appear an
Affectation merely, to any-one who considers duly of this Affair.202
Shaftesbury combines the claim that species have tempers suited to their natural
"systemic" place in the whole with the claim that fancies and opinions are for men
generally conjoined to arrive at the claim that man "is capable of having a Sense of Right
or Wrong; a Sentiment or Judgment of what is done, throř just, equal, and good Affection,
or the contrary."203
As we mentioned above, the phrase "spectator or auditor" in this context recalls
terms he used to frame his discussion of firmness-of-will regarding fancies and opinions
in Soliloquy.204 In Soliloquy, Shaftesbury recommends that we establish "within us" an
"Inspector or Auditor" to judge our fancies. By dividing the self into two persons,
Shaftesbury was able to reestablish the classical distinction between reason and the
passions. The mention of a spectator is also reminiscent of the language Shaftesbury uses
to describe the proper work of "Criticism" in Soliloquy. There, he writes:
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what is there mortifies the good Painter more, than when amidst his admiring
Spectators there is not one present, who has been usřd to compare the Hands of
different Masters, or has an Eye to distinguish the Advantages or Defects of every
Style? Throř all the inferior Orders of Mechanicks, the Rule is found to hold the
same. In every Science, every Art, the real Masters, or Proficients, rejoice in
nothing more, than in the thorow Search and Examination of their Performances,
by all the Rules of Art and nicest Criticism.205
Shaftesbury holds that human beings have a natural tendency to form moral
judgments based on their "connatural" affections for other creatures, especially those of
the same species. Also in Soliloquy Shaftesbury refers to "Criticks by Fashion," who form
a judgment on mores without having developed his deeper way of considering what is
natural in opinions. He offers the following example of this:
the noble Wits of a Court-Education, who can go no farther back into Antiquity
than their Pedegree will carry řem, are able however to call to mind the different
State of Manners in some few Reigns past, when Chivalry was in such repute. The
Ladys were then Spectators not only of feignřd Combats and martial Exercises,
but of real Duels and bloody Feats of Arms. They sat as Umpires and Judges of
the doughty Frays.206
For Shaftesbury, our sense of right and wrong is built upon our natural animal
affections for others of our kind, but susceptible to opinions because of the character of
reason. Fashionable opinions are taken up by men from their societies. "Such is the
205
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different Genius of Nations; and of the same Nation in different Times and Seasons," he
remarks of the fashionable critic in general.
So too does Shaftesbury draw out the consequences of an "uncertain View of the
thing callřd Happiness or Good." Given the relationship of affection to opinions, a
personřs judgment of right and wrong is vulnerable to "misconception or
misapprehension."207 In thinking about this problem, Shaftesbury draws a distinction
between mistakes of fact and right, thus: "a Mistake therefore in Fact being no Cause or
Sign of ill Affection, can be no Cause of Vice. But a Mistake of Right being the Cause of
unequal Affection, must of necessity be the Cause of vitious Action, in every intelligent or
rational Being."208 Opinions of right are usually informed by the fashionable manners and
opinions of the times. An accurate assessment of right and wrong therefore requires "a
use of Reason, sufficient to secure a right application of the Affections."209 As we saw in
our discussion of Sensus Communis,210 Shaftesbury thinks that "Morality and good
Government go together."211
In section 4 of part 2, then, Shaftesbury draws out the implications of his claim
that menřs opinions are those they hold habitually and for the most part. It is significant

207

Inquiry, 2:19.

208

Ibid., 2:20.

209

Ibid.

210

See the discussion of Juvenal and Nero, on page 31.

211

Sensus Communis, 1:67.

279

that according to Shaftesbury, the existence of superstition and pernicious customs or
opinions, does not per se refute the claim that men have a natural sociability. He writes:
thus is Virtue sharřd in different degrees by rational Creatures; such at least as are
callřd rational; but who come short of that sound and well-establishřd Reason,
which alone can constitute a just Affection, a uniform and steddy Will and
Resolution. For it seems evident from our Inquiry, that how ill soever the Temper
or Passions may stand with respect either to the sensible or the moral Objects;
however passionate, furious, lustful, or cruel any Creature may become; however
vitious the Mind be, or whatever ill Rules or Principles it goes by; yet if there be
any Flexibleness or favourable Inclination towards the least moral Object, the
least appearance of moral Good (as if there be any such thing as Kindness,
Gratitude, Bounty, or Compassion), there is still something of Virtue left; and the
Creature is not wholly vitious and unnatural.212
It would therefore be unnecessary to conclude with the modern projectors a radical
attempt to "new-frame the human heart" is necessary for the restoration of political
civility.
Thus Shaftesbury gives a limited endorsement of compassion, which, from a
classical point of view is considered a vice. There are indications of Shaftesburyřs
awareness of this in his personal notebooks. In light of the classical subordination of
passion to reason, the etymology is inescapably pejorative to a classical eye. Yet in this
context Shaftesbury appeals to the difference between the philosopher and most other
men that we saw emerge in Sensus Communis. In the essay Rand entitles "Passions" we
find the following passage:
COMPASSION.--To compassionate, i.e., to join with in passion, be passionate with.-To commiserate, i.e., to join with in misery, be miserable with. This in one order
of life is right and good; nothing more harmonious; and to be without this, or not
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to feel this, is unnatural, horrid, immane [sic]. How else would the machine
perform. For this is meant still of the machine, or what is all one, of the mind,
nature, or temper, as it is when acting like a machine in the common way of life,
in animals and men-animals, where there is no better rule than the speciousness of
the object, nor no other force to act by than that of the  [perturbations] raised
thence, where the only energy is from pain and pleasure, sorrow and transport.
Where men are thus light and heavy, airy and clouded, always under the power of
passion, always passionate, always miserable in their own cases and about their
own affairs, it would be unequal, unjust, unsocial, and hard not to be so in the
affairs of others and be wretched too for company.
This as to one order of life, where this fellow-wretchedness agrees admirably and
makes so great a part in the order of things, and shows us so fair a side of Nature.
Hence the union of several species, their mutual relation, sympathy, life.213
This order of life stands in distinction to another, higher order. To that group, "to
act by temper simply (though ever so good a temper), is in such a one, a loss even of
simplicity, a quitting of that uniform, self-same, divine, and simple principle, for a
various, manifold, compound, and changeable one, a composition, mere composition; for
what else does the word temper signify?"214 Most men, it would seem, lack the resolution
of will and firmness of character so prized by Shaftesbury. He is content to let men be as
they are--namely, fairly governed by chance in their passions. As a practitioner of his own
art of soliloquy, however, he exhorts himself: "for thy part remember that Řfor where
rejoicing is reasonable, there also is congratulation reasonableř" and "in no way
sympathise, or feel as they feel, when they take either this or the other event (even what is
unpremeditated) for good or ill."215 (Interestingly enough, the allusion seems to be to
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Epictetusř Discourses Book II, Chapter 5, entitled How magnanimity can be consistent
with prudence.)
 Im pedi m ent s t o Vi rtue: Rel i gi on and Vi rt ue Com pared

Shaftesbury now216 turns his attention more directly to the overall task of An
Inquiry, that is, "what Honesty or Virtue is, considerřd by it-self; and in what manner it is
influencřd by Religion: How far Religion necessarily implies Virtue; and whether it be a
true Saying, That it is impossible for an Atheist to be virtuous, or share any real degree
of Honesty, or Merit."217
Having seen that virtue is "a certain just Disposition, or proportionable Affection
of a rational Creature towards the moral Objects of Right and Wrong," Shaftesbury now
asks more generally about ways in which religious opinions can interfere with virtue.218
He proposes three possibilities. First, an opinion could destroy the natural sense of right
and wrong. Second, an opinion could pervert this sense. Third, it can give rise to
affections contrary to the moral sense.
In the first case, Shaftesbury finds that the "Sense of Right and Wrong therefore
being as natural to us as natural Affection itself, and being a first Principle in our
Constitution and Make; there is no speculative Opinion, Persuasion or Belief, which is
capable immediately or directly to exclude or destroy it."219 It is a principle of the human
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constitution that human beings make moral distinctions. Since this is so, only a powerful
habit or second nature could counteract the moral sense. Nature is not so plastic that it
will be easily opposed by customs. He writes:
řTis evident in what relates to the Frame and Order of our Bodys; that no
particular odd Mein [sic] or Gesture, which is either natural to us, and consequent
to our Make, or accidental and by Habit acquirřd, can possibly be overcome by
our immediate Disapprobation, or the contrary Bent of our Will, ever so strongly
set against it. Such a Change cannot be effected without extraordinary Means, and
the intervention of Art and Method, a strict Attention, and repeated Check. And
even thus, Nature, we find, is hardly masterřd; but lies sullen, and ready to revolt,
on the first occasion. Much more is this the Mind’s Case in respect of that natural
Affection and anticipating Fancy, which makes the sense of Right and Wrong.
řTis impossible that this can instantly, or without much Force and Violence, be
effacřd, or struck out of the natural Temper, even by means of the most
extravagant Belief or Opinion in the World.220
Nature, it seems, "can shift for her-self."221 As the Critic remarks in ŖMiscellany
IV,ŗ Shaftesbury in this holds with Horace that "you may turn out nature with a pitchfork,
yet back she will keep coming."222 Religious opinion, then, cannot destroy the nature of
man.
In the second case, however, religion is more efficacious.

Weřve seen that

customs can oppose nature, and a "Custom or politick Institution" can lead men to
misapprehend the moral worth of an object.223 Shaftesbury says that it is unlikely that
atheism would erect a "false Species of Right or Wrong," although if it leads men to
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licentiousness it could lead men to be less attentive to their natural inclinations. "Corrupt
Religion, or Superstition," on the other hand, can indeed lead men to praise naturally ugly
things.224 This seems to follow naturally from the strong esteem men have toward their
notions of God. He writes in an especially bold passage,
if there be a Religion which teaches the Adoration and Love of a God, whose
Character it is to be captious, and of high resentment, subject to Wrath and Anger,
furious, revengeful; and revenging himself, when offended, on others than those
who gave the Offence: and if there be added to the Character of this God, a
fraudulent Disposition, encouraging Deceit and Treachery amongst Men;
favourable to a few, tho for slight causes, and cruel to the rest: řtis evident that
such a Religion as this being strongly enforcřd, must of necessity raise even an
Approbation and Respect towards the Vices of this kind, and breed a sutable
Disposition, a capricious, partial, revengeful, and deceitful Temper. For even
Irregularitys and Enormitys of a heinous kind must in many cases appear
illustrious to one, who considers them in a Being admirřd and contemplated with
the highest Honour and Veneration.225
This is especially problematic in the case of a voluntaristic notion of the deity,
such as he attributes to many contemporary Divines as well as his former tutor Locke. "If
the mere Will, Decree, or Law of God be said absolutely to constitute Right and Wrong,
then are these latter words of no significancy at all. For thus if each part of a Contradiction
were affirmřd for Truth by the supreme Power, they wouřd consequently become true."226
On the other hand, Shaftesbury claims that "nothing can more highly contribute to
the fixing of right Apprehensions, and a sound Judgment or Sense of Right and Wrong,
than to believe a God who is ever, and on all accounts, represented such as to be actually a
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true Model and Example of the most exact Justice, and highest Goodness and Worth." We
have seen in Chapter 2 that Shaftesbury favored the "antient Policy" that there be "a
Publick Leading in Religion. For to deny the Magistrate a Worship, or take away a
National Church, is as mere Enthusiasm as the Notion which sets up Persecution. For why
shouřd there not be publick Walks, as well as private Gardens? Why not publick Librarys,
as well as private Education and Home-Tutors?"227

This policy recommendation is

informed by his expectation that people will seldom be "pure atheists."

Given the

influence of custom and the culture on habitual opinion and the difficulty of true devotion
to the practice of soliloquy, such a recommendation makes sense. One must remember,
however, that Shaftesbury also holds that such a public religion ought to teach without
coercion.
Finally Shaftesbury raises the possibility that contrary affections could thwart the
operation of the natural affections. Here too Shaftesbury identifies a problem. While
some might hold (with Locke at least) that hope of reward and fear of punishment by God
are the most powerful influences over human passions, Shaftesbury is reluctant to agree.
Both hope and fear, he argues, teach an excessive self-regard.228
Shaftesbury does think that it is proper for "a civil STATE or PUBLIC" to distribute
rewards and punishments.229 Not only can the magistrate force people to be useful to
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society, but much more importantly, he can make virtue seem to be in the interest of all,
"so as to remove all Prejudices against it, create a fair reception for it, and lead Men into
that path which afterwards they cannot easily quit."230 The power of this lies not in
coercion (although that is certainly present) so much as in the "example which chiefly
influences Mankind, and forms the Character and Disposition of a people."231 As we
mentioned earlier, Shaftesbury holds good morals to be linked to good government. He
continues,
for a virtuous Administration is in a manner necessarily accompanyřd with Virtue
in the Magistrate. Otherwise it couřd be of little effect, and of no long duration.
But where it is sincere and well establishřd, there Virtue and the Laws must
necessarily be respected and belovřd. So that as to Punishments and Rewards,
their Efficacy is not so much from the Fear or Expectation which they raise, as
from a natural Esteem of Virtue, and Detestation of Villany, which is awakenřd
and excited by these publick Expressions of the Approbation and Hatred of
Mankind in each Case. For in the publick Executions of the greatest Villains, we
see generally that the Infamy and Odiousness of their Crime, and the Shame of it
before Mankind, contribute more to their Misery than all besides; and that it is not
the immediate Pain, or Death it-self, which raises so much Horror either in the
Sufferers or Spectators, as that ignominious kind of Death which is inflicted for
publick Crimes, and Violations of Justice and Humanity.232
The power of opinion in these matters makes contrary opinions especially
dangerous. The mercenary view of morality suggests that in fact oneřs private happiness
is in fundamental tension with the public good. "There is a necessity for the preservation
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of Virtue, that it shouřd be thought to have no quarrel with true Interest, and Selfenjoyment."233
The otherworldliness of religion also presents a challenge in the other direction in
that it leads men to underestimate the value of self-regard. When confronted with the
hope of eternal bliss,
an Expectation and Dependency, so miraculous and great as this, must naturally
take off from other inferior Dependencys and Encouragements. Where infinite
Rewards are thus inforcřd, and the Imagination strongly turnřd towards them, the
other common and natural Motives to Goodness are apt to be neglected, and lose
much by Dis-use. Other Interests are hardly so much as computed, whilst the
Mind is thus transported in the pursuit of a high Advantage and Self-Interest, so
narrowly confinřd within our-selves. On this account, all other Affections towards
Friends, Relations, or Mankind, are often slightly regarded, as being worldly, and
of little moment, in respect of the Interest of our Soul.234
It is difficult to expect virtue to lead to happiness without having an admiration for
it on its own terms. This, in turn, is difficult to sustain without some belief that "the
WHOLE it-self" is orderly and beautiful.

While atheism does not produce "false

imaginations of right and wrong,"235 it does seem to foster affections contrary to virtue in
that it fails to present anything "good or lovely" to "Contemplation."236 Taken in this
sense, atheists are far less likely to be happy:
According to the Hypothesis of those who exclude a general Mind, it must be
confessřd, there can nothing happen in the Course of things to deserve either our
Admiration, and Love, or our Anger, and Abhorrence. However, as there can be
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no Satisfaction at the best in thinking upon what Atoms and Chance produce; so
upon disasterous Occasions, and under the Circumstances of a calamitous and
hard Fortune, řtis scarce possible to prevent a natural kind of Abhorrence and
Spleen, which will be entertainřd and kept alive by the Imagination of so perverse
an Order of Things.237
Given his own admiration for the teachings of Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, this
may not be Shaftesburyřs final word on the matter. We have already seen, for example,
that for the philosopher, at least, the passions are firmly governed by reason.

General Conclusion: On the Œconomy of the Passions
In this chapter we have considered Shaftesburyřs response to modern philosophy.
In the first section we considered his response to radical skepticism through a return to
common sense in Sensus Communis. We then examined the Criticřs rejection of modern
epistemology (or as he would have it, "metaphysicks") and the reductionism of the
passions it supports in favor of the classical view that passions must be considered with
opinions. Finally, we looked at the way Shaftesbury attempts to articulate an alternative
approach to the nature of human passions in An Inquiry by restoring man to a place in the
cosmos. This allowed Shaftesbury to present the affections as a comprising natural
"Œconomy of the Passions."
Still, an essential aspect of Shaftesburyřs classical philosophy remains to be
considered. What arguments does he present that nature is in fact an ordered whole or
cosmos? His argument relies in large part on his account of the beauty of the world, and
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for this we must consider the second treatise in Volume II of the Characteristicks. It is to
this task we now turn to in chapter 5, "Shaftesburyřs "Principal Performance"--A reading
of The Moralists.

CHAPTER 5
SHAFTESBURYřS "PRINCIPAL PERFORMANCE":
A READING OF THE MORALISTS.
General Introduction
 The Moralists Cri ti ci zed

We have seen in earlier chapters that the Critic of Miscellaneous Reflections
regards the Characteristicks as having a unity to its structure. Regarding the arrangement
of the individual treatises, he writes, "it will appear therefore in this Joint-Edition of our
Authorřs Five Treatises, that the Three former are preparatory to the Fourth…and the
Fifth (with which he concludes) a kind of Apology for [the] Treatise concerning Virtue
and Religion."1 In this chapter we will turn our attention to the fifth treatise, which is
entitled "THE MORALISTS, A Philosophical Rhapsody. BEING A RECITAL of certain
Conversations on Natural and Moral Subjects."2
Before turning to The Moralists itself, however, we should continue our practice
of consulting Shaftesburyřs own advice for reading the treatise he regarded as his
"principal performance."3

1

Miscellaneous Reflections: Miscellany IV, 3.117.

2

Moralists, 2.101 ff.

3

Miscellany V, 3.176.
289

290

 The Di al ogue - F orm Revi si t ed

In his fifth "Miscellany",4 the Critic invites us to think carefully about the literary
character of the work we are about to encounter. He offers Shaftesbury an ironical
reproach for the literary forms he has chosen for Volume II of his book:
had the Author of our Subject-Treatises considerřd thorowly of…literate Affairs,
and found how the Interest of Wit stood at present in our Nation, he wouřd have
had so much regard surely to his own Interest, as never to have writ unless either
in the single Capacity of mere CRITICK, or that of AUTHOR in form. If he had
resolvřd never to produce a regular or legitimate Piece, he might pretty safely
have writ on still after the rate of his first Volume, and mixt manner. He might
have been as critical, as satirical, or as full of Raillery as he had pleasřd. But to
come afterwards as a grave Actor upon the Stage, and expose himself to Criticism
in his turn, by giving us a Work or two in form, after the regular manner of
Composition, as we see in his second Volume; this, I think, was no extraordinary
Proof of his Judgment or Ability, in what related to his own Credit and
Advantage.5
We saw in chapter 4 that our Critic apologized for the unpleasant "methodick" manner of
An Inquiry; he lamented the "dry Philosophy, and rigid Manner of our Author; without
any Excursions into various Literature; without help from the Comick or Tragick Muse,
or from the Flowers of Poetry or Rhetorick."6 We have a different challenge facing us in
reading The Moralists, perhaps precisely because we now have an overabundance of help
from the Muses. According to the Critic, the
next Piece (the MORALISTS, which we have now before us) must, according to his
own Rules, be reckonřd as an Undertaking of greater weight. řTis not only at the
bottom, as systematical, didactick and preceptive, as that other Piece of formal
Structure; but it assumes withal another Garb, and more fashionable Turn of Wit.
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It conceals what is scholastical, under the appearance of a polite Work. It aspires
to Dialogue, and carrys with it not only those poetick Features of the Pieces
antiently callřd MIMES; but it attempts to unite the several Personages and
Characters in One Action, or Story, within a determinate Compass of Time,
regularly divided, and drawn into different and proportionřd Scenes: And this,
too, with variety of STYLE; the simple, comick, rhetorical, and even the poetick or
sublime; such as is the aptest to run into Enthusiasm and Extravagance. So much
is our Author, by virtue of this Piece, a Poet in due form, and by a more apparent
claim, than if he had writ a Play, or dramatick Piece, in as regular a manner, at
least, as any known at present on our Stage.7
The Critic leads us to expect a serious teaching to emerge from The Moralists, but our
task here will be more difficult than the working through of Shaftesburyřs Inquiry. We
should expect to find "systematical, didactick and perceptive" structure in The Moralists
as much as in An Inquiry. This might be surprising, since formal structure is always more
difficult to discern in a dialogue than in a philosophic treatise. What is more, we must
now draw heavily on the preparation in literary modes that Shaftesbury offered us in
Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author. We are told by the Critic that the author will follow
his "own Rules." The Moralists is a dialogue; it consequently follows the modes of those
works "antiently callřd MIMES." It does this in part by respecting the classical concern to
integrate a variety of characters into a unified story.

We recall that in Soliloquy,

Shaftesbury described these ancient mimes thus: "they were Pieces which, besides their
force of Style, and hidden Numbers, carryřd a sort of Action and Imitation, the same as
the Epick and Dramatick kinds. They were either real Dialogues, or Recitals of such
personated Discourses; where the Persons themselves had their Characters preservřd
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throřout; their Manners, Humours, and distinct Turns of Temper and Understanding
maintainřd, according to the most exact poetical Truth."8 Mimes, then, while having a
certain style and disguised order ("hidden Numbers"), are more than a set of arguments
set off by tunica distincta alone. In a genuine dialogue, the speeches are delivered in the
context of a plot (the "Action and Imitation" found in drama) and by characters who are
presented with artistic integrity (that is, they are "preservřd throřout"). As we discussed
in Chapter 2, the dialogic form invites reflection not only on the things said but also on
the character of the speakers and audience present at a conversation. Since the author of
a dialogue recedes from view--Shaftesbury says the author is "annihilated" by the form-the reader is left with an apparently immediate encounter with characters. Shaftesbury
writes:
the Scene presents it-self, as by chance, and undesignřd. You are not only left to
judg coolly, and with indifference, of the Sense deliverřd; but of the Character,
Genius, Elocution, and Manner of the Persons who deliver it. These two are mere
Strangers, in whose favour you are no way engagřd. Nor is it enough that the
Persons introducřd speak pertinent and good Sense, at every turn. It must be seen
from what Bottom they speak; from what Principle, what Stock or Fund of
Knowledg they draw; and what Kind or Species of Understanding they possess.
For the Understanding here must have its Mark, its characteristick Note, by which
it may be distinguishřd. It must be such and such an Understanding; as when we
say, for instance, such or such a Face: since Nature has characterizřd Tempers
and Minds as peculiarly as Faces. And for an Artist who draws naturally, řtis not
enough to shew us merely Faces which may be callřd Men’s: Every Face must be
a certain Man’s.9
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We will therefore watch the characters of The Moralists carefully, noticing who is
speaking, what they are saying and to whom; that is, we must attend to character and plot.
The Critic also calls our attention to the importance of "a determinate Compass of Time"
and to the "different and proportionřd Scenes" we encounter. When and where certain
speeches occur will deserve our special attention; that is, we must also attend to time and
place.

Finally, we must not overlook the "variety of STYLE; the simple, comick,

rhetorical, and even the poetick or sublime." This last style is especially deceptive
because it is the "aptest to run into Enthusiasm and Extravagance."
The Critic calls Shaftesbury qua author of The Moralists, "a Poet in due form."
Shaftesbury deploys literary styles as he sees fit, following the lessons he learned from
several disciples of Socrates, including
his Disciple of noble Birth and lofty Genius, who aspirřd to Poetry and Rhetorick
[that is, Plato], took the Sublime part, and shone above his other Condisciples. He
of mean Birth, and poorest Circumstances [Speusippus], whose Constitution as
well as Condition inclinřd him most to the way we call Satirick,10 took the
reproving part, which in his better-humourřd and more agreeable Successor
[Xenocrates], turnřd into the Comick kind, and went upon the Model of that
antient Comedy which was then prevalent. But another noble Disciple
[Xenophon, that is], whose Genius was towards Action, and who provřd
afterwards the greatest Hero of his time took the genteeler Part, and softer
Manner. He joinřd what was deepest and most solid in Philosophy, with what was
easiest and most refinřd in Breeding, and in the Character and Manner of a
Gentleman. Nothing couřd be remoter than his Genius was, from the scholastick,
the rhetorical, or mere poetick kind. He was as distant, on one hand, from the
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sonorous, high, and pompous Strain; as, on the other hand, from the ludicrous,
mimical, or satirick.11
We remark in passing that the most conspicuous aspect of Shaftesbury's dialogue, namely
the long rhapsodic prose-poems, imitate the "sublime" style. According to Shaftesbury,
Platořs "dialogues were real POEMS."12 It is for the rhapsodic element above all that the
Critic calls Shaftesbury "a Poet in due form."
To return, the Critic elaborates in an extended footnote the importance of
Shaftesburyřs being a true poet in this dialogue.

We should consider his remarks

carefully:
That [Shaftesbury] is conscious of this, we may gather from that Line or two of
Advertisement, which stands at the beginning of his first Edition. "As for the
Characters, and Incidents, they are neither wholly feignřd (says he) nor wholly
true: but according to the Liberty allowřd in the way of DIALOGUE, the principal
Matters are founded upon Truth; and the rest as near resembling as may be. řTis a
Sceptick recites: and the Hero of the Piece passes for an Enthusiast. If a perfect
Character be wanting; řtis the same Case here, as with the Poets in some of their
best Pieces. And this surely is a sufficient Warrant for the Author of a
PHILOSOPHICAL ROMANCE."--Thus our Author himself; who to conceal,
however, his strict Imitation of the antient poetick DIALOGUE, has prefixřd an
auxiliary Title to his Work, and given it the Sirname of RHAPSODY: As if it
were merely of that Essay or mix’d kind of Works, which come abroad with an
affected Air of Negligence and Irregularity. But whatever our Author may have
affected in his Title-Page, řtwas so little his Intention to write after that Model of
incoherent Workmanship, that it appears to be sorely against his Will, if this
Dialogue-Piece of his has not the just Character, and correct Form of those antient
Poems describřd. He wouřd gladly have constituted ONE single Action and Time,
sutable to the just Simplicity of those Dramatick Works. And this, one wouřd
think, was easy enough for him to have done. He needed only to have brought his
11
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first Speakers immediately into Action, and savřd the narrative or recitative Part
of PHILOCLES to PALEMON, by producing them as speaking Personages upon his
Stage. The Scene all along might have been the Park. From the early Evening to
the late Hour of Night, that the two Galants withdrew to their Town-Apartments,
there was sufficient time for the Narrator Philocles, to have recited the whole
Transaction of the second and third Part; which wouřd have stood throřout as it
now does: only at the Conclusion, when the narrative or recitative Part had
ceasřd, the simple and direct DIALOGUE wouřd have again returnřd, to grace the
Exit. By this means the temporal as well as local Unity of the Piece had been
preservřd. Nor had our Author been necessitated to commit that Anachronism, of
making his first Part, in order, to be last in time.13
We learn many important things from this passage. First, our author has constructed his
dialogue with care--he is "conscious" of his work as a poet. In fact, while the piece may
at times seem to be the product of "incoherent Workmanship," we should not believe it.
The characters and incidents are neither wholly feigned nor wholly true. The work itself
is disguised as a "philosophical romance" but is actually an imitation of the classical
dialogue. Since a dialogue is more than a collection of reported speeches, we will have to
ask ourselves in what way the characters and incidents are feigned or true as we proceed.
We may be sure, however, that the "principal Matters are founded upon Truth."
The narrator of the dialogue is "a Sceptick," while "the Hero of the Piece passes
for an Enthusiast." What could it mean to "pass" for an Enthusiast? As we shall see, the
treatment of enthusiasm is carefully constructed, and Shaftesbury offers us careful clues
as to how we should understand the enthusiasm of our characters.
As for the local and temporal setting of the piece, the Critic calls our attention to
the fact that they are not straightforward. This complexity, we learn, could have been
13
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easily avoided. "He needed only to have brought his first Speakers immediately into
Action, and savřd the narrative or recitative Part of PHILOCLES to PALEMON, by
producing them as speaking Personages upon his Stage." Yet he has not done so, and we
must ask ourselves why not. Given the care of the workmanship, it can hardly have been
"sorely against his Will" to have departed from the ancient manner of dialogue-writing.
The Critic offers us one reason Shaftesbury appears to have so departed. Shaftesbury
wanted to conceal his "strict Imitation of the antient poetick DIALOGUE," and he has for
this reason identified the style and structure of the work a "RHAPSODY."
The fact that The Moralists is a narrated dialogue hardly removes Shaftesbury
from the classical tradition.

Many of Platořs dialogues are narrated, including the

Symposium and the Theaetetus. The latter dialogue, in fact, has an odd preliminary
dialogue between two characters, one of whom shares a manuscript he prepared over time
and in consultation with the philosophical hero Socrates who is himself portrayed in the
manuscript.

Socrates himself draws attention to the narrative literary style in the

Republic.14 Both Xenophon and Cicero present their dialogues as narratives.15
Yet the Critic calls our attention to the irregularities of the time and place of the
conversations in The Moralists by indicating how they might have been presented
differently. He notes that the speakers might have been presented without the narrative
frame. Why then do we have the first letter of Philocles to Palemon at all? Does it really
14
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belong in the same work as the account of Philoclesř visit with Theocles or must we
conclude that the conversation with Palemon is window dressing? We might carry this
further by asking why the character Palemon is present in The Moralists at all. If we
accept the narrative frame, we still wonder about the location of the conversations. Why
not stay in the park? Why does the account of Theocles occur only after Palemon and
Philocles retire to their own apartments? This structure apparently forces an abrupt
ending to the work: At the close of a long discourse on philosophy Philocles writes, "BY
this time we found our-selves insensibly got home. Our Philosophy ended, and we
return'd to the common Affairs of life."16 If Palemon and Philocles remained together for
the duration of the narrative, we might have returned to them after Philoclesř narrative in
parts II and III. Would this exit not have been more graceful? Even if we confine our
attention to the second two parts we encounter a variety of locations--inside and outside-and a variety of times and occasions.
Finally, we are invited to wonder whether the temporal unity of The Moralists has
been violated. The narrative is emphatically out of temporal order. Shaftesbury commits
an "anachronism" in the narrative by placing the conversation with Theocles, which
happened earlier, after the later conversation between Palemon and Philocles. The Critic
might also have noted that even the exchange of part I is not presented directly. Instead,
it, too, is narrated indirectly through letter-writing, albeit still from Philocles to Palemon.
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(The work is, as the title says, a "recital" of certain conversations.) Yet Palemon himself
was present at the conversation of part I and it occurred as recently as yesterday!
According to the Critic, Shaftesbury had reasons for failing to imitate the alleged
simplicity of the ancients. The Critic writes, "he dares not, in his own Model and
principal Performance, attempt to unite his Philosophy in one solid and uniform Body,
nor carry on his Argument in one continuřd Chain or Thred."17 The Critic suggests that it
was difficult to imagine contemporary characters who would engage in an extended
conversation on nothing but philosophy and morals. As we saw in chapter 2, and as the
Critic now reminds us in a footnoted reference to Volume I, Shaftesbury fears that the
"coquetry of a modern Author" somehow suits the manners and mores of the modern
"fashionable world" better than the more salutary practice of dialogue. 18 Shaftesbury is
"forcřd therefore to raise particular Machines, and constrain his principal Characters, in
order to carry a better Face, and bear himself out, against the appearance of Pedantry."19
While these "machines" may help the contemporary reader avoid boredom, they also
make it more difficult to trace the continuous thread of the argument mentioned above. It
will be our job to see whether we can discern a unified argument--one "systematical,
didactick and perceptive," perhaps--in The Moralists. As we shall see, Shaftesburyřs
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dialogue does try to raise the ancient form of dialogue from the dead, since such a style
appeals to those mimes of early times, "before Philosophy was in vogue."20
 The Charact ers

The Critic offers us important clues for thinking about the characters we meet in
The Moralists by indicating the sorts of "machines" we should notice. We have seen the
Critic say that the "hero…passes for an Enthusiast." The hero is named Theocles, and
his name suggests the glory of God.21 We now learn that Shaftesburyřs "GentlemanPhilosopher THEOCLES, before he enters into his real Character, becomes a feignřd
Preacher. And even when his real Character comes on, he hardly dares stand it out; but to
deal the better with his Sceptick-Friend, he falls again to personating, and takes up the
Humour of the Poet and Enthusiast."22

For now it is enough to notice that when

considering the "Bottom" from which Theocles speaks, it may not be the preachy
enthusiasm frequently identified with him. The Critic forces us to wonder about the real
character of Theocles.
The recipient of the letters is named Palemon. The Critic remarks, "PALEMON the
Man of Quality, and who is first introducřd as Speaker in the Piece, must, for fashionsake, appear in Love, and under a kind of Melancholy, producřd by some Mis-adventures
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in the World. How else shouřd he be supposřd so serious?"23 How else indeed. While
this is true, we shall see that Palemon comes by his melancholy honestly. The name
Palemon seems to allude to several things, which I will discuss in detail presently.
The skeptical friend is named Philocles, whose name suggests the friend of
glory.24 The Critic writes that "PHILOCLES his Friend (an airy Gentleman of the World,
and a thorow Raillier) must have a home Charge upon him, and feel the Anger of his
grave Friend, before he can be supposřd grave enough to enter into a philosophical
Discourse."25 If this is an accurate description of what is required to stir Philocles, it is
nevertheless true that he enters the "discourse" artfully and extensively.
It seems likely that Shaftesbury has chosen the names of his characters with care.
We can infer this not only from the general remarks on dialogue above, but also from the
scorn the Critic shows other contemporary attempts at dialogue.

Party authors and

theologians have tried to imitate this ancient form, but without success. The Critic
remarks:
at present, it must be ownřd, the Characters, or Personages, employřd by our new
orthodox Dialogists, carry with řem little Proportion or Coherence; and in this
respect may be said to sute perfectly with that figurative metaphorical Style and
23
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rhetorical Manner, in which their Logick and Arguments are generally couchřd.
Nothing can be more complex or multiform than their moral Draughts or Sketches
of Humanity. These, indeed, are so far from representing any particular Man, or
Order of Men, that they scarce resemble any thing of the Kind. řTis by their
Names only that these Characters are figurřd. Tho they bear different Titles, and
are set up to maintain contrary Points; they are found, at the bottom, to be all of
the same side; and, notwithstanding their seeming Variance, to co-operate in the
most officious manner with the Author, towards the display of his own proper
Wit, and the establishment of his private Opinion and Maxims. They are indeed
his very legitimate and obsequious Puppets; as like real Men in Voice, Action,
and Manners, as those wooden or wire Engines of the lower Stage. PHILOTHEUS
and PHILATHEUS, PHILAUTUS and PHILALETHES are of one and the same Order:
Just Tallys to one another: Questioning and Answering in concert, and with such a
sort of Alternative as is known in a vulgar Play, where one Person lies down
blindfold, and presents himself, as fair as may be, to another, who by favour of
the Company, or the assistance of his Good-fortune, deals his Companion many a
sound Blow, without being once challengřd, or brought into his Turn of lying
down.26
We can expect, then, that Shaftesbury intends to portray real characters rather than
"obsequious Puppets." Also, his names are unlikely to have been chosen haphazardly.
The Critic's list of variations on favorite names for characters--Philotheus, Philatheus,
Philautus, Philalethes--is interesting in itself, since it suggests names that were not chosen
by Shaftesbury. "Philotheus" would have combined the first roots of Philocles and
Theocles, respectively. Insofar as there is friendship for god in The Moralists, however,
it is expressed by characters other than the principal three. "Philo" and "Theo" are also
suggestive given the prevalence of philosophy and theology in the Characteristicks.
Indeed, Shaftesbury's skeptic and enthusiast do provide a continuation of the dispute
between philosophy and theology.

26
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characters will not be straw-men and that disputed opinions will have the full advantage
of reasonable argument.

The Moralists, Part I
The general structure of The Moralists is as follows. The dialogue is divided into
three parts, and each part into sections. The whole is cast in the form of a letter (or three
letters) from Philocles to his friend Palemon.

Part I recounts a conversation held

"yesterday" between Philocles and Palemon.

Parts II and III recount a series of

conversations between Philocles and his friend Theocles, with occasional participation
from additional characters. The conversations between Philocles and Theocles happen
over the course of two days.
Part I is divided into three sections. As we shall see, section 1 sets out the
contemporary environment within which philosophers think. Section 2 examines the
melancholia of Palemon and connects it to broader philosophical concerns. Section 3
acts as a prelude to the rest of the dialogue, setting up the context and indicating the tone
we can expect.
 P art I, § 1: The St ate of P hil osophy

Shaftesbury opens The Moralists by providing a character sketch of Palemon
through the eyes of our narrator, Philocles. We learn that Palemon is a man of "Rank and
Credit in the fashionable World" and a man of "Genius fitted for the greatest Affairs," but
also one who has made a "violent…Turn toward Philosophy and the Schools." 27 This
27
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makes Palemon an unusual gentleman. Philocles writes to his friend that "you are the
only well-bred Man who wouřd have taken the Fancy to talk Philosophy in such a Circle
of good Company as we had round us yesterday, when we were in your Coach together,
in the Park."28 While Philocles is himself quite conversant with philosophy, his praise of
Palemonřs "passion for Philosophy" is mixed with irony. Palemonřs passion leads him to
initiate an "unseasonable Conversation, so opposite to the reigning Genius of Gallantry
and Pleasure." Philocles seems not to share Lawrence Kleinřs sense that the park is an
appropriate place to have philosophical conversations; indeed, one might call Palemon
impolite.29
Philocles remarks that it has "become fashionable in our Nation to talk Politicks
in every Company, and mix the Discourses of State-affairs with those of Pleasure and
Entertainment."30 It is not surprising to find gentlemen (and perhaps also ladies and more
ordinary men) discussing politics given the political currents of the age. 31 But not so
philosophy.
According to Philocles, "we Moderns" have "degraded" philosophy, and "strippřd
her of her chief Rights." Philosophy is in disrepute and political matters are no longer

28
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considered the concern of philosophers. While "Philosophy" once influenced affairs of
the world,
we have immurřd her (poor Lady!) in Colleges and Cells; and have set her
servilely to such Works as those in the Mines. Empiricks, and pedantick Sophists
are her chief Pupils. The School-syllogism, and the Elixir, are the choicest of her
Products. So far is she from producing Statesmen, as of old, that hardly any Man
of Note in the publick cares to own the least Obligation to her. If some few
maintain their Acquaintance, and come now and then to her Recesses, řtis as the
Disciple of Quality came to his Lord and Master; "secretly, and by night."32
This degradation is contrary to nature, however, for "if Morals be allowřd
belonging to her, Politicks must undeniably be hers."33

Politics and morality are

inseparable; one cannot think about "Manners and Constitutions of Men in common"
without first considering who and what men are by nature. Philocles remarks, "nothing is
more familiar than to reason concerning Man in his confederate State and national
Relation; as he stands ingagřd to this or that Society, by Birth or Naturalization: Yet to
consider him as a Citizen or Commoner of the World, to trace his Pedegree a step higher,
and view his End and Constitution in Nature it-self, must pass, it seems, for some
intricate or over-refinřd Speculation."34
Philocles blames part of the shameful reputation of philosophy on her academic
practitioners, whom he describes as "Scholasticks." It is they who are responsible for the
stuffy air surrounding philosophy. The scholastic model consists of over-rehearsed "set-
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places" rather than living ideas. Such language is foreign to the tastes of good company.
"The least mention of such matters gives us a disgust, and puts us out of humour. If
Learning comes a-cross us, we count it Pedantry; if Morality, řtis Preaching."35 This
consequence is especially lamentable, given the tendency of gallant conversation to
become shallow and effete. Philocles writes that modern conversations have lost "those
masculine Helps of Learning and sound Reason" to the extent that even women find them
contemptible.36 Witty conversation may still enjoy "an Air of Play and Dalliance," but
without a foundation in knowledge, serious people dismiss it as mere "colouring and
drapery."
Philocles connects the decline in serious conversation to the decline in the
popularity of the dialogue as a literary form, which "heretofore was found the politest and
best way of managing even the graver Subjects."37 Nor poet nor painter nor philosopher
can cast their works "against the Appearance of Nature and Truth," and the truth is that a
philosophic conversation would be unrecognizable to the fashionable world.

A

philosopher who writes dialogues can expect to be ineffectual. "If he represents his
Philosophy as making any figure in Conversation; if he triumphs in the Debate, and gives
his own Wisdom the advantage over that of the World; he may be liable to sound
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Raillery, and possibly be made a Fable of." As we saw in chapter two, the decline of
conversation and the abandonment of the art of dialogue are mutually influential.
Philocles offers his own fable to make his point clear. He observes that statues
often depict the triumph of heroic men over lions; and indeed, a master sculptor might
move even a lion with his art. Yet lions and men both know the truth: lions are stronger
than men, beautiful fables to the contrary notwithstanding. In the case of philosophical
characters, Philocles asks, "where are the Originals?"38 Even should one have the good
fortune to find a genuine philosopher, can one even imagine a truthful dialogue which
depicts his philosophical conversation?
Genuine philosophy, which Philocles, following Cicero, calls "Academick,"
requires open "Questioning and Doubting." This manner is contrary to the genius of the
age. Philocles writes that contemporary "men love to take party instantly. They canřt
bear being kept in suspence. The Examination torments řem. They want to be rid of it,
upon the easiest terms."39 In this they betray a distrust of the very faculty of reason
which alone might save them from doubt.
The philosophy of the age suits such impatience by directing its attention to
applied rather than purely theoretical matters.

Philocles shares with Shaftesbury a

disdain for philosophic "improvers." Philocles calls these contemporary philosophers
"alchymists."
38
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We have a strange Fancy to be Creators, a violent Desire at least to know the
Knack or Secret by which Nature does all. The rest of our Philosophers only aim
at that in Speculation, which our Alchymists aspire to in Practice. For with some
of these it has been actually under deliberation how to make Man, by other
Mediums than Nature has hitherto provided. Every Sect has a Recipe. When you
know it, you are Master of Nature: you solve all her Phaenomena: you see all her
Designs, and can account for all her Operations. If need were, you might,
perchance too, be of her Laboratory, and work for her. At least one wouřd
imagine the Partizans of each modern Sect had this Conceit. They are all
ARCHIMEDESřS in their way, and can make a World upon easier terms than he
offerřd to move one.40
Philocles concludes section 1 of part 1 by connecting the vices of the age to
scholastic and alchemical modern philosophy. Men no longer "dare to doubt" and "thus
we will needs know every thing, and be at the pains of examining nothing." It is no
surprise then, that "Academick" philosophy, which doesnřt offer firm truths, is unpopular.
Academic philosophy, he writes, "goes upon no establishřd Hypothesis, nor presents us
with any flattering Scheme, talks only of Probabilitys, Suspence of Judgment, Inquiry,
Search, and Caution not to be imposřd on, or deceivřd."41 Young men were once trained
in this academic philosophy, receiving from it an exercise of the mind analogous to the
education of the body receives from wrestling; both disciplines presumably lead to
humane strength and flexibility. Gentlemen carried this humane education with them
throughout their lives and into public and domestic affairs.
So too the art of dialogue, which imitated and taught academic philosophy, is ill
suited to the modern age. Sustaining the willingness to treat open questions as genuinely
40
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open is a philosophical challenge to which the dialogue is especially well-suited. We
have seen that dialogues present more than one character in conversation and thereby
disguise the opinions of the author. Philocles professes reluctance to present such a
conversation, "especially in the Light you have unluckily chosen to set it."42 We learn
that Philocles proceeds only at the request of Palemon--"the Project is your own," he
writes--and that success will require the assistance of the Muses.
 P art I, § 2: Mel anchol y P alem on and Skept i cal P hi l ocl es

In section 2 we learn that Palemon has not been improved by his turn to
philosophy; indeed it seems to have sowed nothing but misanthropy in his soul. The
section opens with a lamentation by Palemon:
O WRETCHED State of Mankind!--Hapless Nature, thus to have errřd in thy
chief Workmanship!--Whence sprang this fatal Weakness? What Chance or
Destiny shall we accuse? Or shall we mind the Poets, when they sing thy Tragedy
(Prometheus!) who with thy stoln celestial Fire, mixřd with vile Clay, didst mock
Heavenřs Countenance, and in abusive Likeness of the Immortals madřst the
compound Man; that wretched Mortal, ill to himself, and Cause of Ill to all. --43
Philocles calls the lamentation a "rant" and expresses surprise that such an ugly mood
was possible on such a lovely day in the park. Palemon quickly concedes that he does in
fact admire the beauty of nature which surrounds them; he excludes man alone from
praise. Insofar as mankind can be said to have beauty at all, Palemon credits art rather
than nature.
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This limited concession to art was unavoidable, because, as Philocles observes,
Palemonřs "Genius" was inclined to "Poetry." Yet Palemon does not admire all poetry.
Philocles writes, "you acknowledgřd it to be true indeed, what had been observřd by
some late Wits, 'That Gallantry was of a modern Growth.' And well it might be so, you
thought, without dishonour to the Antients; who understood Truth and Nature too well, to
admit so ridiculous an Invention."44 Palemon, it seems, deplores "gallantry" for its
artificiality and consequently sees gallantry as contrary to his own understanding of
nature and truth. He cannot imagine that while opinions are shaped by art, some may be
judged as more in accord with nature than others. Clearly, his turn to philosophy had not
led him to the judicious practice of "soliloquy" we discussed in Chapter 2.
As Philocles and Palemon spoke, the hour grew late. Their company at the park
began to withdraw, perhaps because of the hour and perhaps in part because Palemonřs
vehement opinions offended them. "The Beau-monde," says Philocles, "whom you had
been thus severely censuring, drew off apace." It is now evening and the heavenly bodies
can be seen.45 The night brings solitude to the two friends, and Philocles jokes that the
rising moon and planets might be "the only proper Company for a Man in [Palemon's]
Humour." There in the moonlight, Palemon finds "much Satisfaction of natural Things,
and of all Orders of Beautys," with the conspicuous exception of man.
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Philocles seems to connect both the contempt Palemon feels for the fashionable
world and the admiration he has for nature to the modern philosophy he has imbibed.
Philocles writes, "you, who wouřd allow nothing to those fair earthly Luminarys in the
Circles which just now we movřd in; you, Palemon, who seemřd to overlook the Pride of
that Theater, began now to look out with Ravishment on this other, and triumph in the
new philosophical Scene of Worlds unknown." 46
Philocles worries that Palemon, who is so sensible when discussing the heavens,
has allowed his aversion to human beings to grow into hatred. While Palemon objects
that his affection for friends and country remain strong, he cannot ignore the "treacherys"
and "disorders" hidden in the hearts of men. Palemon is torn between his own experience
in common life and the cynical opinions he has learned from modern philosophy. Men
may seem to the careless observer to be sociable, he remarks,
but let him stay a-while. Allow him leisure; till he has gainřd a nearer View, and
following our dissolvřd Assemblys to their particular Recesses, he has the power
of seeing řem in this new Aspect.--Here he may behold those great Men of the
Ministry, who not an hour ago in publick appearřd such Friends, now plotting
craftily each otherřs Ruin, with the Ruin of the State it-self, a Sacrifice to their
Ambition. Here he may see too those of a softer kind, who knowing not
Ambition, follow only Love. Yet (Philocles) who wouřd think it?"-This speech provokes laughter in Philocles, who thinks he has glimpsed the true cause of
Palemonřs ill mood. Only a man who has been unlucky in love would hold these
opinions! Philoclesř joke suggests one possible allusion suggested by Palemonřs name.
Fashionable society is rooted in gallantry and gothic tales. In the "Knightřs Tale" of
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Chaucer's The Canterbury Tales we meet a lovelorn "knyght highte Palamon."47
Chaucerřs Knight himself is also disaffected with gallantry, having himself seen the
consequences of knight-errantry while serving as a mercenary in the Crusades. (There is
also a Palamon in Drydenřs retelling of the tale in his poem "Palamon and Arcite.") We
will see another plausible allusion below. Palemon, like the knight Palamon, may be
melancholy over an unobtainable love; and like the pilgrim Knight he might be
melancholy from a loss of faith in gallantry.
Philocles has broken the mood of Palemon with his good humor and the friends
are now able to engage in a more sober discussion--what Shaftesbury commonly calls
"cool Reasoning." They inquire into the "nature and Cause of ILL in general: ŘThroř
what Contingency, what Chance; by what fatal Necessity, what Will, or what Permission
it came upon the World; or being come once, shouřd still subsist.ř"48 While most
gentlemen would find "this Inquiry" too difficult, Philocles finds Palemon to be a man of
"close Judgment and Penetration."49 A footnote to the word "Inquiry" refers us to the
beginning of the fourth treatise, An Inquiry Concerning Virtue and Merit.

That

beginning, as we explained in chapter 4, sets forth the several logical opinions on the
divine. That section of An Inquiry was described by Shaftesbury as the "thorny part of
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our Philosophy," after which the work became "more plain and easy."50 This difficult
inquiry gives Philocles the opportunity to challenge Palemonřs opinion holding that
nature has erred in making man.
Philocles suggests that good and ill are inseparably mixed in the world, but that
given the right perspective one can find it "agreeable enough, in the main." Palemon is
willing to say that even storms lend beauty to nature; but as for men, they are a failed
mixture of dirt and divine fire much in the way the Prometheus myth suggests.51
Philocles observes that this is not much of a solution to the problem of evil which worried
Palemon. It "explains" evil by moving its cause back one step from the initial question,
but the same question can still be asked.
Yet such an account is an answer of sorts. Philocles points out that most people
can rest satisfied with such an answer, even if the philosopher would recognize it as a
"Tale."52 Indeed, only a philosopher would be such a nuisance as to press the question of
"the cause of ill" past the point of easy solutions--at least in mixed company! Philocles
recognizes the utility of mythological explanations. He says,
in reality…řtis not to be imaginřd how serviceable a Tale is, to amuse others
besides mere Children; and how much easier the Generality of Men are paid in
this Paper-coin, than in Sterling Reason. We ought not to laugh so readily at the
Indian Philosophers, who to satisfy their People how this huge Frame of the
World is supported, tell řem řtis by an Elephant.--And the Elephant how?--A
shreud Question! but which by no means shouřd be answerřd. řTis here only that
50
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our Indian Philosophers are to blame. They shouřd be contented with the
Elephant, and go no further. But they have a Tortoise in reverse; whose Back,
they think, is broad enough. So the Tortoise must bear the new Load: And thus
the matter stands worse than before.53
Matters are made worse by prying too deeply, it seems, because the most fundamental
questions seem capable of an infinite regress. "Heathen Mythologists" were wise enough
not to inquire too deeply into such matters, at least not indiscriminately.

This is

sufficient, says Philocles, for most peopleŕfor the "Heathen Vulgar," that is--but it is not
good enough for philosophers. Shaftesbury shows us that Philocles is aware of the
ancient policy toward religion and philosophy as articulated by the Critic. Philosophers
had their own "allegorical, mythological Account of Sacred Things," but they were
careful that the "mysteries" of philosophy were "treated with profound respect, and lay
unexposřd to vulgar eyes."54
Philocles suggests that such myths, for philosophers at least, might be understood
allegorically. Prometheus, for example, could be a name for "Chance, Destiny, a plastick
Nature, or an evil Daemon; whatever was designřd by it."55 But until the question is
traced back to first principles--principles adequate, that is, to answer for the
"OMNIPOTENCE" of what ultimately happens--the work of philosophy is incomplete. In
light of this insight, Palemon is willing to confess that, given imperfect knowledge, he is
unable to say whether the world would have been better off without certain particular
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events. He says that "řtwas impossible…that Heaven shouřd have acted otherwise than
for the best. So that even from this Misery and Ill of Man, there was undoubtedly some
Good arising; something which over-balancřd all, and made full amends."56
Nevertheless, Palemon is not content with this position, in part because Philocles,
having suggested it, turns to criticize it. Why should one suspect that things are for the
best? He asks Palemon
whether it must not be a very strong philosophical Faith which shouřd persuade
one that those dismal Parts you set to view were only the necessary Shades of a
fine Piece, to be reckonřd among the Beautys of the Creation: Or whether
possibly you might look upon that Maxim as very fit for Heaven, which I was
sure you did not approve at all in Mankind; "To do ILL that GOOD might follow."57
Such a view sounds perverse, of course, to the Christian ears of Palemon, who seems to
be attached to the idea of "Creation"58 and is concerned to avoid "Profaneness."59 Before
Philocles can develop this view of ill with examples drawn from Homer, 60 he is stopped
short by the disapproving visage of Palemon. Palemon has come to see clearly that
Philocles is inclined toward "SCEPTICISM," and consequently he fears that Philocles
"adherř[s] to nothing."61 Palemon is troubled that in debate Philocles seems to be "as
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well pleasřd with the Reason on one side, as on the other," and therefore indifferent to the
"Success of the Argument."62
Philocles confesses this criticism is fair. He has what seem to be Epicurean
reasons for his philosophical stance, claiming that
above all things I lovřd Ease; and of all Philosophers those who reasonřd most at
their ease, and were never angry or disturbřd; as those callřd SCEPTICKS, you
ownřd, never were. I lookřd upon this kind of Philosophy as the prettiest,
agreeablest, roving Exercise of the Mind, possible to be imaginřd. The other kind,
I thought, was painful and laborious; "To keep always in the Limits of one Path;
to drive always at a Point; and hold precisely to what Men, at a venture, callřd
63
THE TRUTH: A Point, in all appearance, very unfixřd, and hard to ascertain."
While one might wonder whether the truth is unfixed, few serious men would deny that
the truth is hard to ascertain. Palemon suggests that his skepticism harms no one, and
makes him agreeable to all more "dogmatical" men, especially on questions of faith.
Philoclesř skepticism makes him suspicious of his "own Understanding" and adverse to
rationalism in general.64 In short, his skepticism makes him agreeable in political life.
He says, "you who are Rationalists, and walk by Reason in every thing, pretend to know
all things, whilst you believe little or nothing: We for our parts know nothing, and believe
all."65 This remark is clearly ironical. Philocles suggests that his rationalist skepticism
makes remaining silent in the face of questionable opinions easier than it is for the
morally grounded--and opinionated--gentleman.
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Palemon is offended by this glib posture of Philocles. He worries that these
skeptical arguments result in a moral nihilism. Betraying his irritation with a cold voice,
he asks Philocles, "whether with that fine Scepticism… [he] made no more distinction
between Sincerity and Insincerity in Actions, than…between Truth and Falsehood, Right
and Wrong, in Arguments?"66

Philocles sees the concern immediately:

does his

skepticism overthrow all principles, both "Moral and Divine?"
Philocles apologizes, confessing that he is guilty of "Sceptical Misbehaviour." He
offers to make amends by exercising the "Sceptick Privilege" of taking up any side of an
argument to defend the cause he had previously attacked. He claims no ambition to
discuss or defend Christianity--he professes himself "unworthy of such a task." This
amusingly ambiguous remark suggests that Philocles follows the practice of the Criticřs
Author, who "on all occasions submits most willingly, and with full Confidence and
Trust, to the Opinions by Law establish’d."67

His concerns are confined to "mere

Philosophy," and, he says, "my Fancy is only to try what I can muster up thence, to make
head against the chief Arguments of Atheism, and reestablish what I have offerřd to
loosen in the System of Theism."68
This offer is sufficient to reconcile Palemon to Philocles. A serious concern
remains for us as readers, however. We can see that the "Questioning and Doubting"
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recommended by "Academick Philosophy" lead men to distrust the intentions of
philosophers.69 It is indeed contrary to the genius of the age to postpone answers to
moral and theological questions. Yet even in antiquity, philosophical "busy-bodys" were
seldom welcome in decent company.70
Be this as it may, Palemon is prepared to hear a defense of "THEISM," despite his
principled objection to "DEISM" when it is opposed to Christianity.71 (It is not clear to me
whether Shaftesbury takes this to be a genuine distinction but it does serve to distance
Philocles from what are perhaps more vulgar contemporary skeptics.) Palemon would
like to hear Philocles' defense of theism, but only on the condition that he intends to
advance those opinions fundamental to all religion and not merely to amuse himself with
the subject.72 While Palemon wants to hear theism defended, he also wants something
else that may or may not be compatible with this desire. "Whatever your Thoughts are,
PHILOCLES, I am resolvřd to force řem from you. You can no longer plead the
Unsutableness of the Time or Place to such grave Subjects. The gaudy Scene is over with
the Day. Our Company have long since quitted the Field. And the solemn Majesty of
such a Night as this, may justly sute with the profoundest Meditation, or most serious
Discourse."73 It is now night and the two friends are alone in the park. Because of the
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resolution made by Palemon, Philocles finds himself "drawn into the following Vein of
Philosophical Enthusiasm."74

 P art I, § 3: The B alm of P hi l osophi cal Ent husi asm

Philocles claims that he now understands the melancholy of Palemon better.
Palemon is not love-sick in the manner of a gallant pining for an unobtainable girl; he is,
instead, melancholy because of "a nobler Love than such as common Beautys inspire."75
Philocles, raising his voice and adopting a solemn air, describes an ascent by "knowing"
up the ladder of order and perfection of form. This, Philocles suggests, is Palemonřs true
love and yearning.
Starting from the claim that Palemon is "well-knowing" of all orders and degrees
of beauty, Philocles explains to Palemon that he is attempting to move beyond the
particular forms of beauty he knows to grasp beauty in more general forms; "and with a
larger Heart, and Mind more comprehensive, you generously seek that which is highest in
the kind."76 A soul such as Palemonřs, longing as it does for larger and deeper beauties,
cannot rest satisfied with any particular thing.

It seeks broader and more complex

beauties, first in social relations, in "Communitys, Friendships, Relations, Dutys; and
considers by what Harmony of particular Minds the general Harmony is composřd, and
Commonweal establishřd." Even this is too parochial for his soulřs longing, and soon the
74

Ibid.

75

Ibid., 2.120.

76

Ibid.

319

soul is contemplating the what might be seen as the best sort of human associations as
such and the highest human activities. The soul
frames it-self a nobler Object, and with enlargřd Affection seeks the Good of
Mankind. It dwells with Pleasure amidst that Reason, and those Orders on which
this fair Correspondence and goodly Interest is establishřd. Laws, Constitutions,
civil and religious Rites; whatever civilizes or polishes rude Mankind; the
Sciences and Arts, Philosophy, Morals, Virtue; the flourishing State of human
Affairs, and the Perfection of human Nature; these are its delightful Prospects,
and this the Charm of Beauty which attracts it.77
Still the soul is dissatisfied, however, for in contemplating the things particular to human
beings it has again realized a partial beauty. The soul remains "true to its native World
and higher Country" and so it must continue its quest for "Order and Perfection; wishing
the best, and hoping still to find a just and wise Administration."78 As the marginal
heading here suggests, the native world and higher country for this soul is "the Whole,"
understood as the entire universe. Yet since no real order can be attributed to the Whole
without the existence of Mind, "řtis here the generous Mind labours to discover that
healing Cause by which the Interest of the Whole is securely establishřd, the Beauty of
Things, and the universal Order happily sustainřd."79
This deepest of longings, says Philocles,
is the Labour of your Soul: and This its Melancholy, when unsuccessfully
pursuing the supreme Beauty, it meets with darkning Clouds which intercept its
Sight. Monsters arise, not those from Lybian Desarts, but from the Heart of Man
more fertile; and with their horrid Aspect cast an unseemly Reflection upon
77
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NATURE. She, helpless (as she is thought) and working thus absurdly, is
contemnřd, the Government of the World arraignřd, and DEITY made void.80
Much like the correspondent-friend in Sensus Communis,81 Palemon seems to be one of
those "gentlemen of fashion…to whom a natural good genius, or force of good education,
has given a sense of what is naturally graceful or becoming."82 Palemon is himself a man
of rank and credit in the fashionable world, "well-knowing and experiencřd in all the
Degrees and Orders of Beauty, in all the mysterious Charms of the particular Forms."83
Yet he has lost confidence that the world in the truest sense is orderly or that the Whole is
a kósmos.
Palemon seems to have come by his melancholia honestly. His turn to the
philosophy of the modern schools was described as a violent one. To this extent he
seems less fortunate than Shaftesburyřs friend in Sensus Communis. There, Shaftesbury
was able to write, "řTIS well for you (my Friend!) that in your Education you have had
little to do with the Philosophy, or Philosophers of our days. A good Poet, and an honest
Historian, may afford Learning enough for a Gentleman. And such a one, whilst he reads
these Authors as his Diversion, will have a truer relish of their Sense, and understand řem
better than a Pedant, with all his Labours, and the assistance of his Volumes of
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Commentators."84

In light of this concern, it seems unlikely that the opening

conversation between Philocles and Palemon, while perhaps out of season in the beau
monde, took its direction by accident. While Palemon first raised the topic of philosophy,
it is Philocles who goes on the offensive against the contemporary state of philosophy in
the world; it is he who decries the separation of academic philosophy from a gentlemanřs
education; and he who identifies schoolmen and alchemists as the root of the problem.
Upon hearing this criticism made of modern philosophy, Palemon brought forth
his lamentation against nature. When pressed, Palemon admitted that his concern is
primarily moral. Despite himself, Palemon is troubled by the moral disorder apparently
natural to mankind. Indeed, it is likely that his affection for his friends, family, country,
and humanity, make his fears stand in dark relief. It is conceivable (although speculative)
that Philocles turns to the "theological" question because he sees that it is at the heart of
Palemonřs ill humor. Having distinguished between myth and philosophy, Philocles then
shows Palemon that even the academic philosopher is sometimes less than edifying, at
least insofar as he makes it difficult to settle upon the truth. This, as we have seen, has
grave moral implications.
The philosophical enthusiasm of Philocles first presents a diagnosis of the illness
troubling Palemon.

In summarizing his diagnosis, Philocles admits that "much is

alledgřd in answer, to shew why Nature errs, and how she came thus impotent and erring
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from an unerring Hand."

85

But swept along by his enthusiasm, Philocles boldly offers

hope.
I deny she errs; and when she seems most ignorant or perverse in her Productions,
I assert her even then as wise and provident, as in her goodliest Works. For řtis
not then that Men complain of the Worldřs Order, or abhor the Face of things,
when they see various Interests mixřd and interfering; Natures subordinate, of
different kinds, opposřd one to another, and in their different Operations
submitted, the higher to the lower. řTis on the contrary, from this Order of inferior
and superior Things, that we admire the Worldřs Beauty, founded thus on
Contrarietys: whilst from such various and disagreeing Principles, a universal
Concord is establishřd.86
One might fear that the apparent diversity we encounter in the world is incompatible with
the notion of sustained universal order. Shaftesbury directs us in a footnote to consider
two passages on "the World" at this point.87 The reader is instructed to consult a footnote
to the Criticřs ŖMiscellany V,ŗ which offers the reader a philosophic pedigree for
Shaftesburyřs opinion about concord and contraries. We will glance at these passages
briefly, before continuing the speech of Philocles to Palemon.
The footnote in ŖMiscellany Vŗ cites two passages from Aristotleřs On the
Heavens (or perí kósmon, appropriately enough). The passages are combined as follows:
perhaps Nature wants opposites too, and wants to make harmony out of them, not
out of similars; as, for instance, she brings the male to the female and not each of
these to one of his or her own sex; and she made the first concord by means of
opposites, not similars. Art too seems to do this in imitation of nature. For
painting, by combining the natures of black and white, yellow and red, makes its
representations correspond with their types. Music, uniting sharp and grave notes,
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and long and short syllables, makes one harmony among different sounds.
Grammar too, bringing together vowels and consonants, builds her whole art upon
them. This is the very point which was given forth by Heraclitus the Obscure,
who said, "combine wholes and parts, that which is dispersed and that which is
united, that which makes discord and that which is in unison, and out of all comes
one and out of one comes all." . . . There is one harmony arising from all the
bodies which sound together and circle in the sky, and it springs from one thing
and ends in one. We might with correct etymology call the universe an order, but
not a disorder. And, just as in a chorus, when the leader has led off, all the band of
men (and sometimes women) joins in, making by combination of different voices,
higher and lower, one harmony in unison, so it is also in the case of the Deity who
controls the universe.88
This passage makes several points useful for our purposes. Here we see Shaftesbury
begin to establish an analogy between art and nature. Earlier Palemon feared that, in the
case of human beings, art alone contributed whatever was of beauty in human beings.
The passages of Aristotle suggest, to the contrary, that art, found in music, painting, and
graceful speaking, imitates nature when it combines contraries into a harmonious whole.
Aristotle suggests for this reason we can call the universe an order but not a disorder.89
The end of the quotation shifts the analogy, attributing to "the Deity" activity analogous
to the choral leader.
According to Philoclesř speech, Nature achieves order by subordinating its parts
to the greater Whole; as Aristotle says, "nature wants opposites too, and wants to make
harmony out of them, not out of similars"--at least "perhaps" it does. Thus can Philocles
account for "those Seeming Blemishes cast upon Nature."90
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This philosophical enthusiasm draws the admiration of Palemon, who wonders
how Philocles came to change his character and speak so eloquently; surely such
thoughts "have some Foundation" in Philocles. Philocles replies that
had [it] been my fortune to have met you the other day, just at my Return out of
the Country from a Friend, whose Conversation had in one day or two made such
an Impression on me, that I shouřd have suted you to a Miracle. You wouřd have
thought indeed that I had been curřd of my Scepticism and Levity, so as never to
have rallyřd more, at that wild rate, on any Subject, much less on these which are
so serious.91
Palemon expresses regret not to have met Philocles before he lost those impressions.
Philocles denies he has lost them; he remarks "I had not so lost řem neither, as not easily,
you saw, to revive řem on occasion; were I not afraid."92 Indeed, he has just shown both
Palemon and the reader that he has philosophical enthusiasm at his ready disposal (and
for reasons we shall see, he cannot lose it). This, of course, makes his claim to be afraid
for both Palemon and himself surprising. Philocles explains: "for tho I was like to be
perfectly curřd of my Scepticism; řtwas by what I thought worse, downright Enthusiasm.
You never knew a more agreeable Enthusiast!"
Philocles seems to be of the opinion that enthusiasm is an antidote which is itself
easily abused. The Critic expresses similar concerns when he discusses enthusiasm in the
second "Miscellany." He writes:
as all Affections have their Excess, and require Judgment and Discretion to
moderate and govern them; so this high and noble Affection, which raises Man to
Action, and is his Guide in Business as well as Pleasure, requires a steddy Rein
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and strict Hand over it. All Moralists, worthy of any Name, have recognizřd the
Passion; tho among these the wisest have prescribřd Restraint, pressřd
Moderation, and to all Tyrořs in Philosophy forbid the forward Use of
Admiration, Rapture, or Extasy, even in the Subjects they esteemřd the highest,
and most divine. They knew very well that the first Motion, Appetite, and Ardour
of the Youth in general towards Philosophy and Knowledg, depended chiefly on
this Turn of Temper: Yet were they well apprizřd, withal, That in the Progress of
this Study, as well as in the affairs of Life, the florid Ideas and exalted Fancy of
this kind became the Fuel of many incendiary Passions; and that, in religious
Concerns particularly, the Habit of Admiration and contemplative Delight, wouřd,
by over-Indulgence, too easily mount into high Fanaticism, or degenerate into
abject Superstition.93
The danger of even philosophical enthusiasm is a recurring theme in "Miscellaneous
Reflections." For example, during the discussion of self-sufficiency and its dependence
on the proper œconomy of the passions in ŖMiscellany IV,ŗ the Critic offers an extended
footnote elaborating his concern over excessive passions of any sort, including the more
laudatory, more sublime passions.94 The footnotes offer quotations from Epictetus which
reproach the passions. The Critic also cites Horaceřs remark that "the wise man must be
called mad, the fair man unfair, if he seek even virtue too keenly." Most interestingly for
our purposes here, we read the following:
Nor was this Prohibition of the wondering or admiring Habit, in early Students,
peculiar to one kind of Philosophy alone. It was common to many; however the
Reason and Account of it might differ, in one Sect from the other. The
Pythagoreans sufficiently checkřd their Tyrořs, by silencing them so long on their
first Courtship to Philosophy. And tho Admiration, in the Peripatetick Sense, as
above-mentionřd, may be justly callřd the inclining Principle or first Motive to
PHILOSOPHY; yet this Mistress, when once espousřd, teaches us to admire, after
a different manner from what we did before.95
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In this passage we see confirmation of our suspicion (discussed in Chapter 2) that
philosophic discretion protects the philosopher from reproach but also serves an
important pedagogical purpose. Once again we Shaftesbury directs our attention away
from the sublime toward the consideration of natural moral life. This is the necessary
prelude to any philosophical progress. As he writes in A Letter Concerning Enthusiasm,
methinks, my Lord, it wouřd be well for us, if before we ascended into the higher
Regions of Divinity, we wouřd vouchsafe to descend a little into our-selves, and
bestow some poor Thoughts upon plain honest Morals. When we had once lookřd
into our-selves, and distinguishřd well the nature of our own Affections, we
shouřd probably be fitter Judges of the Divineness of a Character, and discern
better what Affections were sutable or unsutable to a perfect Being. We might
then understand how to love and praise, when we had acquirřd some consistent
Notion of what was laudable or lovely. Otherwise we might chance to do God
little Honour, when we intended him the most. For řtis hard to imagine what
Honour can arise to the DEITY from the Praises of Creatures, who are unable to
discern what is praise-worthy or excellent in their own kind.96
Nevertheless, Palemon reproaches Philocles for speaking of his friend so carelessly.
"Nor," he adds, "shouřd I, perhaps, judg that to be Enthusiasm which you so freely term
so. I have a strong suspicion that you injure him. Nor can I be satisfyřd till I hear further
of that serious Conversation for which you tax him as Enthusiastick."97
Palemon is now very eager to hear about this friend and he worries that Philocles
is unfair to call the friend's cure for skepticism "enthusiasm." Philocles admits that his
friendřs enthusiasm is not vulgar. To the contrary,
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all was serene, soft, and harmonious. The manner of it was more after the pleasing
Transports of those antient Poets you are often charmřd with, than after the fierce
unsociable way of modern Zealots; those starchřd gruff Gentlemen, who guard
Religion as Bullys do a Mistress, and give us the while a very indifferent Opinion
of their Ladyřs Merit, and their own Wit, by adoring what they neither allow to be
inspected by others, nor care themselves to examine in a fair light. But here Iřll
answer for it; there was nothing of Disguise or Paint. All was fair, open, and
genuine, as Nature herself. řTwas Nature he was in love with: řTwas Nature he
sung. And if any-one might be said to have a natural Mistress, my Friend
certainly might, whose Heart was thus ingagřd. But Love, I found, was everywhere the same. And tho the Object here was very fine, and the Passion it created
very noble; yet Liberty, I thought, was finer than all: And I who never carřd to
ingage in other Loves of the least continuance, was the more afraid, I told you, of
this which had such a power with my poor Friend, as to make him appear the
perfectest Enthusiast in the World, Ill-humour only excepted. For this was
singular in him, "That tho he had all of the Enthusiast, he had nothing of the
Bigot. He heard every thing with Mildness and Delight; and bore with me when I
treated all his Thoughts as visionary; and when, Sceptick-like, I unravelřd all his
Systems."98
Several important things come to light in this speech.

Just as Shaftesbury himself

appealed to the Muses of the ancient poets at the opening of A Letter Concerning
Enthusiasm, so Philocles now describes the "transports of those antient Poets" loved by
Palemon. This laudable form of enthusiasm is again contrasted with the zealotry of
modern churchmen. Philocles then vouches for the love of his friend, saying "here Iřll
answer for it; there was nothing of Disguise or Paint. All was fair, open, and genuine, as
Nature herself."
Yet it must be remarked that Philocles remains a skeptic despite his marvelous
friend's powerful charms. Indeed, Philocles says that "love, I found, was every-where the
same. And tho the Object here was very fine, and the Passion it created very noble; yet
98
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Liberty, I thought, was finer than all." Philocles prefers the love of liberty to this
transporting love of nature. Only the noble object described by his friend could have
tempted Philocles to reconsider his skepticism, for the friend's strong enthusiasm was not
bigoted: he "heard every thing with Mildness and Delight; and bore with me when I
treated all his Thoughts as visionary; and when, Sceptick-like, I unravelřd all his
Systems." Philocles seems to suggest that the counter-arguments he himself presented
were sufficient to challenge the visionary systems of his friend if not refute them.
We will have to see whether or not we agree with Philocles, but Palemon is
enthralled. He insists that Philocles relate the full two-day conversation. (Philocles
equivocates on the length of his visit, saying at one point he spent "one day or two" in the
country and then asserting "two days," and again, "two philosophical Days."99) Philocles
reminded Palemon "again and again" that he knew not "the danger of this philosophical
Passion." Philocles writes that he moved forward reluctantly, and that Palemon listened
at his own hazard.100 Needless to say, such warnings were ineffective and perhaps they
incited Palemon's eagerness all the more. Finally Philocles asks for a respite, offering "to
turn Writer, and draw up the Memoirs of those two philosophical Days; beginning with
what had passřd this last Day between our-selves."101
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 P reli mi nary Ref l ect ions

However persuasive Philoclesř friend Theocles will seem, he was insufficiently
persuasive to have convinced Philocles. This seems to be one reason that Shaftesbury
committed his literary anachronism. As readers, we enter the conversation between the
"academic skeptic" and the "theist" knowing that the skeptic remains skeptical. We can
see, however, that Palemon, whose melancholia seems to have been understood by
Philocles, is open to the possibility of being persuaded by Theocles. To that extent, at
least, Philocles seems to have lived up to his name by proving his generous friendship
toward Palemon.
Palemon himself, who may be named in part for the melancholy lover of Arcite,
has found sufficient hope in the enthusiastic speech presented by Philocles in §1 to ask
for the whole account of Philoclesř recent trip to the country. As we shall soon see,
Palemonřs name may have an additional clue both to his identity and the way to approach
the remainder of The Moralists.

The Moralists, Part II
The plot of Part II is as follows. Section 1 finds Philocles alone in his apartment,
recollecting his recent visit with Theocles and we are soon transported to that scene.
After meeting Theocles in the fields, Philocles and his friend converse until they are
interrupted by the announcement that company has arrived. In section 2, the friends and
company share dinner. Conversation centers on the relationship between civil and moral
liberty. Philocles upsets one of the guests, and Theocles is drawn into the conversation to
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defend his friend. Section 3 takes up the relationship between religion and virtue, which
acts as an "Apology" on behalf of Philocles. At the insistence of two gentleman-guests,
Theocles offers in Section 4 what he calls a "Philosophical Sermon."

Philocles,

according to an agreement, then advances objections to the sermon; Theocles and
Philocles are led to discuss human nature as it presents itself in ordinary life. This leads
to a discussion of the state of nature, which draws the older gentleman into the
conversation. Theocles then advances the argument that man is by nature social. The
two guests dominate the conversation in section 5, which brings Part II to a close;
Theocles remains silent while Philocles and the two guests discuss matters pertaining to
revelation and miracles.
 P art II , § 1: P hil ocles' Sol il oquy

At the end of Part I, Philocles asks Palemon to delay his gratification while
Philocles turns writer. Given the extensive attention given by the Characteristicks to
authorship, writing, self-knowledge, and literary form, it is difficult not to be struck by
this request. As we have seen at the opening of this chapter, the Critic of Miscellaneous
Reflections calls the judgment of Shaftesbury into question when he turns to Volume II of
the Characteristicks. Shaftesbury, "by giving us a Work or two in form, after the regular
manner of Composition," has legitimately opened himself up to the art of Criticism
explored at length in Soliloquy, or Advice to an Author. The Critic told us to look for
"systematical, didactick and perceptive" structure in The Moralists, and we have tried to
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follow his advice so far. It is useful at this point to revisit a passage quoted more fully
above. In ŖMiscellany Vŗ the Critic makes the following remarks about The Moralists:
as for the Characters, and Incidents, they are neither wholly feignřd (says he) nor
wholly true: but according to the Liberty allowřd in the way of DIALOGUE, the
principal Matters are founded upon Truth; and the rest as near resembling as may
be. řTis a Sceptick recites: and the Hero of the Piece passes for an Enthusiast. If a
perfect Character be wanting; řtis the same Case here, as with the Poets in some
of their best Pieces. And this surely is a sufficient Warrant for the Author of a
PHILOSOPHICAL ROMANCE."--Thus our Author himself; who to conceal,
however, his strict Imitation of the antient poetick DIALOGUE, has prefixřd an
auxiliary Title to his Work, and given it the Sirname of RHAPSODY.102
We wondered earlier what it would mean for a dialogue to be "neither wholly
feignřd…nor wholly true: but according to the Liberty allowřd in the way of
DIALOGUE, the principal Matters are founded upon Truth." There is of course an
obvious way in which the entire Moralists is feigned: Palemon, Philocles, and Theocles
are characters. We know, however, that stories can tell the truth, albeit through fiction.103
In the case of this work, however, it may be more complicated still. The Critic tells us
"řtis a Sceptick recites: and the Hero of the Piece passes for an Enthusiast." This seems
fairly straightforward, for clearly Philocles recites, and he is a skeptic. This apparently
leaves enthusiastic Theocles as the hero; certainly this is the common view. 104 But are
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we to think that Theocles only passes for an enthusiast? We have seen Shaftesbury tell
us that in good dialogue, we find "characters preservřd throřout." Yet, strangely enough,
the Critic also remarks of The Moralists that "if a perfect Character be wanting; řtis the
same Case here, as with the Poets in some of their best Pieces."105
How is it that a perfect character could be wanting? In Soliloquy, Shaftesbury
explains the "philosophical Hero" of Platořs Socratic "Mimes" or "Dialogues" like this:
the Philosophical Hero of these Poems, whose Name they carryřd both in their
Body and Front, and whose Genius and Manner they were made to represent, was
in himself a perfect Character; yet, in some respects, so veilřd, and in a Cloud,
that to the unattentive Surveyor he seemřd often to be very different from what he
really was: and this chiefly by reason of a certain exquisite and refinřd Raillery
which belongřd to his Manner, and by virtue of which he couřd treat the highest
Subjects, and those of the commonest Capacity both together, and render řem
explanatory of each other. So that in this Genius of writing, there appearřd both
the heroick and the simple, the tragick, and the comick Vein.106
Here the work of concern does not bear the name of a particular character; it is called The
Moralists and not Theocles or Palemon. Shaftesbury does not leave us in doubt as to
whether he considered Plato a genuine poet as well as a philosopher; he remarks in a
footnote to a discussion of Plato that "his Dialogues were real POEMS."
Socrates is a perfect character despite the fact that he is easily misunderstood.
The "unattentive Surveyor" of Plato may not understand the significance of Socratic

Persona," Studies in English Literature, 1500-1900 10, no. 3 (1970): 498. For G. Gabrielle Starr, Theocles
is "Shaftesbury's altera vox." G. Gabrielle Starr, Lyric Generations : Poetry and the Novel in the Long
Eighteenth Century (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004), 84.
105

Miscellany V, 2.175. (Quoted above on page 316.)

106

Soliloquy, 1.121.

333

irony and may be confused by the "veilřd" presentation. So too Theocles is easily
misunderstood to those readers who are not alert to the deeper meaning of raillery for
Shaftesbury. We must continue to read for the full art of dialogue to show itself in The
Moralists.
 P art II, § 1: P hil ocles’ Sol i l oquy and t he F i el ds of Arcadi a

Philocles opens the next part of The Moralists with an odd prelude. He writes to
Palemon that he awoke the next morning to find himself "under positive Engagements of
proceeding in the same philosophical way, without intermission, and upon harder terms
than ever."107 His work was harder for want of a companion to converse with. Palemon
writes: "I was now alone; confinřd to my Closet; obligřd to meditate by my-self; and
reducřd to the hard Circumstances of an Author, and Historian, in the most difficult
Subject."108
Fortunately for Philocles, he receives some sort of divine inspiration to begin the
project. "But here, methought, propitious Heaven, in some manner, assisted me. For if
Dreams were, as Homer teaches, sent from the Throne of Jove; I might conclude I had a
favourable one, of the true sort, towards the Morning-light; which, as I recollected myself, gave me a clear and perfect Idea of what I desirřd so earnestly to bring back to my
Memory."109 (Presumably this all happens before he begins to write at all.)
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Philocles proceeds to describe the true dream he had.

"I found my-self

transported to a distant Country, which presented a pompous rural Scene. It was a
Mountain not far from the Sea, its Brow adornřd with antient Wood, and at its foot a
River and well-inhabited Plain: beyond which the Sea appearing, closřd the Prospect."
He recognizes this pastoral scene as the place he talked with his friend Theocles on his
second day in the country. So vivid is his recollection that he calls out to his friend, thus
breaking his reverie. Nevertheless, writes Philocles,
so powerful was the Impression of my Dream, and so perfect the Idea raisřd in
me, of the Person, Words, and Manner of my Friend, that I couřd now fansy
myself philosophically inspirřd, as that Roman Sage by his AEgeria, and invited,
on this occasion, to try my Historical Muse. For justly might I hope for such
Assistance in behalf of Theocles, who so lovřd the Muses, and was, I thought, no
less belovřd by them.110
Presumably the Roman sage alluded to in this passage is Numa Pompilius, who
Livy tells us set out to instill a fear of the gods in the Roman people. 111 "Because he
could not win them over without some miraculous fiction," we learn, "he pretended that
he met by night with the goddess Aegeria: it was at her prompting, he claimed, that he
was instituting religious rites that would please the gods most."112 In comparing himself
with Numa, Philocles seems to suggest that there is an aspect of deception in his own
presentation. Numa, we learn from Livy, continued to visit his goddess alone, in a
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shaded and private sacred grove fed by an endless fountain.113 Indeed, I want to claim
that Philocles is about to present us with his own miraculous fiction, having conjured for
himself a visit from the Muses for the sake of Palemon. Shaftesbury may be following
the custom of the ancient poet, who, wanting to appear as a favorite of the Muses, "might
with probability feign an Extasy, tho he really felt none: and supposing it to have been
mere Affectation, it wouřd look however like something natural, and couřd not fail of
pleasing."114 Certainly the charm would be unsuccessful if Palemon were to take the
ecstasy to be a contrivance. We have already seen that Philocles believes that paper-coin
tales are more serviceable for the "generality of men" than "sterling reason."115 He has
also shown himself capable of telling fables116 and of portraying philosophical
enthusiasm despite his continuing skepticism.117
A similar point can be drawn from Ovidřs mention of Numa in Fasti, Book III,
lines 263-4 and 273-6: "here is a lake in the valley of Aricia, inclosed by a dark wood,
sanctified by religious awe…With indistinct murmur glides a pebbly stream: ofttimes, but
in scanty draughts, have I drunk thence. It is Egeria who supplies the water; a Goddess
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pleasing to the Muses; she was the wife and the counsellor of Numa."118 (Similar
suggestions are found in Plutarchřs Life of Numa.) Here we see the poet Ovid drinking
from the same fountain that inspired Numa and was kept flowing by Numařs nymph
wife. In the words of Molly Masco-Pranger, both "Plutarch and Ovid…prepare readers
to see Numa in poetic terms, and particularly encourage them to read Numařs relationship
with Egeria as akin to divine inspiration evoked by the Hesiodic model."119 As Numa is
inspired by Aegeria, so is Ovid. So too is Philocles.
Philocles, then, offers us a few hints to guide our interpretation of his
conversation. He takes us back to the "original rural Scene" and the first morning of his
visit with Theocles, "that Heroick Genius, the Companion and Guide of my first
Thoughts in these profounder Subjects."120
Having been prepared by Soliloquy to read The Moralists, it is difficult not to
recollect the advice we received on the proper way to philosophize. We recall from
118
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Chapter 2 that in Soliloquy, Shaftesbury invoked the image of a "Daemon, Genius, Angel,
or Guardian-Spirit" whom we could invite into "secret Conferences, by which alone he
couřd be enabled to become our Advisor and Guide."121 It is by this art of soliloquy that a
man can come to know himself. By dividing himself into two persons, a man can "exert
this generous Faculty, and raise himself a Companion; who being fairly admitted into
Partnership, wouřd quickly mend his Partner, and set his affairs on a right foot."122
Shaftesbury has recommended this practice "especially in the case of Authors." He
writes:
I wouřd therefore advise our Probationer, upon his first Exercise, to retire into
some thick Wood, or rather take the Point of some high Hill; where, besides the
Advantage of looking about him for Security, he wouřd find the Air perhaps more
rarefyřd, and sutable to the Perspiration requirřd, especially in the case of a
Poetical Genius. 123
Palemonřs philosophical discourse was out of season in part because he had not practiced
sufficiently in solitude. Philocles, however, finds himself transported to a "pompous
rural Scene," complete with an "antient Wood." All "great Wits" practice soliloquy and
are known "for their great Loquacity by themselves, and their profound Taciturnity in
Company."124 In what well may be a clue for thinking about Shaftesburyřs dialogue,
Soliloquy tells us that in the case of "the Moralists or Philosophers," soliloquy is used in
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solitude to make their thoughts "speak out distinctly."125

Shaftesbury agrees with

Socrates that thinking is a conversation the soul has with itself. 126 We can expect that the
philosophers of The Moralists will follow this rule, especially those philosophers who are
also authors.
Contrary to the claim of Philocles to Palemon that he wanted an agreeable
companion to converse with, Philocles "alone" and "obligřd to meditate" is likely to
follow the regimen of soliloquy. The Moralists presents itself emphatically as a written
work rather than a recorded conversation. (This seems true even stipulating that we
know it to be "fictional.") It is difficult to imagine that Philocles, having turned author,
would fail to heed the common practice of great wits. Philocles, too, has a "companion
and guide" even in his solitude named Theocles.
In The Moralists, the philosophical hero of the work follows the method of
soliloquy and divides himself in two. We recall that Shaftesbury writes in Soliloquy that:
this was, among the Antients, that celebrated Delphick Inscription, Recognize
Your-self: which was as much as to say, Divide your-self, or Be Two. For if the
Division were rightly made, all within wouřd of course, they thought, be rightly
understood, and prudently managřd. Such Confidence they had in this HomeDialect of Soliloquy. For it was accounted the peculiar of Philosophers and wise
Men, to be able to hold themselves in Talk. And it was their Boast on this account,
"That they were never less alone, than when by themselves." A Knave, they
thought, couřd never be by himself. Not that his Conscience was always sure of
giving him disturbance; but he had not, they supposřd, so much Interest with
himself, as to exert this generous Faculty, and raise himself a Companion; who
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being fairly admitted into Partnership, wouřd quickly mend his Partner, and set
his Affairs on a right foot.127
When he retires to his apartment to write, Philocles too holds himself in talk. He allows
Palemon and other readers to eavesdrop on his thought, that is, the internal conversation
between 'Philo' and 'Theo' through his literary device or "machine." (He might be said to
make one into two in the same way he reckons the days.) Here, then, we can see why the
Critic offered his strange remark that "if a perfect Character be wanting; řtis the same
Case here, as with the Poets in some of their best Pieces." A perfect character in one
sense is wanting because we are presented with two philosophers rather than one; in
another sense, the matter is exactly the same as in a Platonic dialogue, where the hero
was "in himself a perfect Character; yet, in some respects "so veilřd, and in a Cloud, that
to the unattentive Surveyor he seemřd often to be very different from what he really
was."128 In the case of Philocles' soliloquy, we have one soul having a conversation with
itself--that is, thinking.
"The Muses love alternating verses."129

Philocles finds Theocles "with his belovřd Mantuan Muse, roving in the
Fields."130 Seeing Philocles approach, Theoclesř book "vanishřd." Philocles is naturally
curious to know what Theocles was reading, asking whether it is "of a secret kind" he
127
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was not allowed to see. Theocles shows him the book, "his Poet," asking whether
Philocles expected something more mysterious.
Oddly enough, Philocles does not tell us exactly what Theocles was reading. We
do know it is something by Virgil, the beloved "Mantuan MUSE." Theocles suggests that
"diviner poets" are best appreciated by contemplative men, who have retired from the
world to think. What is true of books is also true of thought. Theocles adds, "that not
only the best Authors, but the best Company, require this seasoning. Society it-self
cannot be rightly enjoyřd without some Abstinence and separate Thought."131 We are left
with the impression that Theocles was engaged in his own private devotional,
communing with Virgil or perhaps a "genius" of his own.
I believe that this brief exchange, combined with another allusion later in the
dialogue, offers us important clues about The Moralists. The second allusion occurs on
the second morning of Philoclesř visit to the country. Theocles again follows his custom
of taking a solitary morning walk, which Philocles describes as "his Hours and
Exercises."132

Philocles jokes that he might need a nymph to join forces against

Theocles, "in the manner your belovřd Poet makes the Nymph AEgle join with his two
Youths, in forcing the God Silenus to sing to řem."133 The allusion is to Virgilřs sixth
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Eclogue.134 In the sixth Eclogue, Silenus sings a cosmological song, tracing the world
from its origin in void and matter. Theocles, confirming the reference, remarks, "do you
expect I shouřd imitate the Poetřs God you mentionřd, and sing ŘThe Rise of Things
from Atoms; the Birth of Order from Confusion; and the Origin of Union, Harmony, and
Concord, from the sole Powers of Chaos, and blind Chance?ř"135 Shaftesbury seems to
recognize, that Virgil, at least, presents a view where order does indeed arise from chaos.
Given the pastoral setting of the conversations between Theocles and Philocles,
the allusions to Virgil in general and to the Eclogues in particular, the reader is invited to
think more carefully about the relationship between Virgil and The Moralists. We have
seen already that Philocles takes us to a pastoral scene that seems more fabulous than
real.136 Many points could be made about this, but for our purposes I note the following.
In Virgilřs third Eclogue we are presented with a singing contest between two shepherds
(Menalcas and Damoetas).137 While one might be tempted to see the contest as little
more than comic bickering, at least to the shepherds it concerns "not small things" (res
est non parva).138 After dickering about the appropriate prize for the best singer, the
shepherds appoint a judge to decide the contest, another shepherd named Palaemon.
134
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While Shaftesburyřs Palemon is spelled differently than Virgilřs Palaemon, it is difficult
to overlook the allusion. (I am untroubled by the spelling partly because translation from
classical languages into English involves choices. For example, in the earliest English
translation of Ovidřs Metamorphoses, Arthur Golding renders the Latin name Palaemon
into English as Palemon.139) The shepherds begin their amoebic song with a responsorial
pair of couplets, each appealing to a very different god:
DAMOETAS: With Jove my song [or the Muse--Musae] begins; of Jove all
things are full; He makes the earth fruitful; he cares for my verses.
MENALCAS: And me Phoebus loves; Phoebus always finds with me the
presents he loves, laurels and sweet-blushing hyacinths.
This exchange is interesting because it seems to anticipate the inclinations of the
interlocutors in The Moralists. Damoetas appeals to Jupiter, generally regarded as the
god of justice and orderly nature.

In identifying Apollo with the name Phoebus,

Menalcas reminds the reader of the god of light and reason. 140 So too, Theocles will
argue for an orderly cosmos, while the skeptical Philocles will present a challenge.
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Thus "Adnuit oranti Neptunus et abstulit illis,/ quod mortale fuit, maiestatemque verendam inposuit
nomenque simul faciemque novavit/ Leucothoeque deum cum matre Palaemona dixit," becomes
"Leucothoe was the mothers name, Palemon was the sonne./ The Thebane Ladies following hir as fast as
they could runne,/ Did of hir feete perceive the print upon the utter stone." Met. 4.542. Ovid, Ovid's
Metamorphoses : The Arthur Golding Translation, 1567, ed. John Frederick; Bate Nims, Jonathan, trans.
Arthur Golding, 1st Paul Dry Books ed. (Philadelphia: P. Dry Books, 2000).
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These competing perspectives are called Řhypothesesř in The Moralists, and seem
to refer to fundamental and mutually exclusive opinions about the nature of the Whole.
In the third Eclogue, the shepherdsř contest ends with Palaemon awarding prizes to both
shepherds. Palaemon says to the shepherds, "it is not for me to settle so close a contest
between you. You deserve the heifer, and so does he."141 As we have already suggested,
The Moralists ends rather abruptly. While the reader is left with the initial impression
that Theocles has persuaded Philocles to accept his enthusiastic appeals for an
harmonious Whole, the structure of the dialogue leaves considerable doubt. We do not
learn how Shaftesburyřs Palemon responds to the dialogue between Theocles and
Philocles. The reader is left to decide the dispute for himself, or at least to continue to
wrestle with the questions that emerge. Shaftesbury presents his case in such a way that
the arguments of Theocles appear very attractive and perhaps more likely than the
alternatives. Yet Shaftesbury is himself too honest a philosopher to choose either side.
The remainder of section 1 of Part II concerns the relationship of happiness or the
good to pleasure. The conversation arises from a remark by Theocles that "all grows
insipid, dull, and tiresome, without the help of some Intervals of Retirement."142
Theocles asks whether or not Philocles agrees that even the best lovers seek distance
from their beloved for periods of solitude. This is true for lovers, and all the more so for
the man who must live in "that common World of mix'd and undistinguish'd Company."
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Theocles seems to suggest that solitude is necessary for restoration when he suffers from
refractory boredom. Philocles responds to this argument of Theocles without offering his
own opinion. He says:
by your Rule, said I, Theocles, there shouřd be no such thing as Happiness or
Good in Life, since every Enjoyment wears out so soon; and growing painful, is
diverted by some other thing; and that again by some other; and so on. I am sure,
if Solitude serves as a Remedy or Diversion to any thing in the World, there is
nothing which may not serve as Diversion to Solitude; which wants it more than
any thing besides. And thus there can be no Good which is regular or constant.
Happiness is a thing out of the way, and only to be found in wandring.143
Theocles infers from this little speech that Philocles holds that "nothing can be good but
what is constant," and in Theocles' own opinion this is a just maxim.144 Philocles
responds that, sadly, while the objects of good may remain constant throughout a man's
life, a man's humor changes with age, temper, passions, thoughts, and conversations. If
this notion of the good is true, then Philocles will have to conclude that all things in life
are changing and vulnerable to "the same common Fate of Satiety and Disgust."
Theocles points out that Philocles is not satisfied with "the current Notion…That
our real Good is PLEASURE."145 Philocles assents to this, adding that he would be more
satisfied if the current defenders of this hedonism could say more about what pleasures
are. As it stands, contemporary hedonists fail to distinguish pleasure from the will. On
their account, men are little more than animals responding to the immediate stimuli of
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pleasure. Such creature-comfort, while arguably a genuine kind of pleasure, hardly
deserves the name good or happiness.146 A footnote to his reply directs our attention to a
similar concern as it arises in Soliloquy. There we encounter the claim of some that men
are governed by "Interest." This claim, however, amounts to equating will with fancy; it
is a confession that human life is essentially aimless.147 "Can I then be suppos'd to hit,"
Shaftesbury asks, "when I know not, in reality, so much as how to aim?"148
By following this thread we see that Philocles does not necessarily object to what
is naturally pleasant. He believes, rather, that by claiming the good to be whatever
pleases a man, modern philosophers undermine our ability to connect "the Opinion of the
Good to the Possessions of the MIND."149 In arguing this modern philosophers divide
men from their nature and teach them to be restless and unhappy. If he is correct about
this, then what is most called for is reflection on how we are to distinguish our true
pleasure from the great variety of false opinions about the good. Philocles seems to agree
with the Critic that "the less fanciful I am, in what relates to my Contentment and
Happiness, the more powerful and absolute I must be, in Self-enjoyment, and the
Possession of my Good."150 As the Critic explains,
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if it be in the Affections themselves that I place my highest Joy, and in those
Objects, whatever they are, of inward Worth and Beauty, (such as Honesty, Faith,
Integrity, Friendship, Honour) řtis evident I can never possibly, in this respect,
rejoice amiss, or indulge my-self too far in the Enjoyment. The greater my
Indulgence is, the less I have reason to fear either Reverse or Disappointment.151
The Critic here displays his own moderate skepticism by tentatively mentioning possible
objects of our affections. While honesty, faith, integrity, etc. are likely contenders for
"inward Worth and Beauty," we cannot know what is natural before we undertake the
sort of investigation recommended by Soliloquy.
Philocles, then, rejects the hypothesis of his contemporary "dogmatizers on
Pleasure."152 It is more sensible, he says, to consider "how to gain that Point of Sight,
whence probably we may best discern; and How to place our-selves in that unbiassřd
State, in which we are fittest to pronounce."153
Theocles is able to praise Philocles for not falling into the dogmatic skepticism of
modern philosophy. He remarks,
O Philocles…if this be unfeignedly your Sentiment; if it be possible you shouřd
have the Fortitude to with-hold your Assent in this Affair, and go in search of
what the meanest of Mankind think they already know so certainly: řtis from a
nobler turn of thought than what you have observřd in any of the modern
Scepticks you have conversřd with. For if I mistake not, there are hardly anywhere
at this day a sort of People more peremptory, or who deliberate less on the choice
of Good. They who pretend to such a Scrutiny of other Evidences, are the readiest
to take the Evidence of the greatest Deceivers in the World, their own Passions.
Having gainřd, as they think, a Liberty from some seeming Constraints of
Religion, they suppose they employ this Liberty to perfection, by following the
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first Motion of their Will, and assenting to the first Dictate or Report of any
prepossessing Fancy, any foremost Opinion or Conceit of Good.154
The Critic presents a modest version of skepticism which seems to accord with this
moderate skepticism of Philocles. The Critic writes:
to say truth, I have often wonderřd to find such a Disturbance raisřd about the
simple name of Sceptick. řTis certain that, in its original and plain signification,
the word imports no more than barely, "That State or Frame of Mind in which
every one remains, on every Subject of which he is not certain." He who is
certain, or presumes to say he knows, is in that particular, whether he be mistaken
or in the right, a Dogmatist. Between these two States or Situations of Mind, there
can be no medium. For he who says, "That he believes for certain, or is assur’d of
what he believes"; either speaks ridiculously, or says in effect, "That he believes
strongly, but is not sure." So that whoever is not conscious of Revelation, nor has
certain Knowledg of any Miracle or Sign, can be no more than Sceptick in the
Case.155
As we have seen, insofar as Philocles adopts a position at all, it is only temporary:
Philocles himself remains a skeptic when he later meets Palemon in the park. His
position is may be like Shaftesburyřs own, at least insofar as it is "certain that, in its
original and plain signification, the word [Skeptic] imports no more than barely, ŘThat
State or Frame of Mind in which every one remains, on every Subject of which he is not
certain.’"
 P art II, § 2: Di nner Com pany

At dinner, Philocles revisits the claim made by Theocles earlier in the day that a
man might live a life of constancy by enlarging friendship to include all mankind.
Whatever Theocles means by his claim, we should not mistake it for the Christian virtue
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of charity. According to Theocles, "Řto deserve well of the Publick,ř and Řto be justly
stylřd the Friend of Mankind,ř requires no more than to be good and virtuous; Terms
which for oneřs own sake one wouřd naturally covet."156 Philocles objects to this claim,
observing that few pursue virtue for its own sake; they are motivated best by "the Rod
and Sweetmeat," that is, punishments and rewards.157
Theocles then advances the argument that practicing the virtues is conducive to
oneřs own health and good.

Following the Epicureans, he is able to show that

temperance is conducive to health and, consequently, to a longer-term notion of pleasure.
Philocles has no difficulty in agreeing with this when considering health, but Theocles
pursues the argument to raise the question of the whole human life. We learn that
Philocles is an admirer of free political institutions. Theocles suggests that civil liberty is
quite compatible with the moral liberty that emerges from the practice of virtue. He says
to Philocles, "you…who are such an Admirer of Civil Liberty, and can represent it to
your-self with a thousand several Graces and Advantages; can you imagine no Grace or
Beauty in that original native Liberty, Moral. which sets us free from so many in-born
Tyrannys, gives us the Privilege of our-selves, and makes us our own, and independent?
A sort of Property, which, methinks, is as material to us to the full, as that which secures
us our Lands, or Revenues."158
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Theocles now advances an image of the relationship between moral and political
liberty.

This is perhaps the clearest statement of the political consequences of

Shaftesburyřs philosophical teaching. So important is this passage that Shaftesbury
arranged for the frontispiece of the Volume II of the Characteristicks to bear its image. I
will now quote it in full:
I shouřd think, said he (carrying on his Humour) that one might draw the Picture
of this moral Dame to as much advantage as that of her political Sister; whom
you admire, as describřd to us "in her Amazon-Dress, with a free manly Air
becoming her; her Guards the Laws, with their written Tables, like Bucklers,
surrounding her; Riches, Traffick, and Plenty, with the Cornucopia, serving as her
Attendents; and in her Train the Arts and Sciences, like Children, playing."--The
rest of the Piece is easy to imagine: "Her Triumph over Tyranny, and lawless Rule
of Lust and Passion."--But what a Triumph wouřd her Sisterřs be! What Monsters
of savage Passions wouřd there appear subduřd! "There fierce Ambition, Lust,
Uproar, Misrule, with all the Fiends which rage in human Breasts, wouřd be
securely chainřd. And when Fortune her-self, the Queen of Flatterys, with that
Prince of Terrors, Death, were at the Chariot-wheels, as Captives; how natural
wouřd it be to see Fortitude, Magnanimity, Justice, Honour, and all that generous
Band attend as the Companions of our inmate Lady Liberty! She, like some newborn Goddess, wouřd grace her Motherřs Chariot, and own her Birth from humble
Temperance, that nursing Mother of the Virtues; who like the Parent of the Gods,
old Reverend CYBELE, wouřd properly appear drawn by reinřd Lions, patient of
the Bit, and on her Head a Turret-like Attire: the Image of defensive Power, and
Strength of Mind."159
One of the few favorable references to a recent contemporary thinker occurs in
Shaftesburyřs discussion of the ancient policy of religion.

In A Letter concerning

Enthusiasm, Shaftesbury recognizes James Harrington, whom he calls "a notable Author
of our Nation," for his observation that "řtis necessary a People shouřd have a Publick
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Leading in Religion."160 While we have seen that Shaftesbury is committed to religious
toleration, his toleration is of the ancient variety.

He is unwilling to leave moral

education to chance, and he consequently advocates moderate religion for most people,
and moral philosophy for those who are capable. In this sense one might wonder if the
Characteristicks cannot be described as the moral education necessary to make
Harringtonřs Oceana a complete account of human life. While often identified as a
"country Whig," one might wonder if Shaftesbury isnřt better identified as a "classical
republican" of the sort described by Skinner and Pocock.
This speculation must be tempered by the reminder that it is Theocles who
delivers the image; Philocles immediately invites the dinner party to consider the triumph
of Liberty in reverse, with: "Virtue her-self a Captive in her turn; and by a proud
Conqueror triumphřd over, degraded, spoilřd of all her Honours, and defacřd; so as to
retain hardly one single Feature of real Beauty."161 The audacity of Philocles leads the
conversation to the first of two major disputes between Philocles and one particular
dinner guest. This guest is described as "a formal sort of Gentleman, somewhat advancřd
in Years," and as we shall see, he is a religious zealot.162
The old gentleman (who never receives a name) objects to Philocles in an "angry
tone," saying:

160

Ibid., 1.11.

161

Ibid., 2.143.

162

Ibid., 2.144.

351

that he had hitherto, indeed, conceivřd some hopes of me; notwithstanding he
observřd my Freedom of Thought, and heard me quoted for such a passionate
Lover of Liberty: But he was sorry to find that my Principle of Liberty extended
in fine to a Liberty from all Principles…and none, he thought, beside a Libertine
in Principle wouřd approve of such a Picture of Virtue, as only an Atheist couřd
have the impudence to make.163
After a pause, Theocles comes to the defense of Philocles. He observes that it is not "the
Atheist alone can lay this load on Virtue, and picture her thus disgracefully."164 To the
surprise of the old gentleman, Theocles suggests that the "revers’d Triumph" described
by Philocles is a portrait resulting not from atheism but rather from "RELIGION itself!"165
Theocles advances the argument we saw in Chapter 4 that there are those who "magnify
to the utmost the Corruption of Manřs Heart; and in exposing, as they pretend, the
Falshood of human Virtue, think to extol Religion."166 The old gentleman is forced to
concede that such a consequence would be no "sign of Tenderness for Religion."
Philocles addresses Palemon at this point, recalling for us the narrative frame of
the dialogue. He tells Palemon (and the reader) that Theocles will proceed to "disclose
himself fully upon these Subjects."167 Philocles remarks that his remarks served as a
"Prelude" to the metaphysical argument the two friends would have the next morning.
Philocles says in anticipation of Theoclesř speeches: "If his Speculations provřd of a
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rational kind, this previous Discourse, I knew, wouřd help me to comprehend řem; if
only pleasing Fancys, this wouřd help me however, to please my-self the better with
řem."168 As readers we must note this interruption of the internal dialogue and wonder
what Philocles hopes for us to see. We will have to return to this question later.
 P art II, § 3: Theocl es' Apol ogy f or P hi l ocl es

We observed at the beginning of the chapter that the Critic calls The Moralists "a
kind of Apology for [the] Treatise concerning Virtue and Religion."169 The Critic calls
especial attention to the part of the dialogue we must now consider. 170 The Critic
remarks that "as for his [the Authorřs] Apology (particularly in what relates to reveal’d
Religion, and a World to come) I commit the Reader to the disputant Divines, and
Gentlemen, whom our Author has introducřd in that concluding Piece of DialogueWriting, or rhapsodical Philosophy."171 By the end of the section, Theocles will say,
THUS…I have made my Friendřs Apology; which may have shewn him to you
perhaps a good Moralist; and, I hope, no Enemy to Religion. But if you find still
that the Divine has not appearřd so much in his Character as I promisřd, I can
never think of satisfying you in any ordinary way of Conversation. Shouřd I offer
to go further, I might be ingagřd deeply in spiritual Affairs, and be forcřd to make
some new Model of a Sermon upon his System of Divinity. However, I am in
hopes, now that in good earnest Matters are come well nigh to Preaching, you
will acquit me for what I have already performřd.172
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Section 3 of Part II, then, will employ an "ordinary way of conversation," and appeal
primarily to reason, while section 4 will present what will be called a "Philosophical
Sermon."173
Before Theocles begins, Philocles remarks to Palemon that we are about to hear a
"Prelude" to the private conversation he and Theocles will have tomorrow morning. He
is eager for this prelude whether or not it proves demonstrative. "If his Speculations
provřd of a rational kind, this previous Discourse, I knew, wouřd help me to comprehend
řem; if only pleasing Fancys, this wouřd help me however, to please my-self the better
with řem."174 This distinction between demonstration and persuasion will prove to be
essential for the remainder of The Moralists.
Theocles, we are told, enters section 3 of Part II with the air of "some grave
Divinity-Professor, or Teacher of Ethicks, reading an Afternoon Lecture to his Pupils."175
He begins with the claim that we must distinguish between force and reason, which,
according to Theocles, are mutually exclusive. He says, "where Force is necessary,
Reason has nothing to do. But on the other hand, if Reason be needful, Force in the mean
while must be laid aside: For there is no Enforcement of Reason, but by Reason."176
This distinction, as we shall see in a moment, has practical consequences.
Theocles next tells us that the name 'atheist' is used indiscriminately, and that two very
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different characters are carelessly grouped together as atheists. There is a distinction, we
learn, between a person who doubts and a person who absolutely denies religion:
Now he who doubts, may possibly lament his own Unhappiness, and wish to be
convincřd. He who denies, is daringly presumptuous, and sets up an Opinion
against the Interest of Mankind, and Being of Society. řTis easily seen that one of
these Persons may bear a due respect to the Magistrate and Laws, tho not the
other; who being obnoxious to them, is therefore punishable. But how the former
is punishable by Man, will be hard to say; unless the Magistrate had dominion
over Minds, as well as over Actions and Behaviour; and had power to exercise an
Inquisition within the inmost Bosoms and secret Thoughts of Men.177
The distinction between force and reason finds its implication in the difference between
one who doubts and one who denies. The two sorts of distinction are not simply
coextensive, however. No amount of force will provoke assent in the mind of a man,
whether he is an outright denier of religion or a mere doubter. Theocles seems to suggest
that by being "daringly presumptuous" and indiscrete in his doubts, the denier risks
causing scandal that could damage the public good, and that, at the very least, one can
expect that the magistrate will punish such behavior.
Theocles goes on to maintain that philosophical freedom "was never esteemřd
injurious to Religion, or prejudicial to the vulgar."178 Philocles is quick to observe the
claim we examined in chapter 2, namely that in "Christian Times," circumstances no
longer permit such "Fair INQUIRY."179 While Cudworthřs True Intellectual System of the
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Universe is mentioned directly here, it is difficult for Shaftesburyřs own An Inquiry
Concerning Virtue and Merit not to come to mind as well.
It is this that provokes Theoclesř "apology" proper. He remarks, "now indeed you
have found a way which may, perhaps, force me to discourse at large with you on this
head; by entering the Lists in defense of a Friend unjustly censurřd for this philosophical
Liberty."180
What I have called the apology proper begins on page 149 and continues for the
remainder of section 3. Theocles begins his account by observing that most defenders of
religion occupy themselves in defending "the Truth of the Christian Faith" or in confuting
heretics. Far fewer occupy themselves with the more fundamental task of examining "the
very Grounds and Principles of all Religion."181 This task is more important, however, if
one is to persuade the unbeliever. According to Theocles, there are those for whom
"what was never question’d, was never prov’d: and That whatever Subject had not, at
some time or other, been examinřd with perfect Indifference, was never rightly examin’d,
nor couřd rightly be believ’d."182 As we have already considered at length, a treatise may
not be the best method for reaching this audience; an "Essay or Inquiry" generally
presents one side only, and seldom with a rational indifference. It is for this reason,
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according to Theocles, that some writers have found it to advance the arguments of
unbelievers with vigor and equanimity. Such a writer
offers to conclude nothing positive himself, but leaves it to others to draw
Conclusions from his Principles: having this one chief Aim and Intention; "How,
in the first place, to reconcile these Persons to the Principles of Virtue; That by
this means, a Way might be laid open to Religion; by removing those greatest, if
not only Obstacles to it, which arise from the Vices and Passions of Men."183
According to Theocles, the commitment to advance the principles of religion
independently from religion is necessary to persuade men who do not accept the claims
of revelation. Since they do not believe in God, they are hardly likely to worry about
rewards and punishments found in a "Future State."184 Defenders of reason, therefore,
generally begin from the wrong point. They try to "prove MERIT by Favour, and ORDER
by a Deity."185 Since the controversial writers so offensive to the older gentleman are
moral "realists," they try to exploit the natural fact of virtue to show that there is order in
the world.
Theocles extends this argument to the possibility of "DEITY." He asserts, "That
whoever sincerely defends Virtue, and is a Realist in MORALITY, must of necessity, in a
manner, by the same Scheme of Reasoning, prove as very a Realist in DIVINITY."186
This, of course, hardly settles the matter. We will see in a later section that the old
gentleman is worried that such a deism does little to affirm the claims of orthodox
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Christianity. Theocles himself seems to confess as much by immediately mentioning
Epicurus, who allowed for nominal deities while offering a wholly rationalistic account
of the world.187
Theocles takes his point further when he suggests to Philocles that his skeptical
philosophy, by asking whether a theology can exist on the basis of reason alone, does
little more that affirm the reigning authoritative religion.188 Yet revelation itself "founded
on the Acknowledgment of a divine Existence." Since only philosophy can demonstrate
what religion presupposes, reason and revelation are mutually dependent.189
Theocles leaves the question open as to whether the controversial writers he
describes actually believe their own arguments. He proposes judging the religious merit
of an hypothesis on the basis of the practical moral consequences it entails for man.
Now whether our Friend be unfeignedly and sincerely of this latter sort of real
Theologists, you will learn best from the Consequences of his Hypothesis. You
will observe, whether instead of ending in mere Speculation, it leads to Practice:
And you will then surely be satisfyřd, when you see such a Structure raisřd, as
with the Generality of the World must pass at least for high Religion, and with
some, in all likelihood, for no less than ENTHUSIASM.190
Our judgment about the sincerity of the opinions, then, requires an examination of their
underlying "hypothesis." The moral and civic consequences are apparently inseparable
from this concern.
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Theocles asks Philocles rhetorically whether there is anything more enthusiastic
than a "notion of Divine LOVE."191 It is not sufficient proof that the writer is "far enough
from Irreligion" for espousing a doctrine of divine love; such claims are familiar even to
the enemies of religion.192 Theocles takes this as an opportunity to advance on his
friend's behalf the "Hypothesis" we know well from Chapter 4, namely that "tho the
disinterested Love of God were the most excellent Principle; yet he knew very well, that
by the indiscreet Zeal of some devout well-meaning People it had been stretchřd too far,
perhaps even to Extravagance and Enthusiasm; as formerly among the Mysticks of the
antient Church, whom these of latter days have followřd."193 So, too, have the enemies of
enthusiasm fallen to their own zeal. Theoclesř writer-friend is of the opinion that "we
ought all of us to aspire, so as to endeavour ŘThat the Excellence of the Object, not the
Reward or Punishment, shouřd be our Motive: But that where throř the Corruption of our
Nature, the former of these Motives is found insufficient to excite to Virtue, there the
latter shouřd be brought in aid, Supplemental Motives. and on no account be undervaluřd
or neglected.ř"194 Theocles does not expect every soul to be moved by "the Excellence of
the Object" alone. Theocles sees love of the good is an insufficient to motivate to virtue
for some men; he therefore retains a role for rewards and punishments to reinforce the
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lessons of virtue. For his part, the friend of Theocles finds it sufficient to inquire into the
existence "in Nature [of] a supreme Mind or Deity."195
Since the friend has precluded an appeal to revelation his arguments must rely on
evidence readily available in the observable world. Theocles says,
now that there is such a principal Object as this in the World, the World alone (if I
may say so) by its wise and perfect Order must evince. This Order, if indeed
perfect, excludes all real ILL. And that it really does so, is what our Author so
earnestly maintains, by solving the best he can those untoward Phaenomena and
ill Signs, taken from the Course of Providence in the seemingly unequal Lot of
Virtue in this World.196
For the purposes of defending his friend Theocles asserts that the world is orderly,
although in fairness we see that he qualifies his statement with an "if." The author does
his best to show how "untoward Phaenomena and ill Signs" can be reconciled with
Providence and the existence of virtue. Theocles admits that the appearance that vice and
chaos rule the world poses a genuine problem for the authorřs argument. It is natural for
men to infer backward from an apparent effect a presumptive cause. In the words of
Theocles, "from so uncomely a Face of things below, they will presume to think
unfavourably of all above."197 Should men become convinced that the world is orderly,
however, they are much more likely to expect reward and punishment in a future state; at
least they are more likely to experience the natural reward for virtue and punishment for
vice suggested in the discussion of temperance above.
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Theocles maintains that the evidence in favor of the intrinsic rewards to be found
in the practice of virtue are more impressive than many recent writers have
acknowledged. Even the incomplete victory of virtue among human affairs is some
evidence, perhaps, "to shew Providence already ingagřd on [Virtue's] side."

198

By

presupposing the efficacy of virtue Theocles is able to recommend to his interlocutors a
trust in the supernatural goodness of Providence. For this reason too, modern defenders
of religion are foolish to exaggerate the disorder (or fallen condition) of the world.
Paradoxically, claims Theocles, the hypothesis of chaos embraced by some Divines
inclines men to accept "the belovřd Atoms, Chance, and Confusion of the Atheists."199
Lest he leave the defense of virtue to its own devices, Theocles next considers the
opinions of the ancients on the matter.
Thus it was, that among the Antients the great Motive which inclinřd so many of
the wisest to the Belief of this Doctrine unrevealřd to řem, was purely the Love of
Virtue in the Persons of those great Men, the Founders and Preservers of
Societys, the Legislators, Patriots, Deliverers, Heroes, whose Virtues they were
desirous shouřd live and be immortalizřd.200
The appeal of virtue--an appeal not dependent on revelation--is still available to the
contemporaries of Theocles in the common human experience of friendship. "Nor is
there at this day any thing capable of making this Belief more engaging among the Good
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and Virtuous than the Love of Friendship."201 For the noble soul, friendship creates a
longing to be joined with virtuous men even after death.
In short, according to Theocles his writer-friend hopes to draw men "of looser
Principles" to divine love through the orderliness in human things to an appreciation of
beauty in the world.202
Theocles concludes by saying that further argument would move beyond "any
ordinary way of Conversation" and into "some new Model of a Sermon upon his system
of Divinity."203 The prospect of setting aside "the way of Dialogue" for "the Law of
SERMON" is very appealing to the two divine gentlemen.204 Theocles agrees to continue
in that style, but only on the condition that Philocles will mount a challenge to the sermon
afterwards. Philocles agrees.
 P art II, § 4: The P hil osophi cal Serm on and t he St at e of Nat ure

Just as the "philosophical enthusiasm" of Philocles came on in the evening of Part
I, section 3, the "philosophical sermon" offered by Theocles, takes place in the evening.
Having embarked on a walk in the fields, the companions observe the pleasant virtues of
country life.
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NATURE."205 Theocles reaffirms the claim that it would be very strange to find order
within our own souls and miss it in the larger world. Nothing, he says,
is more strongly imprinted on our Minds, or more closely interwoven with our
Souls, than the Idea or Sense of Order and Proportion. Hence all the Force of
Numbers, and those powerful Arts founded on their Management and Use. What a
difference there is between Harmony and Discord! Cadency and Convulsion!
What a difference between composřd and orderly Motion, and that which is
ungovernřd and accidental! between the regular and uniform Pile of some noble
Architect, and a Heap of Sand or Stones! between an organizřd Body, and a Mist
or Cloud driven by the Wind!206
According to Theocles, such difference is "immediately perceivřd by plain internal
Sensation."207 Reason concludes from this that every orderly thing has a "Unity of
Design" which can be taken as a whole in itself or as a part in a larger whole. If all the
parts are not united in a broader "UNIVERSE," there can be no claim of design. From this
Theocles draws his "main Subject, insisted on," namely
that neither Man, nor any other Animal, tho ever so compleat a System of Parts, as
to all within, can be allowřd in the same manner compleat, as to all without; but
must be considerřd as having a further relation abroad to the System of his Kind.
So even this System of his Kind to the Animal-System; this to the World (our
Earth;) and this again to the bigger World, and to the Universe.208
All things, claims Theocles, are interdependent, one thing on another. Such an account of
the coherence of the world leads him to this conclusion: "know, my ingenious Friend,
that by this Survey you will be obligřd to own the UNIVERSAL SYSTEM, and coherent
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Scheme of Things, to be establishřd on abundant Proof, capable of convincing any fair
and just Contemplator of the Works of Nature."209
Things are not as simple as they seem at first, however. We soon learn that "the
End and Use of Things does not every-where appear."210 This should not be surprising,
however, given the finitude of the human perspective on the world.

For

in an Infinity of Things thus relative, a Mind which sees not infinitely, can see nothing
fully: And since each Particular has relation to all in general, it can know no perfect or
true Relation of any Thing, in a World not perfectly and fully known."211 This inability
of man to know the whole is insufficient proof either for the presence of mind in the
world or its absence. Theocles exhorts his listeners to overlook this problem with by
offering an image of order. "Think of the many Parts of the vast Machine, in which we
have so little Insight, and of which it is impossible we shouřd know the Ends and Uses;
when instead of seeing to the highest Pendants, we see only some lower Deck, and are in
this dark Case of Flesh, confinřd even to the Hold, and meanest Station of the Vessel."212
Presupposing a cosmos, however, Theocles claims that "we must of consequence
acknowledg a Universal MIND; which no ingenious Man can be tempted to disown,
except throř the Imagination of Disorder in the Universe, its Seat."213 While few men are
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tempted to argue that the rest of the world is disordered, they have a hard time not
wondering about mankind. Nature seems to have left man among the other animals
especially vulnerable in the world. Yet although he lacks claws and fur and horns, man
has the possibility of gaining "Wisdom and Virtue."214 Unlike the beasts, man is able to
improve himself. Theocles therefore exhorts us to look to "a liberal Education" to
improve on our good nature to form in us "a generous Temper and Disposition, wellregulated Appetites, and worthy Inclinations."215
For those who are willing to inquire "what is according to NATURE" for men,
happiness is possible. Few are inclined to do this, however. Theocles remarks, "were we
more so, as this Inquiry wouřd make us, we shouřd then see Beauty and Decorum here, as
well as elsewhere in Nature; and the Order of the Moral World wouřd equal that of the
Natural. By this the Beauty of Virtue wouřd appear; and hence, as has been shewn, the
Supreme and Sovereign Beauty, the Original of all which is Good or Amiable."216 So
ends the "Philosophical Sermon" of Theocles. Where the "Apology" of Theocles offered
the practical reasons for deniers to become prudent and for the religious to tolerate
arguments based on reason alone, the "sermon" serves as an exhortation to seek beauty
and not to grow discouraged. The sermon draws the praise of the two gentlemen;
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Philocles himself is about to commend Theocles when he is reminded of his promise to
criticize the sermon.
Philocles begins his criticism by drawing attention to the narrow argument chosen
by Theocles to defend the existence of God. Philocles says, "I expected to have heard
from you, in customary form, of a first Cause, a first Being, and a Beginning of Motion:
How clear the Idea was of an immaterial Substance: And how plainly it appearřd, that at
some time or other Matter must have been created. But as to all this, you are silent."217
The argument that unthinking substance could never produce a thinking, immaterial
substance is acceptable to Philocles on the philosophical principle of "Nothing being ever
made from Nothing."218

This principle cuts both ways, however, and serves both

dogmatic materialists as well as dogmatic immaterialists.
According to Philocles, the argument as stated by Theocles implies that one can
judge the past by looking at the present. He holds that if "Deity be now really extant; if
by any good Token it appears that there is at this present a universal Mind; řtwill easily
be yielded there ever was one."219 While Philocles does neither admits nor denies that
there is a universal mind, he denies that the conclusion follows the presupposition.
Philocles argues that Theocles failed to demonstrate his reasons: "What Demonstration
have you given? What have you so much as offerřd at, beyond bare Probability?" Quite

217

Ibid., 2.167.

218

Ibid.

219

Ibid., 2.167-68.

366

to the contrary, in fact. "So far are you from demonstrating any thing," Philocles
continues, "that if this uniting Scheme be the chief Argument for Deity, (as you tacitly
allow) you seem rather to have demonstrated, Řthat the Case it-self is incapable of
Demonstration.ř"220
Theocles has argued that it is impossible for finite man to know the whole. Even
if the world as we know it seems orderly, we cannot infer that all things (writ large) are
orderly. It is possible that we observe only "a separate By-World," we will say, "of which
perhaps there are, in the wide Waste, Millions besides, as horrid and deformřd, as this of
ours is regular and proportionřd."221 Who is to say, given enough time, that this odd
orderly world isnřt an anomaly in the great swirl of all matter? "Old Father Chaos (as the
Poets call him) in these wild Spaces, reigns absolute, and upholds his Realms of
Darkness. He presses hard upon our Frontier; and one day, belike, shall by a furious
Inroad recover his lost Right, conquer his Rebel-State, and reunite us to primitive
Discord and Confusion."222 Philocles concludes with an odd compliment for the Divines.
At least the Divines were more honest in facing the chaotic appearance of the world.
Their opinion are not refuted should it be demonstrated that the world is indeed without
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mind. Theocles, on the other hand, has introduced Nature into the conversation, and it is
with great reluctance that Philocles questions Her.223
Theocles tells Philocles not to worry about this. It is only "my Hypothesis can
suffer," he says.

Theocles drolly says that the divine gentlemen seem not to be

vulnerable to such arguments, equipped as they are with "metaphysical Weapons."224
(Indeed, even after the Apology offered by Theocles on the behalf of Philocles, the older
gentleman is able to remark, "the Part you have proposřd for [Philocles] is so natural and
sutable, that, I doubt not, he will be able to act it without the least Pain. I couřd wish
rather, that you had sparřd your-self the trouble of putting him thus in mind of his proper
Character. He wouřd have been apt enough of his own accord to interrupt your Discourse
by his perpetual Cavils."225)
Philocles decides to concentrate on human nature alone. He raises the question of
why man among the beasts is alone so vulnerable and without natural defenses; Theocles
advances counterarguments in defense of manřs excellence. Since the discussion follows
closely the matters we explored in Chapter 3, we will move ahead. Soon, the old
gentleman reenters the conversation. The old gentleman is pleased with the conversation
because, it seems to him, Philocles is being refuted. In an attempt to flush an atheist out
of the bushes, the old gentleman remarks to Philocles "that it was better for me [that is,

223

Ibid., 2.169.

224

Ibid.

225

Ibid., 2.159.

368

Philocles] to declare my Sentiments openly; for he was sure I had strongly imbibřd that
Principle, that the State of Nature was a State of War."226
Philocles instantly sees that the old gentleman is vulnerable on this point. By
placing this objection in the mouth of the zealot, Shaftesbury is able to link the milder
state of nature teaching of Locke to Hobbes. Philocles asks whether he believes in the
state of nature and learns that he does. He does not want to say, however, that the state of
nature is one of warfare, perhaps because he knows that Hobbes is an atheist and
consequently to be opposed. He opts instead for a tolerable condition state of nature prior
to men forming a compact. When asked if this means that man is naturally sociable, he
replies "that Man indeed, from his own natural Inclination, might not, perhaps, have been
movřd to associate; but rather from some particular Circumstances."227 Philocles is
easily able to show that this distinction collapses quickly, and "that the State of Nature
must in all likelihood have been little different from a State of War."228
It is at this point that Theocles reenters the conversation in order to reconcile the
men. Theocles argues (and as we have discussed at length in Chapter 4) that man as we
know him is indeed naturally social.
 P art II, § 5: Monst ers and Mi racl es

The two gentlemen direct the conversation in section 5 and Theocles is largely
silent for the remainder of the evening. This may not be a coincidence. Theocles seems
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to have nothing to say about revelation or miracles. Since we discussed miracles and
their origin in Chapter 2, we will give this section shorter shrift.
For our purposes, the following points are worth noting.

Just as the older

gentleman seemed to follow Locke in distinguishing the state of nature from a state of
war, both of the gentlemen share Lockeřs love of travel tales and the monstrous.
Philocles writes,
nothing was so charming with them, as that which was disagreeing and odd:
nothing so soothing, as that which movřd Horror. In short, whatever was rational,
plain, and easy, bore no relish; and nothing came amiss which was cross to
Nature, out of Sort and Order, and in no Proportion or Harmony with the rest of
Things. Monstrous Births, Prodigys, Inchantments, Elementary Wars, and
Convulsions, were our chief Entertainment. One wouřd have thought that in a
kind of Rivalship between Providence and Nature, the latter Lady was made to
appear as homely as possible; that her Deformitys might recommend and set off
the Beautys of the former.229
Philocles believes that sincere religious motives lie beneath their fascination. He himself
has little worry that such tales will turn him "enthusiastick, or superstitious." It is
unlikely that Philocles can say of the gentlemen, however, what he said to Palemon
regarding Theocles, "that tho he had all of the Enthusiast, he had nothing of the Bigot."
Philocles, addressing Palemon, confesses that his skepticism made it difficult to
avoid offending the gentlemen.230 The conversation moves from monsters to miracles,
and thereby the question of the importance of revelation to religion. Philocles declines to
judge ancient miracles attested by authority, but he is skeptical about reports of
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contemporary miracles.

The old gentleman makes a very sensible reply to this

distinction.
This is Fancy indeed, (replyřd the grave Gentleman) and a very dangerous one to
that Scripture you pretend is of it-self so well attested. The Attestation of Men
dead and gone, in behalf of Miracles past and at an end, can never surely be of
equal force with Miracles present: And of these, I maintain, there are never
wanting a Number sufficient in the World to warrant a Divine Existence. If there
were no Miracles now-a-days, the World wouřd be apt to think there never were
any. The present must answer for the Credibility of the past. This is "GOD
witnessing for himself"; not "Men for GOD." For who shall witness for Men, if in
the Case of Religion they have no Testimony from Heaven in their behalf?231
Philocles might well agree that "if there were no Miracles now-a-days, the World wouřd
be apt to think there never were any," and the older gentleman is not unaware of this. Yet
here the zealous old gentleman and his younger companion split.232 The younger man
shows a willingness to be more careful in accepting reports of contemporary miracles,
and he seems to have adopted Theoclesř preference for a good rather than a severe idea of
God. Shaftesbury seems to be suggesting that the young are more likely to be persuaded
that a rational foundation for religion is necessary. This of course angers the older
gentleman, and Philocles borrows the arguments of Theocles to defend the younger man.
"Thus," he writes, "I took upon me the part of a sound Theist, whilst I endeavourřd to
refute my Antagonist, and shew that his Principles favourřd Atheism."233 Theocles seems
to have been successful in persuading the younger gentleman to become more rational in
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his theology, and to have taught Philocles a more effective defense against religious
zealotry.

The Moralists, Part III:
Reason

Philosophical Rhapsody and Cool

The final part of The Moralists is divided into three sections. The conversation
oscillates between the philosophical rhapsodies of Theocles and cool, reasoned
arguments with Philocles. In their first morning conversation, Theocles and Philocles
discussed human happiness and the existence of a lasting and universal good. At that
time, Theocles had tried to convince Philocles that he had experience of lasting good of
lasting love, for he knew it from his own experience of friendship.

The skeptical

Philocles had said that he doubted the joy of friendship could be expanded to fill an entire
life, let alone point to a more universal good:
Indeed, replyřd I, were it possible for me to stamp upon my Mind such a Figure as
you speak of, whether it stood for Mankind or Nature, it might probably have its
effect; and I might become perhaps a Lover after your way: But more especially,
if you couřd so order it, as to make things reciprocal between us, and bring me to
fansy of this Genius, that it couřd be "sensible of my Love, and capable of a
Return." For without this, I shouřd make but an ill Lover, tho of the perfectest
Beauty in the World.234
We have already seen that on this second morning, Philocles rushes to catch Theocles
and overtakes him in a field. Theocles recalls his vow to Philocles that "if you promise to
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love, I will endeavour to shew you that BEAUTY which I count the perfectest, and most
deserving of LOVE; and which will not fail of a Return."235
It is in the pastoral setting of the fields that Theocles promises Philocles "we shall
find our sovereign Genius; if we can charm the Genius of the Place…to inspire us with a
truer Song of Nature, teach us some celestial Hymn, and make us feel Divinity present in
these solemn Places of Retreat."236
Philocles urges his friend to begin, saying "for now I know you are full of those
Divine Thoughts which meet you ever in this Solitude. Give řem but Voice and Accents:
You may be still as much alone as you are usřd, and take no more notice of me than if I
were absent."237
Theocles turns away to begin his rhapsodic meditation.

As readers we are

allowed to listen. The first hymn thanks Nature for providing a solitary retreat, "a happy
Leisure and Retreat for Man; who, made for Contemplation, and to search his own and
other Natures, may here best meditate the Cause of Things; and placřd amidst the various
Scenes of Nature, may nearer view her Works."238 Here we are able to listen to a
surprising line, in light of the earlier rhetorical elements of the dialogue. Theocles sings
"O mighty Nature! Wise Substitute of Providence! impowerřd Creatress! Or Thou
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impowering Deity, supreme Creator! Thee I invoke, and Thee alone adore."239 If there
were any doubt remaining, Theocles offers his reverie without any expectation that
Nature considers his personal fate.
Theocles stops his hymn to address Philocles, asking him whether his transport
seemed the divine madness of the poet or the ravings of a lunatic. Philocles wishes
Theocles had not interrupted himself, for "already I begin to find a thousand Difficultys
in fansying such a Universal Genius as you describe."240 Theocles then pursues the
concerns raised by his rhapsody through the art of dialogue. He appeals to the fact that
trees and other beings seem to have a unified structure of their own--a form. When
Philocles objects that he is multiplying nymphs and hamadryads and other "immaterial
and immortal Substances," Theocles replies that he is unconcerned that such forms be
proven eternal.241
We injure řem then, replyřd THEOCLES, to say "they belong to these Trees"; and
not rather "these Trees to them." But as for their Immortality, let them look to it
themselves. I only know, that both theirs and all other Natures must for their
Duration depend alone on that Nature on which the World depends: And that
every Genius else must be subordinate to that One good GENIUS, whom I wouřd
willingly persuade you to think belonging to this World, according to our present
way of speaking.242
Insofar as trees are trees, they are and remain trees. Should they stop being trees, it is
suggested, they would be something else and belong to a different form.
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Theocles extends his argument for the unity of being to the question of the self
and personal identity. This is a surprising move, given the difficulties we discussed in
Chapter 3. Philocles is quick to observe that the self is always shifting: "I dare affirm,
that few are so long themselves as half seven Years. řTis good fortune if a Man be one
and the same only for a day or two: A Year makes more Revolutions than can be
numberřd." 243 Theocles appeals to Philoclesř common sense. It is hard to deny that, that
objection aside, "there is a strange Simplicity in this YOU and ME, that in reality they
shouřd be still one and the same, when neither one Atom of Body, one Passion, nor one
Thought remains the same."
As for the claim that matter is always in motion, Theocles observes that the more
fundamental thing to notice is that matter is always compounded; he seems to imply with
Aristotle that we never find some "prime matter" in the world devoid of form. What we
have is a range of things which seem to adhere to "Numbers," and these numbers
themselves seem to be immaterial.244

How, wonders Theocles, can Philocles avoid

recognizing "the universal and sovereign GENIUS" behind this phenomenon?
Philocles objects that should this hypothesis concerning form be true, Nature
nevertheless requires no homage or worship. While the magistrate determines the lawful
religion, philosophy recognizes no such titles.245 Philocles consequently presses to learn
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what unified substances are and whether they are material or immaterial. As Theocles
reminds Philocles, Philocles has already conceded that he knows of at least one genuine
substance, namely himself. This is true whether or not Philocles wholly understands
what this self is. It is difficult indeed to know whether there is only one mind or many
particular minds; here, says Theocles, "every one for himself" bears the responsibility of
understanding their own nature. While nature writ large is not self-aware per se, human
beings are capable of understanding "in her behalf." At the very least, then, nature
contains mind and understanding in this limited sense.246
According to Theocles, this observation is sufficient to show that Nature is a self.
Parts are joined to other parts into a greater system, and no particular mind can believe
that it exhausts the order found in the whole. He mentions two rival hypotheses to his
Theism:
No (says one of a modern Hypothesis) for the World was from Eternity, as you
see it; and is no more than barely what you see: "Matter modify’d; a Lump in
motion, with here and there a Thought, or scatter’d Portion of dissoluble
Intelligence."--No (says one of an antienter Hypothesis) for the World was once
without any Intelligence or Thought at all; "Mere Matter, Chaos, and a Play of
Atoms; till Thought, by chance, came into play, and made up a Harmony which
was never designřd, or thought of."--Admirable Conceit!--Believe it who can. For
my own share (thank Providence) I have a MIND in my possession, which serves,
such as it is, to keep my Body and its Affections, my Passions, Appetites,
Imaginations, Fancys, and the rest, in tolerable Harmony and Order. But the
Order of the UNIVERSE, I am persuaded still, is much the better of the two. Let
EPICURUS, if he please, think his the better; and believing no Genius or Wisdom
above his own, inform us by what Chance řtwas dealt him, and how Atoms came
to be so wise.247
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Theocles suggests here that the atheist also holds an hypothesis which is not in turn
defended by reason. This is true of both modern and ancient atheists. All hypotheses are
presuppositions, the grounds "lying under" an argument. According to Theocles, insofar
as Epicurus and his kin cannot account for our direct awareness of our own minds, the
atheistic hypothesis itself has not been demonstrated. This is as much to say that atheism
too rests on faith and is a matter of belief. Theism thereby withstands skepticism, at least
to the extent that the atheist has no better account of his hypothesis than does the theist of
his. The fundamental question becomes for us as readers one of probability, and it is
unclear where the burden of proof lies. What is clear, however, is that Shaftesburyřs
defense of the sociable nature of man works to remove the rhetorical trump suit of the
modern projector.
Here Philocles professes that he is tempted toward superstition by the account
offered by Theocles, and he asks Theocles to continue before his own enthusiasm cools.
Theocles is unwilling to comply, however, for he does not want to manipulate assent in
Philocles:
I wouřd have you know, replyřd he, I scorn to take the advantage of a warm Fit,
and be beholden to Temper or Imagination for gaining me your Assent. Therefore
ere I go yet a step farther, I am resolvřd to enter again into cool Reason with you;
and ask, If you admit for Proof what I advancřd yesterday upon that head, "Of a
Universal UNION, Coherence, or Sympathizing of Things?248
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Motivated by his desire that "all shouřd go happily and well," Philocles asked Theocles to
become the enthusiast again.249 Theocles consoles him by observing that each natural
thing persists unless it is overcome by some contrary principle. Nature, considered as a
whole, cannot have a contrary principle, however. All that is, is good when viewed from
the broadest perspective. Philocles is quick to tell Theocles, "your Solutions…of the ill
Appearances are not perfect enough to pass for Demonstration. And whatever seems
vitious or imperfect in the Creation, puts a stop to further Conclusions, till the thing be
solvřd."250

Theocles presses Philocles to admit that if human reason is finite, it is

possible that ill effects in the world are only apparent rather than real.

Philocles

reaffirms, however, that the acceptance of Theoclesř "divine hypothesis" presupposes that
the ill effects "remain Appearances only."251 Philocles himself prefers the certainty of
demonstration to the psychological comfort offered by an hypothesis, however plausible
it may be.
Theocles agrees to offer an argument. He argues that it is impossible that the
world would contain contrary principles of equal power. Eventually one will make the
other or others subordinate. The marginal header names the view of nature that allows
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competing principles "Manichaeism."252

According to Theocles, such a view is

philosophically unsupportable. He says,
were there in Nature Two or more Principles, either they must agree, or not. If
they agree not, all must be Confusion, till one be predominant. If they agree, there
must be some natural Reason for their Agreement; and this natural Reason cannot
be from Chance, but from some particular Design, Contrivance, or Thought:
which brings us up again to One Principle, and makes the other two to be
subordinate. And thus when we have comparřd each of the Three Opinions, viz.
"That there is no designing active Principle; Conclusion. That there is more than
one"; or, "That finally there is but One"; we shall perceive, that the only
consistent Opinion is the last. And since one or other of these Opinions must of
necessity be true; what can we determine, other than that the last is, and must be
so, demonstrably? if it be Demonstration "That in Three Opinions, One of which
must necessarily be true, Two being plainly absurd, the Third must be the
Truth."253
While this is not incontrovertible, it is a philosophical demonstration. The argument is
formal insofar as it does little to clarify just what this one fundamental principle of the
whole is, but it does allow Philocles to accept Theoclesř claims about apparent ill.
Philocles renews his request for Theocles to speak in Rhapsody, confident, he
says, that "I shall now no longer be in danger of imagining either Magick or Superstition
in the case; since you invoke no other Power than that single ONE, which seems so
natural."254 The next rhapsody sings of especially abstruse matters; Philocles expresses
his gratitude that it is particularly short.255 The rhapsody itself seems to discourage
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abstruse meditation, claiming that nature hides her "secret Springs of Action." While
human artifice tries to penetrate "that consummate Art exhibited throř all the Works of
Nature," Nature herself reveals an infinite regress of "Worlds within Worlds."256
Theocles suggests that human reason can know little of certainty about matter, motion,
time; and turning inward, even of sense and thought. Still, thought holds the honor of "its
Eldership of Being. Thus are we in a manner conscious of that original and eternally
existent Thought, whence we derive our own"257 From the order of his own reason, man
comes to appreciate "Thou who art Original Soul, diffusive, vital in all, inspiriting the
Whole."
Theocles moves his rhapsody "closer to Nature," and sings of matters "upon the
Borders of our World."258 In this rhapsody, Theocles mentions the motion Philocles had
accused him of omitting earlier in the conversation. He says in praise,
O thou who art the Author and Modifier of these various Motions! O sovereign
and sole Mover, by whose high Art the rolling Spheres are governřd, and these
stupendous Bodys of our World hold their unrelenting Courses! O wise
OEconomist, and powerful Chief, whom all the Elements and Powers of Nature
serve! How hast thou animated these moving Worlds? What Spirit or Soul
infusřd? What Biass fixřd? Or how encompassřd them in liquid AEther, driving
them as with the Breath of living Winds, thy active and unwearyřd Ministers in
this intricate and mighty Work?259
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The sense of wonder expressed here does not lead Theocles and Philocles to investigate
the nature of motion as, say Aristotle does in his Physics or Galileo in De Motu. The
Moralists itself, while trying to inspire an interest in such questions, does not engage
directly in such philosophical exploration. Once again, however, Theocles interrupts his
own rhapsody. He reproaches Philocles for his failure to monitor the enthusiasm of the
rhapsody. Theocles says, "have you at once given over your scrupulous Philosophy, to
let me range thus at pleasure throř these aerial Spaces and imaginary Regions, where my
capricious Fancy or easy Faith has led me? I wouřd have you to consider better, and
know, my Philocles, that I had never trusted my-self with you in this Vein of Enthusiasm,
had I not relyřd on you to govern it a little better."260 Here we see the importance of our
initial reflections on the soliloquy of Philocles in his apartment. Theocles and Philocles
are both necessary for the philosopher to remain in philosophic balance.

Without

Theocles the philosopher lacks the erotic drive to encompass the whole; without
Philocles, though, the philosopher is hard to distinguish from an intoxicated poet. It is
interesting to note, however, that Theocles seems to regulate himself. It is he who has to
remind Philocles not to let him get away with extravagant poetry. This flexibility of role
is artistically defensible only if Theocles and Philocles are two parts of the same soul
conversing.
Theocles proceeds to sing of the elements (earth, air, water, and fire) but he is
stopped short by the intervention of Philocles. Apparently Theocles is carried away to
260
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the point where he has divided the world too discreetly, having forgotten to place "the
Divine Mind" at the forefront.261 His song has taken him far from the nature Philocles
can recognize, and Theocles must return to the "various Map of Nature, and this fair
visible World."262
Theocles returns to Earth and circles the globe in his rhapsody, taking in the
seasons and the great variety of forms in the world we more commonly call nature, from
gems to insects, and from "triumphant Palm down to the humble Moss."263 We learn that
even on Earth there are more forms than man has recognized: "--Fair Image of that
fruitful and exuberant Nature, who with a Flood of Bounty blesses all things, and, Parentlike, out of her many Breasts sends the nutritious Draught in various Streams to her
rejoicing Offspring!--Innumerable are the dubious Forms and unknown Species which
drink the slimy Current."264 We learn as we fly past that the fertility of Nature has often
tempted man to superstition. It is a delicate line Shaftesbury walks between celebrating
the sublimity of nature and reintroducing a belief that the world is miraculous and
unintelligible. Mankind is always tempted to seek out hidden nature rather than rejoice in
the beauty of the visible world. "Even we our-selves," says Theocles, "who in plain
Characters may read Divinity from so many bright Parts of Earth, chuse rather these
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obscurer Places, to spell out that mysterious Being, which to our weak Eyes appears at
best under a Veil of Cloud."265
This observation leads Theocles "to take his leave of the Sublime." Philocles tells
us that dawn had passed and the day was well into "forenoon."266 Shaftesbury has
brought us to the end of Part III, section one.
 P hi l ocl es’ Rhapsody

Theocles decides it is time to leave the "unsociable Places, whither our Fancy has
transported us," for the familiar climate of "our more conversable Woods." It soon
becomes clear that Philocles himself has become attentive to the "mysterious BEAUTY"
Theocles has described. Philocles confesses,
I shall no longer resist the Passion growing in me for Things of a natural kind;
where neither Art, nor the Conceit or Caprice of Man has spoilřd their genuine
Order, by breaking in upon that primitive State. Even the rude Rocks, the mossy
Caverns, the irregular unwrought Grotto’s, and broken Falls of Waters, with all
the horrid Graces of the Wilderness it-self, as representing Nature more, will be
the more engaging, and appear with a Magnificence beyond the formal Mockery
of princely Gardens.267
In this comment we see that for Philocles, nature means primarily what romantic poets
will come to praise--natural scenes unspoiled by the hand of man. Philocles wonders that
so few men appreciate the wondrous beauties Theocles has revealed to him.
Theocles now begins to correct the account of nature offered by Philocles. "Say
not this, replyřd he, of Lovers only. For is it not the same with Poets, and all those other
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Students in Nature, and the Arts which copy after her? In short, is not this the real Case of
all who are Lovers either of the Muses or the Graces?" Nature is present not just to
refined philosophers, but to all human beings who participate in love. Philocles observes
that these inferior lovers are popularly "thought to be plainly out of their wits, or over-run
with Melancholy and Enthusiasm."268 According to Theocles, such lovers deserve the
name of lover, but fail to reason deeply enough. The beauty they pursue is only the
"Shadow of that First Beauty" for it is seen by the senses rather than the mind. Even this
beauty points beyond itself, however, and invites men to the "Contemplation of
Beauty…as it really is in it-self."269 Philocles himself, having learned not to scorn the
longing for inferior, sensual beauty, is now ready to move closer to the "Original."
Philocles soon realizes that praising lower beauties is dangerous, for such praising might
encourage in men "covetous Fancy," ambition, or sordid luxury. 270 He fears that most
men are not moved to contemplation in the face of beauty, and the ironical consequence
of Theoclesř teaching is "that you, Theocles, for ought I see, are become the Accuser of
Nature, by condemning a natural Enjoyment."271
Here Theocles reveals himself as a less-than-moralistic moralist. He is unwilling
to condemn any "Joy which is from Nature."272 When the friends enjoy the woods,
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however, they are directed by nature toward rational, human pleasures as well as such
pleasures as "tasteful Food." As he explains, "we who were rational, and had Minds,
methought, shouřd place it rather in those Minds; which were indeed abusřd, and cheated
of their real Good, when drawn to seek absurdly the Enjoyment of it in the Objects of
Sense, and not in those Objects they might properly call their own: in which kind, as I
remember, we comprehended all which was truly Fair, Generous, or Good.273 Theocles
advances an argument based on pleasure, albeit one which distinguishes higher pleasures
from lower pleasures. This distinction apparently saves pleasure from reproach, for
Philocles replies: "BEAUTY, said I, and GOOD, with you, Theocles, I perceive are still one
and the same."274
Shaftesbury alerts us in a footnote to consult an earlier remark of Theocles. In
their conversation of the first morning, Theocles told Philocles:
HEAR then!...For tho I pretend not to tell you at once the Nature of this which I
call Good; yet I am content to shew you something of it, in your-self, which
you will acknowledg to be naturally more fix’d and constant, than any thing
you have hitherto thought on. Tell me, my Friend! if ever you were weary of
doing good to those you lovřd? Say when you ever found it unpleasing to serve a
Friend? Or whether when you first provřd this generous Pleasure, you did not feel
it less than at this present; after so long Experience? Believe me, Philocles, this
Pleasure is more debauching than any other. Never did any Soul do good, but it
came readier to do the same again, with more Enjoyment. Never was Love, or
Gratitude, or Bounty practisřd but with increasing Joy, which made the Practiser
still more in love with the fair Act.275
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We are reminded by this passage that Theocles includes human action under the
category of the beautiful. He believes in the noble and relies on its persistence to draw
men out of more narrow, selfish concerns. From this perspective, the growth of Philocles
is incomplete. For Philocles, natureřs beauty is pristine and untouched by human art.
Theocles must therefore return us to more sociable places.276
It is useful here to seek assistance from the Critic, who explores the relationship
between the beautiful and the good at some length. In ŖMiscellany III,ŗ the Critic turns
to consider the question of taste, and the way in which an improper education can corrupt
the taste of the young. He writes
řtis easier, I confess, to give account of this Corruption of Taste in some noble
Youth of a more sumptuous gay Fancy; supposing him born truly Great, and of
honourable Descent; with a generous free Mind, as well as ample Fortune. Even
these Circumstances themselves may be the very Causes perhaps of his being thus
ensnarřd. The Elegance of his Fancy in outward things, may have made him
overlook the Worth of inward Character and Proportion: And the Love of
Grandure and Magnificence, wrong turnřd, may have possessřd his Imagination
over-strongly with such things as Frontispieces, Parterres, Equipages, trim Valets
in party-colour’d Clothes; and others in Gentlemens Apparel.--Magnanimous
Exhibitions of Honour and Generosity!--"In Town, a Palace and sutable
Furniture! In the Country the same; with the addition of such Edifices and
Gardens as were unknown to our Ancestors, and are unnatural to such a Climate
as GREAT BRITAIN!"277
The beau monde that educated Palemon may have been corrupt in this way, provoking
the decent young man to turn to philosophy for assistance. According to the Critic,

276

Theocles declares, "METHINKS…PHILOCLES! (changing to a familiar Voice) we had better leave these
unsociable places, whither our Fancy has transported us, and return to our-selves here again, in our more
conversable Woods, and temperate Climes." Ibid., 2.219.
277

Miscellaneous Reflections: Miscellany III, 3.105-06.

386

contemporary educators lead a youth into corruption, "till he is brought to laugh at
publick Virtue, and the very Notion of common Good; till he has openly renouncřd all
Principles of Honour and Honesty, he must in good Policy avoid those to whom he lies so
much exposřd, and shun that Commerce and Familiarity which was once his chief
Delight."278 As Shaftesbury indicated in Sensus Communis, modern philosophy is largely
to blame for this situation, having restored Epicureanism through their sophistical way.
Yet according to the Critic, nature still provides a standard by which true good taste can
be measured. He writes
THAT there is really a STANDARD of this latter kind, will immediately, and on the
first view, be acknowledgřd. The Contest is only, "Which is right:--Which the unaffected Carriage, and just Demeanour: And Which the affected and false." Scarce
is there any-one, who pretends not to know and to decide What is well-bred and
handsom. There are few so affectedly clownish, as absolutely to disown Goodbreeding, and renounce the Notion of a BEAUTY in outward Manners and
Deportment. With such as these, wherever they shouřd be found, I must confess, I
couřd scarce be tempted to bestow the least Pains or Labour, towards convincing
řem of a Beauty in inward Sentiments and Principles.279
Whatever the defects of gallantry, polite society sustains a belief that there is a difference
between comely and ugly behavior. Ultimately it is impossible to sever beauty from truth
because of the persistence of nature. It has a stubborn way of reappearing even in human
customs. The Critic cites Horace favorably in support of this observation. He writes,
"řTis here, above all other places, that we say with strict Justice, You may turn out nature
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with a pitchfork, yet back she will keep coming.280 While the natural is not recognized
univocally, all artists betray their deep belief that proportion lies in the world rather than
their own hands. The Critic writes,
Beauty and Truth are plainly joinřd with the Notion of Utility and Convenience,
even in the Apprehension of every ingenious Artist, the Architect, the Statuary, or
the Painter. řTis the same in the Physician’s way. Natural Health is the just
Proportion, Truth, and regular Course of things, in a Constitution. řTis the inward
Beauty of the Body. And when the Harmony and just Measures of the rising
Pulses, the circulating Humours, and the moving Airs or Spirits are disturbřd or
lost, Deformity enters, and with it, Calamity and Ruin.281
While a man might claim to be a physician, his credibility would suffer were patients die
from his care. According to Shaftesbury, it is the same with beauty: abandon harmony
and you abandon beauty. This holds for the fine arts the Critic mentions, but also for the
art of living well as described by classical philosophy. Is it not so, wonders the Critic,
"that what is beautiful is harmonious and proportionable; what is harmonious and
proportionable, is

TRUE;

and what is at once both beautiful and true, is, of consequence,

agreeable and good?"282 While the claim is indeed controversial, the Critic supports this
view in a long footnote. He writes, "This is the HONESTUM, the PULCHRUM, ò
ó [the Beautiful], on which our Author lays the stress of VIRTUE, and the Merits of
this Cause; as well in his other Treatises, as in this of Soliloquy here commented. This
Beauty the Roman Orator, in his rhetorical way, and in the Majesty of Style, couřd
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express no otherwise than as A Mystery."283 The Critic quotes Cicero to show that even
the most eloquent of men finds it difficult to offer a pure definition of beautiful deeds. It
takes a noble soul to recognize nobility and it requires an education for a soul to become
noble; and still, Shaftesbury maintains with the classical philosophers that there is a
natural standard for human conduct.
The Critic elaborates a scale of beauty on behalf of his Author, moving from "the
IN-ANIMATE," to the animate, to the mixed. This scale is itself vulnerable to criticism,
however, for the Critic imagines the Author engaging here in his customary
"SOLILOQUY or Self-Discourse."284 The Critic advances an objection from yet another
critic to show this. "ŘAnd what of this?ř (says an airy Spark, no Friend to Meditation or
deep Thought) ŘWhat means this Catalogue, or Scale, as you are pleasřd to call it?ř"285
The reply is sensible:
"Only, Sir, to satisfy my-self, That I am not alone, or single in a certain Fancy I
have of a thing callřd BEAUTY; That I have almost the whole World for my
Companions; and That each of us Admirers and earnest Pursuers of BEAUTY
(such as in a manner we All are) if peradventure we take not a certain Sagacity
along with us, we must err widely, range extravagantly, and run ever upon a false
Scent. We may, in the Sportsmanřs Phrase, have many Hares afoot, but shall stick
to no real Game, nor be fortunate in any Capture which may content us.
When confronted with skepticism about the existence of beauty, the Critic, Theocles, and
Shaftesbury himself turn to common sense for defense. They challenge the reader to ask
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where the burden of proof for the existence of true beauty lies when a belief in beauty
enjoys nearly universal consent among mankind.

The Critic shows us that the

philosopher will accept ordinary opinions of beauty to begin his contemplation but that
he also pushes himself to question these opinions.
Thus our MONOLOGIST, or self-discoursing Author, in his usual Strain; when
incited to the Search of BEAUTY and the DECORUM, by vulgar Admiration,
and the universal Acknowledgment of the SPECIES in outward Things, and in the
meaner and subordinate Subjects. By this inferior Species, it seems, our strict
Inspector disdains to be allurřd: And refusing to be captivated by any thing less
than the superior, original, and genuine Kind; he walks at leisure, without
Emotion, in deep philosophical Reserve, throř all these pompous Scenes; passes
unconcernedly by those Court-Pageants, the illustrious and much-envyřd
Potentates of the Place; overlooks the Rich, the Great, and even the Fair: feeling
no other Astonishment than what is accidentally raisřd in him, by the View of
these Impostures, and of this specious Snare.286
Returning to Theocles and Philocles we can see that Philocles initially had not expanded
his reflection to encompass the noble. By connecting the beautiful to the good, however,
Theocles brings Philocles to an enthusiastic embrace of the noble. Philocles sings:
"The Transports of Poets, the Sublime of Orators, the Rapture of Musicians, the
high Strains of the Virtuosi; all mere ENTHUSIASM! Even Learning it-self, the
Love of Arts and Curiositys, the Spirit of Travellers and Adventurers; Gallantry,
War, Heroism; All, all ENTHUSIASM!"--řTis enough: I am content to be this new
Enthusiast, in a way unknown to me before.287
This "new enthusiasm" invites Philocles to consider the human things anew. He
is now ready to undertake the first steps in a science of beauty. By connecting art and
nature, account offered by Theocles is less straight-forward than the naïve enthusiast
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might hope. We soon learn that it is art which contributes beauty to an object; matter is
not beautiful in itself. It follows from this that "the Beautifying, not the Beautifyřd, is the
really Beautiful."288 More directly, it is mind that is responsible for the beautiful. We
can see immediately the importance of Theoclesř defense of the Deity. If the mind alone
recognizes the beautiful, makes the beautiful, and ultimately styles "the forming Forms,"
can it be said that nature is responsible for the existence of beauty? 289
It is essential that Shaftesbury has laid the foundation for a reply to this question.
As we have seen, a proper answer resorts to the analogy between moral virtue and natural
harmony. If he had left the matter at the analogy between the mind and the world, it
would be unclear which was the agent and which the patient. The Characteristicks has
argued, however, that human beings are sociable and that their instincts and thoughts are
naturally inclined toward the sociable order. For this reason, Theocles raises once again
the issue of moral beauty, and connects it to the generation of offspring. He argues: "this
I am certain of; that Life, and the Sensations which accompany Life, come when they
will, are from mere Nature, and nothing else. Therefore if you dislike the word Innate, let
us change it, if you will, for Instinct; and call Instinct, that which Nature teaches,
exclusive of Art, Culture, or Discipline."290
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It is clear from this why, taken together as Volume II, An Inquiry and The
Moralists are properly called the heart of Characteristicks. Only together do they answer
the question surrounding moral life, "whether the Principles spoken of are from Art, or
Nature?"291 The complexity of Shaftesburyřs reply to this question presupposes the
proper preparation in reading, a proper understanding of the relationship between reason
and the passion, and a proper grasp of the good as well as the pernicious effects of
enthusiasm. It is only when he has wrestled with these matters, and then pursued the
encounter with modern philosophy from the point of view of "common life," that a
person is receptive to the dialectical account offered in The Moralists.
According to Theocles, even actions have a natural "Fitness and Decency."292
Men may disagree about which action is more beautiful, but they display in their daily
lives their confidence that there is a natural standard. Theocles maintains that,
without controversy, řtis allowřd "There is a BEAUTY of each kind." This no-one
goes about to teach: nor is it learnt by any; but confess’d by All. All own the
Standard, Rule, and Measure: But in applying it to Things, Disorder arises,
Ignorance prevails, Interest and Passion breed Disturbance. Nor can it otherwise
happen in the Affairs of Life, whilst that which interests and engages Men as
Good, is thought different from that which they admire and praise as Honest.293
For Shaftesbury, it is inadequate to distinguish art and nature entirely when speaking
about human nature. It is the nature of human beings to respond to the world, albeit
within the boundaries set by nature herself. The affairs of life suggest to men where
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happiness lies, but the most beautiful way is often obscured by corrupt philosophical
principles, religious rules, mores, and laws. It is the proper work of philosophy to help
recover the sense of natural happiness for man. This is not a project to be accomplished
for all of society, but is the fruit of careful self-examination.

It happens through

education, soul by soul.
The beauty of nature reveals itself only to mind. As Theocles puts it, "never can
the Form be of real force where it is uncontemplated, unjudgřd of, unexaminřd, and
stands only as the accidental Note or Token of what appeases provokřd Sense, and
satisfies the brutish Part."294 While human beings have sociable passions, the moral life
is emphatically a human thing according to Theocles. Even so, there are ranks of
understanding beauty, and the untutored mind is less attentive than the properly educated
mind. Through philosophy the mind learns to see. On its own, the "Mind’s EYE" sees
dimly; it only reaches its "natural Vigour" in contemplation.295 It is here that we see that
the art of soliloquy is not only a means but an end in itself for Theocles. Through
soliloquy (or philosophy) a man becomes a "self-improving Artist" capable of genuine
moral freedom. When one learns to recognize the proper models, a man "becomes in
truth the Architect of his own Life and Fortune; by laying within himself the lasting and
sure Foundations of Order, Peace, and Concord."296
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In section 3, Theocles makes his understanding of philosophy clearer by
distinguishing it from the modern frauds who borrow its name.

Far from being a

highfalutinř profession, philosophy is commonplace because it is the thing most
appropriate to human beings:
yet, in effect [said Theocles], what else is it we all do in general, than
philosophize? If PHILOSOPHY be, as we take it, the Study of Happiness; must not
everyone, in some manner or other, either skilfully or unskilfully philosophize? Is
not every Deliberation concerning our main Interest, every Correction of our
Taste, every Choice and Preference in Life to be reckonřd of this kind?297
Philosophy is the study of happiness, for everyone at some point asks of his life,
"ŘWhere, then, is the Difference? Which Manner is the best?" Here lies the Question.
This is what I wouřd have you weigh and examine."298 Theocles acknowledges that most
of us would like to ignore such probing questions. "But the Examination," say you, "is
troublesom; and I had better be without it."

It is only the properly educated and

disciplined reason that can formulate a reply to this lazy but sensible objection. No
doubt, suggests Theocles, that the person ignorant of mathematics finds mathematics
difficult; but is he really a fit judge of the activity? Theocles replies that "in Morality and
Life, I ask still…May he not, perhaps, be allowřd the best Judg of Living, who studys
Life, and endeavours to form it by some Rule? Or is he indeed to be esteemřd most
knowing in the matter, who slightly examines it, and who accidentally and unknowingly
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philosophizes?"299

The Critic himself offers a summary statement of Shaftesburyřs

project in the Characteristicks. In ŖMiscellany Vŗ, he writes:
IT HAS been the main Scope and principal End of these Volumes, "To assert the
Reality of a Beauty and Charm in moral as well as natural Subjects; and to
demonstrate the Reasonableness of a proportionate Taste, and determinate
CHOICE, in Life and Manners." The Standard of this kind, and the noted Character
of Moral Truth appear so firmly establishřd in Nature it-self, and so widely
displayřd throř the intelligent World, that there is no Genius, Mind, or thinking
Principle, which (if I may say so) is not really conscious in the case. Even the
most refractory and obstinate Understandings are by certain Reprises or Returns
of Thought, on every occasion, convincřd of this Existence, and necessitated, in
common with others, to acknowledg the actual Right and Wrong.300
The Moralists ends with a more questioning tone than one might have expected from
Theocles. Theocles concludes the conversation in the following way: "thus is Philosophy
establishřd. For Every-one, of necessity, must reason concerning his own Happiness;
'What his Good is, and what his Ill.' The Question is only, 'Who reasons best?' For even
he who rejects this reasoning or deliberating Part, does it from a certain Reason, and
from a Persuasion 'That this is best.'" As for Philocles, he concludes his narrative
abruptly, as we have already remarked. He writes to Palemon, "BY this time we found
our-selves insensibly got home. Our Philosophy ended, and we returnřd to the common
Affairs of Life." By returning us to common life at this point we are left with Theoclesř
important question: what is the best life, and who reasons best about it.
As we have seen, the reader, like Palemon, is left to judge for himself.
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CONCLUSION
"CHARTAE SOCRATICAE"
This dissertation has tried to read Shaftesbury's Characteristicks in light of the
literary theory presented by the Characteristicks itself. Shaftesbury offers his reader
advice through the character of the Critic, who seems to be a practitioner of the subtle art
of criticism.

When this advice is combined with the self-referential apparatus of

footnotes and indices, a map of Shaftesbury's philosophical opinions unfolds before the
patient reader. Shaftesbury hopes that a reader who follows this map will become
acquainted with the dialogical way of philosophizing as classical philosophy traditionally
understood it.
This "antient" yet perennial philosophy aims at self-knowledge. In one sense,
self-knowledge would involve inquiry into the reputable opinions found in common life
with the intention of separating human nature from the inheritance of convention.
Shaftesbury offers his reader a way of coming to know the characteristics of men,
manners, opinions, and times. Because philosophy is an activity practiced by human
beings, and because human life is characterized by the common confusion of convention
and nature, such self-knowledge can be said to be the necessary prelude to any serious
reflection on the character of the cosmos. Viewed from this perspective, Shaftesbury's
Characteristicks is Socratic in the deepest sense of the term.
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It is also Socratic in a more political way. Shaftesbury understands political
liberty to rest on the moral liberty of the individual. He clearly regards the dominance of
Christianity to be an impediment to such moral liberty, in part because of its marriage of
otherworldly hopes and fears, and in part because of its obfuscation of Socratic
philosophy as he understands it. Shaftesbury regards modern philosophy as a project
undertaken to weaken the influence of Christianity on political life; his own account of
Christianity suggests considerable sympathy for the goals of this project.

Yet

Shaftesbury repudiates modern philosophy because of its reckless diminishment of the
noble. A proper concern for the noble is necessary if man is to become virtuous in the
most serious sense. Love of the noble, which Shaftesbury suggests is inseparable from
the highest aspirations of man, is naturally present in the human soul. Despite this fact,
there is no guarantee that men will notice and appreciate the beauty, order, and numbers
of the world, especially in the absence of the literary arts. These arts have political
liberty as a condition for their development and perfection. The Characteristicks, then,
mounts a defense of the noble from both Christianity and modern philosophy by
cultivating the art of criticism in its reader. Criticism as practiced by the reader in his
attempt to understand the Characteristicks is ultimately a model for Socratic inquiry.
The patient reader of Shaftesbury's seldom-understood book can come to see that
he is being shown CHARTAE SOCRATICAE--philosophical sea-cards for the impetuous soul.
Shaftesbury's Characteristicks itself might be described as a philosophic poem meant to
stir eros in the reader for the noble as it is encountered both in art and nature. This
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extravagant, dangerous passion finds a model for orderly love in Shaftesbury's art of
criticism.
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